Justice Reform and Elite Power Consolidation: A Comparative Analysis of Ukraine,Georgia,and Moldova under the European Neighbourhood Policy

Abstract

Under the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the European Union (EU) has worked to harmonize judicial systems in Eastern Partnership countries with European standards. Political leaders in Ukraine, Georgia, and Moldova have publicly endorsed justice reform agendas. This article critically examines these initiatives within the ENP framework, with particular attention to how EU-driven trans-governmental cooperation interacts with domestic political dynamics, including path dependency, elite capture, and anti-corruption challenges. The core argument is that justice reforms, while framed as democratizing efforts, are often instrumentalized by domestic elites to consolidate power rather than reduce it. The study investigates the mechanisms of EU influence and evaluates the effectiveness of the ENP in advancing rule-of-law standards in practice. Drawing on Europeanization theory and domestic political analysis, the article highlights the tension between external conditionality and internal resistance. This research fills an important gap by assessing the ENP’s real-world impact in three countries that now hold EU candidate status. It offers both theoretical insights and empirical evidence on the limits of external governance, contributing to a more nuanced understanding of justice reform trajectories in the EU’s eastern neighborhood.