This article explores the prospects of stabilising financialisation in Europe as a spatial-temporal fix for Anglo-American capitalism’s crisis-tendencies. We analyse the politics of (countercyclical) macroprudential regulation in the critical case study of Sweden. Here, macroprudential regulation is introduced, in contrast with much of the rest of the EU economies, in a credit boom. We find evidence of an administrative crisis, as technocrats face the political constraints on re-regulating financialised accumulation. This suggests that the conditions are ripe for a deepened administrative crisis in Europe once countercyclical macroprudential regulation is implemented.
AnderssonFNGJonungL (2015)
Krasch, boom, krasch? Den svenska kreditcykeln. Ekonomisk Debatt43(8): 17–31.
2.
Belfrage C and Kallifatides M (forthcoming) Financialisation and the New Swedish Model. Cambridge Journal of Economics.
3.
BelfrageC (2017)
The unintended consequences of financialisation: Social democracy hamstrung? The pensions dilemma. Economic and Industrial Democracy38(4): 701–722.
4.
BelfrageCHaufF (2017)
The gentle art of retroduction: Critical realism, cultural political economy and critical grounded theory. Organization Studies38(2): 251–271.
5.
BellSHindmoorA (2014)
The ideational shaping of state power and capacity: Winning battles but losing the war over bank reform in the US and UK. Government and Opposition49(3): 342–368.
6.
BielingHJ (2013)
European financial capitalism and the politics of (de-) financialisation.Competition and Change17(3): 283–298.
7.
BielingHJ (2014)
Shattered expectations: The defeat of European ambitions of global financial reform. Journal of European Public Policy21(3): 346–366.
8.
BielingHJJägerJRynerM (2016)
Regulation theory and the political economy of the European Union. Journal of Common Market Studies54(1): 53–69.
HarveyD (2010) The Enigma of Capital.
London:
Profile.
43.
HeinE (2012) The Macroeconomics of Finance-Dominated Capitalism – And Its Crisis.
Cheltenham:
Edward Elgar.
44.
IMF (2015) IMF Country Report no. 15/329, December, Sweden.
45.
IMF (2016) Financial system stability assessment. IMF Country Report no. 16/355, Sweden.
46.
IngvesS (2016) Tid för omprövning – I huvudet på en centralbankschef. Nationalekonomiska föreningen, Handelshögskolan, Stockholm, 6 April.
47.
KiJ (Kammarrätten i Jönköping) (2015) Remiss: Yttrande över promemorian Amorteringskrav. Report no. 234-2015/51, 26 October.
48.
KoningsM (2016)
Governing the system: Risk, finance, and neoliberal reason. European Journal of International Relations22(2): 268–288.
49.
LapavitsasCKaltenbrunner A, Labrinidis G et al. (2012) Crisis in Eurozone.
London:
Verso.
50.
Lööf A and Johansson O (2015) Debatt: Vi vill se över ränteavdraget. Dagens Industri 2 September
51.
Moody’s (2016) Governments of Switzerland, Denmark & Sweden: Negative interest rates have unintended consequences, with Sweden most at risk of asset bubble. Announcement, 16 March.
52.
MűggeD (2014)
Europe’s regulatory role in post-crisis global finance. Journal of European Public Policy21: 316–326.
53.
OECD (2015) Economic Surveys: Sweden 2015.
Paris: OECD.
54.
OlsarettiA (2014)
Beyond class: The many facets of Gramsci’s theory of intellectuals. Journal of Classical Sociology14(4): 363–381.
55.
OsinskiJSealKHoogduinL (2013) Macroprudential and microprudential policies. Towards cohabitation. IMF Staff Discussion Note 13/05.
56.
PanitchLGindinSAquannoSM (2015)
American empire and the relative autonomy of European capitalism. Competition & Change19(2): 113–128.
57.
Peck J and Tickell A (2002) Neoliberalizing Space. Antipode 34: 380-404.
58.
Regeringen (2009) Överenskommelse mellan Regeringskansliet (Finansdepartementet), Sveriges Riksbank, Finansinspektionen och Riksgäldskontoret för samarbete om finansiell stabilitet och krishantering.
59.
Regeringen (2013) Kommittén för finansiell stabilitet. Beslut vid regeringssammanträde. Report no. Dir 2013:120, 19 December.
RothsteinB and Theorell J (2015)
Getting to Sweden, Part II: Breaking with corruption in the Nineteenth century. Scandinavian Political Studies38(3): 238–254.
68.
ShiveSAForsterMM (2017)
The revolving door for financial regulators. Review of Finance21(4): 1445–1484.
69.
SNS (2016) Hur mycket kapital bör bankerna ha? Report no. N/A, 9 March.
70.
StockhammerE (2008)
Some stylized facts on the finance-dominated accumulation regime. Competition & Change12(2): 184–202.
71.
SumNGJessopB (2013) Towards a Cultural Political Economy: Putting Culture in its Place in Political Economy.
Cheltenham:
Edward Elgar.
YoungKLParkSH (2013)
Regulatory opportunism: Cross-national patterns in national banking regulatory responses following the global financial crisis. Public Administration91(3): 561–581.
