This article was finalized in April 2006, just after the last general elections in Hungary, and it explains the political developments until that date. It is well known that on 17 September an unprecedented revolt broke out in the country, with a direct confrontation of civilians and the police forces including the siege of the National television and the detention of hundreds of protestors. The explanation given for the revolt was the prime minister's leaked speech on the political lies of his own socialist party and the unrevealed economic situation of the country. Yet this article—written before the revolts—shows that confrontation was not solely the consequence of the leaked speech of the prime minister but of an already existing climate of political confrontation, here called “new populism.”
Communist internment camp in Northern Hungary, operational between 1950 and 1953. Around 1,300 people were held in custody mainly for “inadequate” political and religious ideas.
2.
Headquarters of the Arrowcross Hungarian Nazi Party, later of the communist terror organizations Magyar Államrendörség Államvédelmi Osztálya, or AVO, and Belügyminisztérium Államvédelmi Hatósága, or AVH.
3.
My translation of the words of Ferenc Gyurcsány, cited in “Kampány blogon, téren, piacon” [Campaign in blog in square in market], Népszabadság, 6 March 2006, http://www.nol .hu/cikk/396344/ (accessed 4 April 2006); and of János Áder, cited on the Web site of the FIDESZ Hungarian Civic Party in Veszprém, “Milyen telepre kívánja vinni Gyurcsány az Öt kritizálókat?” [To what kind of settlement Gyurcsány would like to bring his critics?], 28 February 2006, http://www.veszprem. fidesz.hu/index.php?CikkID=51502 (accessed 4 April2006).
4.
Agnes Rajacic, “Private Morals versus European Politics: The Mobilisation of National Myths from Hungary's Millennium (2000) to EU Integration (2004),” Ethnologia Balkanica 9(2006 ).
5.
“New Populists often call for issues of popular concern to be decided by referendum, bypassing professional politicians and leaving decisions to the people. Almost every scholar tends to define it being in opposition with the dominant bloc or a critic of democratic limitations.” In Margaret Canovan, “Populism for Political Theorists?”Journal of Political Ideologies9:3( 2004): 241-52. Some think of populism as the antagonism of elites and people who will necessarily remove the present social order: “Populism starts at the point where popular democratic elements are presented as an antagonistic option against the ideology of the dominant bloc.” In Ernesto Laclau, ed., Politics and Ideology in Marxist Theory (London: New Left Books, 1997), 173. “People” is, though, a much undertheorized element of populist theories. Canovan recognizes that political theory paid little attention to the notion. In Margaret Canovan, Populism ( New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1981).
6.
G. Ionescu and E. Gellner, eds., Populism: Its Meaning and National Characteristics (London: Macmillan, 1969); J.F. Conway, “The Nature of Populism: A Clarification,”Studies in Political Economy13(1984): 137-44.
7.
Canovan, “Populism for Political Theorists?”242.
8.
Hans-Georg Betz, Radical Right-Wing Populism in Western Europe (London: Macmillan, 1994); Erwin K. Scheuch and Hans-Dieter Klingemann, “Theorie des Rechtsradikalismus in westlichen Industriegesellschaften,”Hamburger Jahrbuch für Wirtschafts— undSozialpolitik12(1967): 11-19. Referred to in Cas Mudde, “The Populist Zeitgeist,”Government and Opposition39(2004): 541-63.
9.
The former citation is to Paul Taggart, Populism (Buckingham , UK: Open University Press, 2000 ); the latter one is to Mudde, “The Populist Zeitgeist,”546.
10.
Péter Niedermüller , A Nacionalizmus Kulturális Logikája a Posztszocializmusban [The Cultural Logic of Nationalism in Post-socialism] ( Budapest, Hungary: Századvég, 2000 ), 92-97.
11.
The general tendency of these critiques touched upon the cost, bad technical solutions, boring scenarios, inactions, or unimaginative re-creations of the represented historical times. Only a few of the critics dealt with the actualised content and the communicated idea of the films. For the assembled critics on the films see “Firka-Filmkritika-Kalauz,”http://www.geocities.com/firka2003/; for a list of the government-sponsored films, see Index, http://index.hu/kultur/pol/filmfinanc ; for general information on the spending and the involved institutions in the financing, see Tóth Valentin, “Megkettozott filmipar” [Doubled film industry], Index, 10 April 2001, http://index.hu/kultur/pol/mill_film (all sites accessed 11 May 2005).
12.
In Index we could detect harsh attacks on those who criticised the film Sacra Corona: Index forum, “Uj kötelezõ mozi: Sacra Corona”http://forum.index.hu/Article/showArticle?t=9033991 (accessed 22 October 2004).
13.
Allusion to the Hungarians of Romania, of Serbia, and of Slovakia. Speech of the prime minister on 20 August 2000, cited by András Gerö, “Két Milleneum Magyarországon” [Two millennia in Hungary], Mozgó Világ 8(2002): 22.
14.
This is very well portrayed by an interview with Károly Eperjes, the artistically—and also politically—engaged actor/protagonist of Hídember who firmly asserts that politics is the fight of Good and Bad: “. . . Because we cannot serve two Lords. To be on the right means to engage oneself to the better part, that is the moral of the Ten Commandments. This measurement has to be done. It is not enough that the former leader of the country is an authentic Right wing man, but his environment has to grow up also.” My translation of an interview with Károly Eperjes, made by Anita Élö, Heti Válasz, 18 August 2002.
15.
Laclau: “Does not populism become synonymous with politics? The answer can only be affirmative.” Cited in Yannis Stavrakakis, “Antinomies of Formalism: Laclau's Theory of Populism and the Lessons from Religious Populism in Greece,”Journal of Political Ideologies9:3(2004): 253-67.
