Abstract
Digital agriculture is described as a solution to population growth and climate change. It entails technologies such as robots, drones, sensors, Internet of Things (IoT) and AI. However, with the adoption of digital agriculture comes the concern that existing power asymmetries may deepen, and inequalities between farmers may be exacerbated. This article focuses on small farmers due to the correlation between a large farm size and the adoption of digital agriculture, cautioning that digital agriculture may progressively drive more and more farmers out of agriculture. This article examines the risks that digital agriculture poses to the human rights to science and food. On the right to science, this article covers access to technology, especially in relation to barriers for small farmers in adopting digital agriculture. It also explores the obligation to protect from the negative effects of (digital agricultural) technology. On the right to food, the article analyses the impacts on its elements, such as availability and accessibility. Finally, the article presents State obligations under the right to food, alongside an examination of potential measures to ensure State compliance with this right.
INTRODUCTION
Digital agriculture has received growing attention recently, while its adoption is projected to grow further. 1 In the face of climate change and population growth, it has been argued that digital agriculture is a viable solution with the potential to increase productivity and yields. 2 Digital agriculture bolsters farmers’ decision-making with data and AI. 3 Examples include early detection of diseases in livestock, 4 weed distinction and removal, 5 and well as access to weather data combined with actionable agricultural management advice. 6 Robots can also be used for a more calculated application of fertilisers. 7 Additionally, sensors measuring soil moisture can be connected to automatic irrigation systems. 8
The term “digital agriculture” encompasses diverse technologies and uses, including, but not limited to, the ones mentioned above. In this article, digital agriculture will refer to technologies used on-farm, mainly for crops. These include sensors which measure soil pH and moisture, and the data collected from them, combined with AI and weather forecasts, provide real-time information about the farm's irrigation needs. 9 In general, farm management information systems which integrate data and provide information to the farmer are considered. In addition, harvesting or weeding robots and targeted application of inputs (for example, with drones or robots) are envisaged in the article. Thus, applications of digital agriculture that, for example, relate to agricultural insurance, or to connecting farmers to markets, are excluded from this analysis.
The focus is placed on the risks engendered by this technology, because such an examination would assist in anticipating the possible negative effects and planning for preventive measures and regulations. As is the case with other technologies introduced in different sectors, the changes that digital technologies create in agriculture should be critically examined. It is important to underline that challenges may differ, depending on the local context. Farmers in developing countries may face different challenges compared to those in developed countries. Although this article is not geographically limited in scope, it should be acknowledged that context plays a vital role in the uptake and dissemination of digital agriculture and that farmers face hurdles related to their local conditions. 10 For example, issues of lack of internet connectivity may be more pronounced in developing countries, in comparison to developed countries.
The analysis in this article focuses on the right to science and the right to food as enshrined in the International Covenant on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR). 11 The reason for choosing these rights is twofold: first, they have not yet received attention in legal literature in the context of digital agriculture; and second, there is a direct correlation between introducing new technologies and food production, making it necessary to examine both the technology and its impact on food.
Despite the fact that digital agriculture promises an increase in agricultural productivity, it should be emphasised that a yield increase is not correlated with the realisation of the human right to food. 12 In fact, hunger and malnutrition are mostly related to inequalities due to lack of access to food, not a lack of sufficient quantity of food. 13 This is why it is important to examine the impact of digital agriculture on the right to food.
The right to science should be considered when analysing innovations, and even more so when discussing technologies that have the potential to re-shape food production. The issues that arise therefrom are both related to having access to science, as well as the obligation to protect people from the negative effects a technology/scientific application may have.
This article will examine whether, and to what extent, the risks of digital agriculture technologies (as identified by other disciplines) constitute risks to the enjoyment of the human rights of science and food, especially for small farmers. The central argument is that what other disciplines have identified as (social) risks may qualify as human rights risks, and calls for State action, according to their obligations under the ICESCR. Before introducing digital agriculture-related policies, States should be aware of their obligations under these human rights and ensure compliance with them. A doctrinal method will be used, as it is the most suitable for analysing relevant human rights, examining and interpreting the relevant international instruments. Subsidiary means of interpretation will also be examined, for example general comments. However, this article is also informed by literature from various disciplines, such as sociology, geography, agricultural economics, and science and technology studies, to identify what they consider potential risks of digital agriculture.
This article is organised as follows. The first section provides an analysis of the right to science under the ICESCR and introduces the risks that digital agriculture presents, specifically the barriers faced by farmers in adopting new technologies and the challenges of the technology design of digital agriculture. Subsequently, these risks will be connected to the human right to science, explaining whether and how States should act to address the risks of digital agriculture, whilst still in compliance with their ICESCR obligations. The second section of the article explains the State obligations under the human right to food as enshrined in the ICESCR. The section also analyses the implications that digital agriculture might create for food production and the environment, in light of State obligations under the right to food. Potential measures to be taken by States will also be explored.
