Abstract
The problem, policies and politics streams of the Multiple Streams Framework (MSF) provides a clear theoretical structure to examine changes in the concept of election integrity since the 2020 election. Increased attention to perceived, but unproven, voter fraud claims (politics), coupled with an environment of mistrust in government institutions and the nationalization of state politics (problem), and push to create laws to restrict access to the ballot (policy) created a policy window that enabled actors to reframe the concept of election integrity. State election laws already define election malfeasance and guide election administrators and public prosecutors on how to adjudicate those that commit it. In this exploratory study, we examine the state of the field as it pertains to the spectrum of approaches undertaken by state legislatures to manage election integrity—from “election fraud” hotlines to expanded jurisdictions to formalized election integrity units. What do these new definitions of integrity look like in practice and how do they impact election administration? We explore the administrative functions, organizational arrangements, and the level of integration within the current governmental structure of these new approaches.
Introduction
Since the 2020 election, updates to election codes and new election laws have proliferated state legislators across the country (Brennan Center for Justice, n.d.; Ritter et al., 2024; Voting Rights Lab, 2025). The impact of the “Big Lie” and the lawsuits it spawned has created a surge in interest in election administration and the policies that govern it; these changes run the gamut from protecting election workers from violence and threats to increasing scrutiny and prosecution of election workers and voters (States United, Protect Democracy, & Law Forward, 2023). One common term in these discussions is “integrity.” Integrity has always been a concern for election administrators across the country; transparent and detailed procedures and policies have been in place for decades to ensure eligible voters are confident that their vote counts. However, in the wake of a concerted mis- and dis-information campaign following the 2020 election, “integrity” has been co-opted by election deniers to frame any loss as an integrity issue (Karalunas & Weiser, 2023).
The decentralized system of U.S. election administration allows for different structures across the states, with most election responsibility falling under the state’s Chief Election Official, often the Secretary of State. 1 Local election officials (LEOs) have significant discretion in their roles (White et al., 2015) upholding and implementing state election law, including testing voting equipment, promoting voter participation, authority over voter registration and eligibility, and in many states, investigating instances of “fraud.” As evidenced throughout the country via numerous audits and investigations, election fraud is exceptionally rare (Holliday et al., 2025; Minnite, 2019; Parks, 2023). Yet, in the wake of recent elections, unfounded claims of stolen elections, coupled with increasing mistrust of government institutions created a policy window (Kingdon, 1984) for politicians to change election laws in myriad ways, including those that hamper voting (Carter et al., 2024). Florida, with the creation of the Office of Election Crimes and Security (OECS) in 2022, has led the latest wave of new units within state offices with increased investigatory powers, and punishments, for all election crimes within the state. These special election integrity units are often either outside the current state administrative/legal structures or operate under opaque authority and guidelines.
The increased interest in financial penalties for election crimes and/or establishing or codifying election integrity units or election police with unclear or undefined powers can have direct impacts on the election process. This research seeks to answer the following questions: (1) how did election integrity rise to the public policy agenda? (2) which policies have dominated the policy agenda via legislation on election integrity across the country?, and (3) how have political entrepreneurs used this window to achieve long-standing political goals? After reviewing the data, it becomes apparent that disregard for bureaucratic expertise that does not serve political goals, mistrust in government institutions, and the superseding of local power follows patterns of state preemption. Furthermore, the nationalization of party platforms (e.g., claiming election fraud when none is found) can be negatively used to influence definitions of election integrity and commitment to voter protection down to the local level.
This paper revisits the Multiple Streams Framework (MSF) and demonstrates how the nationalization of state politics through the framing of election integrity provides a compelling case study. We explore how the politics, policy, and problem streams have met through the policy window opened after the 2020 election, leading to a surge in election integrity bills across the U.S. For this study, Kingdon’s theoretical framework seemed appropriate because of politics and problems surrounding federal, state, and local allegations of election fraud during and after the 2020 election cycle that gained public and political attention (Parks, 2024). Furthermore, election fraud in the U.S. is infrequent and rare (Edlin et al., 2024), yet elected officials and the public continue to spread baseless accusations that erode public trust and confidence in U.S. elections.
Losers of political contests sometime question results, a phenomenon referred to as the “winners effect.” It occurs across different elections and political parties: the 2000 presidential contest between George W. Bush and Al Gore, the 2018 Georgia governor’s race between Stacey Abrams and Briam Kemp (Lee, 2020), and the 2022 Arizona governor’s race between Kari Lake and Katie Hobbs (Tang & Billeaud, 2023) are all examples. However, the increased rhetoric around a “rigged election” has introduced a new and far-reaching impact on the U.S. electoral system at the state level (Mongrain, 2023). Our analysis examines legislation related to the administrative structures for policing election integrity at the state level from 2021 to 2024. Additionally, we examine the implications of these efforts to redefine election integrity.
