Sage Journals: Discover world-class research

Abstract

Social welfare has increasingly been downloaded to community and faith-based organizations (FBOs). Many FBOs adhere to religious fundamentalist views that challenge the rights of equality-seeking groups and conflict with international human rights laws and the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. Regulations or policies governing how FBOs provide public services are lacking or nonexistent. This article explores guidelines emanating from court decisions on the Charter of Rights and Freedoms’ interpretation of religious freedom and provides a framework through which governments may develop policy governing the delivery of faith-based public services in a manner consistent with equality rights.

Keywords

administration ethics human rights religions and culture research categories social justice social work practice

Introduction

Reverend, missionary work is a great bargain …

but it is a hell of a way to deliver social services.

Kingsolver (1998, p. 120).

The commodification of welfare services within a neoliberal economic and social environment has brought changes to the delivery of social services around the world (Ferguson, Wu, Spruijt-Metz, & Dyrness, 2007; Grills, 2009). In Canada, social-service initiatives, once the domain of local and nation states have increasingly been downloaded to community-based organizations (CBOs), the rationale being government’s perceived need to cut deficits so as to make us more compatible in a globalized economy (De Sousa Santos, 2006; Midgley, 1997; Watkinson, 2001). Along with this trend is the emergence of religiously based organizations eager to provide social welfare services. Some faith-based organizations (FBOs) adhere to religious fundamentalist views that are in direct contradiction to international human rights laws and Canadian laws, in particular the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms as well as the Canadian Association of Social Workers Code of Ethics. Religious fundamentalism legitimizes patriarchal authority and power that has led to the exclusion of women, children, and other equality-seeking groups from exercising their equality rights—including their right to religion and freedom from religion (Howland, 2005; Watkinson, 2004). Equality-seeking groups have much to fear.

Even so, the views and practices of religious fundamentalism are finding legitimacy within Canadian politics, social policy, and public services (Gruending, 2011; McDonald, 2010; Watkinson, 2004) without any obvious policies or guidelines governing their service provision. In fact, a recent study looking into international grant money given out by the Federal Government to the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA)¹ found a sharp rise in funding of religious nonprofit groups. Over a 5-year period beginning in 2005, religious nonprofit groups received a 42% increase in federal funding compared to a 5% increase for secular NGOs (Audet, Paquette, & Bergeron, 2013; Basen, 2013).²

The purpose of this article is to consider the intersection of policy implications regarding the delivery of public services³ by FBOs and our commitment to human rights, social justice, and antioppressive social work practice in Canada and elsewhere.

The Second Coming

Social responsibility has its roots in our belief in humanity and is expressed in our willingness to assist others—to come to another’s assistance (Graham, Swift, & Delaney, 2012). Historically, social responsibility has manifested itself in services provided by individuals, organizations, and especially religious organizations. Within Christian countries, churches provided assistance to the poor funded in part by tithing to the church. The services were a charity. But as Attlee noted in his 1920 book The Social Worker, “[i]n charity there is no right: whatever is provided is a gift” (1920, p. 30).

The Elizabethan Poor Laws of 1601 saw a move away from the “charity” model to the provision of social services as a “legal right” and while the administration of the services to the poor were, for the most part, carried out by churches, the significance of the changes meant that the state was taking a major role in the provision of services. The Elizabethan Poor Laws were in some cases repressive but as Trattner notes, the establishment of social welfare entitlements through law was constructive “especially its assumption that the state had a responsibility to supplement ordinary efforts to relieve want and suffering and to insure the maintenance of life” (1979, p. 10).

This history is of particular interest to the development of Canadian social welfare. Religious organizations played a significant role not only as service providers but also as social reformers. The social movement known as the “Social Gospel” is credited with the establishment of reforms aimed at improving the lives of women and families, transient and homeless men, orphaned children, immigrants, seniors, and prisoners (Turner & Turner, 2009). Jimenez points out that religions have a great deal to offer the profession of social work, “Its commitment to the dignity and worth of all people, … to social justice … the social gospel movement, liberation theology … and the development of policies and programs to meet the needs of oppressed groups …,” but cautions against Christian fundamentalist views, which have and do use religion to justify disparaging some oppressed groups (2006, p. 187).

The involvement of religious organizations in improving the social fabric of Canadian society was welcomed. However, as noted earlier, it was a charity—a gift—rather than a right. Eventually social welfare was increasingly taken over by various levels of government thus assuming state responsibility of social welfare. Today, state delivery of public services appears to be reversing back to community delivery, including religious delivery. Governments are increasingly downloading what was once assumed to be their responsibility, on to CBOs. As noted earlier, FBOs have been stepping into the breach as if by stealth. And some of these FBOs hold fundamentalist beliefs which, when practiced, are harmful to women and other equality-seeking groups.

