New York City “yellow” taxi drivers work as independent contractors. Like many independent contract workers, taxi drivers engage in economically precarious work—or work that is economically uncertain, unpredictable, and risky. This article explores how taxi drivers make sense of the economic risks they face each workday. Drawing on 20 months of ethnographic data, it finds that taxi drivers made sense of their work by expressing a sense of control over their work schedule, which is significant given the self-conceptions that drivers bring with them to this particular work arrangement. As a result, this sense of schedule control serves as a mechanism for worker investment in the structure of independent contract work.
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