This study examines the factors that contributed to the success of the Serbian Radical Party (SRS) during Serbia's September 2004 local elections. Understanding the factors behind the SRS's success is important, both for the future of local government in an increasingly decentralized Serbia, and for electoral politics at the national level. Through quantitative analyses of election results across 160 localities and drawing from evidence gathered from interviews, media reports, and various analytical sources, the study demonstrates that a combination of new electoral laws, turnout levels, proportions of refugees and minorities, economic factors, and divisions amongst democratic bloc parties all contributed to variation in SRS success across Serbia's localities.
For one argument about the beneficial effects of decentralization for democracy, see Larry Diamond, Developing Democracy: Towards Consolidation (Baltimore : Johns Hopkins University Press, 1999), 117-60.
2.
Robert Thomas, The Politics of Serbia in the 1990s (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 81.
3.
Zoran Slavujević, "Razvrstavanje biračkog tela i relavantnih stranaka Srbije na osi "levica- desnica"," In Jovan Komšić, Dragomir Pantić, and Zoran Slavujević, eds., Osnovne linije partijskih podela i mogući pravci politićkog pregrupisavanja u Srbiji (Beograd: Libra, 2003 ), 129-63.
4.
Slavujević, "Razvrstavanje ," 147.
5.
Slavujević, "Razvrstavanje," 147. Several examples of the SRS's aggressive political tactics may be found in, Vera Didanović, "Preko "Ustaša" do birača," Vreme, 15 June 2006, 10-15.
6.
Marijana Milosavljević , "Aveti budućnosti," NIN, 15 June 2006, 12.
7.
Njegoš Manojlović , Odgovnornost politićkih stranaka: Izborne bajke ili posleizborna stvarnost (Beograd: Centar za slobodne izbore i demokratiju, 2005), 8-9.
8.
Robert Thomas, The Politics of Serbia in the 1990s (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 121.
9.
Robert Thomas, "The Politics of Serbia in the 1990s," 133-34.
10.
Bogoljub Milosavljević , Sistem lokalne samouprave u Srbiji, (Belgrade: Lighthouse, 2005), 55.
11.
Robert Thomas , "The Politics of Serbia in the 1990s," 301-2.
12.
Vera Didanović , "Mala zemlja, mnogo pobednika," Vreme, 7 October 2004, 13.
13.
Vjeran Pavlaković , "Serbia Transformed?" In Sabrina Ramet and Vjeran Pavlaković , eds., Serbia Since 1989: Politics and Society Under Milošević and After (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005), 4-54.
14.
Maja Miljković and Marko Attila Hoare, "Crime and the Economy Under Milošević and His Successors," In Sabrina Ramet and Vjeran Pavlaković, eds., Serbia Since 1989: Politics and Society Under Milošević and After (Seattle: University of Washington Press, 2005), 218.
15.
Obrad Kesić , "An Airplane with Eighteen Pilots," In Sabrina Ramet and Vjeran Pavlaković, eds., Serbia Since 1989: Politics and Society Under Milošević and After (Seattle : University of Washington Press, 2005), 95-121.
16.
Marijana Milosavljević , "Aveti budućnosti," NIN, 15 June 2006, 13.
17.
Interview, Miloš Todorović, 22 December 2005, Belgrade.
18.
Vera Didanović , "Deobe, priključenja i komentari," Vreme, 23 December 2004, 10-17.
19.
Centar za slobodne izbore i demokratiju, Direktorijum lokalnih samouprava u Srbiji (Niš: Zenit, 2005).
20.
Srećko Mihailović et al., Political Divisions and Value Orientation of Citizens in Serbia (Belgrade: CeSID, 2005), 29.
21.
See the Serbian Radical Party program at: http://www.srs.org.yu/onama/program.php.
22.
Branko Milanović , "Ko je glasao za radikale?" Prizma January 2004, 10-18.
Branko Milanović , "Ko je glasao za radikale?" Prizma January 2004, 10-18.
25.
D.V. Powers and J.H. Cox, "Echoes from the Past: The Relationship between Satisfaction with Economic Reforms and Voting Behavior in Poland," American Political Science Review91:3 (1997): 617-33; J.A. Tucker, Regional Economic Voting: Russia, Poland, Hungary, Slovakia, and the Czech Republic, 1990-1999 ( Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006); Hubert Tworzeski, "Welfare-State Attitudes and Electoral Outcomes in Hungary," Problems of Post-Communism47:6 (2000): 17-28; David Mason and Svetlana Sidorenko-Stephenson, " Public Opinion and the 1996 Elections in Russia: Nostalgic and Statist, Yet Pro-Market and Pro-Yeltsin," Slavic Review56:4 (1997): 698-717; Marcus A. G. Harper, "Economic Voting in Postcommunist Eastern Europe," Comparative Political Studies33:9 ( 2000): 1191-227.
26.
Marijana Milosavljević , "Aveti budućnosti," NIN, 15 June 2006, 13.
27.
Figures for DS and DSS supporters were 37% and 50%, respectively.
28.
Srećko Mihailović et al., Political Divisions and Value Orientation of Citizens in Serbia (Belgrade: CeSID, 2005), 8-10.
29.
Marijana Milosavljević , "Aveti budućnosti," NIN, 15 June 2006, 13.
30.
Interview with Aleksandar Prodanović, President DS, Sremska Mitrovica, Sremska Mitrovica, 5 January 2006; Interview with Petar Sokić, Indjija administration, Indjija, 31 May 2006; Interview with Vuk Dinčić, Head of DS, Zemun, Belgrade, 6 June 2006; Interview with Pavle Borovac, Former President of Kikinda DS, Kikinda, 1 June 2006.
31.
Interview with Miloš Todorović, 22 December 2006; Interview with Marijana Pajvancic, Novi Sad, 6 January 2006.
32.
For an extensive treatment of this issue, see Robert Thomas, The Politics of Serbia in the 1990s (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999).
33.
Interview, Pavle Borovac, Former President of Kikinda DS, Kikinda, 1 June 2006.
34.
Unemployment, budget, population, and nationality data were drawn from Republički zavod za statistiku Srbije, Opštine u Srbiji: 2005 (Belgrade: Republički zavod za statistiku Srbije, 2006). Election results were drawn from Republički zavod za statistiku Srbije, Izbori 2004 (Belgrade: Republički zavod za statistiku Srbije, 2005). Refugee data was drawn from Ministarstvo za ljudska i manjinska prava Srbije i Crne Gore, Izbeglički korpus u Srbiji (Beograd: Biografika, 2004).
35.
An influential case is an outlier that strongly influences the slope of the regression line, oftentimes distorting what would otherwise be a more consistent relationship across the remaining cases in the sample.
36.
A model (excluded here) including only the refugee variable explained an impressive 47% of the variation in the SRS vote.
