Abstract
This article explores the reasons for the recent populist assault against elite academic institutions in Hungary and Turkey. After exploring the literature on populism, social mobility, and social pluralism, it focuses on the modalities of the attack against two elite academic institutions established upon the U.S. liberal arts college tradition, the Central European University (CEU) and Boğaziçi University, respectively, and its implications for Hungarian and Turkish politics. Two arguments are put forward: First, such attacks have emerged in the context of a populist narrative against institutions facilitating social mobility. Social mobility undermines the “us versus them” populist narrative where the masses are permanently placed on the “losers” side and therefore depend on the charismatic populist leader. With social mobility facilitated through high-quality academic institutions, these “losers” have the chance to improve their material and non-material well-being through education. Second, these institutions promote social pluralism and critical thinking, cultivating a mode of reflection that contradicts the simplistic populist dichotomies and opposes democratic backsliding.
Introduction
On 1 January 2021, the President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, appointed by decree Prof. Melih Bulu as rector of Boğaziçi University. This was the first time in the history of Turkey’s most prestigious university that a rector without any links to the institution was appointed by presidential decree. A few years before, in early 2017, a bill submitted to the Hungarian parliament brought new regulations to the operation of foreign-funded private universities, targeting the Central European University (CEU), one of the country’s leading academic institutions. Both moves met with the protest of Turkish and Hungarian civil society, as they were understood to be assaults not only against the two most prestigious universities in both countries but also an attack against liberalism and pluralism and a symbolic step in the process of democratic backsliding that was menacing the Hungarian and Turkish democracies.
This article aims to examine the reasons for the populist assault against elite academic institutions in Turkey and Hungary established upon the U.S. liberal arts college tradition. With the democratic revolutions in central and eastern Europe and the collapse of the Soviet Union, the two greatest competitors against liberal democracy, fascism and Communism, were defeated. 1 However, this “third wave of democratization” did not always lead to democratic consolidation, as new hybrid regimes emerged combining democratic elections with illiberal features. This article is structured as follows: first, it explores the literature on populism, social mobility, and social pluralism by engaging the discussion of how assaults on elite academic institutions can be instrumentalized by populist leaders to consolidate the authoritarian shift of their regime. The rise of populist discourse in Turkey and Hungary is then examined. The article focuses on the modalities of the populist assault on elite academic institutions, established upon the U.S. liberal arts college tradition, the CEU in Hungary and Boğaziçi University in Turkey, and its implications for Hungarian and Turkish politics. This article engages with two arguments explaining the reasons for the attack on the most established elite academic institutions. First, by being a mechanism for promotion of social mobility, elite academic institutions have emerged as an important battleground for the populist narrative of these leaders. On one hand, promoting social mobility through such academic institutions undermines the “us versus them” populist narrative where the masses are permanently placed on the “losers” side and therefore depend on the charismatic populist leader. With social mobility facilitated through high-quality academic institutions, these “losers” have the chance to improve their material and non-material well-being through education. Second, these institutions promote social pluralism and critical thinking, cultivating a mode of reflection that contradicts simplistic populist dichotomies and opposes democratic backsliding.
Populism, Social Mobility, and Social Pluralism
As the populist tide remains significant on a global level, there are various definitions and approaches of populism and a vibrant debate about in which domain, whether political, social, economic, or discursive, it should be positioned.
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This study follows Mudde’s definition, according to which “populism is an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite,’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the
Moreover, a group of scholars regard “economic inequality” as the driving force for populist discontent. 4 However, very recently, Protzer and Summerville opened a new path of discussion, arguing that rather than inequality, “economic unfairness” should be taken as the real factor behind the rise of populist rhetoric. 5 Unfairness, in this context, corresponds to a decrease in social mobility, which normally provides citizens with a feeling that there exist fair opportunities for them to show their worth. The problem that brings populist discourse as an important tool for capturing voters’ attention is not unequal economic outcomes but the unequal opportunities that would be provided to the people in line with their contribution to society. The so-called “losers” of the system, named the “good people,” feel that family ties and elite networks are the key factors for success, which consolidates the notion of “corrupt elites.” The existence of certain elite academic institutions that provide fair opportunities for high-quality education to students according to their ability and motivation regardless of their socioeconomic status effectively undermines populist discourse.
