Sage Journals: Discover world-class research

Abstract

Research shows that person-to-person contact is associated with a reduction in the levels of social distance between otherwise divided groups. In this study, we explore whether this association holds in immediate post-civil war contexts when the reconstruction of social links is challenging. Using original data from 1228 face-to-face surveys collected in Colombian municipalities where former FARC-EP guerrilla fighters have been reintegrated since 2017, we explore how socially distant civilians perceive the ex-combatants. Our statistical results suggest that contact is associated with less intergroup social distance, despite the length of the armed conflict and the fact that the municipalities for collective reintegration processes were selected without prior consultation. Zooming in on one municipality, we identify three key forms of intergroup cooperation that seem to have facilitated the reduction of social distance. Our results have relevant policy implications for conflict and post-conflict settings.

Keywords

Colombia peacebuilding reintegration social distance

Introduction

Research on intergroup relations has consistently found a negative correlation between intergroup contact and the levels of perceived social distance between the groups. As contact increases, groups seem to perceive each other more closely. Does this relationship still hold for civilians and ex-combatants in the aftermath of a civil war? Rebuilding the social fabric is a major challenge after intrastate conflicts. For lasting peace, both former combatants and civilians must move past the war and coexist. The reintegration of ex-combatants into society, which usually takes place in the context of disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) programs, is a crucial dynamic in this regard (Banholzer, 2014; Bangura, 2023; Knight and Özerdem, 2004; Molloy, 2016; Muggah, 2009; UN-BICC, 2021). While studies on DDR have mostly focused on the ex-combatants that are to be reintegrated, research also suggests that the receiving communities play a critical role in the reintegration process (Dwyer, 2012; Kaplan and Nussio, 2018; Muggah and O’Donnell, 2015). Yet in societies transitioning from civil war, recent violence, victimization, and deepened grievances often result in social distrust or hostility toward ex-combatants, hindering the rebuilding of social ties (Godefroidt and Dyrstad, 2024).

Many studies have explored the reconstruction of social links in contexts of ethnic conflicts (Atwell Seate and Mastro, 2016; Bilali, Iqbal and Erisen, 2019; Cairns and Darby, 1998; Hamberger and Hewstone, 1997; Hewstone and Schmid, 2014; Schaub, 2017). Also in the wake of the refugee crisis in Europe, several studies have focused on the political impact of refugee camps in settlement areas, finding vote-share increases for antimigration and extreme-right wing parties (Dinas et al., 2019) and a rise in pro-exclusionary attitudes toward the outgroup (Hangartner et al., 2019; Sniderman, Hagendoorn and Prior, 2004; Steinmayr, 2021). Researchers have found that the levels of perceived threats (Stephan, Stephan and Gudykunst, 1999) can explain why local communities—the ingroup—might react negatively to the arrival of newcomers—the outgroup. This reaction can result from fears for survival triggered by a potential increase in criminality and/or a history of violence; concerns about potential economic competition and labor losses; and normative objections to the outgroup behavior (Homola, 2021).

As a solution to these challenges, studies have found that intergroup contact can alleviate tensions by reducing the uncertainty about the outgroup's behavior (Allport, 1954; Bekerman and Horenczyk, 2004; Hamberger and Hewstone, 1997; Hewstone and Schmid, 2014; Shnabel and Ullrich, 2016). Contact provides reciprocal information about the respective groups, helping individuals overcome over-generalizations, break prejudices (Allport, 1954; Pettigrew and Tropp, 2006, Zajonc, 1968), and develop mutual familiarity (Bornstein, 1989; Harmon-Jones and Allen, 2001; Lee, 2001; Noor and Halabi, 2018).

Whereas contact has proved effective in reducing social distance in non-conflict settings, its impact in immediate post-conflict scenarios is less understood. In these contexts, physical and emotional legacies of the war can obstruct the reconstruction of social links. High distrust, grievances, and negative views often hinder rebuilding relationships and, therefore, the reintegration process.

Against this background, this paper analyzes whether contact continues to be associated with less social distance in post-civil war settings. In Colombia, the 2016 peace agreement with the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia—Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP) officially ended Latin America's longest civil war that was waged, in particular, in the more peripheral regions of the country, leading to extremely high levels of victimization among the rural population. With a view to demobilization and reintegration, the peace agreement provided a collective DDR scheme dubbed “reincorporation.” The idea was that groups of demobilized FARC-EP members would jointly transition to civilian life in Local Transition and Normalization Zones (Zonas Veredales Transitorias de Normalización—ZVTN). After the signing of the peace agreement, almost 10,000 formed FARC-EP combatants gathered in 26 such ZVTNs (Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies, 2018, 36).¹ In 2017, the ZVTNs were transformed into 24 Territorial Spaces for Training and reincorporation (Espacios Territoriales de Capacitación y Reincorporación—ETCR), which have continued to exist since August 2019 as AETCR (antiguos, i.e. former, ETCR). What is important for our purposes is that these local reintegration zones were established in the rural areas hardest hit by the armed conflict, and their location was decided during peace negotiations without consulting local communities beforehand. Consequently, Colombia's reincorporation process imposed a physical proximity between ex-guerilla fighters and local communities in the host municipalities.

To assess the association between intergroup contact and the local community members’ perceptions vis-à-vis ex-combatants, we analyze the results of an original, face-to-face survey fielded in 2022 in seven Colombian municipalities that hosted an AETCR.

Our statistical analysis of the 1228 questionnaires confirms a reliable negative association between intergroup contact and the level of social distance. Contact is also associated with higher levels of support for the reincorporation process and for the political participation of former FARC-EP members, with an increased probability of voting for an ex-combatant in the future, and with a more positive evaluation of the peace process.

These results hold across multiple model specifications, including regional fixed effects and sub-sample selection. Contrary to initial expectations, victimization experiences are not a significant predictor of the social distance between civilians and ex-combatants in areas near the AETCRs. Together, the results confirm the existing intergroup literature and suggest—in a very conservative test—that sustained intergroup contact is associated with a reduction in social distance and distrust between the civilian population and former combatants and, thereby, contributes to reintegration and the reconstruction of the social fabric after civil wars.

Complementing the statistical survey analysis, we also provide qualitative information from interviews and observations made during field visits. Zooming in on the municipality of Manaure with the AETCR Tierra Grata, we illustrate how, and in which types of settings, intergroup contact seems to contribute to the reduction of social distance. Our analysis highlights three forms of cooperation: local governance of the territories; productive projects; and education, sports, and culture initiatives.

This paper makes important contributions to the overall literature on intergroup conflict and to the scholarship on peacebuilding and DDR. The findings expand our understanding of the contact dynamics in recent (post)conflict settings in which the salience of the war, the victimization experiences, and the enforced geographical proximity pose significant challenges to the reconstruction of the social fabric. The positive results are encouraging for conflict resolution practitioners and policymakers and suggest promising strategies to facilitate sustained intergroup contact in the context of reintegration processes.

This paper proceeds as follows. In the second section, we review the state of research to explain how perceived threats and prejudices, in the contexts of intergroup conflict, increase social distance; how intergroup contact, as established by contact theory, has been used and tested as an effective strategy to reduce social distance; and how civil war contexts add more complexity to the reconstruction of social links. The third section introduces the Colombian peace process with the FARC-EP and explains the selection of the case. The fourth and fifth sections describe the research design and results, respectively. The sixth section presents the case of Manaure/Tierra Grata. The concluding section summarizes our main findings and discusses the limitations and implications of the study.

Intergroup contact, social distance, and the peculiar challenge of reintegration processes after civil war

Intergroup conflict

The scholarship on intergroup conflict covers a broad range of societal configurations. Intergroup conflicts can emerge across multiple cleavages and occur when individuals face the challenge of adapting to changing conditions (Bierwiaczonek et al., 2017). At the core of intergroup conflicts are ingroup and outgroup dynamics that activate prejudices among individuals (Katz, 1991). Such prejudices—here referring to antipathy toward another group—result from faulty over-generalizations (Allport, 1954), materialize in social distance, and cause group members to become less willing to engage with individuals who are not part of the same cluster (Koc and Anderson, 2018). This distancing is fueled by the uncertainty about the behavior of the outgroup. As a result, members of the ingroup develop mistrust and potentially anxiety (Matera et al., 2015; Tausch et al., 2007). In extreme cases, othering can result in a dehumanization of outgroup members (Delgado Rodríguez et al., 2012; Kteily et al., 2016; Vaes et al., 2003).