Multiple Streams and a Policy Window
Policy change is not a predictable process. It often emerges from a variety of factors that create opportunities for action. One of the most influential frameworks for understanding how and when significant policy shifts occur is the concept of policy windows introduced by Kingdon (1984) to explain agenda setting in the U.S. Kingdon’s theory suggests that policy windows open when three key streams align: (1) problems that require attention arise, (2) solutions that are feasible and can be implemented, and (3) political conditions (e.g., environment, public opinion, or election results). To Kingdon, these streams typically operate independently from one another until certain conditions cause them to intersect (Howlett et al., 2015). Together, these streams then provide a moment for bureaucrats or advocates to seize opportunities to introduce policy change (Kingdon, 1984). This “window” can be influenced by events, changes in leadership, and/or public opinion and can be used to implement reforms or policy changes.
Since Kingdon first introduced the MSF, more than 300 cases covering various topics at both the national and international levels have been examined using his framework to understand policy activity (Béland & Howlett, 2016; M. D. Jones et al., 2016; Zahariadis, 2016). Some examples include addressing the COVID-19 global pandemic (Amri & Logan, 2021), environmental policy (e.g., Brunner, 2008; Dolan, 2021), open government policy (Ruvalcaba-Gomez et al., 2023), and education policy (Stout & Stevens, 2000). Some notable examples in the U.S. include the Civil Rights Act (CRA) of 1965 and the Affordable Care Act (ACA) of 2010. Leading up to the ACA, the rise in healthcare costs and persistent coverage gaps created a significant sense of urgency in the U.S. (problem) Policymakers began to formulate and propose solutions across the county (policy). This was further amplified by President Barack Obama’s successful presidential run, where healthcare reform was at the center of his campaign, underscoring the need for policy change (politics). These separate “streams” then crossed to create policy activity.
More recently, in the election context, the introduction of specialized units and other policing measures to address election integrity outside of the normal process after 2020, reinforces the depiction of policy windows as moments when problems (i.e., campaigns to cast doubt on elections by partisan politicians in a polarized environment) and policy/solutions (i.e., creating politicized units to combat so-called fraud) intersect. It also underscores the importance of timing and other strategies used by legislators to change policy within complex political environments. Today’s election “fraud” prevention measures may be introduced not because they effectively address an issue, but rather due to political pressure, national politics, and/or public concern that create a “window” for action.
Within the MSF framework, it is important to clarify the theoretical meaning of key terms that may differ from common parlance. “Problems” are not necessarily observable conditions that require prompt attention, but rather are issues that both policymakers and the public come to think of as requiring government action (Birkland, 1998). These problems are socially constructed and gain attention through focusing events (M. D. Jones et al., 2016). Likewise, the “politics” stream extends beyond electoral politics to include the broader political environment, including public mood, changes in government leadership, and interest group activities. These changes are theorized to create an environment that is receptive to certain policy solutions (Zahariadis, 2016). Finally, the “policy” stream refers to the cadre of policy actors—including researchers, bureaucrats, advocates, and others—who generate and iterate policy proposals that may lie dormant until an appropriate policy window opens (Kingdon, 1984). This operationalization is critical for understanding our construction of election integrity as a “problem” requiring policy intervention, rather than assuming it to represent an objective crisis in election administration.
Understanding the post-2020 policy environment requires clarification of the factors that influence electoral confidence. Prior work finds that claims of fraud, including unsubstantiated claims, reduce confidence and that these effects are amplified through elite rhetoric and the media (Eggers et al., 2021). Notably, conservative media outlets have played a significant role propagating fraud claims and politicizing election procedures (Grumbach, 2022). While external factors, including these, undoubtedly influenced public perception, our analysis focuses specifically on how state legislative bodies respond to and capitalized on the emergent environment.
Questioning election results is not new in American politics; however, claims following the 2020 election constitute a qualitatively different phenomenon that justifies applying MSF because of the framework’s emphasis on unpredictable policy change. Prior election disputes tended to focus on narrow margins or procedural missteps. This focus, however, has changed dramatically to consider claims of “massive and widespread fraud” across multiple states. Most critically, claims of fraud evolved into what has been called the “Big Lie,” a narrative of electoral illegitimacy that motivated concrete actions including the January 6th 2021 attack on the U.S. Capitol (Parks, 2024). We propose that this represents a fundamental departure from post-election grievances of the past, integrates systematic attempts to overturn certified results through extralegal means, thereby opening a policy window for integrity legislation that would have been politically infeasible under circumstances of accepted electoral legitimacy (Mongrain, 2023). We outline the three streams below, starting with the policies stream: the recent history of election administration policy.
Policies: Administration of Elections in the U.S
Article I, Section 4, Clause 1 of the U.S. Constitution, the “Elections Clause”, makes states primarily responsible for regulating congressional elections while vesting ultimate power over elections in Congress (Morley & Tolson, n.d.). States oversee various aspects of elections including voter registration, certification of results, and the administration of both state and local elections. Meanwhile, local governments handle the implementation and administration of elections at the county or municipal level across more than 10,000 election jurisdictions in the U.S. (White et al., 2015) This arrangement makes the U.S. system of elections, which lacks a central government with the responsibility for administering elections, unique among the world’s democracies. This layered, decentralized system of governance also highlights the complex nature of election oversight.
