Mainlandization,the ICAC,and the Seriousness Attached by Local Politicians to Corruption in Post-1997 Hong Kong

Abstract

To date, few studies have focused on how the public has perceived the effectiveness of the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC). Furthermore, little is known about how the public has assessed the functions of the ICAC during the political-economic convergence between Hong Kong and mainland China since 1997. This study attempts to explore local politicians’ perceptions towards the ICAC in post-1997 Hong Kong. The quantitative data show that the important historical juncture of mainlandization has been politicized in Hong Kong and has deeply influenced the seriousness attached by local politicians to corruption. Moreover, a mediating path of the effect of “Conflict of Interest” on the “Perceived Seriousness of Corruption” has been found, that is, mainlandization is found to have brought about increased levels of conflict of interest among government officials, which has weakened the symbolic anti-corruption function of the ICAC and, in turn, has affected the perceived seriousness attached to corruption.

Keywords

corruption conflict of interest ICAC mainlandization Hong Kong

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