The relationship between education and social mobility has been underlined in social science research since the 1950s. 6 Existing studies show a positive correlation between the level of education received and the earnings of individuals. 7 In this regard, with the advent of globalization, which brought to the fore the importance of a knowledge-based economy, the importance of education for material well-being became crystal clear. Recent studies show that earnings of the university graduates are higher than those of non-graduates, and the possibility of a university graduate individual with a low-income family profile to be listed in upper-income percentiles is higher than the ones without a degree. 8 Social mobility can be described as the “horizontal or vertical movement of individuals or groups through a system of social hierarchy or stratification.” This study focuses on the relationship between education and the vertical social mobility of individuals, where, through admission to higher education in a qualified academic institution, they have the chance to move upward and improve the social class to which they belong. As Pastore and Zylberstajn put it, if mobility did not exist in a society, it would reproduce the existing social structures, which would result in stagnation. 9 In this regard, having especially vertical mobility choices brings several opportunities for individuals and groups to show progress from one level to another. In this equilibrium, higher education has been a significant ticket to social mobility, making it possible for anyone with the ability and motivation to succeed. 10
Before considering pluralism and its varieties, one should be aware of the multi-faceted nature of the concept. As Sartori examined, pluralism emerged following the wars of religion in Europe during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; it assumes toleration and posits that the existence of diverse values within a society is an enriching and not destabilizing factor. 11 Lipset and Kornhauser argued that diversity rose with modernization. In this respect, societies characterized by social pluralism have been constructed through the recognition of diversity of interests, which can be organized and compete with one another on the basis of law. 12 Regarding the relationship of the concept with democracy, Conn suggests four basic themes. 13 First, social pluralism is regarded as promoting democratic norms by introducing citizens to democratic processes and peaceful conflict-solving strategies. Also, since diverse interests are accepted in such a society, citizens have the option to become members of different groups, which provides a broader spectrum of knowledge of differences and, in the end, makes them more tolerant of differences. In addition, social pluralism provides various communication lines within a society and helps increase the number of information sources. This brings the opportunity for citizens to explore political questions more and increase their participation in politics. Moreover, the existence of social pluralism facilitates the rise of talented individuals as candidates for political leadership positions. In the long run, social pluralism facilitates the development of healthy policy debates within the society.
Recent scientific research has confirmed that democracy has been facing a severe crisis worldwide. The authoritarian wave is deepening and encompassing more countries in its grip. 14 Populist leaders in different countries attack the basic principles of liberal democracy by changing the rules of the democratic game to their favour, which is named democratic backsliding in the literature. 15 Unlike in the past, democratic degradation occurs gradually; the tactics of new, emerging autocrats differ from previous examples. 16 In this context, institutions promoting liberal democratic values become their target; elite academic institutions are examples. Institutional autonomy and academic freedom are essential features of elite higher education institutions. Being equipped with these features, as Magna Charta Universitatum has described, higher education institutions are the loci for creating and disseminating knowledge through questioning established doctrines. 17 Hence, these institutions by nature nurture liberal democratic norms. In this regard, education plays a vital role in developing democratic culture. As Bergan et al. stated, it would be difficult to imagine democracy without academic freedom and institutional autonomy; equally, it would be difficult to imagine that these values would be established in the absence of a democratic setting. 18 One of the basic missions of elite higher education institutions is being loci for scientific research; the basic condition for conducting such research successfully is enjoying institutional autonomy. Furthermore, as Popper examined in his book, the critical aspect of research is an important component for scientific inquiry. 19 Regarding this, higher education should be built around critical thinking. This spread of critical thinking eventually deploys different ideas and values, which supports the revelation of various interests and thus social pluralism comes into the picture. In line with this, as Joan Wallach Scott argues, academic freedom and pluralism are necessary elements for higher education institutions fostering critical thinking, which would lead to finding and solving the problems in the world. 20 As Sartori pointed out, liberal democracy is based on dissent and diversity, unlike the ancient one. 21 Regarding the nature of populism, where the liberal norms of democracy are under assault through flattering polarization and rejecting pluralism, it is not surprising to witness an attack of populist discourse on academic freedom and the critical thinking aspects of higher education institutions.
Populism in Turkey and Hungary
To understand the rise of populism and its success in Turkey and Hungary, one needs to study the discourse of the Justice and Development Party (AKP) and the Alliance of Young Democrats (Fidesz), the two parties that dominate politics in these countries.
