Abstract
Latin America remains one of the most violent regions in the world, with El Salvador reporting among the highest homicide rates globally. Much of the existing research emphasizes structural inequality, civil conflict, and transnational gangs such as Mara Salvatrucha (MS-13) as contributors to this violence. Yet little attention has been paid to whether demographic shifts, particularly youth bulges, also contribute to lethal violence. This study examines whether the age distribution of El Salvador’s population helps explain homicide trends between 1995 and 2018. Drawing on the criminological concept of the age-crime curve, we assess the relationship between the proportion of youth aged 15–19 and annual homicide rates, while also accounting for inequality and the implementation of militarized policing strategies under Mano Dura. Data were compiled from the World Health Organization (WHO), the United Nations World Population Prospects, and the World Bank. Analyses include descriptive statistics, contour plots, and regression models using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) with Newey-West heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-consistent (HAC) standard errors. Findings indicate that demographic structure matters: increases in the youth population are positively associated with homicide. However, militarized policing also contributes to heightened violence, suggesting that punitive policies may exacerbate rather than mitigate homicide. Policy implications are discussed, with the findings contributing to broader debates about youth, security policy, and the limits of Mano Dura or militarized policing tactics as a sustainable response to crime in El Salvador and abroad.
Plain Language Summary
El Salvador is one of the most violent countries in the world, with homicide rates far above the global average. Much research has focused on gangs, inequality, and the legacy of civil conflict, but less attention has been paid to the role of demographics. Criminologists know that crime is often committed by young people, particularly those aged 15–19. When this group makes up a large share of the population or there is a “youth bulge”, crime and homicide rates are likely to increase. This study examines homicide in El Salvador between 1995 and 2018, asking whether changes in the youth population help explain high levels of violence. We also compare the role of demographics to other factors, including inequality and government security policies. In particular, we examine the effects of “Mano Dura” (“Iron Fist”) policies that rely on mass incarceration and militarized policing, which are a common tactic in El Salvador to address homicide-related violence. We used data from the World Health Organization, the United Nations World Population Prospects, and the World Bank. Our analysis combined descriptive statistics, contour plots, and regression models to address our research questions. The results show that increases in the youth population are strongly associated with higher homicide rates. At the same time, we find that Mano Dura strategies not only fail to reduce homicide but may also worsen it. These findings highlight that homicide in El Salvador is shaped by both population structure and policy choices. They suggest that relying heavily on repression is unlikely to succeed in the long term. Instead, prevention and youth-focused strategies that address root causes may be more effective at reducing violence.
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