On situational analysis and the explanatory power of mechanisms: Analytical sociology and the deductive-nomological model

Abstract

According to the dominant view, analytical sociology is largely incompatible with the deductive-nomological model because the latter allows neither accurate and precise explanations, nor explanations that give individuals and their actions a privileged role. This view neglects two relevant facts about the deductive-nomological model as understood by Hempel and Popper and some of their precursors such as J.S. Mill and Weber. The first is the relationship between this model, situational analysis, and the use of probabilistic laws in explanation. The second is that, from the standpoint of the deductive-nomological theory, it is possible to make sense of social mechanisms in terms of Weber’s ideal–typical models. Like these models, mechanisms are functional for the development of concrete empirical sociological hypotheses that, without covering generalizations, lack explanatory power.