Abstract
Vladimir Putin’s macho image works only when he can give the people what they want, argues
At the time, there was an overwhelming desire for law and order. But, paradoxically, the popular urge for a strong president did not mean people wanted to turn away from democracy. (From 1985 to 1999, under Gorbachev and Boris Yeltsin, the country had experienced an unprecedented sense of freedom.)
During the 1980s years of perestroika, censorship on television and in newspapers was reduced, and people heard and read things that could not have been said previously. After 1991, the country moved from socialism to a private economy. It became possible to travel abroad, to buy and sell, to make money. It was a hurricane of freedom.
However ardent their love was for Putin as a strong leader, the people certainly did not intend to give up their freedoms.
But giving up some political freedom so as to bring order to the country was an unspoken idea in the Kremlin during the first decade of the 21st century. Today the Kremlin is putting forward another unofficial idea – the notion that Russia is surrounded by enemies, so people have to temporarily forego their personal liberties. It’s a different argument with the same goal and it shows how limiting social and political freedom in Russia was never dictated by genuine threats. The authorities need these threats to achieve some tactical target, such as getting rid of political opponents and not giving critics a platform.
And Putin is hamming up his macho side. At a meeting last year with the Federal Assembly, he devoted more than a third of his speech to the latest developments of new nuclear weapons. This year, in an interview with The Financial Times, he stated that “the liberal idea is out of date”. His rhetoric is becoming increasingly militaristic and conservative.
Russian people have appeared indifferent to infringements on their liberties. Sometimes they have even been impressed by the state’s macho style. On occasions they are ready to forget about their poverty-stricken situation and to take pride in an apparent victory by the state on the international stage. At times they may even be pleased with the state’s use of violence.
But we cannot say that the people actively demanded that free speech or political freedom be limited. The closure in the early 2000s of independent TV companies NTV, TV-6 and TVS did not increase Putin’s popularity. Neither did he become more popular when he shut other independent media outlets in 2012-16. But while none of this affected his image, it was only because the Kremlin tried to do this on the quiet. People don’t support restrictions on freedom, so the authorities don’t announce bans.
People stand in front of a figure of Vladimir Putin, marked with the slogans “military” and “economic”, at a carnival in Dusseldorf, Germany
CREDIT: Patrik Stollarz/Getty
The Kremlin has also relied very successfully on subconscious totalitarian stereotypes, which are strong in Russia: cynicism, indifference and the acceptance of state violence against individuals. The Kremlin uses household conservatism and prejudice to consolidate a majority. This is why the LGBT movement could not have mass support in Russia. However, this topic did not seriously worry Russians – until it was talked about on television.
The authorities play on the fact that the majority of Russians still have only a vague idea about what democracy and freedom really mean. There has been no broad discussion within society about what actually happened to the country in 1991 (in reality, the country experienced a bourgeois revolution). This means that many people still have never really experienced political freedom or freedom of speech.
But this doesn’t mean that people who live in Russia have no sense of freedom. Opinion polls conducted by the non-partisan Levada Centre show that half the population believe that having independent media and criticism of the state is normal.
It’s true that the pro-Putin media occasionally demand the closure of opposition media, because “they slander Russia”, but such a view is not considered official. Indeed, the Kremlin has never formally denied that there should be another point of view. A formal ban on the independent press would officially signal that Russia had joined the ranks of authoritarian states, which is something the Kremlin doesn’t want. The authorities understand, too, that a new restriction on freedom of speech could lead to mass protests.
And despite its macho style, the Kremlin does sometimes behave cautiously. For example, attempts in 2018 by the state to block social media site Telegram ended in farce. The company refused to hand over its encryption keys and the authorities had to back down.
The macho style, which does not bring any improvement to people’s economic wellbeing, cannot last long. According to official statistics, 20 million people in Russia today are living below the poverty line. The economic situation for the rest of the population is not improving, and the state continues to increase its share of the country’s economy.
The raising of the pension age in 2018 to 65 for men and 60 for women was an important turning point. For the first time there was a mass vote for opposition candidates at the elections for regional governors. People went to the polls with the express intention of voting for any candidate other than those who represented the state. And for the first time the Kremlin could do nothing about it. Since then, trust in the ruling party and even in Putin himself has been steadily declining, which is reflected in opinion polls.
Perhaps the macho style is no longer working? There are no clear-cut answers. We can merely affirm one thing: limiting political and social freedom has never added to Putin’s popularity, in spite of the cliché that Russian society likes any ban or limit on freedom. Just because people have been indifferent to this for a long time doesn’t mean that they like it.
Footnotes
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