Intergroup relations are significantly affected by how threat perceptions between ingroup and outgroup (Maoz and McCauley, 2009; Riek et al., 2006; Stephan, 2014; Stephan et al., 1999; Xiao et al., 2016; Zarate et al., 2004). Studies have identified several factors that shape threat perceptions: previous intergroup contact and knowledge, group status, and ingroup identification strength (Riek et al., 2006; Stephan et al., 1999); power asymmetry (Maoz and McCauley, 2009); perceived group agency and moral dimensions (Shnabel and Ullrich, 2016); and the exposure to specific media narratives (Atwell Seate and Mastro, 2016; Carey et al., 2025). As the perceived distance between social groups expands, the probability of experiencing intergroup conflict rises (Bobo, 2004).

Intergroup conflict in war-to-peace transitions

Intergroup conflicts do not often escalate violently. However, when they do, past experiences of intergroup violence make ingroup members more alert and anxious about potential outgroup behavior. Research on war-to-peace transitions and post-conflict societies has shown that this dynamic is particularly relevant after civil wars (Bellows and Miguel, 2006, 2009; Blattman, 2009; Hewstone et al., 2006; Kadiangandu and Mullet, 2007; Neto et al., 2007). Intergroup tensions are critical during the early phases of peace processes, which are accompanied by transformations that, inter alia, concern the formal structures of the state (Hughes, 2009; Saideman et al., 2002), the distribution of resources, or the granting of territorial autonomy (Coakley, 1994). War-to-peace transitions affect (power) relations between groups under conditions of high uncertainty (Jarstad and Sisk, 2008; Walter, 2002). Incomplete information further increases the levels of perceived intergroup threats (Joshi et al., 2017).

The consequences of a violent past are more complex when groups share a territory (Cairns and Darby, 1998), which implies physical proximity within a shared jurisdiction, be it a large region (as in the case of the Kurdish/Turkish conflict) or a municipality (as in the Colombian context). In addition to triggering fears of survival, physical proximity can also increase the value placed on group membership as a collective mechanism to face the foreign threat (Delgado Rodríguez et al., 2012). Prolonged conflicts, therefore, tend to increase ingroup cooperation (Bauer et al., 2014; Voors et al., 2012).

An important issue for lasting peace concerns the reintegration of former combatants into society. While research on DDR programs has mostly focused on the relationship between the (former) parties to the armed conflict and on the (individual) trajectories of ex-combatants (Baas, 2012; Bangura, 2023; Hart and Gomez, 2023; Humphreys and Weinstein, 2007; Knight and Özerdem, 2004; Muggah, 2009), reintegration is a relational process that concerns the rebuilding of social ties and relationships between former combatants and civilians. Kaplan and Nussio (2018) have shown that the characteristics of the receiving communities and relations between ex-combatants and communities are crucial in the reintegration process (see also Dwyer, 2012, Muggah and O’Donnell, 2015; Prieto, 2012; Specht, 2023). However, “[i]n their interactions with community members, ex-combatants may also encounter stigma, jealousies over demobilization benefits, and animosities between victimizers and victims that further impede reconciliation” (Kaplan and Nussio, 2018, 133). Against this background, Molloy argues that the role of the “host communities”, including their “perceptions, attitudes, and trust,” should receive greater recognition in DDR research (2016, 4). This, very explicitly, raises the question of how the two groups—ex-combatants and communities—can deal with intergroup prejudices and threat perceptions that, in the context of DDR processes, can be expected to be particularly pronounced and deep-seated.

Impact of social contact on intergroup relations

Many studies suggests that intergroup contact can be the key to reducing social distance between groups and, thereby, alleviating tensions. At the core of this argument is the contact theory, which contends that, under the right conditions, intergroup contact reduces antipathy and prejudices as it allows members to obtain new information about the respective outgroup. This new information equips ingroup members to overcome faulty over-generalizations, reducing social distance and improving intergroup relations (Allport, 1954).

Multiple studies have empirically confirmed the contact hypothesis, especially in the context of ethnic tensions and conflicts. Studies in Great Britain have shown that face-to-face interactions lead to more positive outgroup attitudes toward Muslims in diverse neighborhoods (Hewstone and Schmid, 2014). In Israel, bilingual ethnic schools seem to improve the relationships between Arab and Jewish students (Bekerman and Horenczyk, 2004). This effect, however, does not seem to be unconditional. Research suggests that only high-quality (Vezzali et al., 2010) and frequent contact (Berger and Calabrese, 1974) improve intergroup relations. In a similar vein, a cross-national study of inter-ethnic relations in four West European countries finds that not all types of contact produce the same effects, with personal and more emotionally meaningful interactions—“contact-as-friends,” as opposed to “contact-at-work” and “neighborhood contact”—being the most effective forms (Hamberger and Hewstone, 1997). The personal dimension of contact also allows members to develop a sense of familiarity that can translate into interpersonal liking (Noor and Halabi, 2018). Whether or not this interpersonal liking translates into a more positive view of the entire outgroup is, however, contested (Mousa, 2020).

As emphasized in the introduction, the operation of the contact hypothesis in the challenging context of war-to-peace transitions has received less attention. In fact, in this context a key condition of the contact hypothesis rarely exists: according to Allport (1954), for intergroup contact to be effective, groups must perceive each other to be in an equal position. However, power differences in intergroup relationships are the norm in (post-)civil war contexts. Such asymmetries in capabilities and agency affect the nature of interactions (Shnabel and Ullrich, 2016). Nevertheless, a metanalysis carried out by Pettigrew and Tropp (2006) shows that although Allport's conditions are hardly met, contact in general does reduce group prejudice by decreasing the level of uncertainty between members. In the same vein, scholars have found that as long as the exposure to the stimulus is constant and frequent, intergroup conditions improve (Zajonc, 1968) due to the increased intergroup familiarity (Bornstein, 1989; Harmon-Jones and Allen, 2001; Lee, 2001). These studies make it worthwhile to explore whether the contact hypothesis applies to contexts shaped by (past) violent conflicts and whether and how, thus, intergroup contact contributes to rebuilding the social fabric after civil war.

Collective reincorporation in Colombia: assessing the contact hypothesis in a post-civil war context

Following the signing of the peace agreement between the Colombian government and the now extinct left-wing guerrilla FARC-EP in 2016, over 10,000 rebels laid down their arms and joined a national reincorporation program. With a six-decade-long conflict, highly polarized opinions on the peace process among the population,² and plenty of security concerns about the safety of ex-combatants, groups of former rebels with their families settled temporarily in designated cantonments—ZVTN, later (A)ETCR—to receive protection and social and health assistance as well as educational and labor training sessions, and collectively embark on their transition to civilian life. Initially, these cantonments were meant to be transitory, but 1705 ex-combatantants still reside in AETCRs (ARN, 2025, 6).³

The location of the cantonments was decided by the negotiating parties prior to signing the agreement. As explained by a former FARC-EP unit commander in a personal interview, the rebels chose territories where their troops had extensive knowledge of the topography and locations from which they could easily escape, if necessary. This reflects the uncertainty about the outcome of the peace process and about the capacity of the government to fulfill its commitments. As a result, the cantonments were placed in rural municipalities in regions with a historical presence of the FARC-EP. Existing social and family links with local communities generally did not shape the selection of the zones and the distribution of the ex-combatants across the country. In an AETCR we visited in 2022, none of the former FARC-EP fighters we talked to was from the area or had relatives in the towns close to the facility.

The local communities that saw the establishment of cantonments on their territory or nearby were not consulted in advance.⁴ While these municipalities voted in significantly higher numbers than the national average in favor of the peace agreement (over 80%), they had also experienced the worst of the armed conflict owing to frequent military confrontations and attacks by different armed actors including FARC-EP, right-wing paramilitary squads, the National Liberation Army (ELN), drug-cartels, and state armed forces. Having said that, support for the peace agreement in these regions did not necessarily reflect a prior political alignment with the FARC-EP, but rather the determination to end the violence. As a study by Kreiman and Masullo (2020) shows, it was local exposure to prior FARC-EP violence that made municipalities more likely to support the peace agreement.