One significant insight from Lipsky’s (1980) introduction of street-level bureaucracy is that street-level bureaucrats play a crucial role in local policy implementation, often navigating discretionary decision making within the context of their environments. Their omission from the policy process leads to policies that overlook administrative capacity, constraints, as well as resource limitations. LEOs have previously been described as street-level bureaucrats as they are frontline workers for implementing state election policies and directly interacting with the public and other stakeholders (Rinfret et al., 2018).
Furthermore, Lipsky (1980) highlights the impact of vague legislation on policy implementation. Several studies have utilized and expanded his insights to investigate this phenomenon theoretically (e.g., Carrington, 2005; Natesan & Marathe, 2017) and in the context of education (e.g., Brodkin, 2011; Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003), welfare (e.g., Riccucci, 2005), law enforcement (e.g., Hassell, 2007; Maynard-Moody & Musheno, 2003; Portillo & Kras, 2020), and healthcare (e.g., Cooper et al., 2015; Tummers & Bekkers, 2014) frontline workers. Like these frontline workers, LEOs also make discretionary decisions due to administrative and resource constraints, policy ambiguity, and the unique contextual factors of their jurisdiction.
Although the U.S. system of decentralized elections vests the majority of decision-making in local and state authority, several policies at the federal level guide the work of election administrators. Policies including the 1993 National Voter Registration Act (NVRA), which required states to provide voter registration services at certain agencies and mandated that states identify a chief election official to manage elections, and the 2002 Help America Vote Act (HAVA), which made sweeping reforms to the election process following U.S. Supreme Court’s determination that George W. Bush won the 2000 presidential campaign, shaped modern practice of election administration in the U.S.
HAVA was designed to improve the voting issues uncovered by the 2000 election and introduced a level of federal oversight aimed to address issues including voter access and voting systems. It also provided federal funds to modernize voting equipment and voter registration systems. The many changes to election procedures in the years since HAVA have included both expansions in voter access (and backlash to this expansion) and a focus on physical and cybersecurity (particularly in the wake of Russian attempts to hack voting systems in 2016). Policies to expand voting rights include the expansion of early voting, requirements to produce election documentation in multiple languages, increased access to accessible methods of voting including drive-up voting, and the expansion of vote-by-mail and no-excuse absentee ballots. The U.S. Election Assistance Commission (EAC) was established by HAVA as an independent, bipartisan commission to help give guidance to LEOs. In addition, the Electronic Registration Information Center (ERIC) was created by Secretaries of State in 2012. ERIC is a nonprofit, nonpartisan organization whose mission is to automate the verification of voter registration across state lines through the sharing of data (Electronic Registration Information Center [ERIC], n.d.).
In local terms, HAVA introduced additional burdens, strained LEOs resources, and constricted their autonomy. The passage of HAVA was not a panacea and there is a plethora of research on the unintended consequences of unfunded mandates to modernize voting procedures across the U.S. LEOs suffered increased administrative burden (Burden et al., 2012), increased costs (Kropf et al., 2020), and more difficulty in recruiting the extra poll workers needed to work extended hours (de Nevers, 2021). In addition, with every move to increase access, there is a push to return to more restrictive practices as political power changed hands like reducing the number of early voting days/hours, limiting the types of documents that prove a voter’s identification, and restricting the use of mail ballots. The constant changes in election law add more burden to LEOs as they need to retrain employees and poll workers and communicate changes to voters (de Nevers, 2021; Merivaki & Suttmann-Lea, 2022).
However, HAVA also kickstarted a movement toward professionalization and the sharing of best practices between LEOs (Hale et al., 2015; Hale & Slaton, 2008). Thirty-five states require LEOs to receive mandatory state training and certification, while another 13 provide voluntary training (Furstenberg-Beckman et al., 2021). Auburn University and the University of Minnesota also offer certificate programs in election administration. Advances in the quality of election administration along with increased trust built over time since 2000 are at risk in the wake of the current policy window opening. History has repeated itself as Florida has again become a pivot point for election reform with its creation of the Office of Election Crimes and Security (OECS) and new legislation increasing scrutiny and control over LEOs and voters (Clark et al., 2024).
Politics: The Push-and-Pull
In the U.S., autonomy and discretion have been key characteristics of LEOs, allowing them to tailor the voting process to the unique needs of their voters. How and when LEOs exercise their autonomy and discretion has direct impacts on voters’ ability to exercise their voting rights and, in turn, participate in democratic governance. In recent years, these powers have been increasingly constrained by partisan pressures and state mandates (Furstenberg-Beckman et al., 2021). This shift is often attributed to concerns about local control, particularly in jurisdictions with high populations of minority groups (Berzon, 2024; Jouvenal, 2023; Potts, 2023; Sanders & Clapman, 2024).
