This paper investigates the relationship between International Monetary Fund (IMF)-sponsored economic programs and contentious collective action in Latin America from 1980 to 2007, hypothesizing a positive relationship between participation in IMF programs and the likelihood of social protest. Specifically, we suggest that people in recipient countries protest the unpopular IMF mandates not only because of the negative effects that orthodox economic policies have on their livelihood, but mainly because they perceive a loss of legitimacy and question the sovereignty of their domestic governments. That is, deciding to participate in an IMF program can make governments more prone to being perceived as caving in to the pressures of international agents, increasing the likelihood of contentious collective action. Results from two-stage negative binomial selection models provide strong statistical support for our main hypothesis, remaining robust to different specifications of the second-stage equation and other procedures that correct for potential statistical problems.
AbouharbMRCingranelliDL (2006) The human right effects of World Bank structural adjustment, 1981–2000. International Studies Quarterly50(2): 233–262.
2.
AbouharbMRCingranelliDL (2007) Human Rights and Structural Adjustment. New York: Cambridge University Press.
3.
Adler HellmanJ (2008) Mexican popular movements, clientelism, and the process of democratization. In: Stahler-SholkRVandenHEKueckerGD (eds) Latin American Social Movements in the Twenty-first Century: Resistance, Power, and Democracy. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 61–76.
4.
AlmeidaPD (2007) Defensive mobilization: Popular movements against economic adjustment policies in Latin America. Latin American Perspectives34(3): 123–139.
5.
AlmeidaPD (2008a) The sequencing of success: Organizing templates and neoliberal policy outcomes. Mobilization: An International Quarterly13(2): 165–187.
6.
AlmeidaPD (2008b) Waves of Protest. Popular Struggles in El Salvador, 1925–2005. Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press.
7.
AlmeidaPD (2010) Globalization and collective action. In: LeichtKJenkinsJC (eds) Handbook of Politics: State and Society in Global Perspective. New York: Springer, pp. 305–326.
8.
AlmeidaPDJohnstonH (2006) Neoliberal globalization and popular movements in Latin America. In: JohnstonHAlmeidaP (eds) Latin American Social Movements: Globalization, Democratization, and Transnational Networks. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 3–18.
9.
AnnettA (2001) Social fractionalization, political instability, and the size of government. IMF Staff Papers48(3): 561–591.
10.
ArceM (2010) Parties and social protest in Latin America’s neoliberal era. Party Politics16(5): 669–686.
11.
ArceMBellingerPTJr (2007) Low-intensity democracy revisited. The effects of economic liberalization on political activity in Latin America. World Politics60(1): 97–121.
12.
ArceMRiceR (2009) Societal protest in post-stabilization Bolivia. Latin American Research Review44(1): 88–101.
13.
AuvinenJY (1996) IMF intervention and political protest in the third world: A conventional wisdom refined. Third World Quarterly17(3): 377–400.
14.
AuyeroJ (2001) Glocal riots. International Sociology16(1): 33–53
15.
AuyeroJ (2006) The political makings of the 2001 lootings in Argentina. Journal of Latin American Studies38(2): 241–265.
BeckNKatzJN (1995) What to do and not to do with time-series-cross-sectional data. American Political Science Review89(3): 634–647.
18.
BeckTClarkeGGroffAKeeferPWalshP (2001) New tools in comparative political economy: The database of political institutions. World Bank Economic Review15(1): 165–176.
19.
BlancoLRGrierR (2009) Long live democracy: The determinants of political instability in Latin America. Journal of Development Studies45(1): 76–95.
20.
BrownC (2009) Democracy’s friend or foe? The effects of recent IMF conditional lending in Latin America. International Political Science Review30(4): 431–457.
21.
BushwaySJohnsonBSlocumLA (2007) Is the magic still there? The use of the Heckman two-step correction for selection bias in criminology. Journal of Quantitative Criminology23(2): 151–178.
22.
CardosoFHFalettoE (1979) Dependency and Development in Latin America. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
23.
CareySC (2006) The dynamic relationship between protest and repression. Political Research Quarterly59(1):1–11.
24.
CheibubJAGandhiJVreelandJR (2010) Democracy and dictatorship revisited. Public Choice143(1–2): 67–101.
ClearyE (2007) Mobilizing for Human Rights in Latin America. Bloomfield, CT: Kumarian Press.
27.
CottamML (1994) Images and Intervention: U.S. Policies in Latin America. Pittsburgh, PA: University of Pittsburgh Press.