The establishment of the cantonments near heavily victimized communities that were not consulted in advance, the fact that the geographical relocation of the ex-combatants was driven by military considerations, and the salience of the civil war make our case a rather conservative test of the contact hypothesis in post-conflict settings. In line with the literature on intergroup conflict, it is reasonable to expect that the ex-combatants that collectively arrived to establish cantonments in pre-existing municipalities were perceived as an out-group by the local populations near the facilities, causing distress and potentially threat perceptions. Safety concerns, victimization experiences, uncertainty about the outcome of the peace process, and intergroup power asymmetry are likely to produce a negative reaction toward the installation of cantonments and their inhabitants. Furthermore, moral objections to living in proximity to individuals who actively participated in warfare should also contribute to local resistance. In sum, high levels of perceived realistic and symbolic threats are likely to have prompted local communities to adopt a defensive approach toward the ex-combatants, increasing the intergroup social distance. In fact, in the context of previous community reintegration programs in Colombia, studies have shown that “a large share of community members (41%) view ex-combatant residents with fear and distrust them more than non-ex-combatant residents (82%)” (Kaplan and Nussio, 2018, 138).

Does the contact hypothesis also hold for civilians and former FARC-EP rebels under these circumstances? In line with research on intergroup contact, we hypothesize that interactions provide civilians with new information about ex-combatants, helping them overcome prejudices. New information also reduces the uncertainty about the ex-combatants’ behavior, lowering people's anxiety. These positive effects contribute to improving intergroup relations and reduce social distance (Hypothesis 1A). Following previous findings, we also expect the reduction in social distance to be even more pronounced as contact becomes more frequent (Hypothesis 1B). Moreover, the sense of familiarity toward ex-combatants resulting from intergroup contacts should translate into higher support for the reintegration program (Hypothesis 2), the peace process itself (Hypothesis 3), the political participation of former rebels (Hypothesis 4), and the probability of voting for one of them in the future (Hypothesis 5).

Research design

Data

To test these hypotheses, we drew on the intergroup literature to design a face-to-face survey that was fielded in seven Colombian municipalities in which cantonments of former FARC-EP combatants were established and remained active (as AETCR) to the date of the study (2022). As described earlier, these municipalities were situated in marginalized regions significantly hit by the armed conflict, with high levels of poverty, irregular access to public services, low internet connectivity, and consequently low digital literacy rates. Therefore, a face-to-face survey was the best—in fact, the only—way to reach these communities.

Some of the regions with AETCR have experienced increased levels of violence in recent years owing to the presence of irregular armed groups in the area, including FARC-EP splinter groups known as disidencias. These volatile security conditions on the ground did not allow us to select a fixed set of municipalities before starting the data collection. Instead, each municipality was carefully selected a month before the visit, based on information from law enforcement reports produced by security agencies, a desk review of policy reports and media articles and assessments by non-governmental organizations and private contacts in the field. In doing so, we tried to include municipalities that displayed variation in several aspects. As Figure 1 shows, our seven municipalities are situated in the northern Caribbean and south regions of Colombia, two subregions where most of the AETCRs are located and which differ also in cultural terms, including with a view to their ethnic composition. Additionally, we selected municipalities in which the conditions inside the AETCRs varied. The AETCR in Icononzo was included as it was mentioned by officers of the Reincorporation and Normalization Agency (ARN) as an example of a politically stable cantonment, in which the reincorporation process has been positively evaluated by the government. In the case of Mesetas, in contrast, ex-combatants were forcibly displaced from the AETCR by disidencias (Barrios Sabogal et al., 2023). By securing maximum levels of variation in safety conditions, stability, geographical location, and accessibility, as well as in the overall progress of the reincorporation process, we tried to build a diverse group of municipalities that would allow us to draw more generalizable conclusions.

Figure 1.

Distribution of towns surveyed.

Following a pilot of the survey in Icononzo in December 2021, the data collection took place between March and December 2022. Visits to the seven municipalities lasted between three and four days. To coordinate the data collection, the central square of the urban center of each municipality was made the geographical reference point. Each day, the research team departed from there in a different direction, carrying out door-to-door surveys and interviewing bystanders. As a safety measure, interviewers were divided into pairs, and the distribution of streets guaranteed that all research assistants remained in a two-block radius. The surveys were collected during daylight exclusively. A total of 1228 questionnaires were completed.

Dependent, independent and control variables

A major challenge for measuring the association of contact and the social distance toward ex-combatants is the risk of endogeneity. Individuals who already perceive former FARC-EP members as distant have a low probability of interacting with them in the first place. Acknowledging this limitation, intergroup conflict scholars have used questions that—while measuring social distance—are less likely to increase the likelihood of contact. Aware that the endogeneity issue cannot be solved in a cross-sectional correlational study such as this one, we follow the existing literature, specifically Tausch et al. (2007) who adapted ideas from Pettigrew and Meertens (1995), to ask respondents how much they would mind (a) having a suitably qualified FARC-EP ex-combatant as their boss, and (b) if a close relative were to marry an ex-combatant. For the responses, we offered a five-point scale ranging from 1 (do not mind at all) to 5 (mind extremely). Responses to the two questions were then aggregated in a continuous variable (1–10) with higher values indicating a larger social distance (Hypotheses 1A and 1B). Support for reincorporation (Hypothesis 2), for the peace process (Hypothesis 3), and for political participation of ex-combatants (Hypothesis 4) as well as the probability of voting for a former FARC-EP combatant (Hypothesis 5) are all binary measures with 1 indicating support, zero otherwise.

Measuring contact between civilians and ex-combatants in an immediate post-conflict setting is also challenging. Owing to safety concerns, locals might be reluctant to talk about the types of interactions they have had with former rebels owing to fears of being perceived as affiliated with them. This fear is highly salient in Colombia, where territories have been violently disputed by competing irregular armed groups, ranging from extreme right-wing paramilitary groups to competing left-wing guerrillas (FARC-EP and the National Liberation Army—ELN). This has led to a long history of civilians being assassinated for being perceived as collaborators or sympathizers of a particular group. With those caveats in mind, we used two variants to measure contact.

First, respondents were asked whether they have had contact (any type) with ex-combatants in the reincorporation process in their municipality. Contact is measured as a binary, with 1 indicating that the respondent answered positively and 0 otherwise. Although the survey did not ask them to elaborate on the specific type of interactions for the reasons mentioned above, through informal exchanges we learned that such contacts ranged from brief exchanges such as running into them at local stores to meaningful engagements such as playing soccer together. To try to capture these nuances in the levels of contact, respondents were also asked how often they had interacted with ex-combatants. Following Tausch et al. (2007) and building on Islam and Hewstone (1993), a five-point contact frequency variable grouped all respondents based on the frequency of their interactions, ranging from 0 (never) to 4 (every day)—with higher values indicating a higher frequency. Figure 2 shows the bivariate relationship between contact and perceived social distance, and the distribution of respondents. As illustrated in the figure, as the contact frequency (x-axis) increases, the data points start to cluster at lower levels of social distance (y-axis).

Figure 2.

Social distance and contact frequency. Note: Each dot indicates a respondent. Dots are jittered to facilitate the visibility of variation.

A series of control variables was also included. Because of their emotional toll, victimization experiences can affect the perception of ex-combatants. A binary variable victim indicates if respondents identified themselves as victims (1 = victim, 0 otherwise). Peace process is a binary measure that accounts for a positive (1) or negative (0) assessment of the peace process. Gender is measured binary (female = 1). Education level is measured from 1 to 8, with higher values indicating more years of formal education. To account for the economic dimension, and given the high level of informal labor in these areas of the country, an index of household appliances was added. Higher values indicate better economic conditions. Age is also included. Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics.

Table 1.

Descriptive statistics.

