Attaching political labels to a situation whose roots transcend politics constitutes a critical weakness of Western policies vis-à-vis Belarus. The contemporary nationalist discourse in Belarus allows one to discern three “national projects,” each being a corpus of ideas about Belarus “the way it should be”: (1) Nativist/pro-European, (2) Muscovite liberal, and (3) Creole. While the projects' nametags are debatable, the trichotomy is a useful abstraction, as it reflects the lines of force in the “magnetic field” of Belarusian nationalism. The article analyzes the strengths and weaknesses of each project, cultural wars between them, the role of a civilizational fault line that runs across Belarus and the attendant geopolitical divisions that underlie multiplicity of national projects. The idea is expressed of a desirable consensus based on the most viable aspects of the national projects.
Ales Antsipenka , “Zatsemki na Paliakh Belaruskai Mentalnastsi , Nashe Mneniye, www.mnnby.org, 23 September 2005.
2.
“The Dark Heart of Europe,” The Economist, 21 October 2004.
3.
Margarita M. Balmaceda, “Myth and Reality in the Belarusian-Russian Relationship,” Problems of Post-Communism46:3( 1999): 3.
4.
Steven M. Eke and Taras Kuzio, “Sultanism in Eastern Europe: The Socio-Political Roots of Authoritarian Populism in Belarus,” Europe-Asia Studies52:3(2000): 536.
5.
John McCain, U.S. Senator, Speech at “The New Atlantic Initiative” Conference, Washington, D.C., 14 November 2002, http://minsk.usembassy.gov/html/mccan.html.
This flag was a symbol of the Belarusian National Republic declared by the enthusiasts of the Belarusian idea in 1918 under German military occupation. The white-red-white flag was also used under another German occupation, particularly in its final 1943 to 1944 phase. In 1991, it became the official flag of independent Belarus. In 1995, the country returned to a slightly modified Soviet insignia, including a red-green flag with a strip of Belarusian folk ornament. Belarus is the only post-Soviet country to resort to Soviet-era symbols.
11.
A survey of two hundred randomly selected adult residents of Minsk was conducted in July 2005 by the Novak firm. Random route method was used in the study. To realize interviews with “difficult-of-access respondents,” at the end of each route quotas were used that made it possible to reach the required level of conformity between the universe and the sample. Respondents' gender and age were used as quota criteria. The main criterion was age. The correlation by gender was controlled during the study by each interviewer independently (about 50-50). When using quota by age, the following age groups were used: eighteen to twenty-four, twenty-five to thirty-four, thirty-five to forty-four, forty-five to fifty-four, and sixty-five-plus. The number of respondents in each age group was the same as in general population.
Independent Institute for Socio-Economic and Political Studies is an opposition-minded sociology firm. After the October 2004 referendum, IISEPS was denied registration by Belarus's government; it is now registered as a Lithuanian entity but continues to function in Minsk, for the most part on grants from Western donors.
14.
As for Ukraine, yet another Belarus neighbor, the responses to the same question would likely be different from those obtained in Belarus as well, although some regions of eastern and southern Ukraine may actually harbor similar reactions.
15.
Alexander Yaroshuk , “Pust' Putin Otchitayetsia,” Belorusskaya Delovaya Gazeta, 23 August 2002, www.bdg.by/newsnews/news.shtml?0871,1.
16.
See, for example, Alexander Bekker, “Lukashenko Otstupil,” Vedomosti, 20 February 2004.
17.
Jan Zaprudnik , “Belarus: In Search of National Identity between 1986 and 2000,” In Elena A. Korosteleva, Colin W. Lawson, and Rosalind Marsh, eds., Contemporary Belarus: Between Democracy and Dictatorship (London/ New York: Routledge/Curzon, 2003), 112-24.
18.
Piotr Martsev , “Prezident v Kotle” [President in a Hot Spot], Belorusskaya Delovaya Gazeta, 25 February 2004.
While some Belarusians still favor merging into one state with Russia, there are fewer of them today than before February 2004 and decidedly fewer than before May 2002. In 1998, their political affiliation, Belaya Rus, did not even apply for requisite government reregistration. Either they failed to round up the one thousand followers required by law or the government gently advised them to dematerialize (Yury Drakokhrust, “ `Pamiarkounasts' Zhiviot i Pobezhdayet,” Kuriyer 2 [2002]).
