Abstract
Among the contentious aspects of the debate over the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) was the effect that the trade agreement was likely to have on jobs and wages for workers in Mexico and the United States. Proponents of NAFTA noted that the outcomes would vary by economic sector, but they generally agreed that automobile workers in Mexico would benefit due to the infusion of new capital and greater access to the U.S. market. In this article, I argue that the case of Volkswagen workers in Puebla, Mexico, suggests a different outcome. Evidence is presented that during the period preparing for NAFTA and through the first 3 years of its application, Volkswagen workers' rights have been weakened and their wages reduced. Preliminary support is offeredfor a thesis of NAFTA-driven downward harmonization for workers on either side of the U.S.-Mexico border
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