Assuming strict two-party competition, policy balancing models of the US senate imply that senators from the same state will often be from opposite parties and have great ideological divergence. We analyze the effect of independent candidates on these implications. Our theoretical model implies the two state senators will generally not be from opposite parties and will be closer in ideological space than if they were elected under strict two-party competition. Empirical analysis of senate composition from 1991 to 2002 supports the theory.
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