DIGITAL AGRICULTURE AND THE HUMAN RIGHT TO SCIENCE
The Human Right to Science
The importance of the right to science is becoming more and more apparent with the rapid and exponential growth of science and technology. Article 15(1)(b) of the ICESCR recognises the human right ‘to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications’. 14 According to the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), ‘the term “benefits” refers first to the material results of the applications of scientific research’ including fertilisers’. 15 The term also refers to the derivatives of scientific activity, such as scientific knowledge and information. 16
It has often been debated whether the right also encompasses an obligation to protect against the adverse effects of scientific progress and its applications. 17 An interpretation a contrario to the wording of Article 15 could support this argument. Alternatively, a systematic and teleological interpretation that considers both Covenants in entirety could also support it. 18 Evidence of this obligation can be found in the CESCR Guidelines for reporting by State Parties, which state that, to demonstrate compliance with Article 15, Parties should indicate ‘the measures taken to prevent the use of scientific and technical progress for purposes which are contrary to the enjoyment of human dignity and human rights’. 19 The Venice Statement on the Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress and its Applications (Venice Statement), adopted in 2009 after expert meetings organised by UNESCO, is a non-binding instrument that has also provided an interpretation of the right to science. 20 The Statement uses similar wording, encompassing an obligation to protect from ‘abuse and adverse effects of science and its applications’. 21 The Venice Statement, arguably, introduced a due diligence obligation, called upon States to protect society, and defined a procedural requirement to the right to science, for example, the conduct of impact assessments. 22 Such assessments would help identify the consequences of specific technology applications and, to the best of the State's abilities, help prevent possible negative effects on human rights. 23
A similar procedural requirement appears in the CESCR's General Comment (GC) 25 on the right to science. This could be summarised as a procedural right to ‘contribute in an informed way to transparent public debate and to the policy making that is derived from and addressed to, scientific progress’. 24 This requirement can be further analysed into three sub-aspects: (i) whether discourse was made possible for ‘all relevant and interested parties as to relevant potential consequences for existing and future rights holders’; (ii) whether policymakers have sufficiently examined the discourse; and, (iii) whether adequate measures are in place to mitigate the risks and harms of scientific progress. 25 Legal scholar Hubert, criticises GC 25 for framing the obligation of participation solely as a procedural requirement, arguing that it creates the impression that States are not obligated to ensure that public views are reflected in policy, or that the State has protected against the adverse effects of science and technology. 26 The obligation to protect from adverse effects also entails an obligation to anticipate the risks of adverse effects. 27 This duty is twofold; first, to anticipate and protect from the risks of harm; and, second, to identify the opportunities for benefitting from science and its applications. 28 In the context of new scientific and technological advancements (including AI, robotics, and management of big data), 29 the CESCR has emphasised that State Parties ‘have to adopt policies and measures that expand the benefits of these new technologies while at the same time reducing their risks’. 30
Müller argues that, depending on the immediacy, seriousness, and reality of the harm, States may face less stringent obligations to mitigate and to ‘diligently enact legislation, to conduct impact assessments, to monitor, to provide information to the public to conduct ethics reviews, take required budgetary measures’. 31 The CESCR, both in its Guidelines on Reporting and in GC 25, has argued that the right to science encompasses a State obligation to prevent risks, harms, and effects of science that may inhibit the enjoyment of human rights. This interpretation, supported by the Venice Statement, bolsters the argument for a State duty to protect against such risks and harms. As mentioned above, this creates a procedural requirement for harm assessment and participation in public debate.
Under the obligation to fulfil, States are not only required to adopt laws in compliance with their international obligations, but also other measures, including ‘judicial, administrative and educative’. 32 Under the obligation to fulfil the human right to science, States should ‘use the maximum of their available resources to overcome hurdles that any person may face to benefit from new technologies or other forms of applications of scientific advancements’. 33 States are required to introduce measures aimed at ensuring the enjoyment of benefits of science and its applications, including ‘education policies, grants, […] providing access to the Internet and other sources of knowledge, […] and ensuring appropriate financing’. 34 States are under a positive duty to ‘actively promote the advancement of science through, inter alia, education and investment in science and technology’. 35 In the GC, the CESCR clarified how, in public resource allocation, States should prioritise ‘scientific progress in health, food and other basic needs related to economic, social and cultural rights and the well-being of the population’, especially for vulnerable and marginalised groups. 36
In GC 25, the CESCR explains the elements of the right to science. Importantly, under availability, States should ensure that the applications of science are available to vulnerable and marginalised groups. 37 Under accessibility, States should ensure that everyone has access to scientific applications, especially ‘when they are instrumental for the enjoyment of other economic, social and cultural rights’. 38 In fact, the CESCR included in the core obligations of the right to science, that States are required to ‘ensure access to those applications of scientific progress that are critical to the enjoyment of the right to health and other economic, social and cultural rights’. 39 Access to science is also connected to the diffusion of science, for which States should take positive steps. 40 It has been suggested that this includes the removal of barriers that might prevent or hinder such access. 41
Regardless, as cautioned by former UN Special Rapporteur on the right to food, Olivier De Schutter, the critical factor lies in both the nature of the scientific progress promoted, as well as to what kind of technologies access is facilitated. 42 In the only relevant communication (eventually deemed inadmissible), the CESCR highlighted that ‘States should regularly update their regulations in order to harmonize them with their human rights obligations and with the evolution of society and scientific progress’. 43 Hence, digital agriculture could, arguably, be defined as scientific progress, necessitating States to revise relevant regulations and align them with their human rights obligations.
