This article deals with the (possible) explanation of constitutional development by
the rigidity of the constitution itself, for example the difficulty of the amendment
process. Four concepts of measuring rigidity are tested theoretically and their
respective outcomes concerning the frequency of constitutional reforms are
explained. The strikingly different results show how important it is to discuss and
to test operationalizations of abstract terms.
Anckar, Dag
and
Lauri Karvonen
(2002)
‘Constitutional Amendment Methods in the Democracies of the World’
, paper delivered at the XIIIth Nordic Political Science
Congress, Aalborg, Denmark, 15-17
August, URL: http://www.socsci.auc.dk/institut2/nopsa/arbejdsgruppe24/anckarkarvonen.pdf.
2.
Bogdanor, Vernon
(1988) ‘Introduction’, in
Vernon Bogdanor
(ed.) Constitutions in Democratic Government, pp.
1-13.
Aldershot: Gower
.
3.
Colomer, Joseph M.
(2001)
‘Disequilibrium Institutions and Pluralist Democracy’
, Journal of Theoretical Politics13(3):
235-247
.
4.
Göhler, Gerhard
(1997) ‘Der Zusammenhang von Institution, Macht
und Repräsentation’, in
Gerhard Göhleret al.
(ed.) Institutionen-Macht-Repräsentation, pp. 12-13.
5.
Goldstein, Richard
(1996)
‘Patterns of Missing Data’
, Stata Technical Bulletin32:
12-13
.
6.
Goodin, R.
, ed. (1996) The Theory of Institutional Design.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press
.
7.
Grimm, Dieter (1994) Die Zukunft der Verfassung. Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.
8.
Lijphart, Arend
(1999) Patterns of Democracy: Government Forms and
Performance in Thirty-Six Countries.
New Haven, CT: Yale University Press
.
9.
Little, R.J.A.
and
D.B. Rubin
(1987) Statistical Analysis with Missing Data.
New York: John Wiley & Sons
.
10.
Lorenz, Astrid (2004) ‘Stabile Verfassungen? konstitutionelle
Reformen in Demokratien’, Zeitschrift für Parlamentsfragen 35(3): 448-68.
11.
Lutz, Donald S.
(1994)
‘Toward a Theory of Constitutional Amendment’
, American Political Science Review88(2):
355-370
.
12.
Riker, William H.
(1980)
‘Implications from the Disequilibrium of Majority Rule for the
Study of Institutions’
, American Political Science Review74:
432-446
.
13.
Tsebelis, George
(2000)
‘Veto Players and Institutional Analysis’
, Governance13(4):
441-474
.
