Distribution of Power and Military R&D

Abstract

Military technology plays an important role for national security and the international distribution of power. Yet it has received little formal attention in the literature. This article aims at filling this gap. We build a dynamic model that links the properties of military technology races (intensity and persistence) to the characteristics of the international environment (the distribution of power) and the types of weapons under development. The model is also used to discuss the implications of military technology races for power transition, the incentives countries may have to engage in arms control agreements and the circumstances under which it pays to engage in deception strategies. We find that the intensity of military R&D is higher when a dominant nation faces a potential challenger than under conditions of actual competition. The intensity of weapons development and also the speed of power transition depend on whether the challenger can be ‘intimidated’ through aggressive weapon development or not. We also find that when the stakes associated with the development of a weapon are high, then the optimal policy is to underplay one’s own success and exaggerate foreign accomplishments (threats).