The differences between ordo- and neoliberalism are many and varied. This article suggests, however, that in directing the constitutional dynamic of European integration and postwar reconstruction, ordo- and neoliberalism represent a single movement: a conjunction of political authoritarianism and economic liberalism in opposition to democracy and especially in opposition to democratic constituent power. This dynamic becomes more evident with the Euro-crisis response, but it represents the deeper logic of postwar reconstruction. With a longer historical arc in view, authoritarian liberalism can be traced as a reaction to the interwar breakdown of liberal democracy, based on a narrow diagnosis of democratic collapse. Postwar Europe is thus reconstituted on the basis of a substitution of economic for political freedom as a legitimating device for the new constitutional imagination.
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