Abstract
Previous studies on organizational citizenship behavior (OCB) have largely focused on its voluntary nature and related causes, outcomes, and scope, with limited attention to its potentially distorted nature. This study argues that controlling supervisory leadership and red tape can render street-level bureaucrats' (SLBs) OCBs compulsory and instrumental. Frequent on-site inspections, excessive formal guidelines, and rigid performance evaluation systems undermine SLBs’ autonomy, creating challenges in simultaneously implementing policies and addressing frontline issues. Using data from 28 in-depth interviews and a survey of 657 respondents involved in China’s Targeted Poverty Alleviation (TPA) policy (2019–2020), the findings reveal that bureaucratic control and perceived red tape significantly influence and distort the nature of SLBs’ OCBs. This study underscores the existence of a compulsory dimension to SLBs' OCBs, and highlights its potential to impact SLBs' well-being and the quality of policy outcomes. These insights contribute to understanding the unintended consequences of bureaucratic control on frontline public service delivery.
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