Religious Fundamentalism and Equality

Religious fundamentalism is defined, by Howland (2005) as a group that believes:

society needs to be rescued from the secular state; rejects Enlightenment norms, particularly individual rights and secularism; is committed to the authority of ancient scripture; holds a total worldview such that religious beliefs are inseparable from politics, law, and culture, relies on an idealized past; is selective in drawing from the past for religious traditions and orthodox practice; centers that idealized past in a patriarchal framework mandating separate gender spheres and a pristine morality; rejects outsiders and the concept of pluralism; and is committed to activism and fighting for changed social, political, and legal order (p. 158).

Although this definition applies to all religious faiths, the focus of this article will be on Christian fundamentalism as the Christian faith is historically the most influential religion in the English-speaking world.

Some of the beliefs and practices of religious fundamentalism do not work well and are indeed harmful to women, children, gays, lesbians and other sexual minorities (Watkinson, 2004/2005). Their beliefs and practices are the antithesis of contemporary human rights principles which call for the recognition of the inherent dignity and equal rights of all citizens. They are also the antithesis of our efforts to ensure that social work practice works to alleviate coercive institutions (Ife, 2012; Mullaly, 2010).

One of the hallmarks of religious fundamentalism is a literal, but selective, interpretation of the Bible sometimes used to legitimize Church and patriarchal authority and power (Audet et al., 2013; Howland, 2005; Spong, 1991; van Wijk-Bos, 1991). van Wijk-Bos (1991) notes that “The Bible was composed in a patriarchal culture and bears everywhere the stamp of the patriarchal structures and the ideologies that accompany and support these structures” (p. 63). The reinforcement of patriarchy is a common thread shared among all forms of religious beliefs described as fundamentalist (Rose, 1999). A literal interpretation of the Bible can be used to argue for woman to be obedient and submissive to their fathers and husbands,⁴ to defend the use of child physical punishment,⁵ to condemn homosexuality to the point of calling for their death,⁶ and to justify slavery.⁷

The fact that many of the Biblical messages selected for a literal interpretation reinforce male heterosexual hegemony needs to be questioned and consistently challenged. And when religious fundamentalist organizations spread their influence into the public sphere, and with it their views of women, children and other equality-seeking groups, their religious beliefs become a moral and legal issue—one that may violate the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, international human rights documents and ethical social work practice.

The American Experience With FBO Public Service Delivering

In the United States, the increase in the number and scope of FBOs providing public services came about as a result of the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act of 1996 (Bane, Coffin, & Thiemann, 2000; Boddie & Cnaan, 2006). Embedded in the legislation is the Charitable Choice provision which explicitly invites FBOs and secular organizations to provide public services (Cnaan & Boddie, 2006). However, it was not until George W. Bush became President that the gates opened for FBOs to step up to the plate and receive government funding in exchange for providing public services. Nine days into his presidency, George W. Bush established the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives (Wineburg, 2007). Later in the spring of 2001, he introduced faith-based legislation entitled the Charity, Aid, Recovery and Empowerment Act (CARE). President Bush was unable to get the legislation passed through Congress and instead signed executive orders opening the door for more faith-based agencies to compete for public contracts (Aka, 2008). As Ryden and Polet (2005, p. 3) explain, he did “by administrative fiat what he was unable to accomplish legislatively.” It has become “a multibillion dollar enterprise” (Boden, 2005/2006, p. 991). Within a 2-year span, the White House Office of Faith-Based and Community Initiatives awarded more than US$1.1 billion to FBOs (Ryden & Polet, 2005). In a survey of five federal agencies, during the fiscal year of 2004, US$2.1 billion in federal funding was provided to FBOs (Boden, 2005/2006). The United States Department of Health and Human Services, with responsibilities for, among others, poor families, prisoner rehabilitation, children of prisoners, and high-risk youth, provided US$99.5 million in funding to faith-based service providers within a 3-year period (Ferguson et al., 2007). Most of those receiving federal money were Christian organizations (Kaplan, 2004; Kemp, 2007). At the same time, it is reported that religious groups have difficulty meeting the regulatory standards in hiring specialized staff such as qualified social workers to deliver social services (Boden, 2005/2006).

The United States has had more experience than Canada with FBOs delivering public services. There is ongoing concern raised in the United States that some religious organizations, mandated to provide public services, promote and practice tenets that undermine our understanding and protection of human rights (Ebaugh, Chafetz, & Pipes, 2006; Monsma, 2000). For example, the state of Virginia passed a bill allowing state-funded faith-based adoption agencies to refuse adoption services to couples based on their gender, sexual orientation, and family status (Kumar, 2012), the FBO, the Salvation Army asked for an exemption from United States federal legislation so that they could restrict their hiring practices to heterosexuals (Carney, 2002) and others have used the delivery of public service to promote their religious beliefs and doctrines (Ebaugh, Chafetz, & Pipes, 2006; Monsma, 2000; Sager, 2011). The American National Association of Social Workers (NASW) is opposed to faith-based public service delivery. Their objections flow from concerns about “proselytization, discrimination in hiring and service delivery, and frequent lack of expertise to manage complex psychosocial issues” (Tangenberg, 2004, p. 4).