The Challenges of Digital Agriculture: The Technology
Digital agriculture can be argued to be predominantly beneficial to large-scale industrialised farms. 44 These larger operations possess the financial resources to cover upfront costs more easily and have access to the necessary skills and advice for utilising (big) data, as well as the capability to manage contracts for data management. 45 Conversely, small farms face barriers in adopting this technology, as digital agricultural technology is, primarily, designed for large-scale farms following a monocultural paradigm. Recently, there has been a growing trend toward alternative methods of engaging with digital agriculture. These technologies are not yet widely available, and it remains to be seen whether, when, and how they will be successfully adopted by farmers. While smaller field robots are available for specific, specialised operations, such as seeding and weeding, they remain “niche products” as ‘small-scale adaptability is not currently among the goals of mainstream technology developers’. 46 Additionally, the use of these tools has been put to question, with French organic farmers arguing that they will use them in conjunction with their existing systems and mainly as a source of information. 47 The following section will focus on the dominant paradigm of digital agriculture, which has received the most attention thus far.
Barriers to Adopting Digital Technologies for Small Farms
Cost is one of the most significant barriers to the adoption of digital technologies by small farms – both because of the cost of technology itself, as well as the infrastructural cost of adopting the technology. 48 One of the prerequisites to using digital agriculture is a stable and powerful Internet connection and access to a smartphone – the former is difficult for rural areas. 49 ‘[O]nly 24 to 37 percent of farms of less than one hectare in size have access to 3G or 4G services’. 50 As an example, in India, Internet penetration is around 20.26%, while the majority of farmland (58%) is less than one hectare, thus the adoption of digital agriculture by the majority of farmers remains a challenge. 51 Thus, lack of access to the Internet is a particularly important barrier to overcome, 52 especially given that 45% of the global population lives in rural areas in developing countries and depends on small family farms. 53
In terms of access to the equipment, there are different economic models to assess. The direct sales model is the costliest and difficult to justify as a cost for the small farmer who will not use the equipment too often. 54 In the US, it was found that smaller farms buy used equipment, which may prolong their access to the technology. 55 Models based on leasing or subscription are becoming popular, particularly for agricultural robots. 56 Asset sharing among farmers, such as sharing drones and robots, is gaining traction as well. 57 Additionally, a proposed solution to overcome the cost barrier involves the dissemination of digital equipment through farmer cooperatives. 58 This model distributes the cost and allows all members of the farmer cooperative to enjoy the benefits.
Nevertheless, there are additional costs associated with the equipment, such as maintenance, and the ability to assess whether the incorporation of the technology is successful – that is, if there is a return on the investment made. 59 Research has shown a trial period of two years would be instructive in determining whether digital agriculture performs well on the farm. 60 Larger farms are more likely to take such risks since they have access to sufficient resources and advisors. Moreover, rising farm debt makes it challenging to adopt new technologies. 61 In Greece, some farmers were able to adopt digital agriculture through loans, which is particularly problematic for small farms. 62
Other factors that might affect farmers’ decision to adopt digital agriculture tools and practices relate to the nature of the legal relationship, including whether they lease or own the land, the size of the farm, and whether farming is their main occupation. 63 Land insecurity, in particular, may discourage ‘investment into livelihoods and adoption of improved farming practices’. 64 Therefore, farmers without land tenure security are less likely to adopt digital agriculture.
Scholars have also identified digital illiteracy as another barrier to the adoption of digital agriculture. A study in Kenya found that general literacy would not pose a problem, but digital education of farmers is a necessity. 65 Digital literacy could simply encompass smartphone skills, but can also entail the ability to interpret quantitative data in order to extract value from them. 66 A case study in Spain suggested the set-up of digital agriculture programmes in university extension courses for the development of relevant digital skills. 67
Digital literacy can also impact a farm's ability to access advice or information from digital tools. For example, the placement of the sensors plays an important role in the quality of information that will be received (for example, the accuracy of the measurement). Thus, specific skills are needed, and it is more probable that larger farms will invest in these skills. 68 To drive adoption, some service providers may offer free advisory services to small farmers, relying on the selling of the data collected from the farms to generate income. 69
To conclude, reasons behind the low dissemination among small farms are varied. The primary factors include a lack of access to capital, infrastructure, land tenure security, skills, and advisory services. Conversely, larger farms, which have access to more resources, are more likely to adopt digital agriculture. However, even if these barriers are overcome, another important issue remains. As will be analysed below, it is essential that the technology aligns with the production method that the farm follows.
