Abstract
The article investigates the connections between Hayek’s cognitive psychology and his methodological individualism. It argues that Hayek’s theory of the sensory order, which is his less-studied scientific contribution, supports an original but largely unknown argument in favour of the Verstehen approach of methodological individualism. Hayek merges a theory of the temporality of knowledge as understood by phenomenological hermeneutics, and notably by Gadamer, with a proto-connectionist theory of mind to develop a perspective that anticipates by decades Varela’s and Maturana’s neuro-phenomenology. The article shows that Hayek uses this perspective to criticize the deterministic paradigms of action that consider action to be a mechanical effect of a pre-given reality and challenge the Verstehen approach, which is defended both by methodological individualism and phenomenological hermeneutics.
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