The First Amendment of the American Constitution, referred to as the Establishment Clause, states “Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion.” According to Aka (2008, p. 66) it is “directed at eliminating four evils pertaining to government involvement in religion: sponsorship, financial support, active involvement of the government in religious activity, and political divisiveness and fragmentation along religious lines.”

The now disbanded Round Table on Religion and Social Welfare Policy, a nonpartisan research center established by the Pew Charitable Trusts, monitored legal challenges to the faith-based initiative. It is difficult to determine how many challenges have been made as many cases are under appeal. However, the cases ranged from challenges to using Federal money to fund AmeriCorps employees to teach religion in a Texas Catholic school (Wineburg, 2007) to the promotion of religious programming in prisons (Lupu & Tuttle, 2008; Sullivan, 2009).

One such program was the InnerChange Freedom Initiative setup in an Iowa prison and part of the Prison Fellowship Ministry program (Sullivan, 2009). The program was challenged by the Americans United for Separation of Church and State (AUSCS) as a violation of the First Amendment. The case of Americans United for Separation of Church and State (AUSCS) v. Prison Fellowship Ministries (2003) argued that the InnerChange Freedom Initiative discriminated on the basis of religion since it was intrinsically religious and operated in a government facility. According to Kennedy (2005), “[i]nmates who participate in the program are housed in a separate unit and immersed in ‘24-hour per day Christ-centered Bible-based programming’” (Kennedy, 2005, p. 50). AUSCS alleged that a large part of the InnerChange program was funded by the state and accepts only those who are willing to accept “fundamentalist, evangelical Christianity,” thus discriminating against prisoners who do not practice this type of religion (Kennedy, 2005, p. 50). Jack Cowley the national director for InnerChange Prison Fellowship Ministries said “We believe that crime is a result of sin, therefore, a relationship with Christ can keep one from a life of crime” (Kennedy, 2005, p. 47).

Participants in the InnerChange program, dubbed the God Pod, enjoyed special privileges not available to other prisoners such as having keys to their own cells and a private bathroom while the rest of the population live in lock up units with toilet stools in the middle of the cell. Participants in the InnerChange program also have additional family visits, free phone calls, and access to computers and big screen televisions (Kennedy, 2005, p. 51, citing from the factum filed by AUSCS). AUSCS argued that the program was unconstitutional because it provides incentives to prisoners to subject themselves to religious indoctrination (Kennedy, 2005). Moreover, Prison Fellowship Ministries and InnerChange employ only Christians and only Christians can act as volunteers (Kennedy, 2005).

The case was eventually heard by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit which, in late 2007, agreed with a lower Court finding that the state of Iowa’s joint venture with InnerChange was unconstitutional. The Court found that the program was designed to indoctrinate prisoners through evangelical Christian practices such as Bible study, religious revivals and church services, and the Christian evangelical program was directly funded by the government who further provided InnerChange with control of superior physical space within the prison. The program was only offered to those who agreed to take part in Christian transformation and “was not allocated on neutral criteria and was not available on a nondiscriminatory basis” (Lupu & Tuttle, 2008, p. 83). A similar program has been promoted by Prison Fellowship Canada. Eleanor Cliterous, speaking on the CBC radio program “Q” described her organizations attempts to have the InnerChange program incorporated into a new women’s prison in Manitoba (Canadian Broadcasting Corporation, December 4, 2009). This has not yet happened. The reasoning that led to the InnerChange program being found unconstitutional in the United States may have implications for similar situations in Canada.

The Canadian Experience With FBO Public Services Delivery

As noted earlier, religious organizations in Canada appear to be reestablishing themselves in the sphere of public service delivery (Audet et al., 2013; Haight, 2003; Saskatchewan Housing, 2008). At the same time, the Supreme Court of Canada has issued a number of decisions arising from the Charter of Rights and Freedoms that are relevant to the issue of religion and public service delivery (Trinity Western v. BCCT, 2001; Chamberlain v. Surrey School District No. 36, 2002; Eldridge v. British Columbia, 1997; Reference Re Same-Sex Marriage, 2004; R. v. Big M., 1985). The move to increasingly include FBOs in the delivery of public services has been brought about, in part, by government restructuring of its services (Watkinson, 2004). In the 1990s, provincial, federal, and municipal governments in Canada attempted to reduce their deficits by cutting social programs (Lessa, 2006; Rice & Prince, 2013; Wharf & McKenzie, 2009). Federal transfer payments were cut leaving provinces with fewer resources with which to provide public services (Day & Brodsky, 1998; Graham, Swift, & Delaney, 2012). The push to download public services onto FBOs has taken off in the United States and is seen by some to be a “huge privatization scheme …” (Kaplan, 2004, p. 47) that once in place can be switched off in an instant effectively starving “the beast.”⁸

In Canada, there appears to be no explicit federal or provincial pieces of legislation governing the involvement of FBOs in public service, yet there is an expanding trend to encourage faith-based service delivery (Audet et al., 2013; Saskatchewan Housing, 2008) and with it, the money and an audience.