25.
Ioffe, “Understanding Belarus,” 1263-66.
26.
Jan Zaprudnik, Belarus at a Crossroads of History (Boulder, CO: Westview, 1993).
27.
Samuel P. Huntington, The Clash of Civilizations (New York: Simon & Shuster, 1996), 20.
28.
Interview with Valyantsin Akudovich, Belaruskaya Atlyantyda, radio talk show of the Belarusian Service of Radio Liberty, 23 June 2005, www.svaboda.org.
National Composition of Population of the Republic of Belarus and Languages Used by the Population (Minsk, Belarus: Ministry of Statistics and Analysis2001), 326.
31.
Discontinued in March 2006, it now exists only online at www.bdg.by.
32.
Vladimir Dorokhov, “ Trusovskaya Logika,” Belorusskaya Delovaya Gazeta, 12 August 2005.
Yury Drakokhrust , “Belorusskii Natsionalism Govorit Po-Russki ,” Belorusskaya Delovaya Gazeta, 19 January 1998. In Russian-language publications, the name of this author is spelled “Drakokhrust,” whereas in Belarusian-language sources it is spelled “Drakakhrust.”
Obrashcheniye Vitaliya Silitskogo, Nashe Mneniye , 10 August 2005, www.mnnby.org.
42.
Ibid.
43.
Alexander Feduta , “Bol'noi Zub,” Nashe Mneniye, 12 August 2005, www.nmnby.org .
44.
Yury Drakakhrust , “Yashche Raz pra Zhaneuskuyu Kanventsiyu ,” Nashe Mneniye, 23 August 2005, www.nmnby.org.
45.
Vadim Kaznacheyev , “Volna i Pena,” Nashe Mneniye, 31 August 2005, www.mnnby.org .
46.
“Sprechki Vakol Movy Novai Pragramy Niametskoi Khvali dlia Belarusi” (Dialogue between Svetlana Alexievich and Gennadz Buraukin), Prazhski Accent (talk show of the Belarusian Service of Radio Liberty), 24 September 2005, www.svaboda.org.
47.
Akhrem Matyl, “ Paslaidounyya, razcharavanyya i Inshyya,” Nashe Mneniye , 25 August 2005, www.nmnby.org.
Andrei Dyn'ko , “Poplech tsi Pobach?” Nashe Mneniye, 12 August 2005, www.nmnby.org .
51.
Ibid.
52.
Yury Drakakhrust , “Yashche Raz pra Zhaneuskuyu Kanventsiyu ,” Nashe Mneniye, 23 August 2005, ww.nmnby.org.
53.
Dyn'ko, “Poplech tsi Pobach?”
54.
Andrei Dyn'ko , “Deutsche Welle, Braty-Rusafily,” Nasha Niva, 2 September 2005.
55.
Creatures whose historical memory was surgically removed from their brain; they are pictured by Chingiz Aitmatov in his hallmark novel The Day Lasts More Than a Hundred Years, trans. F. J. French ( Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1980). See also Mykola Ryabchuk, Vid Malorossii do Ukraini ( Kiev, Ukraine: Kritika, 2000).
56.
Uladzimer Abushenka, “ Mickiewicz kak `Kreol': ot `Tuteishikh Geneologii' k Geneologii Tuteshastsi ,” http://www.lib.by/frahmenty/sem-abuszenka.htm .
Alexander Feduta, “ Nedoliot,” Nashe Mneniye, 3 August 2005 , www.nmnby.org.
62.
See John Loftus, The Belarus Secret (New York: Knopf , 1982); see also Belarusian Nazi during World War II and Their Work for the Cold War, http://www.geocities.com/dudar2000/Bcc.htm. A few alleged collaborators who found themselves in the West were tried and convicted. Anton (Andrei) Savoniuk, who in 1999 was given two life sentences for his role in a 1942 massacre of Jews, died in a British prison in November 2005.
63.