Variable		Quantity	Percentage
Gender	Female	682	56%
	Male	541	44%
Experience of victimization	Yes	795	65%
	No	426	35%
Has had contact with ex-combatants	Yes	697	57%
	No	521	43%
Supports the reincorporation of ex-combatants	Yes	1018	89%
	No	123	11%
Supports the peace process	Yes	791	70%
	No	342	30%
Supports the political participation of ex-combatants	Yes	469	42%
	No	637	58%
Has considered voting for an ex-combatant in the future	Yes	372	33%
	No	746	67%
	Mean	SD	Min	Max
Social distance	5.08	2.05	1	9
Contact frequency	1.05	1.16	0	4
Education	4.35	1.53	1	8
Age	36	14.10	17	86
Number of appliances	3.14	1.34	0	5

Results

In line with previous studies, we have hypothesized that—even in conditions of imposed proximity and in post-conflict settings—intergroup contact will be associated with less social distance and, hence, better intergroup relations. Table 2 reports the results. Models 1–3 use the binary measure of social contact, distinguishing between individuals with contact and individuals without. Models 4–6 use the continuous explanatory measure and, thus, account for the frequency of such contacts. The unit of analysis, throughout the models, is the respondent. Models 3 and 6 include municipality fixed effects to account for possible regional variations.

Table 2.

Intergroup contact and social distance.

	Dependent variable: Social distance
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Contact	$-$ 0.61 $^{* * *}$	$-$ 0.59 $^{* * *}$	$-$ 0.60 $^{* * *}$
	(0.12)	(0.12)	(0.12)
Contact Frequency				$-$ 0.33 $^{* * *}$	$-$ 0.31 $^{* * *}$	$-$ 0.32 $^{* * *}$
				(0.05)	(0.05)	(0.05)
Victim		$-$ 0.06	$-$ 0.02		$-$ 0.04	0.003
		(0.12)	(0.13)		(0.12)	(0.13)
Gender		0.54 $^{* * *}$	0.52 $^{* * *}$		0.51 $^{* * *}$	0.50 $^{* * *}$
		(0.12)	(0.12)		(0.12)	(0.12)
Education		0.03	0.04		0.03	0.05
		(0.04)	(0.05)		(0.04)	(0.05)
Appliances		0.04	0.03		0.05	0.03
		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.05)	(0.05)
Age		0.01 $*$	0.01 $*$		0.01 $*$	0.01 $*$
		(0.004)	(0.004)		(0.004)	(0.004)
Constant	5.44 $^{* * *}$	4.55 $^{* * *}$	4.46 $^{* * *}$	5.43 $^{* * *}$	4.52 $^{* * *}$	4.47 $^{* * *}$
	(0.09)	(0.30)	(0.33)	(0.08)	(0.29)	(0.33)
Municipality FEs			✓			✓
Observations	1195	1175	1175	1196	1176	1176

Note: Entries are OLS coefficient estimates. Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.

The results are in line with the theoretical expectations. Models 1–3 reveal a reliable negative association between having had contact with ex-combatants and reporting lower levels of perceived social distance. Similarly, Models 4–6 indicate that more frequent contact is reliably associated with further reductions in social distance. The results remain statistically significant when fixed effects are included. Some control variables are worth mentioning. Contrary to expectations, victimization was not reliably associated with the levels of perceived social distance. Several factors might explain these results. The lack of effect might be a consequence of an overexposure to the conflict. The seven municipalities chosen for this study have been significantly affected by the armed conflict. It is possible that the frequency of victimization experiences (over 65% of the respondents identified as victims) has trivialized the emotional impact by giving the experiences a sense of everydayness, reducing their salience. Additionally, the survey does not identify the perpetrator of the aggression. Owing to the conflict dynamics, it is very likely that our group of respondents included victims of FARC-EP, paramilitary groups, ELN, and the state. A victimization experience caused by other group than FARC-EP would probably prompt a different reaction on the social distance toward former FARC-EP members. Different reactions to different victimization experiences might be canceling each other out. Also interesting is the gender effect. Women seem to perceive ex-combatants more distantly than men, confirming that although they are critical in conflict resolution processes (UN Women, 2022), the socially constructed ideas of forgiving mothers are simplistic and reductionist misconceptions (Cupples, 2004).

We now turn to the association of contact and the specific political attitudes toward former FARC-EP fighters. If contact is negatively associated with social distance toward ex-combatants as the previous results show, this reduction should also be evident in the adoption of more positive views toward other dimensions related to the peace and reintegration process. Table 3 shows how contact correlates with support for the reincorporation of ex-combatants (Models 1–3) and general support for the peace process (Models 4–6).

Table 3.

Intergroup contact and political attitudes I.

	Dependent variables
	Reincorporation			Peace Process
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Contact	1.24 $^{* * *}$	0.93 $^{* * *}$	0.93 $^{* * *}$	0.12 $^{* * *}$	0.08 $^{* *}$	0.05
	(0.20)	(0.22)	(0.22)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Social Distance		$-$ 0.31 $^{* * *}$	$-$ 0.31 $^{* * *}$		$-$ 0.03 $^{* * *}$	$-$ 0.03 $^{* * *}$
		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.01)	(0.01)
Victim		0.36	0.39		$-$ 0.03	$-$ 0.01
		(0.21)	(0.22)		(0.03)	(0.03)
Gender		$-$ 0.48 $*$	$-$ 0.44		$-$ 0.03	$-$ 0.03
		(0.23)	(0.23)		(0.03)	(0.03)
Education		0.21 $*$	0.18 $*$		0.03 $^{* *}$	0.03 $^{* *}$
		(0.09)	(0.09)		(0.01)	(0.01)
Appliances		0.11	0.13		0.02	0.01
		(0.09)	(0.09)		(0.01)	(0.01)
Age		0.04 $^{* * *}$	0.04 $^{* * *}$		0.001	0.001
		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	1.52 $^{* * *}$	0.96	1.02	0.63 $^{* * *}$	0.65 $^{* * *}$	0.67 $^{* * *}$
	(0.12)	(0.59)	(0.65)	(0.02)	(0.08)	(0.08)
Municipality FEs			✓			✓
Observations	1132	1096	1096	1123	1084	1084

Note: Entries are coefficient estimates for logistic regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.

As the first three models show, the likelihood of supporting the reincorporation of former rebels into society increases when respondents have had contact with former FARC-EP members. The results are positive and remain statistically significant when control variables and fixed effects are included. Even after social distance is accounted for, the results remain in the expected negative direction and statistically significant. The gender effect identified in Table 2 remains negative and statistically significant although it disappears once fixed effects are included. Age and education are also positive and statistically significant, indicating that older and respondents with more years of formal education display stronger support the reincorporation of ex-combatants than younger individuals.

In a similar direction, Models 4–6 indicate that individuals who have interacted with ex-combatants are more likely to provide positive evaluations of the peace process. The results also hold with control variables and remain significant after accounting for the levels of social distance. The effect of more years of formal education and age also remain positive and statistically significant.

In sum, respondents who display higher levels of social distance vis-à-vis ex-combatants are less likely to support the reincorporation program as well as to provide positive evaluations of the peace process in general. Also worth mentioning, and in line with the previous results, victimization experiences have no significant effect on the political attitudes toward ex-combatants in the municipalities surveyed.

All together, the results in Table 3 suggest a positive correlation between contact and support for the reincorporation of former FARC-EP members, as well as for the peace process, providing support for Hypotheses 2 and 3.

Table 4 presents the results for Hypotheses 4 and 5. As Models 1–3 indicate, respondents who have interacted with ex-combatants are more likely to support their political participation. Consistent with these findings, Models 4–6 suggest that the likelihood of voting for a former fighter in the future also increases among individuals who have been in contact with former FARC-EP members. In all six models, this positive association remains statistically significant under different specifications, with and without fixed effects and control variables.

Table 4.

Intergroup contact and political attitudes II.

