Formal constitutional systems of separated powers often fail to sustain meaningful systems of checks and balances in presidential-style democracies. What conditions support balance in the separation of powers and what conditions provoke instability and conflict? We draw on Madisonian political theory and research addressing the separation of powers in the United States to develop a game theoretical model of inter-institutional stability and conflict within a separation of powers system. Two factors emerge as catalysts for institutional instability and conflict among the branches of government: high-stakes institutional rivalry combined with uncertainty about the public’s relative support for various branches of government. We apply the model to the experience of Honduras in 2008–2009 that resulted in the coup ousting President Zelaya which illustrates the difficulty of developing credible checks and balances.
Ajenjo FresnoN (2001) Honduras. In Alcántara SáezMFreidenbergF (eds), Partidos polticos de América Latina: Centroamérica, México y República Dominicana. Salamanca, Spain: Ediciones Universidad Salamanca, pp. 179–273.
2.
Ajenjo FresnoN (2007) Honduras: Nuevo gobierno Liberal con la misma agenda poltica. Revista de Ciencia Polticaspecial volume: 165–181.
3.
Alcántara SáezM (2009) Un intento de explicación de la crisis de Honduras de 2009 desde la mirada de sus legisladores.Boletn datos de opinión, Elites Parlamentarias Latinoamericanas, no. 11-09, August.
4.
AmericasBarometer (2010) Survey shows Hondurans’ support of political system increases, despite objection to way previous president was ousted. AmericasBarometer press release, 15April2010.
5.
ArguetaM (1989) Tiburcio Caras: Anatoma de una época, 1923–1948. Tegucigalpa, Honduras: Editorial Guaymuras.
6.
BoothJASeligsonMA (2009) The Legitimacy Puzzle in Latin America: Democracy and Political Support in Eight Nations. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
7.
BowmanKS (2002) Militarization, Democracy and Development: The Perils of Praetorianism in Latin America. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
8.
BowmanKLehoucqFMahoneyJ (2005) Measuring political democracy: Case expertise, data adequacy and Central America. Comparative Political Studies38: 939–970.
9.
BurnsJM (2009) Packing the Court: The Rise of Judicial Power and the Coming Crisis of the Supreme Court. New York: Penguin Press.
10.
CastagnolaAPérez-LiñánA (2011) Bolivia: The rise (and fall) of judicial independence. In HelmkeGRios-FigueroaJ (eds), Courts in Latin America. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 278–305.
11.
ChavezRBFerejohnJWeingastB (2011) A theory of the politically independent judiciary: A comparative study of the United States and Argentina. In HelmkeGRios-FigueroaJ (eds), Courts in Latin America. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 219–247.
12.
ClarkTS (2009) The separation of powers, court curbing, and judicial legitimacy. American Journal of Political Science53: 971–989.
13.
ColemanKMArguetaJR (2008) Political culture, governance and democracy in Honduras, 2008. LAPOP AmericasBarometer, Vanderbilt University, July.
14.
de MontesquieuM (1748) The spirit of laws. In The Complete Works of M. de Montesquieu. London: T. Evans and W. Davis.
15.
Ferreira RubioDGorettiM (1998) When the president governs alone: The Decretazo in Argentina, 1989–93. In CareyJMShugartMS (eds), Executive Decree Authority. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 33–61.
16.
FriedmanB (2009) The Will of the People: How Public Opinion Has Influenced the Supreme Court and Shaped the Meaning of the Constitution. New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux.
17.
FritzCG (2008) American Sovereigns: The People and America’s Constitutional Tradition before the Civil War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
18.
GutiérrezNC (2009) Honduras: Constitutional law issues. Report for Congress, August2009. Directorate of Legal Research LL file no. 2009-002965, The Law Library, US Congress.
19.
HamiltonA (1996) [reprint of 1788 original] Federalist 78. In WrightBF (ed.), The Federalist. New York: Barnes & Noble Books, pp. 489–496
20.
HelmkeG (2010) The origins of institutional crises in Latin America. American Journal of Political Science54: 737–750.
21.
HelmkeGStatonJK (2011) The puzzling judicial politics of Latin America: A theory of litigation, judicial decisions, and interbranch conflict. In HelmkeGRios-FigueroaJ (eds), Courts in Latin America. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 306–331.
22.
HochstetlerK (2006) Rethinking presidentialism: Challenges and presidential falls in South America. Comparative Politics38: 401–418.
23.
JonesMP (1997) Evaluating Argentina’s presidential democracy: 1983–1995. In MainwaringSShugartMS (eds), Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 259–299.
24.
KnightJEpsteinL (1996) On the struggle for judicial supremacy. Law and Society Review30: 87–120.