Turkey
To understand the rise of right-wing populism as a vital force in Turkish politics, one should look for its traces in late Ottoman and early republican Turkish history. Turkey’s defining social cleavages are described in the seminal work of Şerif Mardin, who emphasized the centre–periphery paradigm.
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In the Ottoman context, the centre was constituted by the sultan and the members of the military and civil bureaucracy, whereas the periphery was the rest of the society. State control over society and the role of religion in the public sphere emerged as key issues that eventually developed into a “culture war” (
Following the introduction of multi-party politics and the rise of the Democrat Party (DP) to power, the role of religion in the public sphere became a key element of Turkish populist mobilization. By criticizing the Kemalist elites for not developing an organic relationship with the people, the DP managed to win the first free and fair elections in Turkish political history. This right-wing populist discourse of DP facilitated its hegemonic position in Turkish politics until the coup d’état of 1960. The tutelary democracy introduced by the 1961 Constitution emerged as the key battleground for right-wing populism. Conservative Muslims, aka the periphery, were victimized by the new tutelary regime system; on the other hand, this victimization allowed them to appeal to the masses. Several military interventions into politics with the aim of suppressing the left victimized the periphery while paving the way for Turkish politics to evolve toward the right. 24 The urbanization process combined with industrialization established a new class within the cities, which blended with the Islamist political discourse, since the left-wing alternative proved unattractive while being brutally suppressed. The absence of a strong populist left paved the way for the hegemony of populist discourses shaped by right-wing movements.
This development created two camps within society: on one hand secularists, on the other hand conservatives. The liberal nature of the 1961 Constitution paved the way for the rise of political Islam, which blossomed under the National View movement (Milli Görüş) and its leader Necmettin Erbakan. However, the Kemalist elite took the rise of Islamist parties as a threat to the secularist values of the state; this paved the way for the ban of these parties. Meanwhile, following the 1980 coup, the Evren regime decided to support strengthening the role of Islam to fight Communist and leftist ideologies, which paved the way for a sharp rise in the fortunes of Islamist parties. 25 These parties engaged with populist discourse in their aim to represent the dispossessed and the poor. 26
AKP was established by members of the younger generation of the National View movement. By inheriting the populist attitudes of their seniors, the AKP and its leader, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, built his political appeal in the eyes of the masses, which benefited from the
By using an “us versus them” rhetoric, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan managed to build an image of himself as the “true” representative of the Turkish people. To realize this image and manifest his anti-establishment attitude, he stressed the division of Turkish society into “Black Turks,” the ordinary people, the majority oppressed and excluded from power, and “White Turks,” who represent the republican elites who had founded and governed the Republic against the will of the majority. This helped him present an image of a populist leader, which combined the “three dimensions of populism”: anti-establishment standing, anti-elitist standing, and a Manichaean worldview. 28 While there were additional reasons for launching such an attack, such as capturing key state institutions and converting political hegemony to cultural hegemony, populism remained an indispensable political tool to legitimize such an assault.
Hungary
In Hungary, the four-decade Communist regime left an indelible legacy on every aspect of social life. 29 The Hungarian People’s Republic was ruled by the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (MSZMP) under the influence of the Soviet Union from 1949 to 1989. In the first phase of the regime, the control of the Communist Party and the state was fierce. Soviet overlordship faced a major challenge on 23 October 1956, when thousands of Hungarians gathered in front of the National Assembly to protest the Stalinist regime. The peaceful demonstration turned into a massacre when security forces opened fire. The demonstrators fought back and managed to install a new government under the leadership of Imre Nagy. A Soviet military retreat proved short-lived. Returning with extra forces, the Soviets managed to suppress the revolution, and a new government was established under the leadership of János Kádár. The revolutionaries faced brutal repression to deter such attempts in the future, and the Kádár regime visualized this event as a horrible example for upcoming generations. Through these measures, it restricted all possibilities for mass mobilization to exert full political control over the country. 30 In the 1960s, under the Kádár administration, control over society and the economy somewhat relaxed; this opened the way for the rise of a second, shadow economy, where it became possible to do business beyond the control of the state. This contributed to the alienation of people from politics, in parallel with state pressure over individuals. These had a substantial effect on how politics and society were shaped following the transition to democracy. 31
The transition from a Communist regime to a democratic one took place through a round-table negotiation process between the regime and opposition groups. 32 It happened peacefully and brought the same six parties into parliament in the first two elections. 33 Since the economy was controlled by the state, party lines in the new regime were drawn on the cultural level, which had been affected by the social cleavages inherited from the previous regime. 34 A legacy of the Communist regime was also the absence of a strong civil society, which had an important effect on the voting behaviour of citizens; choices were made by personalistic appeals rather than ideological premises of parties. 35 While the Communist regime was indeed a deeply polarizing one, the newly founded democratic regime needed to find unity though the system introduced by round-table talks, in which elites made decisions in the name of society. All of these resulted in a chance for larger parties to dominate the political scene. However, this did not occur from the very beginning; polarization through social cleavages came onto the scene in the late 1990s and in the early years of the new millenium.
