Abstract
In 2012, civil society activists and governments met to discuss the future of the internet. But, says
As 2013 begins, it is too soon to tell if bleak predictions about the future of the internet will materialise. Campaigners committed to keeping the internet open and transparent, true to the spirit in which it was originally created, have expressed frustration and anxiety over negotiations at the World Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT), which took place in Dubai in December 2012. Much has been written about the conference itself, including the possibility of its outcome producing a two-tier internet and the disenfranchisement of developing countries. Though these fears are not without foundation, it is impossible to tell if they will be realised. However, it is a good moment to step back and look at the process leading up to the WCIT itself, during which I served as a participant with the UK government delegation.
Friends and foes went into battle on behalf of their political ideals
In September 2011, I attended the Internet Governance Forum for the first time. I was consulting on behalf of the International Chamber of Commerce and my work brought me to Nairobi, Kenya, for the meeting. Though I had no idea what to expect, I didn’t think I’d hear about the International Telecommunication Union’s (ITU) renegotiation of the International Telecommunication Regulations treaty, nor did I even know what the World Conference on International Telecommunications (WCIT) was at that time. But I soon gathered it was pronounced ‘wicket’, it was a world conference on international telecommunications to be held in Dubai in December 2012, and governments like India and Brazil were planning to use the event to support global internet regulation using some kind of international NGO- or UN-based organisation.
After the 2011 Internet Governance Forum, I became concerned about the WCIT and about the growing threat to the future of the open internet. This was before the Stop Online Piracy Act (SOPA), Protect IP Act (PIPA) and Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA) campaigns became such formidable and public defenders of online freedom. (SOPA and PIPA are bills that have been introduced in the US, whereas ACTA is a multinational treaty.) At the time, as a new entrant to internet governance policy, I was largely unaware of the global network of like-minded campaigners or the existing Tunis Agenda model of open debate among all interested parties. The antecedent World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS), held in Tunis in 2005, concluded with the approval of a consensus statement calling for the creation of the Internet Governance Forum, where the internet governance structure would be shaped by multi-stakeholders with limited power.
But I did know a few people in the UK government that I could to talk to about it. That is where I began.
Over the first few months of 2012, I emailed my friends and colleagues around the world. I asked if they had heard of the WCIT or even the ITU, and what they thought about the forthcoming renegotiation. In the meantime the UK’s Department for Culture, Media, and Sport (DCMS) began holding meetings to co-ordinate preparations for regional meetings leading up to the WCIT. This was just part of a longer process that had started many years before 2012. The UK saw multi-stakeholder involvement as a priority, especially in the light of the Foreign Office’s growing interest in promoting freedom and security online through initiatives such as cyber conferences.
Then things started to kick off. The SOPA campaign exploded into action and achieved a remarkable victory. WCITLeaks – an initiative to improve transparency at the WCIT – was launched, making proposal documents available for anyone to view. The Internet Society, the Center for Democracy and Technology and many other organisations started voicing concerns. The closed nature of the WCIT began to be blown wide open as once-secret documents were made public through the work of campaigners and like-minded individuals around the world. The publicity was not good for the ITU and it became clear that some ITU member countries had agendas that went against the existing multi-stakeholder model.
Ironically, it was an earlier ITU-backed conference that had developed the approach now under threat. The Tunis Agenda, the consensus statement resulting from the World Summit on Information Society (WSIS), codified the multi-stakeholder model for internet governance and formed the Internet Governance Forum (IGF), a yearly event that all internet stakeholders can attend. The WSIS was driven by a mandate coming out of the 1998 ITU Plenipotentiary Conference. So, in effect, the ITU drove the agenda to formalise the multi-stakeholder model.
Back in the UK, in mid-July 2012, I hosted a meeting for civil society groups interested in the WCIT to talk to DCMS and to get involved. This resulted in a number of us attending the WCIT as part of the UK delegation. This was no small achievement, not just in terms of the UK government’s openness, but also because we were able to negotiate the administrative hurdles set up by the ITU. Names, identification and paperwork had to be submitted months in advance. It was quite unlike the IGF where, in my experience, one can show up on the day and still attend an event. The whole process was cumbersome, something of a metaphor for how the ITU administers the internet, through a series of long and drawn out processes designed to set up old telephone networks.
At the beginning of December, 30 of us made our way to Dubai on behalf of the UK government. We represented government, civil society, industry and academia. It was clear upon arrival that we were one of only a handful of member state delegations that had such a diverse group. The United States brought over 120 members, but most were observers.
I severely underestimated the amount of work and stamina required by 14 continuous days of negotiations. It was one of the most exhausting things that I have ever done, and if it wasn’t for the fact that others were in Dubai for four weeks in total – two at the World Telecommunication Standardisation Assembly and then two immediately following at the WCIT – I probably would have complained a bit more. A lack of freely available coffee and tea didn’t help either!
Opening speeches from the ITU Secretary General, Hamadoun Touré, and the new CEO of Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN), Fadi Chehade, spoke of partnerships and co-operation. Touré repeatedly remarked that the conference wasn’t about the internet, but about telecommunications and the growth of new technologies. Chairmen were appointed and administrative issues addressed. The conference seemed off to a good start.