Public education provides many opportunities for such audiences. During the summer of 2004, the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) conducted an investigation into allegations of sexual abuse and sexual exploitation in the polygamous community of Bountiful in British Columbia (B. C. RCMP to Investigate, 2004). Bountiful was established over 40 years ago by a breakaway group of Mormons. Their sect is part of the Fundamentalist Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints. Bountiful has its own school which receives government funding. Part of the RCMP investigation was directed at allegations that the schools’ curriculum promotes beliefs in the subordination of women and espouses white supremacist views. According to a 2002 report issued by the Government Education Ministry, “Bountiful girls were allowed to do only ‘preparing, catering, and cleaning up after a meal’ and ‘sewing and experiencing other types of handwork or needlework’” (Bramham, 2004, p. A15).⁹ A Winnipeg Christian charity, Youth for Christ¹⁰ was granted US$3.2 million in federal infrastructure stimulus funding to assist in the building of a US$11.5 million community center. New Democratic Party Member of Parliament Pat Martin opposed the grant going to an organization that, according to the report, “seeks converts.” Martin questioned whether funding would have been made available “if this group was called Youth for Allah?” (Wells, 2010, p. 23).

Recently, researchers reviewed Federal funding handed out to organizations through the CIDA between 2001 and 2010. The period covers 5 years of the Liberal Government (2001–2005) and 5 years of the Conservative Government of Canada (2005–2010). They classified the agencies as secular NGOs, religious NGOs, and proselytist NGOs. The distinction between a religious and proselytist NGO was based on their mission and values and the degree to which they aim to “transform and promote religious faith” (Audet et al., 2013, p. 297). The authors report that:

During the Liberal government of 2001–2005, funding to secular NGOs (SNGOs) increased by 27.1 per cent, while funding to RNGOs [religious NGO s] decreased by 4.6 per cent. During the Conservative government of 2005–2010, funding to SNGOs increased by a mere 5 per cent, while funding to RNGOs increased by 42 per cent. (Audet et al., 2013, p. 299)

The increase in funding to FBOs was particularly evident in the funding of proselytizing agencies under the Conservative Government. During the Liberal era, FBOs, identified as proselytizing organizations, saw a decrease in their funding by 2.4%. Funding for the proselytizing organizations “skyrocketed during the Conservative period, with an increase of 74.6 percent” (Audet et al., 2013, p. 300). FBOs that were not considered proselytizing had their funding reduced by 5.7% during the Liberal period and increased by 27.8% during the Conservative period (Audet et al., 2013).

Abortion plays a major role in which organizations receive federal international funding. While abortion has been determined, by the Canadian Supreme Court, to be a woman’s right to security of her person and a liberty right (R. v. Morgentaler, 1988), the International Development Minister said the Canadian Federal Government will not fund international agencies that assist war rape victims and child brides, in other parts of the world, to obtain an abortion (Canada won’t fund abortion, 2013).

Human Rights and Public Services Delivery

The Charter of Rights and Freedoms (hereinafter, the Charter), by virtue of its location within Canada’s constitution, makes it part of Canada’s supreme law (Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson, 1989). The Supreme Court of Canada’s interpretation of the Charter, including its application, the limits to be placed on rights and freedoms, and the interpretation of equality rights, are instructive in the development of public policy (Faraday, Denike, & Stephenson, 2006; Watkinson, 2006). The Charter of Rights and Freedoms protects the equality and fundamental freedoms of all Canadian citizens including the right to religious freedoms and freedom from religion (R. v. Big M., 1985; Trinity Western, 2001). The Supreme Court has ruled that section 2(a) of the Charter ¹¹ protects the autonomy of citizens to practice their religious beliefs. The Court also ruled that this same Charter right prohibits state coercion or constraint in matters of conscience or faith. State coercion is found in state support for a particular religion which, according to the Supreme Court, “is coercive because it puts pressure on non-adherents to conform to the favoured religion … it signals to them that they are not full members of the political community, that they are less worthy or deserving than others” (Moon, 2009, p. 221). Moon (2009) points out that freedom of religion has two sides: “it protects the individual’s freedom to religion and her freedom from religion” (p. 220). The equality rights section of the Charter affirms the equality rights of all people to be free from discrimination based on, but not limited to, sex, age, disability, religion, marital status (Miron, 1995), and sexual orientation (Vriend v. Alberta, 1998). The Charter also protects fundamental freedoms such as freedom of conscience, religion, thought, freedom of association, and the right to life liberty and security of the person. There is a universal and historical tension between freedom of religion and equality rights (Denike, 2007; Ellison, Musick, & Holden, 2011; Greven, 1991; Howland, 2005; Rose, 1999; Spong, 1991; Straus, 2001) which is evident in a number of Charter decisions emanating from the Supreme Court of Canada (A.C. v. Manitoba, 2009; Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren, 2009; B.(R.) v. Children’s Aid Society, 1995; Ross v. School Board #15, 1996; Trinity Western, 2001; Vriend v. Alberta, 1998).