16.
László Lengyel , “Tömegpropaganda és buborékpolitika,”Mozgó Világ32:1(January 2006): 35-45. According to some, the tendency originates from the '80's Thathcerian or Reaganian regimes, or in other explanations, from the modernist and consumer society. A convincing explanation can be found in Orsolya Reich, “A politika, mint élményfogyasztás,”Kultúra és közösség9:2(2005): 47-59. Drawing on Zygmunt Bauman, Reich links up the structure of consumer society with the way in which identity is defined. In a value-free world, one's identity is basically determined by what he or she has, what he or she consumes. In Bauman's interpretation, a consumer's enjoyment is furthermore the substitute of real—ontological or communal—freedom. If politics with the mediation of PR and the media wants to be sold according the laws of the free market, it is offering an identification similar to a consumer's choices.
Michael Stewart , “The Hungarian Status Law: A New European Form of Transnational Politics?” Diaspora12:1( 2003): 67-102.
19.
On behalf of FIDESZ and the Christian Democrats there were fears about the damages that a negative result of the referendum could do for neighboring Hungarians, of the damages which party propaganda and desinformation could do (on behalf of FIDESZ). On behalf of the liberal democrats (SZDSZ) there were fears of the damage that a positive result could engender within Serb, Romanian, and Ukrainian people surrounding outside Hungarians and, on the other hand, the pressure it would put on the budget itself. Socialists stressed that the referendum had to be initiated at all costs because opinions about what the results should be were not the matter of the Parliament. See all interventions in “A kettôs állampolgárságról: Adatok, állásfoglalások, elemzések” [On the double citizenship: Data, statements, analysis], http://www.kettosallampolgarsag.mtaki.hu/ (accessed 12 February 2006).
20.
For example, István Hiller, “A népszavazás zsákutca” [The referendum is a one-way-only street], 2 December 2004, Web page of the Socialist Party, MTI/mszp.hu.
21.
“Bocsássatok meg határontúli magyarok” [Forgive us Hungarians beyond borders], http://bocsassatokmeg.tubi.hu/ .
22.
These proposals were the “Homeland fund”; the provision of civil rights to ethnic Hungarians, an idea that the party sharply refused in 2001; and the delivery of Schengen passports.
23.
“Orbán: hóolvadás után nemzeti kormány” [Orbán: National government after the thaw], Magyar Hírlap (15 March 2006); Zsolt Gréczy, “Forradalom” [Revolution] , Népszabadság (10 January 2006).
24.
“Nemzet, haza, köztársaság: az ünnep kampánytémái,”Magyar Hírlap (15 March 2006).
25.
“Rend Örség, ügyészség, bíróság—gerjed a kampány” [Police, public prosecutor, tribunal—The campaign is turning on], Népszabadság (23 February 2006).
26.
Zoltán Lakner , “A magyar pártok és az Europai Unió: Az EU mint belpolitikai kérdés 1990 és 2004 között” [Hungarian parties and the European Union: The EU as a matter of internal politics between 1990 and 2004], Politikatudományi Szemle13:1/2(2004 ): 139-59.
27.
László Práger , “A magyar felzárkozás: versenyképesség, érdek-és értéktrendek a XXI sz. elején a globális világ és az Európai Unió terében” [The Hungarian line-up: Competitiveness, interest and value trends in the global world and the EU at the beginning of the XXIc.], Politikatudományi Szemle13:1/2(2004): 117-39.
28.
Cited in Mária Vásárhelyi , “Fecseg a felszín, hallgat a mély” [The surface babbling, the deep is silent], In Két Magyarország (Budapest, Hungary: Osiris, 2005), 186.
29.
László Lengyel , “Tömegpropaganda és buborékpolitika,” 35-45; György Bugyinszki, “Közéleti közléstan középhaladóknak” [Public communication for advanced], Mozgó Világ32:1(January 2006): 52-68; Ferenc Kumin, “Godolatok a média és a politikai kommunikáció kölcsönhatásairól” [Thinking on the interaction of political communication and media], Politikatudományi Szemle14:1( 2005): 105-25.
30.
László Kéri, “Agitprop, piár, politika” [Agitprop, PR, politics], Mozgó Világ32:1(January 2006): 45-52; Ripp Zoltán, “A populizmus árnyéka” [The shadow of populism], Mozgó Világ32:1(January 2006): 19-29; Eva Várhegyi, “Piár a gazdaságpolitikában” [PR in political economy], Mozgó Világ32:1(January 2006): 29-35.
31.
László Kéri, “Agitprop, piár, politika,”45-52.
32.
Péter Kende, “ Mit Öl van mégis két Magyarország?“ [Why is there two Hungary though?] , In Két Magyarország ( Budapest, Hungary: Osiris, 2005), 102-32; Vásárhelyi, “Fecseg a felszín, hallgat a mély,“ 166-99; Akos Szilágyi, “Egyet mondok-kettö lesz bel Öle” [If I say one, there will be two], In Két Magyarország (Budapest, Hungary: Osiris, 2005), 199-248.
33.
The last scandal of this type unfolded relating to the Oscar-winning film director István Szabó.
34.
C. Shore and A. Black, “ Citizens' Europe and the Construction of European Identity,“ In V. Goddard, J. R. Llobera, and C. Shore, eds., The Anthropology of Europe (Oxford, UK: Berg, 1994), 275-98.
35.
Michael Oakeshottnoted that faith and skepticism are two of the most important features of political modernism. Michael Oakeshott and Timothy Fuller, eds., The Politics of Faith and the Politics of Scepticism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1996).
36.
Explained in Yannis Stavrakakis, “Antinomies of Formalism: Laclau's Theory of Populism and the Lessons from Religious Populism in Greece,”262.