Technology Design
The design decisions behind digital agriculture technology largely explain why it primarily benefits large industrial farms. Specifically, these technologies are predominantly geared toward monocultural production. 70 To illustrate, it has been estimated that ‘all agricultural robots currently under commercial development require a monoculture’. 71 The design of digital agriculture technology is of paramount importance, as both the type of production envisaged and the local conditions embedded in the design can affect its performance and adoption by farmers. In short, the homogeneity of fields envisioned by the technological design necessitates a simplification of farm production. 72
However, this also means that the crop cultivated might need to change, as the innate design of digital agriculture technologies prioritise commodity crops intended for exports, such as soy, maize, and canola. 73 It could also mean a shift in the farm's focus. To illustrate, a farmer in Carolan's study explains that, to “take full advantage” of the technology, he reduced the acreage of sweetcorn, since the drone and field corn assessment software could only identify genetically identical corn, and could not be used on all types of corn, including sweetcorn. 74 Additionally, adoption of digital agriculture might necessitate changes to the farmland itself. For example, the presence of tree stumps in a field may prevent the deployment of large machinery, such as an automated tractor, 75 requiring the farmer to make modifications to the field. Clearly, digital agriculture presents challenges due to its design, which primarily befits – or even encourages – monocultural farming. It is worth mentioning, however, that recommendations have been made for technologies that are not solely focused on monocultures, including smaller robots capable of manoeuvring more complex fields. 76
Technology design plays a significant role in the dissemination of digital agriculture. If the design primarily envisages larger farms, these are the only farms that will benefit from this technology. It has been shown, however, that smaller farms attempting to benefit from existing technology will need to adapt their operations to meet the demands of the technology, including making changes to their land or switching to different crops.
Applying the Right to Science to Digital Agriculture
In exercising the right to science in the context of digital agriculture, one questions whether digital agriculture can be considered a “benefit” under the right to science. Both material results, including technological instruments, methods, and information are clearly considered “benefits”. 77 It can be argued that both the hardware used in digital agriculture, as well as the knowledge and advice that is provided through the software fall under the definition of “benefits” of the right to science.
The previous section analysed two facets of the right to science: access to science and the obligation to protect from the adverse effects of scientific and technological development. First, concerning accessibility of science, there are barriers to adopting digital agricultural tools, such as high costs that may deter small farmers. Other aforementioned barriers include the digital divide, where access to the Internet, smartphones, and other useful equipment is not available to all, especially in less developed countries. 78 Additionally, there is the challenge of digital literacy, which particular impacts rural – poor – populations who are already at a socioeconomic disadvantage. 79
Under the obligation to fulfil, administrative and educative measures are envisaged to overcome these hurdles and ensure that every individual benefits from scientific advancements. States must address the underlying prerequisites affecting access to digital agriculture technology. For example, States should take steps to bridge the digital divide by providing sufficient infrastructure in rural areas. Another potential measure is to provide incentives and adopt measures to facilitate easy access to digital agriculture. This could be in the form of courses or training programmes to disseminate digital knowledge and skills. A study on digital agriculture in Tanzania found that advisory services tailored to the needs of smallholder farmers would promote their adoption of digital agriculture, 80 which could also satisfy the State obligation to fulfil the right to science. Finally, investments and the promotion of scientific progress through public resource allocation, as stated in GC 25, 81 should focus on scientific progress for food security and the wellbeing of the population, especially of vulnerable and marginalised groups, such as rural people and small farmers. States could direct their investments toward digital agriculture that caters to the needs of small farmers.
The obligation to protect from adverse effects should be accompanied by an obligation to protect – States must protect individuals from any adverse effects caused by actions or omissions by the private sector. 82 This would entail taking measures and adopting regulation to protect against any adverse effects on human rights caused by digital agriculture providers. The question arises whether the adverse effects of digital agriculture extends to human rights beyond simply the human right to science. Specifically, scholar Samantha Besson, criticises GC 25 which defines acceptability of the harm by reference to the human rights of those affected. Besson opines that anticipatory duties should be framed within the right to science itself, as they are inherent to its protection, rather than under duties arising from other human rights. 83 She argues that the right to science is dualistic, encompassing both the promotion of the positive effects of science and protection against its negative effects. 84
Following this interpretative approach, it is not necessary to show that there are adverse effects of science on the enjoyment of other human rights (namely, the right to food, which will be analysed in the following section). Evidently, the advantage of this interpretation for rights holders is that it eliminates the need to prove an impact on other human rights. However, caution is necessary in interpreting the right to science in this way, as GC 25 consistently refers to science in relation to other human rights. In this way, States are encouraged to prioritise science in the service of other human rights, 85 and to ensure accessibility to science, especially as it is instrumental for the enjoyment of other human rights. 86 Nevertheless, the introduction of a purpose for science and its applications by GC 25 has been questioned by scholars who have examined the travaux préparatoires of the ICESCR. 87 In any case, an assessment of the risks remains essential, as highlighted by GC 25.
This section has demonstrated how digital agriculture engages States’ obligations under the right to science. The issue of access to science is encompassed by the right to science, obligating States to create conditions enabling access to science. Another facet of the obligation is protecting against the adverse effects of science. It can be argued that, under the obligations arising from the right to science as found in Article 15(1)(b) of the ICESCR, States have an obligation to protect small food producers from the adverse effects of digital agriculture on their human rights. This may be through the regulation of the private digital agriculture sector and conducting assessments to address risks. The following section will analyse the impact of digital agriculture on the human right to food.