Policy Implications

The challenge for public policy development is how best to reflect Canada’s commitment to fundamental freedoms and equality rights in the delivery of public services. Section 32 of the Charter states that the Charter protections apply to Parliament and the governments of each province and territory. The Supreme Court of Canada has ruled that the Charter extends to government legislation, decisions, actions, and inactions, to agencies that provide a public service and those receiving public funding (Eldridge, 1997; R. v. Carosella, 1997).

In Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General), the Supreme Court of Canada examined whether a private entity, such as a hospital, could be held accountable under the Charter. The hospital argued that since it was a private entity, it was beyond the reach of the Charter. However, the Court ruled that private institutions were part of government when they perform tasks assigned to them through legislation. The Court said “governments … should not be allowed to evade their constitutional responsibilities by delegating the implementation of their policies and programs to private entities” (Eldridge, 1997, ¶ 42).

Private entities, such as FBOs, which on first blush do not appear to be government, may fall within the Charter’s purview if it meets one of the following requirements: first, if it is performing a government policy or program (Eldridge, 1997); second, the entity is controlled or influenced by government in its decision making (Douglas/Kwantlen, 1990; McKinney, 1990); and third, it receives government funding (McKinney, 1990).

Earlier, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled that fundamental freedoms, including freedom of expression and freedom of religion do not operate in a vacuum. Freedom is “subject to such limitations as are necessary to protect public safety, order, health, or morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others” (R. v. Big M., 1985, ¶ 95). The Court also noted that “although the freedom of belief may be broad, the freedom to act upon those beliefs is considerably narrower” (B. (R.), 1995, p. 435). In a subsequent case, the Supreme Court of Canada said “The freedom to hold beliefs is broader than the freedom to act on them” (Trinity Western University, 2001, ¶ 36). It is this line that requires clarity through policy direction.

Therefore, FBOs will be subjected to Charter scrutiny in regard to the manner in which their services are provided. The extent of the Charter’s net will be dependent on the types of services they deliver, that is, can the service be defined as performing a specific government policy or program, such as prison programming, public education, and international development; are they acting as a government agent; and/or, are they receiving funding from the government.

This is not to say all FBOs delivering public services will trigger Charter scrutiny. It depends of the amount of organizational religiosity. Ebaugh, Chafetz, and Pipes (2006) examine the various means by which researchers have attempted to categorize organizational religiosity. For the most part, this has been done using various variables along a continuum. For the purposes of this discussion, I will focus on Thyer’s typology.

Thyer (2006, p. 73) proposes that FBOs can be considered within three typologies. Type 1 are those staffed and financially supported by persons of faith but that provide secular services, Type 2 are faith-based services staffed by persons of faith and provide services that contain some religious teachings, and Type 3 are those staffed by persons of faith who provide religious services “intended to produce supernatural changes.”

Using Thyer’s (2006) typologies, FBOs which are providing a public service, void of any religiosity, but supported by persons of faith will not likely attract the attention of a Charter challenge. These organizations would fit with Thyer’s Type 1 description. However, if the organization is staffed exclusively by persons of faith, questions may be raised regarding their hiring practices.

FBOs providing a public service that are staffed by persons of faith and provide services that contain some religious teachings or adhere to religious doctrine in their practice (Type 2) may potentially violate the Charter depending on what strings are attached to the services they receive.

Organizations staffed by persons of faith who provide religious messages as part of their public service delivery (Type 3) are most vulnerable to a Charter challenge. It is one thing to hold religious beliefs but quite another to act on them in the delivery of a public service. The InnerChange program, described earlier, would clearly draw Charter scrutiny. Its purpose is to provide Christian-based programming in prisons. Currently, prisons in Canada are under government jurisdiction, the obligation to provide programming to prisoners is part of the government’s mandate and in most cases, funding for these programs comes from government.

Conclusion

The Canadian Supreme Court has issued a number of rulings that are relevant to the expansion of FBOs into the delivery of social programs. First, Charter rights cannot be usurped by handing over the delivery of government programs to a private entity (Eldridge, 1997). In other words, if a governmental social program, such as health care, prison programming, adoption services, child welfare, public education, is carried out by a FBO, it must do so in accordance with the rights and freedoms enunciated in the Charter. The impact would be that once a private agency is providing a public service, it must do so without discrimination on the basis of sex, age, sexual orientation, marital status, and, in addition, without compromising the fundamental freedoms of those who use its services.

