Abstract
In 1808 the French Islands of Martinique and Guadeloupe represented the last threat to British colonial interests in the West Indies. Strategic concerns were not, however, the driving force behind British combined naval–military operations to capture them. Professional and financial gain were the primary motives for the officers in charge, Rear Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane and General Sir George Beckwith, as they debated fleet and troop dispositions for attacks on the islands. The chance to seize prizes, booty, and valuable appointments to colonial offices on captured territory played a large part in the formulation of plans, although changes to both the strategic situation in the region and the metropolitan–colonial relationship threatened their prospects. This article examines Cochrane and Beckwith's efforts to maintain autonomy in the face of stricter government oversight, sufficient to achieve their personal ambitions.
Keywords
Britain's success in the West Indies during the Napoleonic Wars meant that by 1808 only a handful of French colonies remained. Garrisons on the French islands of Martinique and Guadeloupe had been ravaged by disease and their few surviving soldiers faced serious food and materiel shortages. Such difficulties eroded the already tenuous French imperial loyalties of the islanders, a fact that was well known to British authorities in the region. The grands blancs planter class of both islands were overtly Royalist and seen by their imperial governors as anglomanie. 1 Additionally, the island militias, which consisted mainly of free men of color, harbored no love of empire and saw both the French governors and the grands blancs as oppressors. 2 It was understood by all parties that in the event of an invasion, the colonists and the local militias would be “warmly attached to the British.” 3 Still, the islands and their smaller satellites, Marie Galante and the Saintes, presented a problem for British colonial and naval interests in the region. The principal threat lay in their location at the junction of the Leeward and Windward Island chains, where they served as a forward base for French naval and privateering operations. The situation was particularly hazardous for British planters and merchants at Dominica, which lay between Martinique and Guadeloupe.
The strategic importance of the islands and their apparent vulnerability were not, however, the driving forces behind British plans for combined naval–military operations to capture them. Personal gain was the primary motivation for the Commander in Chief (CinC) of the Leeward Island Station, Rear Admiral Sir Alexander Cochrane, and the Commanding General of the Army for both the Leeward and Windward Stations, Lieutenant General Sir George Beckwith. The self-interest they pursued took three forms. First, they sought to preserve their personal and professional reputations which were jeopardized by a shortage of ships and naval–military manpower to properly protect the region. 4 Second, they sought financial gain, in the form of prize money from naval captures, and the distribution of booty for assets seized in combined operations on land. Finally, they hoped to grab lucrative appointments to colonial offices on newly captured territory for themselves, their friends, and family members. All of these factors weighed heavily on decision-making in the coming campaigns.
Self-interest as a motive for British naval and military action was hardly unique to Cochrane and Beckwith. The hunt for prize money, perquisites, and prestige echoes in the correspondence of officers throughout the eighteenth and early-nineteenth centuries. Ryan Mewett's contribution to this forum emphasizes the autonomy of naval officers in the early to mid-eighteenth century and their almost unlimited ability to profit from the West India station. Their actions were enabled by broad opportunities, an abundance of enemy targets, and loose government oversight of both the service and the colonies. 5 However, in the later years of the Napoleonic Wars, changes in the strategic situation in the Caribbean and the political situation at home presented senior commanders with a new paradigm that threatened their traditional sources of money and power. This case study of the events surrounding the capture of Martinique and Guadeloupe explores how Cochrane and Beckwith navigated these changes in attempts to satisfy the forms of self-interest that had long been expected from the station in wartime. The ultimate success of their campaigns belied the deep personal and professional rivalries that developed as a result of a dwindling number of enemy targets, a changing naval–military/colonial relationship, and the extended reach of the Admiralty and Colonial Office. The aim is to show the effect of these changes on the autonomy of senior officers on the Caribbean frontier.
