Abstract
While considerable research exists on the underlying causes of terrorism, the timing of terrorist attacks remains poorly understood. This study argues that terrorist groups strategically exploit transient periods of crisis to strike when their targets are most vulnerable. During moments of crisis, state resources are redirected toward immediate challenges, diminishing the likelihood of prompt retaliation. However, terrorist groups weigh both opportunistic gains and reputational risks when deciding to attack. Attacks during certain crises may carry high reputational costs, creating a tradeoff. The study finds that terrorist activity increases during severe security or economic crises but significantly decreases during severe humanitarian crises.
Keywords
Get full access to this article
View all access options for this article.
References
Supplementary Material
Please find the following supplemental material available below.
For Open Access articles published under a Creative Commons License, all supplemental material carries the same license as the article it is associated with.
For non-Open Access articles published, all supplemental material carries a non-exclusive license, and permission requests for re-use of supplemental material or any part of supplemental material shall be sent directly to the copyright owner as specified in the copyright notice associated with the article.
