Abstract
This paper examines how territorial claims between states condition the effect of power on interstate conflict. I argue that when the weaker state in a dyad controls a piece of contested territory, increases in power for the state that does not hold the territory lead to increases in the probability of conflict initiation. This has important implications for our understanding of the role that territorial claims play in conflict processes and attempts at conflict management, and provides support for the theoretical claim that the relationship between power and conflict is conditioned by the distribution of benefits.
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