25.
KramerLD (2004) The People Themselves: Popular Constitutionalism and Judicial Review. New York: Oxford University Press.
26.
KramerLD (2006) The interest of the man: James Madison, popular constitutionalism, and the theory of deliberative democracy. Valparaiso University Law Review41: 697–754.
27.
PrensaLa (2009) Mel acepta que desea seguir en el poder. La Prensa, 14March2009 (on-line edition).
LAWR (2009) Honduras: An inept president and a ‘pre-emptive’ coup. Caribbean and Central America Regional Report, Latin America Weekly Report, July.
30.
LondreganJPooleK (1990) Poverty, the coup trap, and the seizure of executive power. World Politics42: 151–183.
31.
MadisonJ (1900a) Public opinion [reprint of the 1791 original]. In HuntG (ed.), The Writings of James Madison. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons.
32.
MadisonJ (1900b) British Government [reprint of the 1792 original]. In HuntG (ed.), The Writings of James Madison. New York: G. P. Putnam’s Sons.
33.
MadisonJ (1996a) [reprint of the 1788 original] Federalist 48. In WrightBF, The Federalist. New York: Barnes & Noble Books, pp. 343–347
34.
MadisonJ (1996b) [reprint of the 1788 original] Federalist 49. In WrightBF, The Federalist. New York: Barnes & Noble Books, pp. 347–351
35.
MadisonJ (1996c) [reprint of the 1788 original] Federalist 51. In WrightBF, The Federalist. New York: Barnes & Noble Books, pp. 355–359
36.
MainwaringSBrinksDPérez-LiñánA (2001) Classifying political regimes in Latin America, 1945–1999. Studies in Comparative International Development36: 37–65.
37.
MartinRWT (2010) James Madison and popular government: The neglected case of the ‘Memorial’. Polity42: 185–209.
38.
MooreC (2008) Assessing Honduras’ CCT programme PRAF, Programa de Asignación Familiar: Expected and unexpected realities. Country Study No. 15, International Poverty Center, United Nations Development Programme, April.
39.
MorenoI (2008) Now in ALBA, Always in Impunity. Envio326 (September): 33.
40.
PELA (2008) Disciplina partidista: Honduras (2006–2010). Proyecto Elites Latinoamericanas no. 26, Universidad de Salamanca, June.
41.
Pérez-LiñánA (2007) Presidential Impeachment and the New Political Instability in Latin America. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
42.
RogersJRUraJD (2011) The majoritarian basis of judicial countermajoritarianism. Paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, Chicago, IL.
43.
RosenbergMB (1987) Political obstacles to democracy in Central America. In MalloyJMSeligsonMA (eds), Authoritarians and Democrats: Regime Transition in Latin America. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press, pp. 193–215.
44.
RuhlJM (2010) Honduras unravels. Journal of Democracy21: 93–107.
45.
SchulzDSchulzDS (1994) The United States, Honduras, and the Crisis in Central America. Boulder, CO: Westview.
46.
SheehanCA (2002) Madison and the French enlightenment: The authority of public opinion. William and Mary Quarterly59: 925–956.
47.
StatonJK (2010) Judicial Power and Strategic Communication in Mexico. New York: Cambridge University Press.
48.
StokesWS (1950) Honduras: An Area Study in Government. Madison, WI: University of Wisconsin Press.
49.
TaylorMM (1996) When electoral and party institutions interact to produce caudillo politics: The case of Honduras. Electoral Studies15: 327–337.
50.
Taylor-RobinsonMM (2006) La poltica Hondureña y las elecciones de 2005. Revista de Ciencia Poltica26: 114–124.
51.
Taylor-RobinsonMM (2007) Presidential and congressional elections in Honduras, November2005. Electoral Studies26: 515–518.
52.
Taylor-RobinsonMM (2010) Do the Poor Count? Democratic Institutions and Accountability in a Context of Poverty. University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.
53.
UraJDWohlfarthPC (2010) An appeal to the people: Public opinion and congressional support for the Supreme Court. Journal of Politics72: 939–956.
54.
VanbergG (2001) Legislative–judicial relations: A game-theoretic approach to constitutional review. American Journal of Political Science45: 346–361.
55.
VanbergG (2005) The Politics of Constitutional Review in Germany. New York: Cambridge University Press.
56.
VileMJC (1967) Constitutionalism and the Separation of Powers, 2nd edn. Indianapolis, IN: Liberty Fund.
57.
WhittingtonKE (2007) The Political Foundations of Judicial Supremacy: The Presidency, the Supreme Court, and Constitutional Leadership in U.S. History. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
58.
WoodGS (1981) Heroics. New York Review of Books28(5): 16–18.