Between the 2000 and 2020 U.S. presidential elections, LEOs also often operated quietly in the background administering democratic elections without attracting public or political attention. Their efforts in implementing elections, for the most part, were seen as bureaucratic, technical, and nonpartisan with bipartisan trust. However, the 2020 election shifted this viewpoint with the global pandemic leading to new, emergency election procedures to accommodate voters through expansions in mail-in and early voting. Election officials at both state and local levels found themselves at the center of mis- and dis-information campaigns stemming from their discretionary choices about how to run a federal presidential election during a deadly pandemic and public debates surrounding the election in general. These campaigns fed into an atmosphere of increasing distrust in government institutions (Pew Research Center, 2024).
While politicization has always been a force influencing policy creation, this practice has increased (Grumbach, 2022; Herd & Moynihan, 2018). Recently, we see politicization expressed as the dehumanization of public servants by politicians and the public alike. Partisan maneuvering has often ignored or cast aspersions on bureaucratic expertise or, worse, lied about the work carried out by public servants, painting them as incompetent at best, and evil at worst (Christensen, 2022; Meier et al., 2019; Moynihan, 2022; Nichols, 2017). This hostility has spread to the public, resulting in threats and violence toward members of the public health community, teachers, and election officials in recent years (Barsky et al., 2025; Humphrey, 2021; Ward et al., 2022).
After the 2020 election, intense focus on voting access and methods was reinforced through a combination of heightened rhetoric from elected politicians at all levels of government, including the presidency, as well as legislative actions. False claims of widespread voter fraud, allegations of a stolen election, and contentions related to mail-in voting, the handling of ballots, and corrupted voting machines permeated the election landscape in the years following election (Jouvenal, 2023; Parks, 2023; Wines, 2021; Wolfe, 2022). Despite lacking evidence of systematic voter fraud (Brennan Center for Justice, 2022; Eggers et al., 2021), the rhetoric continued to spread through social media, news outlets, political campaigns, and statements made by elected officials.
This dedication to the fraud myth included a move from Republican-led states to leave ERIC; ironically, ERIC is one of the best tools to keep voter registration records clean (Parks, 2023; Vasilogambros, 2023). By 2022, 31 states plus the District of Columbia had voluntarily joined ERIC. However, the election denial movement, led by activists concerned with “integrity,” led to a succession of states withdrawing from the organization. As of the writing of this manuscript 24 states and the District of Columbia remain members of ERIC (ERIC, n.d.).
There may be questions as to whether rhetoric translates into action. In other words, a plethora of bills introduced for the purpose of curbing “election fraud” does not necessarily mean that they will accomplish systemic change, let alone be passed and signed into law. Are legislators signaling their loyalty to the party platform by vocally supporting these bills or do they really believe that the system needs changed? Scholars have investigated the timing of co-sponsorship of bills, arguing that legislators strategically time their co-sponsorship in response to electoral vulnerability, partisanship, and the idiosyncrasies of their chambers (Schilling et al., 2023). Others have found that higher political action committee (PAC) contributions decrease party unity in legislatures (Norton & Pildes, 2020). Tracking the amount of political campaign contributions is outside the scope of this project but adds an intriguing question as to why legislators may or may not introduce these types of bills and how they may benefit from their party.
Problem: Nationalization of State Politics
The concept of nationalization of state politics explores the increasing alignment of state-level dynamics with national issues, trends, and/or partisan divisions. Hopkins (2018) has been instrumental in developing and expanding this idea arguing that the growing influence of national political identity and issues has reshaped state and local elections, diminishing the relevance and importance of local concerns. Others have also contributed to understanding this idea by exploring voter behavior and political responsiveness (Wlezien & Erikson, 2002). Sievert and McKee (2019) argue that American elections have become more nationalized since the 1970s whereby “. . .presidential and national politics exert greater influence over down-ballot contests” (p. 1055).
It is well established that Americans tend to have higher levels of trust for local governments than federal lawmakers. Since 1972, Gallup has documented trust ratings for U.S. government institutions. In 2023, Gallup reported that 67% of Americans have trust and confidence in their local government (a 3 point drop from the historic average) while just 32% reported feeling the same way about the legislative branch of the U.S. government (a 16 point drop from the average; J. M. Jones, 2023). Similarly, when Pew Research polled registered voters immediately following Election Day in 2024, they found that 69% reported that elections in their community were run very well—yet just 43% indicated feeling the same way about elections across the U.S. (Hatfield, 2025).
In the academic literature, scholars have explored this phenomenon in the context of election administration (e.g., Atkeson & Saunders, 2007; Rinfret & Barsky, 2020). Recent work suggests that political and administrative actors play an important role in enhancing or damaging trust in the electoral process (Brown et al., 2024) and that by common measures, Americans were more confident in the 2020 election than they were in 2016 (Stewart, 2022b). The grafting of national party politics and strategies onto the local government may damage trust at the local level as administrators struggle to adhere to and/or understand legislative language that has little to do with their everyday tasks (Roman, 2015).