David Marples , “Europe's Last Dictatorship: The Roots and Perspectives of Authoritarian-ism in `White Russia,' ” Europe-Asia Studies57:6(2005): 905.
64.
Ioffe, “Understanding Belarus,” 1248.
65.
Andrei Vardomatsky, “ Belarus i Mir” [Belarus and the World], Analiticheskii Biulleten Belorusskikh Fabrik Mysli 2 (2000): 18-30.
66.
Alexander Lukashenka, Stenogramma Vystupleniya pered Studencheskoi Molodiozh'yu Brestchiny, 23 September 2004. www.president.gov.by.
67.
Grigory Ioffe , “Belarus: The Nation Yet to Be United. Reflections on the Book by Yury Shevtsov,” Eurasian Geography and Economics (forthcoming).
68.
Grigory Minenkov , “Zametki o Yazyke, Znanii Puti i Prochem ,” Nashe Mneniye, 23 August 2005, www.nmnby.org.
69.
Ernest Gellner , Nations and Nationalism ( Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983), 57.
70.
Grigory Ioffe , “Understanding Belarus: The Questions of Language,” Europe-Asia Studies55:7(2003): 1009—1047.
71.
Valyantsin Akudovich , “Bez Nas,” Nasha Niva, 28 March 2003, accessed at www.litara.net .
72.
Valyantsin Akudovich , “Vaina Kulturau ili Piramida Kheopsu za Muram Minskaga Zamku” (2005), http://www.knihi.com/.
73.
From 1998 to 2002, Transparency International (TI) considered Belarus to be one of 50 countries with the least corruption. More specifically, the 2002 ranking of 102 world nations on “perceived corruption” had Belarus as number 36, tied with Lithuania and less corrupt than Poland (ranked 45), not to mention Russia (71), and Ukraine (85). In 2003, Belarus was ranked 53; in 2004 its rank was within the range 74-78; and in 2005, within the range 107-116. A change of this magnitude within just three unremarkable years defies objective explanation and allows one to suspect regrettable corruption of TI's criteria, that is, their infusion with politics. This suspicion finds tentative confirmation in the 25 October 2005 broadcast of the Prague Accent, a talk show of the Belarusian service of Radio Liberty. “What happened? Did they begin to steal more in Belarus?” asks the talk show's host. Says Yaroslaw Romanchuk, one of the leaders of the United Civic Party of Belarus' standing in opposition to Lukashenka: “The authors justly call this index [TI's corruption index] a perception index—this is how corruption is perceived by different personalities and institutions. Belarus' rating of 2.6 [on the 0-10 scale where 10 stands for the total lack of corruption] was assigned on the basis of responses to five questions given by ... the Economist Intelligence Unit, Freedom House, and UN. The presence of these organizations in Belarus is not wide enough to monitor all changes in our legislation and practical relationships between business and state. I met with TI's experts and explained to them the methodological differences between corruption estimates in market and non-market countries. And two years of those discussions and explanations brought about the result which led to an essential methodological correction” (http://www.svaboda .org/textarticlesprograms/pragueaccent/2005/10/27).
74.
Grigory Ioffe , “Understanding Belarus: Economy and Political Landscape,” Europe-Asia Studies56, no. 1 (2004): 85-118.
75.
Interview with Svetlana Alexievich, Izvestia , 14 May 2004, www.izvestia.ru/person/article103553 .
76.
Sergei Nekhamkin, “ Na Put' Ispravleniya Nie Vstal,” Izvestia, 16 December 2003, www.izvestia.ru/world/article42249 .
77.
Yury Drakokhrust, “ Sapega i Masherov,” Svobodnyye Novosti 33 (31 August 2001), http://www.bymedia.net/press/gazeta.article.php?articleID=146193 .
78.
Alexei Pankin, “ Demos i Kratos v Belorussii i v Rossii,” Izvestia, 3 November 2004, www.izvestia.ru/comment/629774_print .
79.
Miroslav Hroch, Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations, 2nd ed. (New York: Columbia University Press, 2000).
80.
Stephen Shulman , “National Identity and Public Support for Political and Economic Reform in Ukraine,” Slavic Review64:1(2005): 59-87.
