During a civil war, does external intelligence assistance reduce violence perpetrated by the recipient government against civilians? I contend that intelligence assistance reduces violence against civilians by facilitating identification problems and adopting a “winning-hearts-and-minds strategy,” which enhances the recipient government's legitimacy and intelligence potential. Enhanced intelligence capability solves the recipient government's identification problems. I examined this logic using a dataset on external support and one-sided violence between 1990 and 2008. The empirical findings show that external intelligence assistance reduces the recipient government's violence against civilians.
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