Action is a central category in the social sciences. It is also commonplace to assume that the social world has a causal structure. Yet standard ways of specifying causal relations in social science lack explanatory force when the subject matter is intentional action. The present article considers this problem. The metaphysics of action are distinguished from the metaphysics of intentional action, and it is argued that the former forces an implausible unity on the actions of inanimate nature and of rational agents. Agency in the metaphysics of action adds nothing to state-variable causation. Agency in the metaphysics of intentional action, in contrast, is argued to have a different structure, not reducible to state-variable causation. Work on endogenous choice in social science suggests that the concept of agency that is on view in literature on selection effects and social generation implies the metaphysics of intentional action. Recent research in the philosophy of action is considered in order to specify the structure of intentional action and the force of intentional explanations.
L’action est une catégorie centrale en sciences sociales. De même on a coutume d’admettre que le monde social a une structure causale. Pourtant les spécifications usuelles des relations causales en science sociale manquent de force explicative lorsqu’il s’agit de l’action intentionnelle. C’est à cela que s’intéresse cet article. La métaphysique de l’action y est distinguée de la métaphysique de l’action intentionnelle, et l’auteur soutient que la première impose une unité peu plausible aux actions de la nature inanimée et à celles des agents rationnels. L’action en métaphysique de l’action n’ajoute rien à la causalité des variables d’état. L’action en métaphysique de l’action intentionnelle, au contraire, est présentée comme ayant une structure différente, qui ne peut être réduite à la causalité des variables d’état. Les travaux sur le choix endogène en science sociale suggèrent que le concept d’action que donne à voir la littérature sur les effets de sélection et la production sociale implique la métaphysique de l’action intentionnelle. Les recherches récentes en philosophie de l’action sont prises en compte pour spécifier la structure de l’action intentionnelle et la force des explications intentionnelles.
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