Service autonomy in a new era
Threats to Cochrane and Beckwith's self-interest after 1808 came from two sources. First, there were increasingly limited opportunities for wartime gain in the theater. Earlier success in subduing French possessions meant that Martinique and Guadeloupe represented the last substantial prospects for personal and professional enrichment. When these islands fell, there would be few chances for prize money, appointments, or the exercise of patronage that had made the command so desirable over the previous century. The coming campaigns saw Cochrane and Beckwith grasping at the few remaining straws, which lent urgency to their actions and raised the temperature of interpersonal and interservice relationships.
Maintaining workable army–navy partnerships in combined operations had never been easy. Since the start of the French wars, clashes had frequently erupted between admirals and generals on stations from the Mediterranean to the West Indies, with most squabbles centered on matters of jurisdiction and control. 6 Early in his career, Cochrane had demonstrated an ability to work with army colleagues. As a captain in 1801 he oversaw the successful landing of General Ralph Abercrombie's forces at Aboukir Bay and the Admiralty hoped that similar interservice amity would be forthcoming when he assumed command of the Leeward Islands in 1805. 7 Diplomacy, however, was never Cochrane's strong suit and his position as CinC only raised his expectation of great rewards to come. Beckwith, who had been stationed in the West Indies since 1797, was elevated to Lieutenant General in 1805 and took command in Barbados in June 1808. Experience and a nuanced understanding of the military–colonial relationship saw him well placed to profit from the station. 8 Yet the high hopes of both commanders were threatened by the limited number of opportunities to cash in. Such pressures led to increased tensions which adversely affected the army–navy relationship, although the fundamental rivalries were more personal in nature. Their disputes centered less on command and control issues, and more on the question of who would gain from the coming action.
The second problem related to changing political attitudes in the metropole, which had shifted slowly toward the need for greater centralized control over the West Indian colonial legislatures. Concern for the security of the imperial frontier had a long history rooted in fears that American revolutionary ideas might spread to British possessions. 9 Recent work by Christer Petley, David Lambert, and Claudius Fergus emphasizes the influence of the French and Haitian Revolutions which “provided new momentum to the extension of British imperial power over the sugar colonies.” 10 Subsequent slave uprisings during the 1790s on the British islands of St Vincent, Grenada, and St Lucia and a maroon rebellion on Jamaica heightened contemporary fears. 11 Amid the ongoing French Revolutionary War, colonists’ inability to defend themselves from external French attack or internal slave uprisings weakened the independence of local legislatures, forcing them to call upon the government in London to provide “paternal care” to guarantee their security. 12 As the representatives of imperial authority on the distant frontier, senior officers of the Royal Navy and British army became the beneficiaries of rising colonial anxiety and were invested with enormous power to act in the interests of both crown and colony. They also became essential to the maintenance of the plantocracy, which further elevated officers’ importance in Caribbean social, economic, and political life. The colonial/service relationship was symbiotic – with planters giving emoluments and gifts to senior officers in return for protection of territory and trade. This mutually beneficial exchange also allowed colonists to exhibit their imperial loyalties, honoring officers as proxies for the state, while they practiced de facto legislative independence. 13 As Petley notes, “colonies, trade and naval strength came to form a mutually reinforcing holy trinity.” 14
By the start of the Napoleonic Wars, however, an overall decline in the profitability of the sugar colonies, coupled with the rising power of the Abolitionist lobby in London altered the relationship between metropole and colony. 15 This culminated in the government's strongest assertion of central authority yet – the Act for the Abolition of the Slave Trade in 1807 – which struck at the foundations of the slave-owning plantocracy. 16 Apart from increasing moral and religious opposition to slavery in Britain, there was serious political concern that the planters’ brutality toward their enslaved populations might incite rebellion as in Saint Domingue, severing the profits from colonial trade that sustained Britain's war effort. A general (but erroneous) belief that newly enslaved Africans were the greatest source of insurrection helped justify passage of the new law. 17
Ending the slave trade also created a new conflict of interest between planters, who depended on an influx of enslaved labor, and the armed services, particularly the navy, as the enforcers of imperial law. The Royal Navy was now responsible for interdicting the slave trade, a role that potentially threatened officers’ relationships with colonial elites. As will be seen, some of these connections grew increasingly acrimonious. Yet the dangers of wartime threats to the islands and their trade ensured that navy and army officers continued to have their interests served. In some ways, the Abolition Act strengthened the authority of senior navy and army officers, both as “agents of empire” and as colonial protectors, and opened opportunities to take advantage of the Abolition Act. Cochrane, who embodied the conflict as both a slave-owning planter and a naval officer, exploited the law and the authority of his service rank to profit in the most unethical and opportunistic ways. 18 By less obvious or egregious means, Beckwith also leveraged his authority for personal gain under the auspices of enforcing state power and safeguarding colonial interests. 19 The real change, however, was a realignment of service loyalties in which the interests of navy and army officers were less tied to colonial legislatures and more answerable on the government in London.