28.
CrispBKellyMJ (1999) The socioeconomic impacts of structural adjustment. International Studies Quarterly43(3): 533–552.
29.
DahlRA (1971) Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
30.
DavenportCArmstrongDAII (2004) Democracy and the violation of human rights: A statistical analysis from 1976 to 1996. American Journal of Political Science48(3): 538–554.
31.
DreherAGassebnerM (2012) Do IMF and World Bank programs induce government crises? An empirical analysis. International Organization66(2): 329–358.
32.
EllingsenT (2000) Colorful community or ethnic witches’ brew? Multiethnicity and domestic conflict during and after the Cold War. Journal of Conflict Resolution44(2): 228–249.
33.
EvrenselA (2002) Effectiveness of IMF-supported stabilization programs in developing countries. Journal of International Money and Finance21(5): 565–587.
34.
FearonJDLaitinDD (2003) Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war. American Political Science Review97(1): 75–90.
35.
FeierabendIKFeierabendRL (1966) Aggressive behaviors within polities, 1948–1962: A cross-national study. Journal of Conflict Resolution10(3): 249–271.
36.
FeierabendIKFeierabendRL (1972) Systematic conditions of political aggression: An application of frustration aggression theory. In: FeierabendIKFeierabendRLGurrTR (eds) Anger, Violence, and Politics; Theories and Research. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, pp. 136–186.
37.
FengY (1997) Democracy, political stability and economic growth. British Journal of Political Science27 (3): 391–418.
38.
FrankAG (1980) Crisis in the World Economy. New York: Holmes & Meier.
39.
FriedmanEJHochstetlerK (2002) Assessing the third transition in Latin American democratization: Representation, regimes and civil society in Argentina and Brazil. Comparative Politics35(1): 21–42.
40.
GaltungJ (1964) A structural theory of aggression. Journal of Peace Research1(2): 95–119.
41.
GarudaG (2000) The distributional effects of IMF programs: A cross-country analysis. World Development28(6): 1031–1051.
42.
GivanRKRobertsKMSouleSA (2010) The Diffusion of Social Movements: Actors, Mechanisms, and Political Effects. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
43.
González SouzaL (1993) México en la Estrategia de Estados Unidos. Enfoques a la Luz del TLC y la Democracia. México: Siglo XXI.
44.
González SouzaL (1994) Soberanía Herida. México ante Estados Unidos en la Hora de la Globalización. México: Nuestro Tiempo.
45.
GreenDKimSYYoonDH (2001) Dirty pool. International Organization55(2): 441–468.
46.
GreeneWH (2003) Econometric Analysis. New York: Macmillan.
47.
GurrTR (1970) Why Men Rebel. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
48.
GurrTR (1986a) Political origins of state violence and terror: A theoretical analysis. In: StohlMLopezG (eds) Government Violence and Repression: An Agenda for Research. New York: Greenwood Press, pp. 45–71.
49.
GurrTR (1986b) Persisting patterns of repression and rebellion: Foundations for a general theory of political coercion. In: KarnsM (ed.) Persistent Patterns and Emerging Structures in a Waning Century. New York: Praeger, pp. 149–170.
50.
HajroZJoyceJ (2009) A true test: Do IMF programs hurt the poor?Applied Economics41(3): 295–306.
51.
HeckmanJJ (1988) The Microeconomic Evaluation of Social Programs and Economic Institutions. Chung Hua Series of Lectures by Invited Eminent Economists., Vol 14. Taipei: The Institute of Economics Academia Sinica.
52.
HellerPSBovenbergALCatsambasTChuKShomeP (1988) The implications of Fund-supported adjustment programs for poverty: Experiences in selected countries. Occasional Paper No. 58. Washington, DC: IMF.
53.
HibbsDA (1973) Mass Political Violence: A Cross-national Causal Analysis. New York: Wiley.
54.
HutchisonMMNoyI (2003) Macroeconomic effects of IMF-sponsored economic programs in Latin America: Output costs, program recidivism, and the vicious cycle of failed stabilizations. Journal of International Money and Finance22(7): 991–1014.
55.
ImmermanR (1982) The CIA in Guatemala. The Foreign Policy of Intervention. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
56.
International Monetary Fund (2009) Review of Fund facilities. Available at: http://www.imf.org
57.
International Monetary Fund (2011) International Financial Statistics CD and Yearbook (various years). Washington, DC: IMF.