The second important direction emanating from Supreme Court decisions is that it is not religious beliefs that are at issue but rather the practices of some of those beliefs. This is an important point to highlight. FBOs can obviously provide public services but the line is drawn between belief and conduct (Trinity Western, 2001). The beliefs of service providers are beyond challenge since they too enjoy the right to freedom of religion and conscience. However, if their beliefs translate into practices that infringe the equality rights of others they have crossed the line. In a case dealing with the religious rights of a teacher to disseminate literature considered to promote hatred against another group, the Court said “[t]he objective of promoting equal opportunity unhindered by discriminatory practices based on race or religion [is] pressing and substantial” (Ross, 1996).

Another important consideration, the Court asserted, is Canada’s commitment to international human rights documents. The Court referred to the international community’s commitment to the eradication of discrimination. The commitment, it said, extends to prohibiting the dissemination of ideas and practices based on racial or religious superiority.

The Supreme Court of Canada, in its interpretation of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms (which came into effect in 1982), has provided us with over 30 years of insight into the meaning of equality rights. Our public policies should reflect this. All levels of government need clear and concise policies to provide direction to service provider so that the onus and expenses associated with challenging each isolated incident do not fall on those adversely affected by what has already been deemed unconstitutional practices. Thyer’s typology provides a useful framework within which to develop such policies.

The Preamble to the Canadian Association of Social Workers’ Code of Ethics states “[t]he profession of social work is founded on humanitarian and egalitarian ideals. Social workers believe in the intrinsic worth and dignity of every human being ….” The Supreme Court in its discussion on the meaning of human dignity as a value protected by the Charter said human dignity is “concerned with physical and psychological integrity and empowerment” (Law, 1999, ¶ 53). However, some of the beliefs and practices of religious fundamentalists collide with and limit the integrity and empowerment of citizens. We see it in the limiting of employment opportunities based on sex, sexual orientation, religious beliefs, in child-rearing practices that promote physical punishment, in limited access to birth control and sex education, and in some of the curriculum of private educational institutions. And while it may be uncomfortable to challenge religious institutions, we are obliged to do so when their practices violate the equality rights of others.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Notes

References

A. C. v. Manitoba Director of Child and Family Services, 2 S.C.R. 181 (2009).

Aka

P. C.

(2008). Assessing the constitutionality of President George W. Bush’s faith-based initiatives. Journal of Law in Society, 9, 53–110.

Alberta v. Hutterian Brethren of Wilson Colony , 2 S.C.R. 567 (2009).

Attlee

C. R.

(1920). The social worker. London, England: G. Bell and Sons.

Audet

Paquette

Bergeron

(2013). Religious nongovernmental organizations and Canadian international aid, 2001–2010: A preliminary study. Canadian Journal of Development Studies, 34, 291–320. doi:10.1080/02255189.2013.794721

Bane

M. J.

Coffin

Thiemann

(2000). Who will provide? The changing role of religion in American social welfare. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.

Basen

(2013, 3 15). From “Bible Bill” to Stephen Harper, the evolution of faith-based politics. CBC News. Retrieved from http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/story/2013/03/14/f-vp-basen-faith-politics.html

B.C. RCMP to Investigate Polygamous Community. (2004, 7 23). The Calgary Herald, p. A5.

Boddie

S. C.

Cnaan

R. A.

(Eds.). (2006). Faith-based social services: Measures, assessments, and effectiveness. Binghamton, NY: Haworth Press.

10.

Boden

M. A.

(2006). Compassion inaction: Why present Bush’s faith-based initiatives violate the establishment clause. Seattle University Law Review, 29, 991–1030. (Original work published 2005/06)

11.

Bramham

(2004, 7 23). Valley of the brides. The [Montreal]Gazette, p. A15.

12.

B.(R.) v. Children’s Aid Society of Metropolitan Toronto , 1 S.C.R. 315 (1995).

13.

Canada won’t fund abortion in cases of war rape, child marriage. (2013, 10 4). Retrieved from http://www.cbc.ca/news/politics/canada-won-t-fund-abortion-in-cases-of-war-rape-child-marriage-1.1912822

14.

Canadian Broadcasting Corporation. (2009, 12 4). “Q.”

15.

Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, Part 1 of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11.

16.

Carney

T. P.

(2002). Administration retreats on protecting Salvation Army. The National Conservative Weekly. Retrieved from http://www.humaneventsonline.com/articles/07-16-01/carney.html

17.

Chamberlain v. Surrey School District No. 36, 4 S.C.R. 710 (2002).