	Dependent variable
	Participation			Vote
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)
Contact	0.75 $^{* * *}$	0.56 $^{* * *}$	0.62 $^{* * *}$	0.19 $^{* * *}$	0.13 $^{* * *}$	0.14 $^{* * *}$
	(0.13)	(0.15)	(0.15)	(0.03)	(0.03)	(0.03)
Social distance		$-$ 0.37 $^{* * *}$	$-$ 0.37 $^{* * *}$		$-$ 0.08 $^{* * *}$	$-$ 0.08 $^{* * *}$
		(0.04)	(0.04)		(0.01)	(0.01)
Victim		0.12	0.06		0.03	0.01
		(0.15)	(0.15)		(0.03)	(0.03)
Gender		$-$ 0.71 $^{* * *}$	$-$ 0.72 $^{* * *}$		$-$ 0.06 $*$	$-$ 0.06 $*$
		(0.14)	(0.14)		(0.03)	(0.03)
Education		0.08	0.07		0.03 $^{* *}$	0.03 $^{* *}$
		(0.05)	(0.05)		(0.01)	(0.01)
Appliances		$-$ 0.01	0.01		$-$ 0.01	$-$ 0.01
		(0.06)	(0.06)		(0.01)	(0.01)
Age		0.02 $^{* * *}$	0.02 $^{* * *}$		0.001	0.002
		(0.01)	(0.01)		(0.001)	(0.001)
Constant	$-$ 0.77 $^{* * *}$	0.51	0.97 $*$	0.22 $^{* * *}$	0.52 $^{* * *}$	0.62 $^{* * *}$
	(0.10)	(0.37)	(0.42)	(0.02)	(0.07)	(0.08)
Municipality FEs			✓			✓
Observations	1100	1069	1069	1112	1080	1080

Note: Entries are coefficient estimates for logistic regressions. Standard errors in parentheses. *p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001.

Similar to the previous findings, the gender effect persists. Older respondents are also more likely than younger individuals to support the political participation of former FARC-EP members, but the effect vanishes when asked if they would vote for one of them. In line with the results concerning attitudes toward reincorporation and the peace process, higher levels of social distance are associated with a lower likelihood of supporting the political participation of ex-combatants, as well as the probability of casting a vote for a former FARC-EP member. In sum, the findings in Table 4 provide support for Hypotheses 4 and 5.

To further illustrate the substantive association between contact and political attitudes toward former FARC-EP members, Figure 3 shows the differences in predicted probabilities between respondents with and without contact with ex-combatants for each of the dependent variables included in Hypotheses 2–5. The results suggest that the support for the reincorporation of ex-combatants is close to 12% points higher for individuals who have interacted with former rebels. Following a similar pattern, the support for their political participation is 17% points higher; the probability of voting for them is over 19% points higher; and the support for the peace process is close to 12% points higher.

Figure 3.

Differences in predicted probabilities.

The differences in predicted probabilities as well as the models presented in this section provide evidence of the positive and statistically significant correlation between contact and attitudes toward ex-combatants. Under different specifications,⁵ frequent interactions between civilians and ex-combatants are associated with lower levels of social distance, supporting Hypotheses 1A and 1B. Similarly, this positive effect seems to translate into better attitudes toward former FARC-EP members, with individuals who have had contact with ex-combatants becoming more willing to support their reincorporation, political participation and the peace process, as stated in Hypotheses 2–5.

Tierra Grata: a hub for community engagement in Manaure

How does contact between local communities and former FARC-EP combatants manifest on the ground? Through field visits and interviews, we identified three forms of cooperation that might reduce social distance between both groups: inclusive governance and infrastructure development; productive projects; and education, culture, and sports initiatives. However, alternative explanations must also be considered, for instance, the rebel governance established by the FARC-EP during the conflict, which may have fostered social closeness between the ex-combatants and local communities.

To better illustrate how such interactions take place, we zoom in on Manaure Balcón del Cesar, a municipality strategically positioned near the Venezuelan border and with a history of severe conflict exposure owing to a prolonged absence of the state and an agrarian crisis, which together exerted a profound impact on its social and economic development.

Manaure suffered the coexistence of multiple non-state armed groups, with the left-wing guerrillas ELN and FARC-EP dominating the region until the 1990s, when right-wing paramilitary groups seized almost total control (Barrera, 2014). By 2008, the national government had regained effective command of the region and bolstered military and institutional presence (Trejos Rosero, 2016). These changes in the local de facto authorities coincide with regular swings in the political alignment of the municipality, whose voting behavior changes after each electoral cycle. In the last ten years, Manaure residents voted for left, center and right-wing parties, exhibiting inconsistent voting patterns. There is, thus, no reason to expect that Manaure's residents would have met the arrival of former FARC-EP members with a particularly positive or welcoming attitude.

Following the signing of the peace agreement, Manaure and the neighboring municipality of La Paz were chosen as prioritized conflict-affected territories, and a ZVTN was established in the area to host ex-combatants from FARC-EP's Front 41 and 19. Approximately 164 ex-combatants underwent their disarmament process in this cantonment. In 2019, the ex-combatants acquired land and the former ETCR was officially integrated into the political jurisdiction of Manaure, as Tierra Grata Village.⁶ By the time of our visit, and based on local sources, it had approximately 390 residents, comprising 162 ex-combatants and their families.

Despite severe wartime exposure, including personal and collective victimization and attacks on local infrastructure (Trejos Rosero, 2018), most residents view the peace process positively, with 68% of respondents stating that the peace process has brought about favorable transformations: reduced violence, enhanced tranquility, infrastructure investment, and increased tourism. Support for the reintegration process is also strong, with 84% emphasizing its importance. Positive perceptions, reflected in surveys, interviews, and field visits, stem from opportunities for interaction and cooperation. Over 58% of the respondents had contact with ex-combatants, and 36% had visited the village, now drawing external visitors. Improved accessibility, infrastructure, and ongoing projects have turned Tierra Grata into a hub for community engagement.

“Mano a mano”: inclusive governance and collaborative development

A robust leadership structure, led by the Local Political Council, meets weekly to address daily concerns, including community cohabitation. This has streamlined decision-making processes and fostered inclusive governance with neighboring communities. During our visit, a Council meeting brought together indigenous groups to discuss territorial defense and opposition to mining. This governance model is reinforced by communal spaces in rural areas, where ex-combatants and local communities deliberate on regional issues.

Participatory decision-making and active community involvement have also improved infrastructure. For instance, through an internationally funded project, ex-combatants, their families, neighboring communities, and the Colombian military collaborated to build a water system. According to Quintero (2019) from Colombia's UN Mission, this initiative has significantly benefited 300 residents of Tierra Grata and nearly 700 people from San José de Oriente (La Paz), strengthening intergroup connections. It has also fostered dialogue and reconciliation, exemplified by the community sancochos—shared meals that cultivate a collective vision.

Reparation projects under the transitional justice process⁷ further expanded electricity services to rural communities surrounding the former ETCR. The electricity grid, in turn, enabled essential services including a health post, a grocery store, a tailor shop, and a restaurant, benefiting both ex-combatants and locals. As one interviewee noted: “Electricity is shared with the communities, as well as water. The restaurant is also handled hand in hand (mano a mano) with them.”

Building “Ciudadela de Paz”: interactions facilitated by productive projects

Ex-combatants in Tierra Grata have spearheaded two pivotal initiatives—housing and eco-tourism—that have fostered intergroup interactions and benefit local communities.

The first initiative, a cement block factory established by former FARC-EP members, operates with ex-combatants and local community members managing four block machines. The materials are sold regionally, enhancing interactions with local merchants. Training for factory operation has not only improved technical skills but also fostered contact between ex-combatants and community members. The material benefits brought by these socioeconomic projects could also explain the positive attitudes toward reintegration.

Second, the construction of “Ciudadela de la Paz” (City of Peace) has strengthened intergroup relations. In 2019, ex-combatants acquired 23 hectares near the cantonment for a permanent settlement, aiming to build 150 houses with local workers’ support. This initiative aligns with Tierra Grata's broader development plan, which includes a tourism hub showing post-war life. Following the peace agreement, Manaure experienced a tourism surge, with 300–400 vehicles arriving weekly (Trejos Rosero, 2018). This ecotourism initiative is viewed as a major benefit of the peace process. Simultaneously, it has played a crucial role in fostering interaction and reconciliation in Manaure. Collaboration with local tourism providers extends visits to natural parks, historical conflict sites, and ongoing peace-building efforts.