58.
JenkinsJC (1998) Channeling social protest: Foundation patronage of contemporary social movements. In: PowellWWClemensES (eds) Private Action and the Public Good. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, pp. 206–216.
59.
JensenN (2004) Crisis, conditions, and capital: The effects of IMF agreements on foreign direct investment inflows. Journal of Conflict Resolution48(2): 194–210.
60.
JohnstonHAlmeidaP (2006) Latin American Social Movements: Globalization, Democratization, and Transnational Networks. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
61.
KapurDNaímM (2005) The IMF and democratic governance. Journal of Democracy16(1): 89–102.
62.
KingJC (2000) Exploring the ameliorating effects of democracy on political repression: cross-national evidence. In: DavenportC (ed.) Paths to State Repression: Human Rights Violations and Contentious Politics. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 217–239.
63.
KnightMSantaellaJA (1997) Economic determinants of fund financial arrangements. Journal of Development Economics54(2): 405–436.
64.
KurtzMJ (2004) The dilemmas of democracy in the open economy: Lessons from Latin America. World Politics56(2): 262–302.
65.
LipsetSM (1983) Political Man: the Social Bases of Politics, 2nd edn.London: Heinemann
66.
López MayaMLanderL (2005) Popular protest in Venezuela: Novelties and continuities. Latin American Perspectives32(2): 92–108.
67.
MainwaringSPerez-LiñanA (2008) Regime legacies and democratization: Explaining variance in the level of democracy in Latin America, 1978–2004. University of Notre Dame, H. Kellogg Institute for International Studies, Working Paper no. 354.
68.
McAdamD (1982) Political Process and the Development of Black Insurgency, 1930–1970. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.
69.
McAdamD (1996) Conceptual origins, current problems, future directions. In: McAdamDZaldMNMcCarthyJD (eds) Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings. New York: Cambridge University Press, pp. 23–40.
70.
McAdamDTarrowSGTillyC (1996a) To map contentious politics. Mobilization. An International Journal1(1): 17–34.
71.
McAdamDZaldMNMcCarthyJD (1996b) Comparative Perspectives on Social Movements: Political Opportunities, Mobilizing Structures, and Cultural Framings. New York: Cambridge University Press.
72.
MidlarskiMI (1999) The Evolution of Inequality: War, State Survival, and Democracy in Comparative Perspective. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
73.
MooreWH (1998) Repression and dissent: Substitution, context, and timing. American Journal of Political Science42(3): 851–873.
74.
MooreWH (2000) The repression of dissent: A substitution model of government coercion. Journal of Conflict Resolution44(1):107–127.
75.
MorleySMachadoRPettinatoS (1999) Indexes of structural reform in Latin America. Serie Reformas Económicas Working Paper 12. Santiago: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean.
76.
MullerEN (1985) Income inequality, regime repressiveness, and political violence. American Sociological Review50(1): 47–61.
77.
NielsonDL (2003) Supplying trade reform: Political institutions and liberalization in middle-income presidential democracies. American Journal of Political Science47(3): 470–491.
78.
NsouliSMAtoianRMourmourasA (2004) Institutions, program implementation and macroeconomic performance. IMF Working Paper. Washington, DC: IMF.
79.
OrtizDG (2007) Confronting oppression with violence: Inequality, military infrastructure, and dissident repression. Mobilization. An International Journal12(3): 219–238.
80.
OrtizDG (2013) Rocks, bottles, and weak autocracies: The role of political regime settings on contention–repression interactions. Mobilization. An International Journal18(3): 489–513.
81.
ParsaM (2003) Will democratization and globalization make revolutions obsolete? In: ForanJ (ed.) The Future of Revolutions, Rethinking Radical Change in the Age of Globalization. New York: Zed Books, pp.73–82.
82.
PastorMJr (1987) The effects of IMF programs in the Third World: Debate and evidence from Latin America. World Development15(2): 249–262.
83.
PaunovicI (2000) Growth and reforms in Latin America and the Caribbean in the 1990s. Serie Reformas Económicas. Working Paper 70. Santiago: Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean.
PerraultTValdiviaG (2010) Hydrocarbons, popular protest and national imaginaries: Ecuador and Bolivia in comparative context. Geoforum41: 689–699.
86.
PetrasJBrillH (1986) The IMF, austerity and the state in Latin America. Third World Quarterly8(2): 425–448.
87.
