Promoting Cleaner Production in Ports: Analysis of Joint Governance by Central and Local Governments

Abstract

Pollution emissions caused by maritime port activities have attracted increasing attention. To promote cleaner production in port enterprises, based on evolutionary game theory, this paper establishes a tripartite evolutionary game model involving central government, local governments, and port enterprises by analyzing the conflicts of interest among the main stakeholders. Examining the evolutionary game model, we found six combinations of evolutionary stabilization strategies in the system that promote cleaner production in port enterprises. Moreover, we conducted a sensitivity analysis on the relevant parameters of the system and identified the key parameters affecting the stability and equilibrium of the system. The results, from the perspective of interests, show that the cost of cleaner production, fines imposed and subsidies provided by local governments, and incremental benefits are the most significant parameters. In addition, simulation results support the idea that strengthening the risk appetite of port enterprises and local governments and the environmental preferences of local governments is conducive to prompting port enterprises to choose cleaner production more quickly. Finally, we also provide some management insights for policy makers based on the results of sensitivity analysis of relevant parameters affecting the evolution path of the tripartite game. This paper presents an analysis of practices and policies that may be applied to reduce pollution emissions and promote cleaner production in major port activities worldwide. Because China operates several of the world’s largest container ports, the paper mainly explores the Chinese system itself but also provides important insights that could inform improvements elsewhere.