In these transition years, Viktor Orbán entered Hungarian politics as co-founder of the Fidesz movement. In the late 1980s, Orbán was a young liberal with an ambition to fight against Communism and promote liberalism. At that time, the party had a collective leadership and a strong appeal toward youth. Fidesz changed its political agenda when the leadership realized that it could win power only if it moved toward the political mainstream. 36 This brought a dilemma, since the party needed to decide whether to turn its face toward the centre-left or to the right by giving up its liberal tone. The party congress in 1993 brought Orbán to the leadership of the party. Orbán turned his and the party’s political agenda toward a more nationalist, conservative (in moral terms), and religious tone. Through this change, Fidesz metamorphosed into a right-wing party. In 1998, Fidesz emerged as the dominant force of the right; Hungarian politics was divided along a single left-right cleavage, where the left was represented by the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP, heir of the Communist party) and the right was represented by Fidesz. Fidesz managed to win an electoral victory in 1998 by adopting a populist tone, which could last only until the next elections. The 2002 elections witnessed the hitherto most visible polarization in Hungarian politics. Fidesz with its populist tone attacked political elites, banks, and multinationals and also started relying on national symbols. 37 However, this did not suffice for it to succeed. As a response to the electoral defeat, Orbán helped the populist discourse stay alive by organizing certain civil society organizations as “civic communities.” The 2006 parliamentary elections turned out to be a crucial point for Hungarian politics, paving the way for Orbán’s success in the 2010 elections. After the 2006 elections, people realized that the country’s economic and political crisis was more profound than thought, when a speech of Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány at a private party meeting, admitting that he had lied to voters, was leaked to the public. 38 Demonstrations calling for the resignation of Gyurcsány were held; Gyurcsány, however, stayed in power, implementing a deeply unpopular austerity program aiming to manage Hungary’s dire economic situation. These measures gave an opportunity for the rise of a populist wave in Hungarian politics. People who felt alienated due to the patronage system supported Orbán since he adopted a populist tone and situated society as the victim of government. 39 Gyurcsány eventually resigned in 2009. Therefore, an economic crisis paved the way for a reverse transition in Hungary—once a model democracy—from a consolidated democratic regime into an illiberal one.
After his success in the 2010 elections, Orbán riding on the populist narrative embarked on taking control of the media and the judiciary, lifting checks and balances and undermining the rule of law. Through an “us versus them” rhetoric, he declared the opposition as “elites” and the “people’s enemies.” One of his most important initiatives was the introduction of a new Constitution in 2011, which helped him to redesign the structure of politics in favour of his power. This newly established Constitution paved the way for the realization of his populist agenda and the consolidation of his rule. He used terms as “the people,” “the free Hungarians,” and “the Hungarians” to describe his supporters. As the economic crisis was increasingly felt, his neutral language shifted to a virulent nationalistic one when he started to fight a “war of independence” against international organizations such as the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Orbán started to increasingly identify himself with the people and its destiny, addressing them as “we, Hungarians.”
Attacking Elite Academic Institutions: Boğaziçi and the CEU as Victims of Populist Assault
Attacking Turkey’s and Hungary’s most prestigious academic institutions has emerged as a crucial common feature of Orbán’s and Erdogan’s populist tactics. Targeted as bastions of the country’s elites, liberalism, and pluralism, Boğaziçi University in Turkey and the CEU in Hungary became symbols of resistance against democratic backsliding.