PoeSCTateCNKeithLC (1999) Repression of the human right to personal integrity revisited: A global cross-national study covering the years 1976–1993. International Studies Quarterly43(2): 291–313.
88.
PowellGBJr (1982) Contemporary Democracies: Participation, Stability, and Violence. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
89.
PowellGBJr (1986) American voter turnout in comparative perspective. American Political Science Review80(1): 17–43.
90.
PrzeworskiAVreelandJ (2000) The effects of the IMF on economic growth. Journal of Development Economics62(2): 384–421.
91.
PrzeworskiAAlvarezMECheibubJALimongiF (2000) Democracy and Development: Political Institutions and material well-being in the World, 1950–1990. New York: Cambridge University Press.
92.
RabeSG (1988) Eisenhower and Latin America: The Foreign Policy of Anticommunism. Chapel Hill, NC: The University of North Carolina Press.
93.
RemmerKL (1986) The politics of economic stabilization, IMF standby programs in Latin America, 1954–1984. Comparative Politics19(1): 1–24.
94.
ReuveniRLiQ (2003) Economic openness, democracy and income inequality: An empirical analysis. Comparative Political Studies3(5): 575–601.
95.
RootHLNellisN (2000) The compulsion of patronage: Political sources of information asymmetry and risk in developing economies. In Bueno de MesquitaBRootHL (eds) Governing for Prosperity. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, pp. 85–105.
96.
RossiFM (2008) La Transnacionalización Norte-Sur de los Conflictos y sus Actores. La Experiencia de la Red ATTAC en Argentina. In: GrimsonAPereyraS (eds) Conflictos Globales, Voces Locales: Movilización y Activismo en Clave Transnacional. Buenos Aires: UNRISD Prometeo, pp. 233–262.
97.
RossiFM (2013) Juggling multiple agendas: The struggle of trade unions against national, continental, and international neoliberalism in Argentina. In: SilvaE (ed.) Transnational Activism and National Movements in Latin America: Bridging the Divide. London: Routledge, pp. 141–160.
98.
SaniGSartoriG (1983) Polarization, fragmentation and competition in Western democracies. In: DaalderHMairP (eds) Western European Party Systems. London: Sage, pp. 306–337.
99.
SartoriG (1976) Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
100.
SchatzmanC (2005) Political challenge in Latin America: Rebellion and collective protest in an era of democratization. Journal of Peace Research42(3): 291–310.
101.
ShefnerJPasdirtzGBladC (2006) Austerity protests and immiserating growth in Mexico and Argentina. In: JohnstonHAlmeidaP (eds) Latin American Social Movements: Globalization, Democratization, and Transnational Networks. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 19–42.
102.
SpronkSWebberJR (2008) Struggles against accumulation by dispossession in Bolivia: The political economy of natural resource contention. In: Stahler-SholkRVandenHEKueckerGD (eds) Latin American Social Movements in the Twenty-first Century: Resistance, Power, and Democracy. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, pp. 77–91.
103.
Stahler-SholkRVandenHEKueckerGD (eds) (2008) Latin American Social Movements in the Twenty-first Century: Resistance, Power, and Democracy. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
104.
SuárezHJ (2003) Una Semana Fundamental: 10–18 Octubre 2003. La Paz: Muela del Diablo.
105.
TanziV (1989) Fiscal policy and economic reconstruction in Latin America. IMF Working Paper 89/94. Washington, DC: IMF.
106.
TarrowS (1998) Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press.
107.
TillyC (1978) From Mobilization to Revolution. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley.
108.
VreelandJR (2002) The effect of IMF programs on labor. World Development30(1): 121–139.
109.
VreelandJR (2003) The IMF and Economic Development. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
110.
VreelandJR (2006) IMF program compliance: Aggregate index versus policy specific research strategies. The Review of International Organizations1(4): 359–378.
111.
WallersteinI (1978) The Modern World System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century. New York: Academic Press.
112.
WaltonJRaginC (1990) Global and national sources of political protest: Third World responses to the debt crisis. American Sociological Review55(6): 876–890.
113.
WaltonJSeddonD (eds) (1994) Free Markets and Food Riots: The Politics of Global Adjustment. Oxford: Blackwell.
114.
WeedeE (1981) Income inequality, average income, and domestic violence. Journal of Conflict Resolution25(4): 639–654.
115.
World Bank (2010) World Development Indicators [CD-Rom]. Washington, DC.