Currently, Democrats hold governorships in a minority of states (23), while 27 states are led by Republicans. Considering the nationalization of state politics, it follows that gubernatorial and legislative races may focus more on national rhetoric like immigration, health care, and defense and national security rather than state-specific concerns since voters are increasingly influenced by national political narratives. The two major U.S. political parties have historically supported either more access to the vote (Democrats) or more restrictive voting practices (Republicans; de Nevers, 2021; Hasen, 2012; Moynihan & Silva, 2008). We would expect to see policies in blue states that protect and defend election administrators and voters, while red states would introduce policies that police or investigate elections to restrict turnout.
Understanding how state politics are being nationalized is crucial to understanding the evolving landscape of election administration in American democracy and its role in shaping state-level outcomes. Grumbach (2022) has suggested that the power of national political parties over state and local politicians has altered American federalism; he argues that there is a polarized resurgence of state policy, democratic backsliding in Republican-controlled states, and decreased policy diffusion among states led by different parties. Additionally, nationalization of state politics can result in greater policy uniformity among states governed by elected officials of the same political party, which can intensify political polarization and negatively affect both implementers on the ground (e.g., LEOs) and voters (Grumbach, 2022).
Policy Window in Action: Seizing Opportunities to Reform Election Administration
The post-2020 environment offers a compelling case for applying the policy window because it exemplifies how heightened public attention can coincide with political shifts to drive policy changes in election administration (Stewart, 2022b). A political environment of mistrust and misinformation regarding election administration, coupled with a national political party ready to influence state legislatures with restrictive election policies has created an environment that has enabled the reframing of election integrity as a major policy problem. As evidenced in Table 1, the policy window that opened in the wake of the 2020 election has precipitated an avalanche of bills addressing election “crimes.” Data from the National Conference of State Legislatures (NCSL) election law database allows for searching by theme/category. From 2020 to 2021, there is an 149% increase in the number of bills referencing election crimes. This level of interest is maintained annually through 2024. In addition, the number of states in which these bills are being introduced increased from 31 in 2020 to 44 in 2024, indicating a pattern of diffusion amongst the states. The diffusion of bills purporting to fight election crime include attempts to limit mail voting, requiring more personal information while casting a ballot, and increasing election fraud convictions from misdemeanors to felonies (Brower, 2023).
Bills-All Statuses Categorized as Referencing “Election Crimes” From National Conference of State Legislatures 2016–2024. a
Updated through October 22, 2024.
Methodology
To help uncover how state governments approach managing election integrity, we first compiled a corpus of election laws via the NCSL database. The NCSL database was chosen due to its widespread use in election science research and the organization’s reputation as a national bipartisan repository of data and research. The authors recognize the limitations in using one, albeit trusted, data source. Future iterations of this study could include cross-referencing against other state legislation repositories like the Voting Rights Lab or FindLaw or expand search terms beyond “integrity.” Because we are interested in the influence of the contested 2020 election on the emergenc of election integrity units, we focused our dataset on the time period between January 1, 2021, and October 22, 2024. First, we broadly searched the database using the term “election integrity.” Then, we focused on searching “integrity” within the topics of “election crimes” and “task forces/study commissions/interim committees.” Finally, we met as a research team to discuss the initial corpus of 47 bills and determined that several pieces of legislation that we had knowledge of were missing from the corpus. Ultimately, 17 additional pieces of legislation were added for a total of 64 bills. From the corpus, we identified 32 pieces of legislation for inclusion in the dataset. Those excluded were unrelated to legislative action directed towards election integrity (instead, for instance, many pieces of legislation concerned voters’ bills of rights). The final dataset includes 32 bills from 19 states (see Figure A1, Appendix A).
To systematically analyze the pieces of legislation, we developed a coding form, as detailed in Appendix B. Each piece of legislation was carefully coded by two of the authors using a Google Form, which captured key descriptive details such as the title of the legislation, its status, year it was introduced, and the state where it was introduced. These foundational details provided essential context for our analysis to better understand where and when these election integrity units are being created. To ensure intercoder reliability, as Saldana (2015) states, qualitative researchers should “rely on intensive group discussion, “dialogical intersubjectivity,” coder adjudication and simple group consensus as an agreement goal.” The authors met regularly throughout the coding process to outline emerging themes and discuss differences in definitions and arrive at consensus; the authors also considered the prevalence of “missing” information, particularly the lack of detail in many of the bills.
In addition to the descriptive information collected, the coding process included specific variables of interest. We assessed the location of the division or entity created by the legislation—essentially, where it is housed administratively; this included if the unit would be located under the Secretary of State, state legislature, committee, or as a separate entity. The form also captured details about the structure of the entity and whether the legislation explicitly mentioned efforts to combat fraud or crime. Because we are interested in how these policies impact the implementers of elections (local election officials), we attempted to examine the presence of administrative burdens introduced by the legislation. For the concept of administrative burden, we are interested in understanding whether there are increased costs (i.e., learning or compliance) associated with the implementation of the integrity unit for LEOs. This may include additional tasks such as list maintenance, hiring more staff members, or coordination with the new unit. Increased costs may also include the financial costs associated with complying with the policy.
