Abstract
This article investigates the causes and scale of land-related public service inefficiencies in Ghana. Public choice theorists contend that the primary cause of inefficiency of public service agencies is their tendency to grow excessively. The finding of the study did not support the excessive growth proposition as far as the land-related public service agencies in Ghana are concerned. On the contrary, the evidence suggests that the agencies in question are shrinking in size, with some experiencing deficit budgetary growth rate of approximately −28.71% (Land Title Registry). Large proportions of inefficiencies were rather discovered in nontraditional (hidden) sources, such as insufficient budgets, misallocations of limited funds, and imbalances in the structure of the respective workforces of these agencies. These have led to heightened intensity of rent-seeking activities, inertia, lack of customer care, abuse of procedures, general dearth of professionalism, and considerable delays in the delivery of services.
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