This paper examines the effect of mimetic isomorphism on bribery of firms in transitional China. In addition, we also consider whether or not market competition and perceived benefit moderate the effect of mimetic isomorphism. The results show that a given firm’s bribing behavior is significantly motivated by other firms’ bribing behavior, confirming the existence of mimetic isomorphism. Moreover, market competition and perceived benefit are also found to have a significant and positive effect on firms’ bribing behavior. Furthermore, market competition significantly and positively moderates the effect of mimetic isomorphism while perceived benefit does not.
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