Another key focus was the financial dimension of these entities. We coded for any references to budget, funding, or resource allocation to better understand if and how financial priorities are structured. Lastly, we explored whether the legislation included provisions for increased policing measures, particularly those affecting LEOs, as these could have significant implications for election administration. This may include imposed fines and criminal penalties.
Results and Discussion
Our analysis reveals that the aftermath of the 2020 elections and heightened concerns over election security and fraud facilitated the introduction of election “integrity” units. By applying Kingdon’s (1984) MSF model, we identified some of the patterns in how elected officials introduce and institutionalize election integrity units, offices, or forces within their state. These reform policies have been coupled with a political strategy that has reframed any unwanted election result as evidence of “fraud”; further, we see the problem of nationalization of state politics allowing these policies to diffuse amongst politically-aligned states. This section presents the findings of our analysis on the introduction of election integrity units in the U.S. from 2021 to 2024.
As aforementioned, we attempted to isolate the introduction or creation of a specific “unit” dedicated to election integrity outside of standing law and procedure. Election integrity units with policing power or direct support from police units changes the nature of and the solutions to mistakes made in democracy administration (Barsky et al., 2025). The word “integrity” is used throughout legislation when referring to all manner of election processes, making the delineation of which bills to include daunting. We recognize that many of the bills excluded from our corpus might be included by other researchers. This quirk of language is a key point of contention for those arguing in the election fraud space (Edlin et al., 2024; PBS NewsHour, 2021). Election processes must be fair, accurate, and transparent; however, the word integrity has been co-opted by political actors to cast doubt on any result in which they did not win (Parks, 2023, 2024).
Scholars have defined focusing events as sudden and uncommon in the MSF literature (Birkland, 1998; M. D. Jones et al., 2016) and elections, as predictable and planned as they may be, might not seem to fit the traditional definition. However, the 2020 election was framed by many policy entrepreneurs as a “stolen election.” This framing enabled supporters of increased election scrutiny to emphasize the urgent need for reform. Even in Florida, where the “right” candidate won the state’s votes, Governor DeSantis quickly jumped on the reform bandwagon to change the way in which Florida elections were conducted (Kennedy, 2022). Texas also followed suit, passing its own law in 2021 that tightened its already restrictive voting laws, coupled with the introduction of a Texas Election Integrity Unit under the state’s Attorney General’s office (Paxton, 2021; Ura, 2021).
While policy windows may be brief, the nature of election-related debates has kept the window open longer. The results from this study demonstrate how the post-election period for the 2020 presidential election and 2022 midterm election led to a surge in legislative activity. Table 2 showcases the uptick in legislation after a presidential (2021; 12) and midterm election (2023; 10). Years following off-cycle elections yield fewer bills. This speaks directly to the use of a focusing event (e.g., a major election) to enable the three streams to open for the introduction of election integrity unit bills.
Introduced Legislation on Election Integrity Units 2021–2024.
We were also interested in the diffusion of bills being introduced across the country. Figure 1 shows how bills on election integrity diffused to 19 states within our study time frame. Thirteen of these states are considered “red states,” or those with a trifecta of Republican leadership in both houses of the state legislature and the governor’s office, and another four states have divided government (Ballotpedia, 2025). Grumbach (2022) has argued that polarization of the national parties has created increased segregation and diffusion of policies across similar states; we see that in our initial findings as well. Efforts to restrict the election process and to create new financial and criminal penalties by red states have been noted by scholars and practitioners (Brower, 2023; Karalunas & Weiser, 2023).
Introduced Legislation on Election Integrity Units by State 2021–2024.
Since the 2020 election, the attention given to false claims of voter fraud suggested deep flaws with the U.S. system of elections. In response, state officials created an atmosphere in which it was a foregone conclusion that reforms needed to be made. The titles and wording of many of these bills indicate both a reaction to an alleged fraudulent system and a need to “restore” integrity. In addition, beginning with Florida’s OECS, the word “crime” was used to indicate any discrepancies within the voting process with no delineation between mistakes made due to vague statutes, voter error, or even systems errors at the elections office. Famously, Florida arrested 20 people for “election fraud” even though those voters had registered and received voter registration cards from the state confirming their status. Most of those cases were reversed in court (Jouvenal, 2023; Lopez, 2022).
The events following the 2020 election, including the January 6th attack on the U.S. Capitol while Congress was meeting to certify the results of the election, represent a crisis that forced national reflection on democratic stability. Yet upon investigating the 2020 election in six states challenged by President Trump, the Associated Press found fewer than 475 potential instances out of more than 25 million votes cast (0.0019%; PBS NewsHour, 2021). Such attention draws interest and resources away from problems that election administrators have actually expressed the need for help on, including revamping security systems, recruiting and paying poll workers, and updating current voting equipment, among others (Stewart, 2022a).