18.

Cnaan

R. A.

Boddie

S. C.

(2006). Setting the context: Assessing the effectiveness of faith-based social services. In Boddie

S. C.

Cnaan

R. A.

(Eds.), Faith-based social services: Measures, assessments, and effectiveness (pp. 5–18). Binghamton, NY: The Haworth Press.

19.

Day

Brodsky

(1998). Women and the equality deficit: The impact of restructuring Canada’s social programs. Ottawa, Canada: Status of Women.

20.

Denike

(2007). Religion, rights and relationships: The dream of relational equality. Hypatia, 22, 71–91.

21.

De Sousa Santos

(2006). Globalizations. Theory, Culture, Society, 23, 393–399. doi:10.1177/026327640602300268

22.

Douglas/Kwantlen Faculty Association v. Douglas College, 3 S.C.R. 570 (1990).

23.

Ebaugh

H. R.

Chafetz

J. S.

Pipes

P. F.

(2006). Where’s the faith in faith-based organizations? Measures and correlates of religiosity in faith-based social service coalitions. Social Forces, 84, 2259–2272.

24.

Eldridge v. British Columbia (Attorney General), 3 S.C.R. 624 (1997).

25.

Ellison

C. G.

Musick

M. A.

Holden

G. W.

(2011). Does conservative Protestantism moderate the association between corporal punishment and child outcomes? Journal of Marriage and Family, 73, 946–961. doi:10.1111/j.1741-3737.2011.00854.x

26.

Faraday

Denike

Stephenson

M. K.

(Eds.). (2006). Making equality rights real: Securing substantive equality under the Charter. Toronto, Canada: Irwin Law.

27.

Ferguson

K. M.

Spruijt-Metz

Dyrness

(2007). Evaluation in faith-based social services: Are we evaluating faith accurately? Research on Social Work Practice, 17, 264–276.

28.

Graham

J. R.

Swift

K. J.

Delaney

(2012). Canadian social policy: An introduction (4th ed.). Toronto, Canada: Pearson Prentice Hall.

29.

Greven

(1991). Spare the child: The religious roots of punishment and the psychological impact of physical abuse. New York, NY: Alfred A. Nephew.

30.

Grills

(2009). The paradox of multilateral organizations engaging with faith-based organizations. Global Governance, 15, 505–520.

31.

Gruending

(2011). Pulpit and politics: Competing religious ideologies in Canadian public life. Calgary, Canada: Kingsley Publishing.

32.

Haight

(2003, 10 9). Groups seeks operating funds for teen addictions centre. The Star Phoenix, p. A3.

33.

Howland

C. W.

(2005). The challenge of religious fundamentalism to the liberty and equality rights of women: An analysis under the United Nations Charter. In Bucar

E. M.

Barnett

(Eds.), Does human rights need God? (pp. 156–201). Cambridge, England: William B. Eerdmans Publishing Company.

34.

Ife

(2012). Human rights and social work: Towards rights—based practice. New York, NY: Cambridge University Press.

35.

Jimenez

(2006). Epistemological frameworks, homosexuality and religion: A response to Hodge. Social Work, 51, 185–187.

36.

Kaplan

(2004). With God on their side: How Christian fundamentalists trampled science, policy, and democracy in George W. Bush’s White House. New York, NY: The New Press.

37.

Kemp

M. A.

(2007). Blessed are the born again: An analysis of Christian fundamentalists, the faith-based initiative and the establishment clause. Houston Law Review, 43, 1524–1561.

38.

Kennedy

(2005). Religion, rehabilitation and the criminal justice system. In Ryden

D. K.

Polet

(Eds.), Sanctioning religion? Politics, law and faith-based services (pp. 39–52). London, England: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

39.

Kingsolver

(1998). The poisonwood Bible. New York City, NY: Harper.

40.

Kumar

(2012, 2 8). Adoption overhaul seen as anti-gay. The Washington Post, p. B1.

41.

Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), 1 S.C.R. 497 (1999).

42.

Lessa

(2006). Single motherhood in the Canadian landscape: Postcards from a subject. In Westhues

(Ed.), Canadian social policy: Issues and perspectives (4th ed., pp. 291–308). Waterloo, Canada: Wilfrid Laurier University Press.

43.

Lupu

Tuttle

R. W.

(2008). The state of the law 2008: A cumulative report on legal developments affecting government partnerships with faith-based organizations. Washington, DC: The Roundtable on Religion and Social Welfare Policy. Retrieved from http://www.religionandsocialpolicy.org/docs/legal/state_ofthe_law_2008.pdf

44.

McDonald

(2010). The Armageddon factor: The rise of Christian nationalism in Canada. Toronto: Vintage Canada.

45.

McKinney v. University of Guelph, 3 S.C.R. 229 (1990).

46.

Midgley

(1997). Social welfare in the global context. London, England: Sage.