DIGITAL AGRICULTURE AND THE HUMAN RIGHT TO FOOD
The Human Right to Food
Food is necessary for life. It is also necessary for health, making it a fundamental determinant for the realisation of human rights. 88 The right to food is enshrined in Article 11 of the ICESCR, as part of the ‘right of everyone to an adequate standard of living for himself and his family’. 89 As interpreted by the CESCR in its GC 12, the right to food entails ‘physical and economic access at all times to adequate food or means for its procurement’. 90 Moreover, it is not limited to a narrow interpretation of “adequate food”, based on the number of calories, proteins, and other nutrients. 91 The CESCR states that a core aspect of the right to adequate food is the ‘availability of food in a quantity and quality sufficient to satisfy the dietary needs of individuals free from adverse substances and acceptable within a given culture’. 92 Additionally, a core aspect is ‘the accessibility of such food in ways that are sustainable and that do not interfere with the enjoyment of other human rights’. 93
Pursuant to GC 12, States are under an obligation to ensure full and equal access to economic and natural resources, as well as appropriate technology. 94 As part of a national food strategy, States should address all aspects of the food system, from production to consumption. 95 Importantly, States must also ensure ‘the most sustainable management and use of natural and other resources for food at the national, regional, local and household levels’. 96
The right to food is comprised of four elements: availability, accessibility, acceptability, and adequacy. Availability comprises the entitlement to access either the means to produce food or the food itself, which should reach people according to demand. 97 Accessibility encompasses both physical and economic accessibility. The latter means that other needs must not be threatened, or compromised, by the cost of food. 98 In turn, physical access to adequate food includes the stipulation that certain populations - such as victims of natural disasters or Indigenous peoples – may require special attention and priority regarding access to food. 99
Acceptability relates to the non-nutrient-based values that are attached to food, as well as ‘informed consumer concerns regarding the nature of accessible food supplies’. 100 According to the CESCR, sustainability means that food will be available and accessible in the long run, thus also for generations to come. 101 Adequacy is not explicitly defined in the GC. The CESCR states that the adequacy of food depends on several factors, ‘to a large extent determined by prevailing social, economic, cultural, climatic, ecological and other conditions’. 102 Adequacy can be framed in terms of the food being sufficient in quantity and quality. 103 For example, food should contain the necessary nutrients to support the physical and mental development of children. 104
Technology and the production of food are inextricably linked. In fact, this relationship was considered in the writing of Article 11(2)(a) of the ICESCR, which states, that States Parties shall take measures to ‘improve methods of production, conservation and distribution of food by making full use of technical and scientific knowledge, by disseminating knowledge of the principles of nutrition and by developing or reforming agrarian systems in such a way as to achieve the most efficient development and utilization of natural resources’. 105 Article 11(2)(a) can be interpreted as creating an obligation for States to conduct agricultural research. A contextual interpretation of Article 11(2)(a), read in conjunction with Article 15, suggests that States are not only under an obligation to receive scientific progress and its applications, but also to engage in its creation. 106 Pursuant to Article 2(1) of the ICESCR, the extent of the State obligation to conduct research is subject to the State's available means to do so. 107
Special Rapporteur on the right to food Michael Fakhri highlighted the need to interpret Article 2(1) of the ICESCR in light ‘of contemporary understandings’. Fakhri argues for reframing the obligation to improve food production and conservation to prioritise increasing biodiversity, rather than merely enhancing efficiency. 108 He also notes that knowledge not only encompasses technical and scientific information, but also traditional and Indigenous knowledge. 109
The Voluntary Guidelines on the Progressive Realisation of the Right to Food (Voluntary Guidelines), a non-binding, yet authoritative, document by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) asserts that States should create an environment where technologies, inter alia, are promoted to enhance effective food production among all farmers. 110 The Guidelines also emphasise that States ‘should promote agricultural research and development, in particular to promote basic food production […] with its benefits to small and women farmers’. 111 States should ‘promote access by medium and small-scale farmers to research results enhancing food security’. 112
Scholars and the international community alike have long considered rural people and small-scale farmers as a vulnerable population with limited access to food. 113 In a 2009 declaration, the General Assembly highlighted the ‘increasing cost of inputs and the fall in farm incomes; that access to land, water, seeds and other natural resources is an increasing challenge for poor producers’. 114 The declaration recognised that supporting small farmers is key to ensuring food security and the right to food. 115 Given that rural populations depend on land and other productive resources for access to food, any threats to their access jeopardise their right to food. 116
In considering the types of State obligations implicated by the introduction of a digital agriculture strategy or policy, the obligation to respect would require States to refrain from any measures which would interfere with the enjoyment of the right to food, that is ‘measures that could prevent, restrict or deprive people of the ability to feed themselves’. 117 The adoption of digital agriculture introduces risks that could undermine this ability, due to systematic inequalities and the potential exploitation by digital agriculture providers, who may raise prices or speculate with food production data. Thus, States risk violating their obligation to respect the right to food.