Table 3 provides a breakdown of the location of the election integrity units or task forces, while Table 4 shows the names of these proposed units. The majority are housed within their state’s Attorney General’s office (12) and eight are within the Secretary of State’s office. Elections are administrative functions of the state and while Secretaries of State and State Attorneys General have often collaborated in cases of election fraud, we argue that the movement to create separate election policing functions with a state’s legal hierarchy removes bureaucratic discretion and expertise from the equation.
Location of Division.
List of Official Titles of the Integrity Unit or Task Forces.
Finally, although legislation has been introduced to create election integrity units, many of the bills themselves are very vague and lacking in detail such as personnel levels, costs, proposed policy changes, and how election administrators are meant to play a role in the new unit. The vagueness pervasive in the election integrity bills discussed above represents a deliberate and significant feature of this policy phenomenon. Our coding reveals that this ambiguity manifests across several dimensions: three bills provided no information about where the integrity unit would be housed administratively, many pieces of legislation failed to specify organizational structure or staffing levels, and a significant portion omitted any mention of funding sources or allocations. Even Florida’s Office of Election Crimes and Security—the most developed model—lacks information on how many people would be employed, how county supervisors should interact with the unit, and how much money is being spent on “countering election crime” (Clark et al., 2024).
Strategic vagueness serves many political functions that align with how policy entrepreneurs may exploit policy windows (Kingdon, 1984). It allows lawmakers to signal partisan loyalty through symbolic policymaking while avoiding political costs that may be associated with specifying or detailing enforcement mechanisms (Edelman, 1967; Weaver, 1986). It also provides maximum discretion for implementation that may be adapted to local contexts, shifting the burden for defining “election integrity” to administrators who must interpret vague mandates (Hood, 2011). The absence of administrative and implementation specifics creates an environment where local election officials must navigate unclear legislative mandates while facing increased scrutiny and, in some cases, potential criminalization of routine administrative decisions (Zahariadis, 2016). Thus, vague legislation becomes a mechanism for expanding state oversight of local election administration without the political accountability—a phenomenon that shows how policy windows like the 2020 election can facilitate not just policy change, but policy obfuscation that serves political rather than administrative purposes (Baumgartner & Jones, 2009).
Given the contested nature of the term “election integrity,” we see different framing of what a unit has the authority to do. The creation of election integrity units, or the strengthening of already created units, can be used by those looking to support election officials or oppose them by casting aspersions on the nature of their work (Carter et al., 2024). While our data show only two “blue states” introducing election integrity units, these bills reference “irregularities” not “crimes” and focus on cooperation between current election officials and the state to ensure integrity.
The highly politicized nature of these reforms means that the outcomes of these pieces of legislation have varied widely by state demonstrating some of the tensions surrounding elections. Although the implications of when state’s implement election integrity task forces or units is still unclear, election integrity units can be perceived as partisan tools if they disproportionately investigate certain areas, voter demographics, or election outcomes (Jouvenal, 2023). Furthermore, if investigations yield few or no cases of fraud, questions may arise regarding the cost effectiveness of these units or forces. Finally, if a unit has no fraud to prosecute, the state may invent other tasks for the unit to undertake.
Conclusion and Directions for Future Research
Election fraud is quite rare. Across the U.S., governors from both political parties praised the work and dedication of election administrators in the wake of the 2020 election (Kennedy, 2022). Many instances of “fraud” are actually simple voter mistakes that could be easily rectified or explained (Davilla et al., 2024; Schladen, 2024; Sneed & Schouten, 2024). Yet, from the slew of bills introduced across the country, many people might believe that fraud is rampant. This study provides a starting point to better understand how the American electoral landscape continues to be shaped by policy windows created from problems identified. In the case of election administration, the 2020 election opened a policy window through which the balance of problems, politics, and policy has allowed the successful reframing of election “integrity,” leading to increased scrutiny of voter access and voter methods.
While our analysis focused on legislative patterns, current events suggest election integrity legislation has emerging, significant consequences. The vagueness of these bills is strategic, creating implementation challenges that extend beyond politics and impact election administrators, democratic processes, and ultimately the public. Prior work (e.g., Burden et al., 2012; Herd & Moynihan, 2018) demonstrates that vague legislative mandates increase compliance costs and implementation complexity. Our analysis suggests these dynamics are materializing in the field of election administration. For instance, the highly publicized arrest of voters for alleged fraud in Florida, which were later overturned, illustrates how integrity units my pursue enforcement actions against routine administrative decisions, creating chilling effects on administrative discretion (Jouvenal, 2023; Lopez, 2022) and democratic participation (Mohammed, 2024). Furthermore, documented increases of turnover in the election administration workforce and experiences of harassment and violence may indicate that the scrutiny codified in integrity legislation is contributing to a crisis of administrative resources and capacity (States United, Protect Democracy, & Law Forward, 2023; Ward et al., 2022; Clark et al., 2022). Future research should evaluate the costs and outcomes of election integrity units and whether they strengthen democratic institutions.