“People come here every day”: the role of education, sports and culture

Education has been another driver for contact. Programs like “Arando la Paz” (“Ploughing Peace”) offer joint training for ex-combatants and community members, while a school bus service transports their children to local schools, promoting social cohesion.

Sports, particularly football, have also facilitated intergroup interactions. As one interviewee noted, “People come every day to play soccer with the ETCR teams”. Football serves as a neutral ground, breaking stereotypes and fostering connections beyond past roles. Cultural programs, including thematic workshops and collaborative events, further reinforce these bonds. Colectivo Miradas, for instance, has brought together approximately 40 combatants, community members, and university photojournalists to document local peacebuilding efforts. In 2021, a workshop led by renowned Colombian photographers captured daily life in communities that have been connected to the ex-combatants since they laid down their weapons.

Lastly, reconciliation efforts have created spaces for dialogue between ex-combatants, victims of the conflict, and further local residents. Initiatives in Tierra Grata have sought to acknowledge and apologize, for instance, for a 1992 attack by the guerrilla in Media Luna, a village in a neighboring municipality. Public apologies and recognition of past suffering have been crucial in fostering empathy, mutual understanding, and collaboration.

Discussion

Deep-seated grievances and mistrust are major obstacles hindering the reconstruction of the social fabric after civil wars. Perceived intergroup threats tend to reproduce negative over-generalizations, which in turn can cause spikes in anxiety, increase the likelihood of intergroup conflict, and inhibit the successful reintegration of former combatants into local communities. The well-established contact hypothesis suggests that contact can alleviate such intergroup tensions by providing individuals an opportunity to obtain more information on the outgroup, which can reduce the uncertainty about their behavior and generate a sense of intergroup familiarity. The effectiveness of contact can increase with frequency, reducing the perceived social distance between groups.

In this paper, we have set out to assess whether the negative correlation between intergroup contact and social distance found in the literature also applies in Colombia's unusual post-conflict setting, in which civilians were forced to share their territories with former guerrilla fighters. Based on an original face-to-face survey in seven Colombian municipalities which have hosted reincorporation facilities for the demobilization of former FARC-EP combatants and in line with the theories of contact and intergroup conflict, we have shown that contact is associated with lower levels of perceived social distance between civilians and ex-combatants, even under the conditions of this difficult war-to-peace transition. This reduction, which is more pronounced as the frequency of contacts increases, also seems to translate into more positive attitudes toward the ex-combatants, as contact is equally associated with a more positive evaluation of the reincorporation and the overall peace process, with more support for the political participation of ex-combatants as well as with a higher likelihood of voting for a former fighter in the future.

Whereas these quantitative findings are encouraging, they should be taken with caution. Our results are vulnerable to the selection of the municipalities (owing to the safety concerns) and the nature of the interactions captured in the field visits. There are also important limitations to collecting information in conflict-affected communities. Fieldwork observations and experiences in the data collection process show how challenging interviewing locals can be. Civilians are very cautious to respond to surveys, and although over 1200 individuals agreed to participate in the study, for many sensitive questions they refused to give an opinion. Connected to this issue is the social desirability challenge, which although existing in most survey studies, is significantly higher in (post-)war contexts where fears for survival are still active.

The most important limitation to our argument, however, concerns the challenge of endogeneity, or reverse causality, when it comes to assessing the relationship between contact and levels of social distance. Since our data is cross-sectional, we cannot entirely rule out the possibility that it is low levels of social distance that lead to (more) contact, instead of the other way round. In fact, it is highly likely that this effect exists. Still, our analysis suggests that it can not entirely explain our findings. Given the selection of the municipalities to host cantonments (without consultation of the local population and not based on social ties but military considerations), we can expect that the high levels of fear and distrust vis-à-vis ex-combatants found in previous studies on community reintegration in Colombia (Kaplan and Nussio, 2018, 138) also apply to our case. Against this background, it is safe to assume that the large share of respondents in our survey (57%) that reported at least one contact with former FARC-EP fighters does not merely include local residents that already held positive attitudes toward ex-combatants and the FARC-EP in general. As a robustness check, we have also tested the negative association between contact and social distance controlling, e.g. for positive perceptions toward the FARC-EP. Even if we, therefore, cannot make definitive causal claims, we are confident that our correlations are not entirely spurious. Very clearly, at least, we can rule out the equally possible opposite effect: that contact with ex-combatants reinforces mistrust and threat perceptions among local community members.

Another important limitation concerns alternative explanations. Contact with ex-combatants is not the only variable that shapes perceptions and attitudes of local community members in our context. Most plausibly, the reduction in social distance might rather result from the material benefits that come with the collective reintegration process in the municipalities hosting cantonments with former FARC-EP members. As our qualitative research confirms, material benefits certainly play such a role. Also, those residents that report frequent contacts are plausibly benefiting more (e.g. from joint projects). Still, for our dichotomous explanatory variable—which distinguishes between contact and no contact—it is hard to see why even minimal contact should systematically be associated with more material benefits, as compared with local residents without any direct contact. Many benefits are ultimately public goods (e.g. improvements in infrastructure) that do not require direct contact with ex-combatants.

Our brief analysis of the former ETCR and now village of Tierra Grata suggests that we should not think about contact and benefits as two competing explanations. As seen, it is the same forms of intergroup cooperation that create opportunities for sustained contact and provide material (and ideational) benefits to both ex-combatants and local communities and, in doing both, contribute to reducing social distance: inclusive governance and infrastructure development; productive projects; and education, culture, and sports initiatives. While contact itself is empirically linked to reduced social distance, it is crucial that this contact occurs within the context of a reintegration process seen as mutually beneficial. This is key to rebuilding social ties in conflict-affected regions. In Manaure, for example, the collective effort toward intergroup understanding, trust, and collaboration has been fostered through joint projects aimed at achieving a common good. For these relationships to truly thrive, it is essential that all stakeholders, including the state, continue to support interactions between the groups, ensuring lasting peace within the communities.

With those caveats in mind, our findings on the negative association between person-to-person contact and the social distance between former FARC-EP guerrilla fighters and the local population in Colombia's post-civil war suggest several avenues for further research. First, disaggregated panel studies in combination with in-depth qualitative analyses can be a useful complement to overcome the limitations discussed. Second, examining the long-term sustainability of the observed reduction in social distance can provide insights into the lasting effects of interactions. Third, it is critical to assess how governments and organizations leading post-conflict reconstruction projects can leverage person-to-person contact to foster social cohesion and reconciliation. Fourth, more studies are necessary to understand the role of victimization experiences in war zones. The findings in this paper suggest that, contrary to conventional wisdom, victimization neither reduces nor increases social distance toward ex-combatants. Although some potential explanations are advanced in the paper, targeted research is necessary to expand our understanding of this issue. Fifth, new research on the intersection of gender and conflict is critical to explain the gender effect identified in the analyses. Women’s participation in peace processes and conflict resolution programs has been shown to be critical and beneficial. At the same time, the findings here suggest that women perceive ex-combatants more socially distant than men do, contrary to popular belief. More fieldwork can contribute to explaining how these two phenomena dialogue with each other.

Lastly, this study provides important information to conflict and post-conflict mediators and managers, as some conflict termination strategies inevitably lead to situations that can trigger exclusionary attitudes in local communities. This is particularly relevant when the war is salient and there is a long-lasting history of violence. Therefore, it is critical that programs that will necessarily interfere with the daily lives of civilians are accompanied by tailored strategies that can prepare them for these interventions. In line with the evidence presented, DDR programs should actively promote initiatives, projects, and institutions that bring local communities and ex-combatants together in joint activities and, thereby, reduce animosity and fight prejudices. Such strategies can curb the social distance between groups while simultaneously bolstering the legitimacy of the peace process.