Under the obligation to protect, it is the State's duty to safeguard the enjoyment of the right to food from interference of the private sector. As analysed in GC 12, violations of the right to food may result from both State actions and insufficient regulation of private entities. For example, this occurs when States fail ‘to regulate activities of individuals or groups so as to prevent them from violating the right to food of others’. 118 The same GC notes that, under the obligation to protect, States should ensure that private sector activities respect the right to food. 119
This obligation becomes particularly relevant in the context of digital agriculture providers exploiting their power, which can affect both economic and physical access to food and to food-producing resources. This includes risks of speculation on food prices or agricultural inputs. States would be in violation of the right to food if they fail to adequately regulate these actors. Specifically, the CESCR states that, as part of the obligation to protect, States have a duty ‘to adopt a legal framework requiring business entities to exercise human rights due diligence in order to identify, prevent and mitigate the risks of violations of Covenant rights’. 120 The UN Commissioner for Human Rights, similarly, stresses the need for regulations to ensure food affordability, especially for vulnerable and marginalised populations, and to mitigate foreseeable impacts of business activities on the climate, thereby safeguarding the right to food. 121
Under the obligation to fulfil (facilitate) the right to food, States should aim to strengthen ‘people's access to and utilization of resources and means to ensure their livelihood, including food security’. 122 This includes adopting agrarian reform policies and minimum income regulations. 123 Additionally, States can implement policies of urban and rural development. States enjoy a wide margin of discretion in demonstrating that they have taken reasonable and appropriate steps to facilitate the human right to food. 124
At the same time, the accessibility of food must not compromise other human rights. 125 As an example, while pesticides can enhance the efficiency of food production, the risks associated with pesticides make their use incompatible with both the right to health and the right to food. 126 This aligns with the principle that all human rights are indivisible, interdependent, and interrelated. 127 Regardless of whether access to food improves under such policies, it should not come at the expense of other human rights, including those not covered in this article, such as the right to work.
Moreover, this argument can be linked to the emerging recognition of the right to a healthy environment. 128 A recent report by the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights highlighted that industrial agriculture based on monocultures could lead to long-term ecological damage, undermining the right to a healthy environment. 129 It was also acknowledged that relying on agrochemicals is not a sustainable solution to food insecurity. 130 It is important to also note the relevant special procedures established in support of this right, namely the Special Rapporteur on the issue of human rights obligations relating to the enjoyment of a safe, clean, healthy, and sustainable environment, 131 and the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of human rights in the context of climate change. 132
Finally, according to the Voluntary Guidelines, the promotion of technology is essential to enhance the effectiveness of food production for all farmers. Consequently, States are under an obligation to consider the needs of all farmers, address inequalities and ensure accessibility to food. To fulfil their obligations under the right to food, States must consider not only issues of productivity and food quantity, but also accessibility. While adopting digital agriculture policies and distributing this technology may be viewed as compliant with Article 11(2)(a) of the ICESCR, States must implement additional protective measures. These measures should aim to remove barriers hindering small farmers’ access to digital agriculture, whilst also addressing systemic inequalities that may be exacerbated or manipulated by corporations. Echoing the report by the Special Rapporteur on the right to food, the focus should be reframed to prioritise not only efficiency, but also the conservation of biodiversity.
The Challenges of Digital Agriculture to Food Production
As a paradigm, digital agriculture has, primarily, been characterised by its support for further industrialisation of agriculture, including the intensification of food production, the increase of farm size, and the use of technological and chemical inputs. 133 Monocultural production is particularly vulnerable to pests and diseases, which can negatively impact soil fertility and future yields. 134 To elaborate upon a previously used example, if farmers make changes to their farmland by removing tree stumps or altering cropping patterns, soil erosion can occur, leading to reduced fertility and yields. 135 Additionally, it has been argued that, in the context of monocultures using digital agriculture, large-scale crop failures may result from poorly calibrated sensors, or an algorithmic model error. 136
The following sub-sections will explore market issues, such as competition and market concentration, as well as the environmental risks associated with the digital industrial agriculture paradigm, which may, inadvertently, harm the environment, rather than protect it.
Competition and Market Concentration
Since 2014, the food and agriculture sector has experienced significant consolidation through mergers and acquisitions. Agricultural companies have increased their utilisation of new technologies, focusing on acquiring technological expertise and providing data-based services to farmers. 137 The food market has been monopolised by four companies who dominate the grains market and the seed and agrochemicals sector. 138 In practice, only a few companies steer innovation, primarily, towards securing shareholder profits, rather than for the public good. 139
Concerns have been raised about ‘further market integration and corporate concentration’, which may, ultimately, exclude ‘small, peasant and agroecological farmers from participating in agro-food production’, 140 as ‘technological disparities further economic polarization and make it increasingly difficult for small and medium sized farmers to participate in agriculture altogether’. 141
Digitalisation is likely to further consolidate farms, with family-owned farms increasingly selling, or leasing, their land to large operations. 142 It is illustrative to note that the introduction of automated milking systems – a precursor to digital agriculture – has led to a decline in small farms and greater market concentration in the dairy industry. 143 Consequently, farmers are forced to become less independent, or leave the market altogether.