Boğaziçi University
To better understand the semantics of the populist assault against Boğaziçi University, it is worth exploring the history of the institution. The roots of Boğaziçi University can be traced back to the late Ottoman Empire. Dr. Cyrus Hamlin, a U.S. missionary, and Mr. Christopher Rhinelander Robert, a U.S. merchant, decided in 1859 to establish a modern school that would provide a secular education, and they opened the school’s doors in 1863 under the name “Robert College.” The Board of Trustees set English as the language of instruction and posited that students would be accepted regardless of religion and ethnicity, and that education would be depoliticized. Following the establishment of a School of Engineering in 1912, the School of Business Administration and the School of Sciences were established in 1959. All of the above-mentioned faculties were placed within the “Yüksek Okul” (Higher School), which was established under the umbrella of Robert College. Until the late 1960s, the establishment of a separate university was not an option for the college. However, the political atmosphere of the late 1960s brought the Board of Trustees to a crossroads. 40 On 12 January 1971, the Constitutional Court annulled the “Law on Private Education Institutions,” which allowed private Higher Schools, as contrary to Article 120 of the Constitution. 41 With the decision of the Constitutional Court, the Board of Trustees had no other option but to transfer the “Higher School” to the Turkish government. As a result, Boğaziçi (Bosporus) University was established in 1971.
Despite its nationalization, the culture of Boğaziçi University managed to survive thanks to its faculty and administration. It could be traced back to the founding principles of Robert College, nurturing diversity, pluralism, and critical thinking. This has defined as “the culture of living together” by the members of the university, respecting difference and establishing unity within diversity.
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The most crucial factor that makes these differences to stick together could be described by the existence of a liberal democratic environment within the boundaries of the campus. This led to the emergence of Boğaziçi University as an island of academic excellence, liberalism, and pluralism within an increasingly polarized Turkish public sphere. This institutional culture was respected by the Turkish state and was nurtured by the university rectors for decades. Boğaziçi University’s special position became clear amid rising political polarization and human rights violations in the late 1990s. The rise of the headscarf question into a symbol of Turkey’s
As Turkey’s democratic backsliding gained momentum in the 2010s, Boğaziçi University’s adamant defence of fundamental rights and freedoms and its status as safe haven of dissident views attracted the attention of the Turkish government. The appointment of rectors became the tool through which the Turkish government aimed to take the University under its firm control. The history of appointing university rectors in Turkey was linked to the vicissitudes of Turkey’s democratization. Higher education was perceived as a crucial tool to promote modernization in the early republican years, and rectors were appointed by the President. 43 The advent of the multi-party era in 1946 brought the idea of institutional autonomy into the picture; universities were briefly placed at the heart of the selection procedure, though this did not last very long. With democratic backsliding in the 1970s and 1980s, state control over higher education became more rigid. The Law of Higher Education was approved under the Evren military regime in 1981, which founded a Higher Education Council (YÖK), raising it to a supervisory authority for all universities. This new law also granted the right of appointing rectors to the President. This illiberal and undemocratic procedure was amended in 1992; rectors were elected through a selection procedure within the universities overseen by YÖK. YÖK became responsible for nominating three candidates to the President; the President was granted the right to appoint one of these three candidates to the office.
Following its rise to power in November 2002, the AKP implemented a policy of proliferating higher education institutions across the country, already formulated in the 1980s under the slogan “one university per province.”
44
Tens of new public and private universities were established, particularly in less developed and rural regions of the country. This has been an important tool for the AKP populist discourse, as the AKP could claim that it broke the higher education monopoly of big cities and their elites and sharply increased the number of university students and graduates, notwithstanding the institutional integrity of universities and the quality of education offered. Before the AKP came to power in November 2002, there existed seventy-six universities in Turkey, fifty-three of which were public.
45
The data of 2021–2022 of higher education show that there were 208 universities, seventy-five of which were private non-profit universities.
46
Most of these universities served as an important tool for the AKP aim to establish cultural hegemony and nurture a “pious generation” as opposed to the “infidel generation” republican Turkey had educated with Western values. As Tekerek argued, this policy brought a model of the “university as the extension of political power” in the countryside.