Over the previous decades, the government had slowly increased its oversight, bringing many unruly officers to heel. The bald opportunism of naval captains who, in the mid-eighteenth century, used His Majesty's ships and crews to make private fortunes from illicit trade between the islands was a thing of the past. 20 In the 1780s Admiral Rodney and General Vaughan had attempted to bank dubiously won booty and prizes from their West India campaigns but were denied much of their claim in the legal aftermath. Government crackdowns on questionable seizures of property in the 1790s saw the combined Jervis–Grey, Christian–Abercrombie, and Harvey–Abercrombie campaigns similarly denied of spoils, although the limited success of these operations, coupled with massive losses of men to tropical disease may have influenced the government's decision. 21
In the new century, senior officers were more cognizant of the need for accountability to their respective services, which demanded a more guarded approach to matters of self-interest. Cochrane and Beckwith exhibited far greater deference to their civilian chiefs in London and attention to executing their duties “by the book” than CinCs of the past, forcing colonial legislatures to take a back seat to the demands of Whitehall. Both men were careful to ensure that the Admiralty and Colonial Office sanctioned all actions related to the capture of Martinique and Guadeloupe, which afforded them the appearance of propriety in addressing the needs of the state. While this limited their autonomy, they still exercised considerable independence when it came to tactical and operational decisions. This enabled Cochrane to assert himself at the Admiralty in ways that sometimes overstepped the mark, although he generally conformed to the dictates of the First Lord. It was also visible in Beckwith's careful performance of subordination to the will of the Colonial Office, particularly when it suited his needs. Self-interest could still be satisfied, although doing so now required subterfuge or at least some deft political handling. As long as the personal interests of commanding officers generally aligned with imperial priorities, their actions could be justified as fulfilment of duty to king and country. Distance from the metropole and colonial reliance on naval–military protection continued to provide the opportunity. The exigencies of war and the government's desire to assert greater colonial control via its naval and military leaders now provided the means. So long as Cochrane and Beckwith worked within the boundaries set by the central government, they could maintain sufficient autonomy to pursue self-interested goals under the guise of strategic advances against the enemy.
Capturing Marie Galante
Problems between the two commanders began in March 1808 when Cochrane took Marie Galante, a small island off Guadeloupe. He was under enormous pressure from the British planters and merchants at Dominica to address the problem of French privateers who attacked regularly from their bolt-holes on Marie Galante, which stood only 15 miles to the northeast. 22 The outcry from local businessmen reached Whitehall, which ignored Cochrane's complaints that he had insufficient vessels to patrol the area. The Admiralty calculated that there were 80 vessels on station at Cochrane's disposal, while he protested that he had only 41, including his flag ship, one 44-gun fifth rate, four frigates, 20 sloops and 15 smaller vessels – too few to cover such a vast area effectively. 23 When Lloyds of London filed a complaint against Cochrane for not doing enough to protect merchants in the region, his personal and professional reputation was on the line. 24
Cochrane's response was to capture Marie Galante with a contingent of sailors and marines, who overpowered the French garrison of fewer than 500 men. Of these, only about 20 were regulars while the rest were local militia. 25 It soon became apparent, however, that Cochrane's marines could not hold the island alone and he appealed to Beckwith for reinforcements. 26 Despite misgivings that Marie Galante was of little importance and that Cochrane's garrison was “sinking fast,” Beckwith sent three companies from the 1st West India Regiment to bolster the navy's marines and a small contingent of “Colonial Marines” that Cochrane had created from freed Africans on the island. 27 The reinforcements proved sufficient, and the strengthened garrison defeated a French counterattack which came on 27 August 1808.