Finally, another key market competition concern is price speculation. Product prices may fluctuate based on data gathered from digital agriculture, 144 including fertilisers, pesticides, and seeds. 145 Smaller farmers, who have fewer resources and less access to markets, may be at a disadvantage.
Arguably, digital agriculture could exacerbate existing inequalities in the sector, leading to increased market concentration and driving small farms out of agriculture. This outcome could result from a multitude of causes, including heightened competition, the consolidation of farms, and price changes in both products and inputs. As analysed below, the dominant model of production will be strengthened, with significant consequences for the planet.
Paradigm of Industrial Farming
Critics have voiced concerns that digital agriculture will perpetuate the paradigm of industrial agriculture, rather than encourage alternative modes of production. 146 Arguably, promoting high-tech innovative solutions may discourage the use of simpler technologies, or farm improvements that do not rely on such technology. 147 Digital agricultural technology does not suit all modes of production. For instance, a farmer in a French study noted that the technology focuses on plot management, rather than the holistic management needed by most organic farms. 148 Consequently, smaller farms may not benefit from this technology and are not encouraged to innovate independently.
However, some scholars posit that the diffusion of technology will start with innovators, ‘who are by default large-scale producers and able to afford the high cost of technology’, and, in the future, through the standardisation and price reduction, other farms may adopt it as well. 149 The tendency for innovations to benefit affluent, resource-equipped farmers more than smaller, vulnerable farmers is not a new debate. 150 Nonetheless, small farmers risk having the innovations imposed on them, rather than opting to adopt them based on their perceived benefits. 151 Moreover, farmers may feel compelled to adopt these technologies to keep up with competition. 152 As aforementioned, alternative approaches to engaging with digital agriculture are gaining traction. It remains to be seen whether these alternatives will address the needs of small farmers without promoting industrial or intensive farming, which has been the dominant model of production in digital agriculture thus far.
Therefore, the risk is that the intensified market competition and increased support for intensive agriculture may push farmers towards digital agriculture without genuine persuasion, forcing them to make changes to their farmlands and crop. This adaptation could have broader implications for the planet and the climate, as will be further explored in the following subsection.
Environmental Effects
It has been argued that digital agriculture is still input-led, that is, relying heavily on fertilisers, herbicides, and pesticides. 153 Not only is the effectiveness of these chemicals waning – with weeds becoming more resistant to herbicides and insects to insecticides – 154 but their use poses significant environmental risks. Agrochemicals threaten the environment by degrading soil fertility, 155 which, in turn, leads to biodiversity loss. Biodiversity is also declining because the organisms that are not targeted from pesticides are exposed to them, 156 reducing agricultural resilience to climate change shocks, 157 and threatening the right to food. Additionally, agrochemicals can produce environmental toxins that move through the food chain and affect pollinators, 158 posing a danger to human health.
Despite these concerns, literature on digital agriculture often associates this mode of production with sustainability, and portrays it as a solution to climate change. 159 Nevertheless, the arguments for this association are, often, unconvincing. Critics have attributed this to “technological/digital solutionism” or “digital sublime”, where digital technologies are assumed to improve sustainability, without sufficient evidence. 160 Policies tend to focus on input optimisation as a sustainability factor, neglecting biodiversity conservation, soil protection, and climate change adaptation and mitigation. 161 Indeed, sustainability encompasses, not only economic gains, but also ecological and social dimensions. 162 While digital agriculture may offer economic opportunities, it is cannot be deemed sustainable if it fails to address the social dimension as well. Small farmers, who have contributed the least to climate change, are disproportionately affected by its impacts on their livelihoods, environment, and food security. 163
Thus, it is crucial to examine, holistically, the challenges posed by digital agriculture. Despite claims of sustainability and environmental friendliness, evidence of these benefits is insufficient. Risks, such as biodiversity loss, are associated with digital agriculture, and there is little proof that it is a viable solution to climate change. Encouraging the use of inputs with known detrimental environmental effects makes the adoption of digital agriculture counterintuitive. Although digital agriculture appears financially viable, it is imperative to address the threats to the social dimension of sustainability.
Applying the Right to Food to Digital Agriculture
The following section will examine how digital agriculture impacts the elements of the right to food, and, specifically, State obligations that may be called into question by the adoption of digital agriculture. On the one hand, digital agriculture can be framed as an innovation that leverages scientific knowledge to ‘improve methods of production, conservation and distribution of food’. 164 It could be argued that, in fact, States are compliant with their human rights obligations under the right to food, as digital agriculture could arguably increase productivity. A re-interpretation calls for consideration of additional factors beyond efficiency, such as biodiversity. As demonstrated, there are significant concerns regarding biodiversity loss that must be addressed.
