I. Geopolitics is used in this article to designate prevailing patterns of hegemonic structures and processes and not in the more restricted sense of referring to the geopolitical school of thought which is particularly associated with Halford Mackinder, who emphasises the strategic Implications of 'heartland' and 'islands' as unlocking the mysteries of world politics, For a spirited exposition and application of geopolitics in this latter sense, see Colin S. Gray, The Geo Poilitics of Super Power (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press, 1988), pp. 4-12.
2.
Political regions, especially the Middle East, would benefit by subordinating Intra-regional conflict among states to a common interest in achieving insulation from global intrusions. However, for reasons argued, the presence of oil reserves and of Israel make this task almost impossible.
3.
The hostage crisis of 1979-1980 was provoked by the United States' willingness to grant asylum to the Shah of Iran after his departure from Iran.
4.
The vision was otherwise flawed, drawing its strength from an Islamic tradition of confessional severity that was applied in a manner antagonistic to the most elementary protection of human rights.
5.
That is, the Islamic confessional impulse has spread among the distinct people. of the region, but the leadership of such Islamic political movements is decidedly nationalistic and does not look to Tehran for inspiration and guidance.
6.
Other concerns were alleged by the United States' government and others to be relevant. These included, resisting further expansion by Saddam, upholding the sovereign character of Kuwait, resisting and deterring aggression, validating the United Nations' claim to protect the security and existence of Its members and asserting United States' leadership in the post-Cold War world.
7.
Yasir Arafat aggravated the Palestinian plight by his emotive and intense pro-Saddam rhetoric. particularly after the Gulf War begin. The role and position of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) was nuanced more than the media allowed, The PLO favoured Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait and used its energies to promote a negotiated seutllement right up to the 15 January deadline.
8.
The Armenian story is probably worse. Caught in the maelstrom of Turkish nationalism, the Armenian peoples endured genocide in 1915, the survivors being dispersed and essentially left with only their memories.
9.
Arguably, the Kurds have allowed themselves to be too easily divided Into distinct national groupings (i.e.. the Iraqi Kurds, the Turkish Kurds), making them especially vulnerable to geopolitical manipulation and suppression by state power in the region and by global forces.
10.
See Ernest Gellner , Nations and Nationalism ( Oxford: Basil Blackwell. 1983) for a dogmatically propounded, yet insightful, argument.
11.
See Mary Kaldor , The Imaginary War: Understanding the East-West Conflict (Oxford: Basil Blackwell , 1990) for a brilliant reinterpretation of the Cold War as political experience.
12.
The shape of the new Europe remains sharply contested: whether it will move toward federation or confederation; whether unity will be mainly the outcome of intergovernmental negociation or, more the product of civil organised at the societed level: whether limited to affluent industrial Europe or moving to incorporate the less affluent European periphery, including even breakaway republics from the Soviet Union.
13.
For limited horizons of political hopes, even by those engaged most militantly engaged In democratisation initiatives and perspectives, see George Konrad.Anti-Politics (London: Quartet, 1983); and Mary Kaldor and Richard Falk (eds.), Dralignment: A New Foreign Policy Perspective (Oxford: Basil Balckwell.1987).