This apparent success did not insulate Cochrane from more criticism as the regional plantocracy refused to condone any arrangement that involved the arming of former slaves. It was evidence of the rising colonial/naval tensions in the anti-slavery era and the conflict of interests that now existed. Aside from the freed Colonial Marines, the West India Regiments themselves were the source of much angst among white colonists. Since 1795, when the British government created the regiments, it had purchased men for service from the Caribbean slave-auction houses in direct competition with the planter elites. 28 Adding insult to colonial injury, the government declared all men of the West India Regiments free after the Abolition Act took effect. To the planters, this announcement increased the threat of a slave uprising. Cochrane also came under more fire from the governor of Antigua, who feared that the capture of Marie Galante and seizure of property might inspire French retribution against British colonies, including his own. 29
If Cochrane could not rescue his professional reputation from the barrage of complaints filed by, as he put it, “a despicable set of merchants in the island of Dominica,” prize claims were the only fringe benefit to all his trouble. 30 As the navy alone had captured Marie Galante, he claimed it solely as a naval prize – one that did not have to be shared with the army. To the Admiralty secretary he argued that as he had taken the island “without entering into any sort of capitulation, the [navy] captains are entitled to the whole as Prizes.” For its size, Marie Galante was quite productive and by his estimates had “an annual produce of 1 million weight of coffee, 300 hogsheads of sugar and 200 bales of cotton.” 31 While the claim pleased the captains of Cochrane's squadron, 32 it strained relations with Beckwith, who felt that army assistance in holding the island entitled him to a piece of the pie. “There is a thing called prize afloat,” Beckwith wrote to Secretary of State for War and the Colonies, Lord Castlereagh, “searching for it on shore tends to a different signification, though both words begin with a P,” a reference to Cochrane's plundering. 33 In fact, Cochrane's greed over the issue of booty colored their working relationship on combined operations for the next two years.
Taking Martinique
The plan to capture Martinique evolved from colonists’ continued demand to secure the region for British commerce. Now that Spain was on the cusp of a formal alliance with Britain, all efforts could be directed at French possessions in the West Indies and Martinique, the richest island in the Lesser Antilles, was a prime target. 34 Despite repeated attempts, Cochrane noted that blockading the island was impossible, “due to the current and the northerly winds,” and suggested that it be taken as soon as possible. 35 His spies on Martinique reported that its garrison of about 2700 regulars was hobbled by yellow fever. They also informed Cochrane that Admiral Villaret-Joyeuse, commander of the island, had lost his wife to tuberculosis. 36 As Cochrane remarked in a letter to Beckwith, “I understand it has almost deprived him of his reason,” suggesting it would be a good time to attack. 37 A dearth of food and supplies on the island had grown worse in 1808 as the American trade embargo, enacted in response to British orders and French decrees against neutral shipping, caused widespread hunger and a collapse of the island's economy. 38 A lack of reinforcements also meant that French imperial strength rested largely on the 3000 man militia, a force whose allegiance was questionable. 39 At the capital of Fort Royal they represented the bulk of French manpower, while defensive positions around the island saw a blending of regulars and militia, “about half and half.” 40