On the other hand, although digital agriculture aims to enhance productivity, the critical issues affecting the right to food often revolve around accessibility. 165 Simply increasing production through digital agriculture does not necessarily ensure State compliance with their obligations under the human right to food. Small food producers encounter various hurdles in both producing and accessing food and farming resources. 166 The disparities between small farmers and large corporate farmers are likely to widen further. Economic accessibility to the means of production will be strained, making it challenging for small farmers to compete or access resources and means of producing food. Furthermore, concerns persist that farm data could be exploited for price speculation, affecting the affordability of inputs such as fertilisers, seeds, and pesticides, thereby threatening economic accessibility.
Evidently, physical accessibility to food can be compromised when farmers lack access to the means of food production and face threats to soil productivity. Farm consolidation can also impact access to land, and directly impacts the realisation of the right to food. Moreover, the availability of food is jeopardised by monocultures that degrade soil over time – ultimately affecting long-term food sustainability. Soil degradation reduces the land's capacity to produce food for current and future generations alike.
Another issue that merits discussion is the acceptability of food produced through digital agriculture. Acceptability pertains to the cultural and ethical values that individuals associate with food, influenced by factors such as religious beliefs and worldviews. For example, a study conducted in Germany highlighted potential reluctance among Germans to embrace food produced by digital agriculture, particularly in the context of meat and dairy products, due to concerns about animal welfare. 167 This study specifically explored automated milking robots and animal husbandry. Higher levels of acceptance were found for crop robots, especially when supported by evidence of their environmental benefits, rather than merely increased productivity. 168 Arguably, alternatives to food produced by digital agriculture may exist, so that States may not be in violation of the right to food, per se. Nevertheless, it is important to note that both the CESCR and the FAO emphasise cultural acceptability as a fundamental aspect of the right to food. 169
The risks that are created by digital agriculture impact all the elements of the right to food – including both physical and economic accessibility to food. The availability of food is further threatened by soil degradation and reduced biodiversity, stemming from the adoption of digital agriculture. Equally significant is the acceptability of food, as individuals often attach cultural and religious values to food. This article has also analysed that States are under the obligation to respect the right to food, which entails refraining from actions that could interfere with the current enjoyment of this right.
Under the obligation to protect, States should sufficiently regulate the digital agriculture technology sector. Although it is not within the scope of this article, it should be noted that agricultural technology companies may also bear responsibilities under business and human rights law. For example, they should identify, prevent, mitigate, and account for how they address their impacts on human rights, carrying out human rights due diligence. 170
Furthermore, under the obligation to fulfil/facilitate, States should consider access to research and development for small farmers that would benefit food production. Pursuant to GC 12, States should ensure that there is access to economic and natural resources, as well as appropriate technology, while, at the same time, ensuring the sustainable management of natural resources for food. Thus, States should remove the hurdles that small farmers face in accessing technology (as discussed under the human right to science). However, States must also balance this against the potential negative environmental impacts on natural resources. Measures could include incentivising the design of technology tailored to small farmers and their food production paradigm, thereby promoting agriculture diversity away from monocultures.
CONCLUSION
Digital agriculture presents numerous issues that merit scholarly attention. This article has demonstrated how the risks identified by other disciplines, especially for small farmers, also impact the human rights obligations of States under the ICESCR. The article focused on the risks engendered by the technology itself, addressing the barriers to adopting digital agriculture technology, and the product-design decisions that influence the type of food production envisaged by the technology. Additionally, in its consideration of current market conditions, the article analysed how digital agriculture may lead to further market concentration and support the industrial model of agricultural production. Digital agriculture may have unintended consequences that create more harm to biodiversity and the environment, thus contrary to the positive perception of digital agriculture as a solution to the environmental crisis.
These risks are inherently risks to the full enjoyment of the human rights to science and food. There is a correlation between the two causes of low dissemination of digital agriculture among smaller farmers (adoption barriers and technology design) and the right to science. In order to comply with their obligation to fulfil the right to science, States must address the underlying impeding factors, namely, lack of Internet connectivity and digital skills. In addition, States have an obligation to protect from the adverse effects of science on the enjoyment of other human rights.
States also have an obligation to respect the right to food by refraining from limiting access to food. Under the obligation to protect, States must sufficiently regulate the private sector (the digital agriculture providers). Although the right to food, as found in the ICESCR, presents a connection between food and scientific progress, this progress should not be at the cost of small farmers. Productivity is not a panacea, as hunger is primarily an issue of systematic inequalities that lead to disproportionate access to food.
This article has questioned the “solutionism” of digital agriculture, not by completely disregarding its merits, but by cautioning against its risks, especially in the context of human rights. States, under their obligations arising from the right to food and the right to science, must act accordingly. Before introducing digital agriculture policies or encouraging the uptake of such technologies, States must have the necessary policies in place to protect the rights of small farmers. This includes the removal of adoption barriers and sufficiently regulating digital agriculture providers. A balance should be struck so that small farmers have the opportunity to engage with digital agriculture – if they choose to – while also ensuring that monocultural production is not the only mode followed, given the negative effects identified. It is thus crucial to invest in and promote digital agriculture that caters to the needs of small farmers, so that they too may benefit from these scientific advancements.
Footnotes
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Funding
The author received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