47
These efforts were reinforced by the role the Directorate of Religious Affairs (
As Turkey’s autocratic shift was gaining momentum, university autonomy could not remain unaffected. In early 2016, the deputies of the incumbent AKP first brought a bill to parliament that entrusted the authority of appointing university rectors directly to the President. However, the bill was withdrawn as a result of the objections of the opposition. Nevertheless, given that a state of emergency was declared in Turkey following the failed coup of 15 July 2016, the bill came into force by presidential decree. YÖK became responsible in state universities for selecting and offering three rector candidates to the President, and President was granted the right to appoint one of these three candidates to the office. In accordance with the legislative decree of 2016 and given that the tenure of the incumbent rector at Boğaziçi University had been completed, YÖK brought the name only of the incumbent rector, Prof. Gülay Barbarosoğlu, who had received 86 percent of the vote in the intra-university election, to Recep Tayyip Erdoğan. However, rather than Barbarosoğlu, Erdoğan appointed Prof. Mehmed Özkan, who was the vice-rector at the time and who was not even a candidate in the elections. While the discretionary character of Erdoğan’s decision raised strong concerns, as this was the first time since the 1980 coup that the rector was imposed upon the university, the state of emergency and the fact that Özkan was a member of faculty and university administration watered down the reactions.
On the other hand, the 2 January 2021 appointment by presidential decree of Prof. Melih Bulu as the new rector of Boğaziçi University met with fierce reaction.
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Although Bulu was not the first appointed rector of the Boğaziçi University, he was the first appointee without any prior academic connection to the University. This decree was regarded as an attack against the values and the tradition of Boğaziçi University and a very ominous signal about the country’s developments. Both faculty and students started the protests, which metamorphosed into a “Boğaziçi Resistance” movement. In the protests, it was argued that rectors should be selected through an election process, an important tradition reflected in the Boğaziçi University culture. In line with this argument, the slogan of the student protests was shaped by their desire not to have a “trustee (
As explained earlier, while constructing the “us versus them” rhetoric, Erdoğan divided society into “White Turks” and “Black Turks.” In this context, a columnist of
However, when both personal experiences and statistics on admitted students are taken into account, it becomes clear that students from all around Anatolia make up the majority.
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When the protests started at Boğaziçi University, Erdoğan did not openly state that his moves toward restricting the university’s academic freedom were linked to its elite nature; however, from the early days of his rule, this fact could be traced. This idea found resonance in several pro-government media outlets. Hilal Kaplan, a columnist at
In his speech during the 2018 Boğaziçi Alumni Programme, Erdoğan stated that the reason for Boğaziçi University’s failure to achieve the place that it expected in the international arena resulted because of its failure not to rely on “national and local values” (
The CEU
Framing the CEU as an “elite,” “enemy institution” was relatively easy due to its affiliation with one of the most famous and controversial Hungarian entrepreneurs and philanthropists, George Soros. Born in Budapest in 1930 in a Hungarian Jewish family, Soros survived the Second World War and the Holocaust before pursuing his university studies at the London School of Economics (LSE) and then emigrating to the United States, where he became a towering figure of international finance. Recognizing the effect of his LSE mentor Karl Popper on his intellectual development, Soros dedicated a large part of his wealth to the promotion of liberal values. In line with this desire, he established the “Open Society Foundation,” with the mission to promote freedom of expression, accountable government, and societies on a global scale. 67 With the end of the Cold War, Soros also aspired to help the democratic transition of central and eastern Europe by establishing a model liberal university with campuses across the region. In 1991, following the desire of a group of intellectuals who envisioned an internationally recognized university in the heart of Europe, he helped found the CEU in Budapest, Prague, and Warsaw. The foundation of the CEU as a private non-profit organization in 1991 aimed not only to improve the quality of higher education in the host countries but also to become a model institution promoting liberal democratic values across central and eastern europe and to train the future elite of post-Communist Europe. The university’s founding mission was shaped by the ideals of open society and liberal democracy. Eventually, the CEU’s operations were concentrated in Budapest.