Lord Castlereagh authorized the capture of Martinique on 20 August 1808 and Beckwith worked with Cochrane to assemble a force of more than 10,000 soldiers for the operation. 41 Always short of troops, Beckwith received permission from Castlereagh to bring 4000 men under Major General Sir George Prevost from Halifax to make up the numbers. 42 Cochrane's martial skills were well honed after years of experience on combined operations and he expended much ink on logistics, laying out detailed plans for the movement of troops, marines, sailors, and ships in multiple landings across the island. His proposal appeared to elicit Beckwith's full support. 43 It therefore came as a shock when Beckwith pulled the plug just weeks before the operation was scheduled to begin. Citing instructions from Castlereagh that the campaign must not risk the lives of too many British soldiers, and that he held discretionary authority to “suspend” operations as he saw fit, Beckwith officially cancelled the action on 3 January 1809. 44 It is clear from Cochrane's memo of their 1 January meeting at Barbados that the general feared the arrival of a French squadron filled with reinforcements estimated at 2000–3000 men. 45 His concerns were unfounded as neither of the two French relief squadrons was able to break through the Royal Navy blockades at L’Orient or Rochefort. Even if they had, no more than 600 men were destined to assist the garrison at Martinique, too few to make a difference against the assembled British force. 46 Although the possibility of French reinforcements played a part in Beckwith's decision, it was equally true that concerns over Cochrane's motives and integrity in the distribution of booty weighed heavy on his mind.
According to prize law, the king was officially responsible for the division of booty in conjoined operations by dint of a Royal Warrant, although prior agreements made by the commanders involved carried much weight in the final accounting. 47 Warnings from Beckwith's prize agent on St Vincent, Henry Haffey, who denounced Cochrane as a “buccaneer” and someone not to be trusted, reinforced the general's own suspicions. 48 Beckwith had earlier complained to the Colonial Office that while Cochrane demanded soldiers to help man his depleted fleet, he had no compunction about sending sailors ashore for the sole purpose of securing his claim on booty. 49 Beckwith remained adamant in calling off the attack until Cochrane, Prevost, and Beckwith's own second in command, Major General Frederick Maitland, pointed out that this might incur the wrath of Britons everywhere. As Cochrane noted, “After all preparations … and going so far as to bring Sir George Prevost's army from Halifax, and the enemy being but little if anything different in point of strength … I fear the nation will expect more from us.” He continued with a plea to Beckwith's professional reputation: “relinquishment of the expedition … on which the eyes of the Western world have been fixed – would have but a bad appearance” and, he added, “will be but ill received in England and not accord with the exertions now making by our allies in Europe.” 50 Beckwith reconsidered, and plans for Martinique went forward with the landings beginning on 30 January 1809. An extended siege of Fort Desaix (Fort Bourbon) near the capital lasted three weeks, largely owing to Villaret's extensive preparations despite his limited resources. Villaret surrendered the garrison on 24 February after the loss of more than a third of his forces at the fort. 51
Dividing the spoils
Cochrane's initial report on 25 February lavished praise on his army counterpart, 52 although his tone soon soured. Just days later he complained to the Admiralty that Beckwith was making appointments to positions on Martinique that ignored the navy. 53 Cochrane had his eye on the governorship of the island and was disappointed to learn that Castlereagh had decided it would go to Major General John Broderick, a veteran of Wellington's first campaign in the Peninsula War. 54 The situation opened old wounds. After capturing St Croix in 1807, Cochrane had awarded the position of harbor master at the island's ports of Fredericksted and Christiansted to his 18-year-old son, the newly minted post captain, Thomas John Cochrane. The admiral's early promotion of his son and his claim on the sinecure were acts of nepotism that reflected his own experiences under Rodney, a man notorious for taking care of himself and his favorites during his West India commands. 