The proliferation of legislation addressing “election integrity” in the U.S. leads to redoubled interest in the tension between politics and administration. With regards to the administration of elections in the U.S., the relationship between political power at the state level and the implementation of policy at the local level has functioned in a generally effective and complementarily manner for some time. However, this relationship has grown increasingly antagonistic leading to concerns about the viability of funding, staffing, and securing elections in their current form.
This research focused on state legislation because election administration is by and large the domain of state and local governments. However, as of the writing of this manuscript, we are also seeing an effort at the national level to pass the Safeguard American Voter Eligibility (SAVE) Act, which proposes a policy solution for the problem of election integrity by requiring proof of citizenship to register to vote (Safeguard American Voter Eligibility Act (SAVE Act), 2025). The 14th Amendment of the U.S. Constitution already stipulates that the right to vote in federal elections is restricted to U.S. citizens. The SAVE Act would require proof of citizenship (e.g., a birth certificate or U.S. passport) at the time of registration, which would eliminate electronic or mail voter registration. Many experts agree that requiring a birth certificate with a name that matches the voter’s registration will disenfranchise married women, the elderly, and voters of color while doing very little to fight alleged fraud (Clark, 2025). In addition, the Trump Administration has also issued an executive order echoing the restrictions (e.g., proof of U.S. citizenship at the time of voter registration and not counting ballots received after Election Day) included in the SAVE Act. Many election law experts argue that the order is unlawful and will have a chilling effect on voter registration and, perhaps, participation. The order also outlines a plan to give the Department of Government Efficiency (with the Department of Homeland Security) the power to subpoena state voter rolls to verify adherence to federal law (Howard, 2025). Although states have broad authority over elections, the SAVE Act and Trump administration Executive Orders suggest that nationalization of politics is playing a significant role in election problem and policy debates.
Future research could explore pre-2020 legislation related to integrity efforts, comparing policies introduced by Republican and Democratic leaders. Analyzing the rhetoric used in crafting these pieces of legislation may also provide valuable insights into the framing and underlying intentions of each party. In addition, while this study focused on state legislation, election integrity units can be created by State Attorneys General as units within their office without any approving legislation (e.g., Ohio and Texas).
The 2000 presidential campaign and the passage of HAVA in 2002, illuminated ways in which U.S. elections could be managed more effectively and uniformly. Theoretically, we would expect that increased commonality in the election process from state to state and county to county resulted in an increase in voter trust and confidence (Hale et al., 2015; Hale & Slaton, 2008). In the wake of Bush v. Gore reforms to the U.S. election system established a standard baseline for the execution of federal elections including the use of provisional ballots, accessibility requirements for people with disabilities, centralized voter registration, mail registration, voter education and information, and identification requirements. We believe there is cause for concern that today’s attacks on integrity that have resulted in policy solutions in search of a legitimate problem will undermine the progress that we have made to mutually realize the ideals of representative democracy and operate safe and secure elections.
Importantly, the dynamism and frequency of changes to election laws at the state level not only impact voters but also the public servants responsible for the implementation of elections. The decentralized nature of U.S. elections allows for local adaptation and innovation. Top-down reforms like the Civil Rights Act, NVRA, and HAVA, provide a clear demonstration of how federal legislation can push electoral processes toward a normative good by increasing access and suffrage. On the other hand, centralized changes to the rules of elections can result in unfunded mandates, increased complexity, and reduced autonomy. The administrative burden attached to constant changes initiated by political actors means that LEOs face increased demands on their time and complexity in their practice. The more chaos that is sewed into the process, the more likely we are to lose the expertise and stability that seasoned public servants bring to the administration of U.S. elections.
Footnotes
Appendix
Code Form
What’s “integrity”?: A review of extraneous election integrity units in the U.S.
| • Coder Name |
| • State |
| • Legislation Number (file name) |
| • Legislation title (short title) |
| • Sponsor(s) |
| • Year |
| • Legislation status |
| • Companion bill |
| • The official title of the integrity unit or task force |
| • Location of Division |
| • If a description of the entity’s location is provided, please provide details below. |
| • If a description of the entity’s structure is available, please provide details on how the election integrity unit is organized (e.g., number of staff, leadership roles, and reporting lines). |
| • Legislation mentions combating fraud (yes/no) |
| • Legislation mentions combating crime (yes/no) |
| • Mentions of financial aspects (select one or more) |
| ○ Funding allocations mentioned ○ Source of funding specified (e.g., sate budget) ○ No financial aspects mentioned |
| • Mentions of administrative burden (select one or more) |
| ○ Additional Staffing ○ Additional responsibilities (reporting, list maintenance, etc) ○ Fines imposed ○ Compliance obligations ○ Increased coordination |
| • Mentions of policing measures (select one or more): |
| ○ Criminal penalties ○ Imposed fines ○ Third-party oversight ○ Public reporting/hotline |
| • Please provide any other observations or comments about this legislation. |
Funding
The authors received no financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.
Declaration of Conflicting Interests
The authors declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.