As democratic backsliding in Hungary was gaining pace, Soros and the CEU appeared as natural “enemy figures” for the Orbán administration. By depicting Soros and his influential network of charitable organizations as “shadow power,” Orbán portrayed the Soros network as a “threat” to national sovereignty and undertook the role of expelling it from Hungary. 68 As Orbán’s political agenda was shaped by a defence of traditional, conservative values, it was not surprising that the CEU became a battlefield. Since the beginning of the post-Communist era, Hungarian governments have not been successful in building a competitive higher education system. After several failed attempts to introduce a new higher education law, Orbán, following a constitutional amendment to his liking, introduced a law in 2011 dealing a grave blow against the institutional autonomy of universities. Similar to Turkey, with this new law state authorities were granted the power to make critical appointments in university administration. 69 In 2014, the office of university “chancellor,” directly appointed by the Prime Minister, was introduced in addition to that of rector, creating a dual executive governance structure. 70 The chancellor was named responsible for financial and personnel affairs, whereas the rector remained responsible for academic issues. 71 A year later, the government passed a law establishing a “consistory council” for each university, replacing the “financial council,” and bestowed it with veto powers over strategy and finance questions. 72 Each council consisted of five members, including the rector and the chancellor, while the remaining three members were appointed by the government. 73 Both steps proved crucial in ending the institutional autonomy of higher education institutions and imposing direct government control. Zoltán Balog, then Minister of Human Resources, submitted a bill to the parliament in March 2017 that became a watershed for the future of higher education institutions; as a result, foreign-funded higher education institutions faced unprecedented state regulation. This was regarded as a direct act against the CEU, the largest academic institution operating in the country under this framework.
Following Balog’s bill, on 4 April 2017, the parliament adopted certain amendments to the higher education law with the aim of strictly regulating the activities of foreign-funded higher education institutions in Hungary, also known as “Lex CEU.” This new law required that legal entities based outside the European Economic Area (EEA) had to operate in their country of origin in addition to Hungary and sign a bilateral agreement with the Hungarian government to continue their operations. As the “Lex CEU” stipulated, the CEU had to have a campus in the United States to continue its operations in Hungary.
Following the adoption of the “Lex CEU,” protests erupted involving people not from only Hungary but from all over the world. Hungarian liberal democrats were disappointed with the developments because Hungary, formerly an example of how a post-Communist country could succeed in democracy and liberalism, was backsliding into authoritarianism. The protests went beyond state legislation against the CEU but also addressed the threat to liberal democratic values, since the CEU was recognized as their fortress in Hungary. 74 The Orbán administration was targeting not only one university but also the ideals of open society and liberal democracy. Orbán, in one of his speeches, argued that Soros’s affiliation with the state in the 1990s provided the university with an unfair advantage over the other universities in the country. In his words, “Fraud is fraud. . . . We found that there are irregularities in the operation of several universities including ‘George Soros’ University.’” 75 To legitimize its act, the government argued that the “Lex CEU” was proposed to overcome this “unfairness,” since competition is intense among Hungarian universities and the CEU, through having an unfair advantage, harmed the other Hungarian universities.
Orbán’s populist discourse also developed into attacking liberalism. Claiming to protect national values, he took important steps against women and LGBTQI rights. One interesting example involving academic freedom was ending the Hungarian state accreditation of gender studies programs offered at Hungarian universities. This affected the gender studies program offered by the CEU and led to the cancellation of gender studies programs offered at other universities, including Eötvös Loránd University (ELTE). 76 As Elissa Helms and Andrea Krizsan pointed out, the existence of a Department of Gender Studies was highlighted as a crucial issue, which made visible attempts on campus to raise awareness of gender inequality, advocate, for LGBTQI rights, and denaturalize normative gender assumptions. 77 The government’s spokesperson, Gergely Gulyá, stated that “the government’s standpoint is that people are born either male or female. And we do not consider it acceptable to talk about socially constructed genders rather than biological sexes.” 78 Similarly, Deputy Prime Minister Zsolt Semjén stated that “gender studies programs have no business in universities as they represent an ideology, not a science.” 79 After Orbán’s decision, the European Parliament approved a resolution in which it called for EU member states to determine whether Hungary’s move was at risk of violating the Union’s founding values, including academic freedom and freedom of expression and association. 80 Since the participation of marginalized groups can indicate a more inclusive and democratic political environment, authoritarian governments often instrumentalize such issues. In this perspective, this move of the Hungarian government can be read as the beginning of a cultural shift from liberal values to a more conservative, homophobic national look, which Orbán had promised in the April 2018 elections. Orbán claimed to be responsible to “safeguard” values against Western liberalism and started his attack on the CEU under this populist premise. The CEU’s set strategic aim to educate a new academic and political elite embracing the ideals of open society and liberal democracy was portrayed as an elitist project against the will and the interests of the Hungarian people. By denigrating the CEU and Soros, Orbán had the opportunity to nurture his populist rhetoric, which proved a successful electoral strategy.