55 Cochrane too, had been the beneficiary of Rodney's patronage when, in 1782, he was made post over and above the claims of more senior commanders. It is reasonable to assume that Cochrane's mentor shaped his sense of entitlement, at least in part. 56 Lord Castlereagh, however, had rescinded the appointment for Thomas John at St Croix and given it instead to his own uncle, Lord Seymour. Now, two years later, it seemed to Cochrane that Castlereagh was at it again, stealing another valuable appointment out from under him. For the sake of peace, Beckwith offered the position of harbor master at Martinique to Captain Cochrane, although the admiral declined on his son's behalf. He predicted that Castlereagh's hatred of him would prevent Thomas John from ever being confirmed and refused to subject himself to another humiliation. 57 To the First Lord of the Admiralty, Lord Mulgrave, Cochrane complained: “The unprecedented and unhandsome manner he [Castlereagh] acted to me by disapproving my son of a similar appointment he held at St Croix … showed not the least regard for my honor or reputation, two things held most dear to an officer.” 58
Cochrane may have correctly guessed one reason why Castlereagh was so set against him. As he told Mulgrave, “Lord Castlereagh has attributed to me a considerable share of the violent proceedings of my brother Mr. Johnstone.” 59 Andrew Cochrane-Johnstone, acting as naval prize agent for the captures made at St Croix, was caught bribing the Vice-Admiralty Court at Tortola to rule in favor of his brother. 60 Castlereagh may well have disdained the Cochrane clan, but the admiral's paranoia knew no bounds. Cochrane believed that Castlereagh had gone so far as to poison the king's opinion of him by confirming the “libelous representations” from the merchants he now referred to as “the Dominica smugglers.” 61 Ultimately, Thomas John took up the position of harbor master at Martinique, while Cochrane himself was raised to the rank of Vice-Admiral, although it did little to assuage his temper. 62
The Saintes and scandal
In the aftermath of Martinique, the arrival of the French relief squadron from L’Orient under the command of Commodore Amable-Gilles Troude, which had sailed too late to assist Villaret's garrison, presented Cochrane with a rich target. 63 Chased north from Martinique by the admiral's ships, Troude's three ships of the line and two frigates took refuge at the Saintes in April 1809. A combined force of 3000 British sailors, marines, and troops under Major General Maitland then captured the main island and its batteries, forcing the French ships out of the harbor. Troude split his squadron, using the two channels out of the bay of Terre de Haut. His flagship Hautpoult led Cochrane's ships off in a chase, allowing the French troop transports and supply ships to safely break away. 64 Cochrane's flagship, HMS Neptune, was too slow to engage, but the faster British frigates and brigs of teh squadron eventually captured the Hautpoult, and the admiral received his share of the prize money.
Despite this success, scandal soon followed. Upon taking the Saintes, enslaved Africans on the island were declared free, according to British law. Reports surfaced, however, that Cochrane had ordered many to be sold back into slavery, an accusation that plagued him for the next decade. 65 His record in managing recaptives was appalling even by contemporary standards, and despite his denials, few doubted his involvement in the sale or his profiteering motives. 66 More accusations of shady “money transactions” that involved both Cochrane and Beckwith circulated in July, causing Cochrane to appeal to his brother Basil for moral support in London. Although Beckwith was equally named in the offending documents, Cochrane feared for his own reputation: “At present my fame is assassinated in the dark, and I know not from where the blow comes.” 67
Taking Guadeloupe and killing the goose that laid the golden egg
In June 1809 Cochrane set his sights on the capture of Guadeloupe. It was the only remaining French possession in the region, although the government in London believed the strategic benefits of taking it were limited. The loss of Martinique had deprived the French of the last port “fit for the reception of Line of Battle ships,” reducing the possibility of a large French fleet presence in the region. 68 Cochrane understood that the capture of Guadeloupe would remove the threat entirely and put an end to opportunities to profit from French prizes. He would, therefore, make this operation pay and set about staking claims for the future by securing the Admiralty's promise to make him governor of the island once it was in British hands. On 28 June he sent Mulgrave an ultimatum – if the government did not approve Guadeloupe's capture, he would resign as CinC of the Leeward Islands and request a transfer to a more financially rewarding station. 