47.

Miron v. Trudel, 2 S. Ct. 418 (1995).

48.

Monsma

S. V.

(2000). Deciding whether and when to seek government funds. In Queen

E. L.

(Ed.), Serving those in need: A handbook for managing faith-based human services organizations (pp. 165–182). San Francisco, CA: Jossey-Bass.

49.

Moon

(2009). Government support for religious practice. In Moon

(Ed.), Law and religious pluralism in Canada (pp. 215–238).Vancouver, Canada: UBC Press.

50.

Mullaly

(2010). Challenging oppression and confronting privilege: A critical social work approach (2nd ed.). Toronto, Canada: Oxford Press.

51.

Reference Re Same-Sex Marriage , 3 S.C.R. 698 (2004).

52.

Rice

J. J.

Prince

M. J.

(2013). Changing politics of Canadian social policy (2nd ed.). Toronto, Canada: University of Toronto Press.

53.

Rose

S. D.

(1999). Christian fundamentalism: Patriarchy, sexuality and human rights. In Howland

(Ed.), Religious fundamentalism and the human rights of women (pp. 9–20). New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press.

54.

Ross v. School Board #15, 1 S.C.R. 825 (1996).

55.

R. v. Big M Drug Mart Ltd., 1 S.C.R. 295 (1985).

56.

R. v. Carosella, 1 S.C.R. 80 (1997).

57.

R. v. Morgentaler, 1 S.C.R. 30 (1988).

58.

Ryden

D. K.

Polet

(2005). Introduction: Faith based initiatives in the limelight. In Ryden

D. K.

Polet

(Eds.), Sanctioning religion? Politics, law and faith-based services (pp. 3–15). London, England: Lynne Rienner Publishers.

59.

Sager

(2011). Faith-based social services: Saving the body or the soul? A research note. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 50, 201–210.

60.

Saskatchewan Housing Corporation. (2008). Rental development program. Retrieved from http://www.socialservices.gov.sk.ca/H01-FS.pdf

61.

Slaight Communications Inc. v. Davidson, 1 S.C.R. 1038 (1989).

62.

Spong

J. S.

(1991). Rescuing the Bible from fundamentalism: A bishop rethinks the meaning of scripture. San Francisco, CA: Harper Collins Publishing.

63.

Straus

(2001). Beating the devil out of them: Corporal punishment in American families and its effects on children. London, England: Transaction Publishers.

64.

Sullivan

W. F.

(2009). Prison religion: Faith-based reform and the constitution. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

65.

Tangenberg

(2004). Spirituality and faith-based social services: Exploring provider values, beliefs and practices. Journal of Religion & Spirituality in Social Work: Social Thought, 23, 3–23.

66.

Thyer

B. A.

(2006). Faith-based programs and the role of empirical research. In Boddie

S. C.

Cnaan

R. A.

(Eds.), Faith-based social services: Measures, assessments, and effectiveness (pp. 63–82). Binghamton, NY: The Haworth Press.

67.

Trattner

W. I.

(1979). From poor law to welfare state: A history of social welfare in America. New York, NY: The Free Press.

68.

Trinity Western University v. British Columbia College of Teachers, 1 S.C.R. 772 (2001).

69.

Turner

J. C.

Turner

F. J.

(2009). Canadian social welfare (6th ed.). Toronto: Pearson Education Canada.

70.

van Wijk-Bos

J. W. H.

(1991). Reformed and feminist: A challenge to the church. Louisville, KY: Westminster/John Know Press.

71.

Vriend v. Alberta, 1 S.C.R. 493 (1998).

72.

Watkinson

A. M.

(2001). Human rights laws as advocacy tools for a global civil society. Canadian Social Work Review, 18, 267–286.

73.

Watkinson

A. M.

(2004). Equality rights and re-privatized public services: Religious fundamentalism meets the Charter. In Schick

Jaffe

Watkinson

A. M.

(Eds.), Contesting fundamentalisms (pp. 137–151). Halifax, Canada: Fernwood Press.

74.

Watkinson

A. M.

(2004/2005). To whom do we entrust public education. Education and Law Journal, 14, 191–213. (Original work published 2004/05)

75.

Watkinson

A. M.

(2006). The Charter and the role of the courts in policy making. In Westhus

(Ed.), Canadian social policy: Issues and perspectives (4th ed., pp. 69–90). Waterloo, Canada: Wilfrid Laurier University Press.

76.

Wells

(2010, 3 29). Harper’s hard right turn: Social conservatism is on the rise in Ottawa and across Canada. Macleans, pp. 22–25.

77.

Wharf

McKenzie

(2009). Connecting policy to practice in the human services. Toronto, Canada: Oxford University Press.

78.

Wineburg

(2007). Faith-based inefficiency: The follies of Bush’s initiatives. London, England: Praeger Publishers.