Democratic backsliding in Hungary could not escape the attention of the European Union. At the end of the month when the “Lex CEU” was adopted, the European Commission started its three-step EU infringement procedure against Hungary by arguing that the amendments to the Hungarian higher education law were
not compatible with the fundamental internal market freedoms, notably the freedom to provide services and the freedom of establishment but also with the right of academic freedom, the right to education and the freedom to conduct a business.
81
The Hungarian government responded that the higher education law was not violating EU law and refused to comply with the Commission position. As a result, the European Commission decided to take the case to the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in December 2017. 82 In October 2020, the Court ruled that the amended higher education law was incompatible with EU law and argued that Hungary was taking steps toward harming the checks and balances system by weakening institutions. 83 Meanwhile, the then rector of the CEU, Prof. Michael Ignatieff, came up with the idea of relocating the majority of university operations to Vienna. After all efforts to persuade the Hungarian government to reconsider its policy failed, the CEU U.S.-accredited courses were relocated to Vienna in September 2019.
Following the departure of the CEU from the country, the Orbán government took further steps to take the higher education system under its full control. The government started a process to transfer previously state-funded public universities to private governance structures thanks to the power granted by the new higher education legislation. The Corvinus University of Budapest was the first that underwent that transformation. It came under the control of a private foundation called
Conclusion
The attack of the Hungarian and Turkish governments on their countries’ most prestigious academic institutions caused great harm to both institutions and could be explained by the governments’ political agenda shaped by populism. By using a populist discourse, Orbán and Erdoğan managed to win the elections and then took essential steps to create a mechanism in which they would consolidate their grip on power by nurturing democratic backsliding. Both Boğaziçi University and the CEU have showcased how populist leaders can use their populist discourse to attack autonomous institutions and suppress liberal norms and possible opposition to pave the road toward democratic backsliding.
Both universities, through creating an atmosphere of critical thinking and pluralism, have taught their students to tolerate and celebrate difference, which in the long run can turn into respect for diversity. As explained earlier, the most visible enemy of the power base of populist leaders is the existence of liberal norms nurtured by autonomous systemic institutions. Hence, attacking elite academic institutions has become a crucial phase of their democratic backsliding strategy. Thanks to its academic excellence and normative environment, Boğaziçi University has served as a key institutional pillar promoting the social mobility of its students. Enrollment statistics have shown that the student ratio from public high schools is substantially higher than from private ones. 86 Similar to Boğaziçi, through making the CEU leave the country, the Hungarian government would deprive scores of Hungarian students of obtaining world-class education in their country either free of charge or supplemented by generous scholarships. 87 To understand the effect of the Orbán government on social mobility, one should look to the early years of Orbán’s rule. By introducing a new higher education act in 2011, the Hungarian government took essential steps toward limiting the access of students to higher education institutions. Fee-paying programs have also been expanded without fellowships for students in need or performing excellently. 88 Moreover, the government introduced an obligation for students who obtained a state-sponsored scholarship to either repay the amount after graduating or remain in the country and work for a given period. 89 Meanwhile, state subsidies allocated to higher education institutions started to drop after 2011. 90 Public higher education as a means for achieving social mobility and promoting liberal democratic values ceased to be a priority in Hungary. Both social pluralism and social liberalism with which these institutions equip their students weaken the grip of populist leaders on the society. As a response, by using a populist tone, Erdoğan and Orbán have positioned these two elite academic institutions as representing “them” in the typical “us versus them” dichotomy, and the elites educated in these institutions as the “enemy.” Both leading higher education institutions served as scapegoats for their populist rhetoric; Boğaziçi University and the CEU were attacked not only because of being islands of excellence but also because of the social values they espoused, which undermined the populist political agenda. By cancelling academic freedom and the autonomy of academic institutions, such as Boğaziçi University and the CEU, both Erdoğan and Orbán aspired to convert their political hegemony into cultural hegemony, testing the limits of their respective civil societies and the international community—in particular, the European Union.