What transpired over the two weeks was nothing short of a political power play on the stage of the ITU. It was clear to me from the outset that the WCIT was yet another forum where political friends and foes were going into battle on behalf of their political ideals. Governments that believe that their citizens are at their best when they are free were up against those that restrict freedom as a means to control their citizens.
Hamadoun Touré, Secretary General of the International Telecommunication Union (middle), speaks to journalists on the final day of the World Conference on International Telecommunications in Dubai, 14 December 2012
Despite reports stating otherwise, it is my belief that from all the discussions that I participated in, there was no member state at the WCIT that went there knowing that they wouldn’t sign the treaty. Debates around language and co-operation on issues including security, routing, terminations, spam and payments for the use of fixed line and mobile infrastructure raged late into the night. Those of us working towards transparency and to protect an open internet tried to achieve consensus to the best of our ability while conceding on certain issues.
In the end, the UK and other European countries were willing to compromise, but other countries were not. Instead they insisted on forcing through their proposals. This can be demonstrated in a number of examples, but the most obvious was the wholesale treaty proposal leaked at the end of the first week. To be fair, time was of the utmost essence as there just wasn’t room to dwell on a specific word or phrase for more than a few minutes. That said, after months of preparations across all regions, receiving a brand new, complete treaty proposal was not in the spirit of compromise. This frustrating situation was partially reflected in the final outcome, with the UK and many other nations refusing to sign. But the final outcome does not reflect two weeks of negotiations and compromises endured by everyone involved.
One insight that did come out of the WCIT process was the fact that many countries brought issues to the forum that they were not able to discuss elsewhere. For example, many developing countries in Africa have serious issues with unwanted spam clogging telecommunications networks. Yet the truth is that such matters, while important, did not belong at the WCIT.
A long list of issues, from spam in developing countries’ networks to the non-payment of telecommunications infrastructure costs, should have been accounted for and addressed outside the WCIT. Indeed, groups like the Internet Society are already doing this. But the WCIT highlighted that, in the multi-stakeholder model, capacity building is critical. Talking about issues is not enough. Dealing with them in practical, hands-on ways like skills development would go a long way to resolve many of the problems that were brought to the WCIT in good faith – only to end up being used for political leverage by what can be described as the enemies of the open internet.
China, Russia, the United Arab Emirates and the outspoken delegations from Bahrain and Algeria were all busy trying to shift the WCIT’s agenda. In the middle of the WCIT discussions, a leaked document showed that each of these countries’ governments wanted restrictive control over the internet. (Though Egypt was initially listed as one of these countries, its government quickly disassociated itself from it due to the fact that the presidential palace was surrounded by protests during the time.) There seems to be no way to convince such governments of the benefits of freer societies, and their ambition to put the internet – and their citizens – on a leash led directly to the outcome of the WCIT. Less than half of the member states actually signed the final document, the new set of international telecommunications regulations (ITRs).
What happens next? Implementation of the new ITRs won’t begin until January 2015 and countries can sign up to the treaty until that date. Those that don’t sign by then will remain under the remit of the old version. The UK, for example, will be held to the older regulations when working with a country that did sign the new treaty. However, in reality, bilateral agreements will more than likely trump the ITRs and private contracts will supersede top-level international agreements.
So where does this leave us? Is this the birth of a bifurcated internet, one open net and another controlled and guarded?
I’m an optimist and I believe in the triumph of committed citizens over oppressive governments and regimes. The WCIT was just the first skirmish in the long, global fight to maintain an open internet. Look at the document of reservations submitted by each country that did or did not sign the ITRs. Russia makes a clear play for internet governance issues as the remit of government. Countries like Bahrain implied that the ITRs supersede other agreements, and most countries reserve the right to protect their own interests. This issue isn’t over. The WSIS is being reviewed at its 10-year anniversary. The constitutional convention of the ITU is coming up in 2014, at which countries will try to enshrine state control of the internet not just in a treaty but in the very constitution of the ITU. We can expect a major battle there.
The clear loser at the WCIT was the ITU itself, because so many countries didn’t sign up to it. Without even a fig leaf of consensus, the ITU was weakened as the de facto facilitator of internet governance. This was not, from where I sat, any member state’s goal, but the surprise result of a last-minute, ill-judged forced vote on the internet and human rights. This mis-step, together with the intransigent mentality that several countries brought to the negotiating table, led to the failure of the conference.
As individuals and citizens we have a lot of work to do to defend the open web, but the recent success of other campaigns makes me optimistic. We need to remain vigilant as we work towards new ways of building capacity and finding practical solutions from the bottom up, not the top down. This work has to be spurred on by individuals and groups on the ground that can understand the culture and politics of what is needed within different countries. This is a long fight, and there are many organisations like the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) and Internet Society that will continue to play important roles in standards development and capacity building outside of governmental institutions.
Most importantly, after the WCIT, campaigners for an open internet know we have the backing of all those countries that made a stand and refused to sign. Not just the UK and the US, but countries from Costa Rica to Kenya understand what is at stake.