69 It was an extraordinary example of Cochrane's audacity and his faith in the First Lord's friendship and his ability to sway government opinion. Mulgrave unenthusiastically authorized the campaign in August, noting that His Majesty's government “though not desirous of the capture of Guadeloupe as a colonial possession, are yet of the opinion that … it is of sufficient perturbance to render its capture expedient.” 70
The combined operation with Beckwith's troops proceeded on 28 January 1810. A mutiny among the Guadeloupe militia, whose French allegiance was equally as tenuous as on Martinique, eroded what little support General Jean Augustin Ernouf could muster for the defense of the island, and it fell to British forces just eight days later. Beckwith assumed command of the island as governor pro tem, but Cochrane wasted no time in implementing his long game. In a lament to Mulgrave on the subject of his personal finances which, he explained, had been used to supplement the campaigns, Cochrane equated the elimination of the French threat to killing the “goose that laid him daily a golden egg.” If no more French ships were around to be captured as prizes, and no more islands could be taken for booty, then a substantial part of his income had effectively dried up. After 40 years of service, he argued, the governorship of Guadeloupe, “which I presume I am equally entitled to,” would be but a small token of recognition. 71 Despite the crown's unwillingness to take on a new colony in the West Indies, Cochrane was confirmed as governor on 1 May 1810. 72 It was a parting gesture from Mulgrave, who resigned from the Admiralty shortly after.
Mulgrave's successor, Charles Yorke, had his own way of dealing with officers who, in his opinion, overstepped their purview. On 28 July he announced that as Cochrane had subdued the French threat in the region, the number of vessels needed for its protection could be reduced. A smaller squadron no longer required the oversight of a vice-admiral so Cochrane would be relieved of command. 73 The admiral protested but to little avail: “had I conceived that my holding the command was incompatible with being Gov of Guadeloupe I would not have applied for it.” 74 Cochrane would be replaced at the beginning of 1811 by Rear Admiral Sir Francis Laforey, a known “friend” of Yorke. “It is with extreme reluctance I retire from the service,” Cochrane wrote, mourning the coming loss of his position and his naval pay of £1600 p.a., without which, he claimed, there was little hope of covering his expenses. 75
By September, Cochrane felt thoroughly cheated by the system of remunerations. Writing to Mulgrave, who was now Master General of Ordnance, he begged for help to secure a larger salary and argued that Beckwith had, while serving as the interim governor, earned £6200 p.a., £2200 more than Cochrane now received. Moreover, he argued, the perquisites of fees and “licences to Publicans, Traders and a variety of other sources,” which would have added about £1000 to his income, had been eliminated without compensation to his salary. 76
Cochrane's concerns for his fading financial prospects were soon overshadowed by the legacy of his last few months as CinC of the Leeward Islands. Before Beckwith departed Guadeloupe in early July 1810, Cochrane had promised to dedicate a portion of the fleet to protecting Barbados, Beckwith's headquarters. As Barbados stood far to windward of the other islands on the station, it required a dedicated squadron to guard it and provide Beckwith the means of moving his troops quickly to wherever they were needed. Between late July and September, Cochrane recalled “the whole of the Naval Force” from Barbados and reassigned it to protect Guadeloupe. 77 By October, Beckwith was furious: “the effect of this measure must be to leave all the islands to windward of Guadeloupe, comprehending three fourths of our possessions, to their internal means alone and to lock me up in the island of Barbados.” 78 Cochrane's response is not extant, although the enmity between the two officers quickly deepened.