Supplemental Material

sj-pdf-1-cmp-10.1177_07388942251382732 - Supplemental material for Sharing community life after a civil war: Intergroup contact and social distance

Supplemental material, sj-pdf-1-cmp-10.1177_07388942251382732 for Sharing community life after a civil war: Intergroup contact and social distance by Santiago Lopez Alvarez, Laura Camila Barrios Sabogal and Jonas Wolff in Conflict Management and Peace Science

Supplemental Material

sj-csv-2-cmp-10.1177_07388942251382732 - Supplemental material for Sharing community life after a civil war: Intergroup contact and social distance

Supplemental material, sj-csv-2-cmp-10.1177_07388942251382732 for Sharing community life after a civil war: Intergroup contact and social distance by Santiago Lopez Alvarez, Laura Camila Barrios Sabogal and Jonas Wolff in Conflict Management and Peace Science

Supplemental Material

sj-R-3-cmp-10.1177_07388942251382732 - Supplemental material for Sharing community life after a civil war: Intergroup contact and social distance

Supplemental material, sj-R-3-cmp-10.1177_07388942251382732 for Sharing community life after a civil war: Intergroup contact and social distance by Santiago Lopez Alvarez, Laura Camila Barrios Sabogal and Jonas Wolff in Conflict Management and Peace Science

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

Research for this paper was possible thanks to the support of the Instituto Colombo-Alemán para la Paz (CAPAZ). The project was coordinated by Universidad del Rosario (Bogotá, Colombia), and funded by CAPAZ and Rice University. The authors gratefully acknowledge the support provided by Camila Forero García, Martín Gómez Perry, and Odan Acero Arnedo during the fieldwork led by Laura Camila Barrios Sabogal. This paper benefited from comments by colleagues from the Peace Research Institute Frankfurt and by Jonathan Homola and Sabine Carey. The authors are most grateful to the communities in Fonseca, Manaure, Icononzo, Planadas, Mesetas, San José del Guaviare and La Montañita, for their warm reception and their willingness to participate in the survey.

ORCID iDs

Laura Camila Barrios Sabogal

Jonas Wolff

Supplemental material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

Notes

References

Agencia para la Reincorporación y la Normalización (ARN) . (2025) ARN EN CIFRAS. Available at: https://shorturl.at/CBlZK (last accessed 1 April 2025).

Allport

(1954) The Nature of Prejudice. Cambridge, MA: Addison-Wesley.

Atwell Seate

Mastro

(2016) Media’s influence on immigration attitudes: An intergroup threat theory approach. Communication Monographs 83(2): 194–213.

Baas

(2012) From Civilians to Soldiers and from Soldiers to Civilians: Mobilization and Demobilization in Sudan. Amsterdam University Press.

Bangura

(eds) (2023) Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Africa. London: Routledge.

Banholzer

(2014) When do disarmament, demobilisation and reintegration programmes succeed? Dt. Inst. fur Entwicklungspolitik.

Barrera

(2014) Las vicisitudes de la integración: Trayectorias de desarrollo y conflicto armado en el Cesar. In: Territorio y conflicto en la Costa Caribe. Bogotá, Colombia: Odecofi-Cinep, 227–330.

Barrios Sabogal

López Álvarez

Wolff

(2023) ¿Qué está en riesgo en Mesetas, Meta? El Espectador, 23 March. Available at: https://www.elespectador.com/colombia-20/analistas/que-esta-en-riesgo-en-mesetas-meta/ .

Barrios Sabogal

(2024) From cantonments to settlements: Lessons for reintegration of former combatants from the Colombian peace process. International Peacekeeping 31(5): 599–637.

10.

Bauer

Cassar

Chytilová

, et al. (2014) War’s enduring effects on the development of egalitarian motivations and in-group biases. Psychological Pcience 25(1): 47–57.

11.

Bekerman

Horenczyk

(2004) Arab-Jewish bilingual coeducation in Israel: A long-term approach to intergroup conflict resolution. Journal of Social Issues 60(2): 389–404.

12.

Bellows

Miguel

(2006) War and institutions: New evidence from Sierra Leone. American Economic Review 96(2): 394–399.

13.

Bellows

Miguel

(2009) War and local collective action in Sierra Leone. Journal of Public Economics 93: 1144–1157.

14.

Berger

Calabrese

(1974) Some explorations in initial interaction and beyond: Toward a developmental theory of interpersonal communication. Human Communication Research 1(2): 99–112.

15.

Bierwiaczonek

Waldzus

van der Zee

(2017) Protective or harmful? Exploring the ambivalent role of social identification as a moderator of intergroup stress in sojourners. International Journal of Intercultural Relations 60: 1–11.

16.

Bilali

Iqbal

Erisen

(2019) The role of lay beliefs about group transgressions in acceptance of responsibility for ingroup harm-doing. European Journal of Social Psychology 49(5): 99–1006.

17.

Blattman

(2009) From violence to voting: War and political participation in Uganda. American Political Science Review 103(2): 231–247.

18.

Bobo

(2004) Group conflict, prejudice and the paradox of contemporary racial attitudes. In: Jost

Sidanius

(eds) Political Psychology. New York: Psychology Press, 333–357.

19.

Bornstein

(1989) Exposure and affect: Overview and meta-analysis of research, 1968–1987. Psychological Bulletin 106(2): 265.

20.

Cairns

Darby

(1998) The conflict in Northern Ireland: Causes, consequences, and controls. American Psychologist 53(7): 754.

21.

Carey

Gläßel

Paula

(2025) Media impact on perceptions in postwar societies: Insights from Nepal. Conflict Management and Peace Science 42(4): 394–417.

22.

Coakley

(1994) Approaches to the resolution of ethnic conflict: The strategy of non-territorial autonomy. International Political Science Review 15(3): 297–314.

23.

Cupples

(2004) Counter-revolutionary women: Gender and reconciliation in postwar Nicaragua. Gender & Development 12(3): 8–18.

24.

Delgado Rodríguez

Rodríguez-Pérez

Vaes

, et al. (2012) Contextual variations of infrahumanization: The role of physical context and territoriality. Basic and Applied Social Psychology 34(5): 456–466.

25.

Dinas

Matakos

Xefteris

, et al. (2019) Waking up the golden dawn: Does exposure to the refugee crisis increase support for extreme-right parties? Political Analysis 27(2): 244–254.

26.

Dwyer

(2012) Expanding DDR: The transformative role of former prisoners in community-based reintegration in Northern Ireland. International Journal of Transitional Justice 6(2): 274–295.

27.

Fabra-Zamora

Molina-Ochoa

Doubleday

(2021) The Colombian Peace Agreement. A Multidisciplinary Assessment. London: Routledge.

28.

Godefroidt

Dyrstad

(2024) Hurting or healing? How conflict exposure and trauma (do not) shape support for truth commissions. Conflict Management and Peace Science 42(5): 514–535.

29.

Hamberger

Hewstone

(1997) Inter-ethnic contact as a predictor of blatant and subtle prejudice: Tests of a model in four West European nations. British Journal of Social Psychology 36(2): 173–190.

30.

Hangartner

Dinas

Marbach

, et al. (2019) Does exposure to the refugee crisis make natives more hostile? American Political Science Review 113(2): 442–455.

31.

Harmon-Jones

Allen

JJB

(2001) The role of affect in the mere exposure effect: Evidence from psychophysiological and individual differences approaches. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 27(7): 889–898.

32.

Hart

Gomez

(2023) Is recognition the answer? Exploring the barriers for successful reintegration of ex-combatants into civil society in Northern Ireland and Colombia. Peacebuilding 11(2): 205–221.

33.

Hewstone

Cairns

Voci

, et al. (2006) Intergroup contact, forgiveness, and experience of ‘the Troubles’ in Northern Ireland. Journal of Social Issues 62(1): 99–120.

34.

Hewstone

Schmid

(2014) Neighbourhood ethnic diversity and orientations toward Muslims in Britain: The role of intergroup contact. The Political Quarterly 85(3): 320–325.

35.

Homola

(2021) Partisanship and perceived threats about immigration. Party Politics 27(5): 977–982.

36.

Hughes

(2009) Armed conflict, international linkages, and women’s parliamentary representation in developing nations. Social Problems 56(1): 174–204.

37.

Humphreys

Weinstein

(2007) Demobilization and Reintegration. Journal of Conflict Resolution 51(4): 531–567.

38.

Islam

Hewstone

(1993) Dimensions of contact as predictors of intergroup anxiety, perceived out-group variability, and out-group attitude: An integrative model. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 19(6): 700–710.

39.