Cochrane's bitterness over his retrenchment and the loss of income saw him plumb the depths of petty greed and dive headlong into a nasty squabble with Beckwith over booty from the capture of Guadeloupe. Cochrane's claim on the personal possessions of the islanders, including Ernouf's books in the governor's house, threatened to alienate the once-anglomanie residents, whose support had been essential to the smooth take-over of the island. It also raised ethical and legal questions. Outraged by Cochrane's avarice, Beckwith appealed to the new Secretary of State Lord Liverpool's Advocate General in London for an official ruling. 79 The legal decision determined that there was “strong proof” that “private land, houses and negroes” could not be seized as booty. 80 Beckwith was happy to apprise Cochrane of his overreach and take a dig at his grasping: “the furniture and library of the Govt House at St Pierre, Martinique was never considered by me as an object of booty worthy the consideration of either service and it was turned over in the state in which we found it to Governor Broderick.” 81 This jab came on the heels of a letter Beckwith wrote to Cochrane in December 1810 informing him that as he was soon to be superseded in his naval position, they could only communicate on issues related specifically to the security of Guadeloupe. 82 Whether Beckwith intended it as an insult is uncertain, although Cochrane read it as gloating over his misfortune.
It is not a stretch to see the vengeance in Cochrane's next move. Throughout January 1811, he attempted to seize control of the army garrison on Guadeloupe. Cochrane demanded that Major General Hugh Carmichael hand over the troops to gubernatorial control, stating (incorrectly) that the crown intended to make Guadeloupe a viceroyalty, consolidating all military and civic power in Cochrane's hands as the king's representative. Cochrane even ordered his men to take “forceable possession” of the arsenal that Carmichael commanded. 83 Beckwith's response made little attempt at civility. Twisting the knife, he instructed Cochrane that he had received no such orders, either in his capacity as the commanding general on station or as governor of Barbados. Until orders appeared, Carmichael would retain command of the garrison and continue to report only to Beckwith. 84 For the next two years Cochrane sought to antagonize Beckwith by holding up the payment of rents for land occupied by the army barracks on Guadeloupe, and in his “irregularities” in settling accounts for the garrison's ordnance. 85 In September 1813 Cochrane was still complaining to senior officials about Beckwith's “abandonment” of the Martinique campaign four years earlier and the “infamous assertions” he allegedly made regarding Cochrane's character. 86 The feud cooled only when a new, more sympathetic First Lord, Robert Dundas, the 2nd Lord Melville, named Cochrane CinC of the North America Station in December 1813. The appointment meant a return to active service for which he gladly gave up the governorship of Guadeloupe. 87
Conclusion
Cochrane and Beckwith's personal and professional correspondence from 1808 to 1811 reveals little to suggest that they had their minds fixed solely on the strategic situation in the Leeward Islands. Their actions in most instances reflected other motivations: the preservation of personal or professional reputations, the acquisition of prize money and booty, or the ways in which conquest could translate into appointments or patronage opportunities. Cochrane was not alone among naval officers in his tireless pursuit of riches, and Beckwith was not unusual in taking care of himself and his friends in the conduct of his army duties. 88 What stands out is the degree to which the various forms of self-interest identified here dominated their correspondence, their thoughts, and their actions. The nature of their grievances was intimate and essentially personal, although their high-command positions saw tensions occasionally boil over and poison wider interservice relationships.
There is little doubt that distance from the metropole and colonial need for protection enabled behavior that reflected at least some of the autonomy exercised by naval and army officers of the past. It was, however, an attenuated independence as Whitehall's effort to exert greater control in both the colonial and naval–military spheres forced senior officers to toe a line in which matters of self-interest could only be achieved if they aligned with the interests of the central government. Attempts to acquire money and power from the Caribbean frontier remained at the forefront of Cochrane and Beckwith's planning, although they had to navigate new paths that paralleled Admiralty and Colonial Office goals in order to achieve their own. In prioritizing the government's needs over the demands of colonial legislators who once pulled the strings of local naval and military movements, these officers justified actions that satisfied their personal ambitions as they went about conducting a war, often against each other, as much as the French enemy.