Jarstad

Sisk

(2008) From War to Democracy: Dilemmas of Peacebuilding. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

40.

Joshi

Melander

Quinn

(2017) Sequencing the peace: How the order of peace agreement implementation can reduce the destabilizing effects of post-accord elections. Journal of Conflict Resolution 61(1): 4–28.

41.

Kadiangandu

Mullet

(2007) Intergroup forgiveness: A Congolese perspective. Peace and Conflict: Journal of Peace Psychology 13(1): 37.

42.

Kaplan

Nussio

(2018) Community counts: The social reintegration of ex-combatants in Colombia. Conflict Management and Peace Science 35(2): 132–153.

43.

Katz

(1991) Gordon allport’s ‘the nature of prejudice’. Political Psychology 12(1): 125–157.

44.

Knight

Özerdem

(2004) Guns, camps and cash: Disarmament, demobilization and reinsertion of former combatants in transitions from war to peace. Journal of Peace Research 41(4): 499–516.

45.

Koc

Anderson

(2018) Social distance toward Syrian refugees: The role of intergroup anxiety in facilitating positive relations. Journal of Social Issues 74(4): 790–811.

46.

Kreiman

Masullo

(2020) Who shot the bullets? Exposure to violence and attitudes toward peace: Evidence from the 2016 Colombian referendum. Latin American Politics and Society 62(4): 24–49.

47.

Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies (2018) State of Implementation of the Colombia Peace Agreement. Bogotá: University of Notre Dame. https://rb.gy/atcql7 .

48.

Kteily

Hodson

Bruneau

(2016) They see us as less than human: Metadehumanization predicts intergroup conflict via reciprocal dehumanization. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 110(3): 343.

49.

Lee

(2001) The mere exposure effect: An uncertainty reduction explanation revisited. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin 27(10): 1255–1266.

50.

Maoz

McCauley

(2009) Threat perceptions and feelings as predictors of Jewish-Israeli support for compromise with Palestinians. Journal of Peace Research 46(4): 525–539.

51.

Matera

Stefanile

Brown

(2015) Majority–minority acculturation preferences concordance as an antecedent of attitudes towards immigrants: The mediating role of perceived symbolic threat and metastereotypes. International Journal of Intercultural Relations 45: 96–103.

52.

Meernik

DeMeritt

JHR

Uribe-López

(2019) As War Ends: What Colombia Can Tell us About the Sustainability of Peace and Transitional Justice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

53.

Molloy

(2016) Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration: Theory and Practice. Boulder, CO: Kumarian Press.

54.

Mousa

(2020) Building social cohesion between Christians and Muslims through soccer in post-ISIS Iraq. Science 369(6505): 866–870.

55.

Muggah

(2009) Security and Post-conflict Reconstruction: Dealing with Fighters in the Aftermath of War. London: Routledge.

56.

Muggah

O’Donnell

(2015) Next generation disarmament, demobilization and reintegration. Stability: International Journal of Security and Development 4(1): 1–12. 10.5334/sta.fs.

57.

Neto

da Conceição Pinto

Mullet

(2007) Intergroup forgiveness: East Timorese and Angolan perspectives. Journal of Peace Research 44(6): 711–728.

58.

Noor

Halabi

(2018) Can we forgive a militant outgroup member? The role of perspective-taking. Asian Journal of Social Psychology 21(4): 246–255.

59.

Pettigrew

Meertens

(1995) Subtle and blatant prejudice in western Europe. European Journal of Social Psychology 25(1): 57–75.

60.

Pettigrew

Tropp

(2006) A meta-analytic test of intergroup contact theory. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 90(5): 751.

61.

Prieto

(2012) Together after war while the war goes on: Victims, ex-combatants and communities in three Colombian cities. International Journal of Transitional Justice 6(3): 525–546.

62.

Quintero

(2019, September 4) “Este es el Proyecto por el agua que une a reincorporados y comunidad en el Cesar”. Misión de Verificación de la ONU en Colombia. https://colombia.unmissions.org/este-es-el-proyecto-por-el-agua-que-une-reincorporados-y-comunidad-en-el-cesar

63.

Riek

Mania

Gaertner

(2006) Intergroup threat and outgroup attitudes: A meta-analytic review. Personality and Social Psychology Review 10(4): 336–353.

64.

Saideman

Lanoue

Campenni

, et al. (2002) Democratization, political institutions, and ethnic conflict: A pooled time-series analysis, 1985–1998. Comparative Political Studies 35(1): 103–129.

65.

Schaub

(2017) Threat and parochialism in intergroup relations: Lab-in-the-field evidence from rural Georgia. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences 284(1865): 20171560.

66.

Sharif

Carranza-Franco

(2025) Delegative peacebuilding: Explaining post-conflict selective violence. Conflict Management and Peace Science.

67.

Shnabel

Ullrich

(2016) Putting emotion regulation in context: The (missing) role of power relations, intergroup trust, and groups’ need for positive identities in reconciliation processes. Psychological Inquiry 27(2): 124–132.

68.

Sniderman

Hagendoorn

Prior

(2004) Predisposing factors and situational triggers: Exclusionary reactions to immigrant minorities. American Political Science Review 98(1): 35–49.

69.

Specht

(2023) Innovations to DDR to address conflicts and stabilise combatants and communities in the Central African Republic. In: Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants in Africa. New York: Routledge, 119–135. 10.4324/9781003390756-11.

70.

Steinmayr

(2021) Contact versus exposure: Refugee presence and voting for the far right. The Review of Economics and Statistics 103(2): 310–327.

71.

Stephan

(2014) Intergroup anxiety: Theory, research, and practice. Personality and Social Psychology Review 18(3): 239–255.

72.

Stephan

Gudykunst

(1999) Anxiety in intergroup relations: A comparison of anxiety/uncertainty management theory and integrated threat theory. International Journal of Intercultural Relations 23(4): 613–628.

73.

Tausch

Hewstone

Kenworthy

, et al. (2007) Cross-community contact, perceived status differences, and intergroup attitudes in Northern Ireland: The mediating roles of individual-level versus group-level threats and the moderating role of social identification. Political Psychology 28(1): 53–68.

74.

Trejos Rosero

(2016) Explanatory hypotheses on the strategic defeat of the armed insurgency in the Caribbean region of Colombia: The cases of the FARC-EP and the ELN. Revista de Derecho Uninorte 45: 346–377.

75.

Trejos Rosero

(2018) Manaure y ciénaga, ejemplo de La Paz posible en el caribe. La Silla Vacía. https://www.lasillavacia.com/red-de-expertos/red-caribe/manaure-y-cienaga-ejemplo-de-la-paz-posible-en-el-caribe/.

76.

United Nations and Bonn International Center for Conversion (2021) The Evolving Nature of DDR: Study on Engaging armed groups across the peace continuum.

77.

UN Women . (2022) “Women’s Meaningful Participation in Peace and Political Processes in Fragile Contexts”. Available at: https://bit.ly/3ExrAi7.

78.

Vaes

Paladino

Castelli

, et al. (2003) On the behavioral consequences of infrahumanization: The implicit role of uniquely human emotions in intergroup relations. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 85(6): 1016.

79.

Vezzali

Giovannini

Capozza

(2010) Longitudinal effects of contact on intergroup relations: The role of majority and minority group membership and intergroup emotions. Journal of Community & Applied Social Psychology 20(6): 462–479.

80.

Voors

Nillesen

EEM

Verwimp

, et al. (2012) Violent conflict and behavior: A field experiment in Burundi. American Economic Review 102(2): 941–964.

81.

Walter

(2002) Committing to Peace: The Successful Settlement of Civil Wars. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

82.

Xiao

Wohl

Van Bavel

(2016) Proximity under threat: The role of physical distance in intergroup relations. PloS one 11(7): e0159792.

83.

Zajonc

(1968) Attitudinal effects of mere exposure. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 9(2p2): 1.

84.

Zarate

Garcia

Garza

, et al. (2004) Cultural threat and perceived realistic group conflict as dual predictors of prejudice. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology 40(1): 99–105.

Supplementary Material

Please find the following supplemental material available below.

For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.

For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.

0.00 MB

0.02 MB

0.05 MB

0.10 MB