Creative industries spatial policy in the United Kingdom,1995

Abstract

The aim of this article is to explore the construction of spatial policy for the creative industries in the UK over the last three decades. The nature of much creative work benefits from, and therefore leads to co-location of firms, practitioners, supporting organisations and infrastructure. Since the advantages of a buoyant creative economy were recognised by policymakers in the 1990s, developing spatial policy to enhance these benefits has been a focus for governments at various scales across the world. These policies have been prompted by changing motivations, with different aims and using different interventions. This article traces UK’s central government interventions in the creative industries since the mid-1990s. UK creative industries policy has been incredibly influential and exported around the world, and this influence has led to a great deal of examination and critique, meaning there is plenty of literature for us to review. We begin by tracing the development of creative industries spatial policy in the UK through three time periods: mid-1990s–2009, 2010–2020, and 2020–present day. In so doing, we identify the interplay of policy and academic work, highlight key ideological drivers for policy development and offer critique of prevailing policy discourses.

Keywords

creative industries department for culture,media and sport’s government spatial policy United Kingdom

Introduction

The term ‘creative industries’ came into popular usage in the UK at the end of the 1990s under the New Labour Government and their economic development policy (for a longer history, see O'Connor, 2011; Gross, 2020). The Department for Culture, Media and Sport’s (DCMS) definition and mapping of the newly labelled creative industries marked an important shift in policy for arts and culture, placing it centre stage for a new government seeking to think differently about the economic value of cultural activities.¹ For O’Connor (2011), this different approach can be traced back to work of the Great London Council and UNESCO in the early 1980s, while Luckman (2019) and Granger and Hamilton (2010) have argued Australia’s Department of Communications and the Arts ‘Creative Nation’ report is an important precursor to the DCMS work. Nevertheless, the DCMS’s 1998, 2001 mapping documents, and subsequent policy, have become epoch-making interventions which cemented the creative industries as key economic activities in the UK and beyond. We can see this as such approaches spread around the world and scholars have suggested one of DCMS’s greatest successes is the export of their model (Ross, 2007).

In this article we draw on our experience of researching creative industries policy, working for and with policymakers, and collaborating with creative companies and individual practitioners to trace how spatial policy for developing the creative industries in the UK has changed in the last 25 years. We argue that ideological drivers have been key to the evolving nature of this spatial policy, and despite rhetoric of their importance for local and regional development, the current Government pays lip service to the creative industries, especially when compared to the golden age of spatial policy under New Labour. What follows is organised into three time periods – mid-1990s to 2009, 2010–2020, and 2020–present day – which exemplify shifts in the motivation for creative industries spatial policy. We begin with policy forms in the 1990s and 2000s which saw the importance of culture and the creative industries rise, particularly under New Labour, and an emphasis on economic change. Next, we highlight the decline and re-emergence of creative industries spatial policy under coalition and Conservative Governments in the 2010s. In our examination of policy since 2020 we draw attention to a mix of ambivalence and deliberate attacks on the sector.

Mid-1990s–2009: The ‘invention’ of the creative industries and new labour policy

Cultural regeneration

Before the so-called invention of the creative industries by the DCMS, spatial forms of cultural policy were evident in the UK in a series of ways. The introduction of the UK state sponsored lottery in 1994 opened up opportunities for major capital projects and initiated a ‘roll call of mega projects’ (Evans 2005) that positioned architecture (or ‘star-chitecture’) and flagship cultural buildings as a way of raising the profile of an area and contributing to an overall ‘brand’ (Levin and Solga, 2009). In addition, the idea was that transplanting a large ‘anchor’ organisation will attract smaller organisations in its wake. The ‘Bilbao Effect’ meant working with small locally embedded cultural organisations and encouraging construction of large scale high concept architecture in places in need of regeneration and renewal in order to ‘kick-start’ regeneration (Gómez and González, 2001). Rather than architects making neutral spaces for art, now the building was part of the spectacle – one that could circulate globally as a brand. In 1997, for example, Arts Council awarded £33.4 million from the National Lottery to a project team of Gateshead Council and the Royal Institute of British Architects (RIBA) to facilitate the redevelopment of the Baltic Flour mill on the banks of the River Tyne into a centre for contemporary art. In 1999 the site held its first exhibition in the hollowed out structure following the removal of 148 grain silos from the inside of the building, before opening fully to the public in July 2002 (see Miles, 2004 for more).

While flagship culture-led developments have been heralded as successes, such policies have been criticised, however, for its functionalist perspective including an expectation of homogeneity within creative practice, assumptions of linearity in urban development and focus on large scale interventions to the detriment of grassroots practices (Comunian and Mould 2014). Whilst the body of literature on creative cities has grown, it remains focused on the ‘spaces that might dazzle’ (Dale and Burrell 2003, 2010). Conceptions of space continue to be limited by emphasis on designed spaces (Halford 2004) as well as ‘formal mega projects and one-time events’ (Comunian and Mould 2014:72). This has had three effects: firstly, this emphasis on two ends of the temporal spectrum reinforce a binary view of urban cultural activity that occludes the temporary or the transient. Secondly, it has provided policy-makers with a copy/paste method of regeneration that occludes localised cultural activity in favour of homogenous formal urban projects, or short-term spectaculars. Finally, the creative city is a policy construct focused on the presentation of cultural assets, and in doing so neglects the processes and spaces of production.

Clusters

At a wider scale than architectural-led interventions, clusters are perhaps the most prominent example of spatial policy for the creative industries. The Department of Trade and Industry’s cluster mapping document (DTI, 2001) drew attention to the existence of geographical concentrations of creative industries alongside those in other parts of the economy. The research highlighted computer games in Yorkshire and the Humber, music industry in London and TV/digital media in South West England, amongst many others. The Department for Culture, Media and Sport’s own ‘Creative Industries Mapping Document’ (DCMS, 2001) references the DTI work and argues:

“[s]uccessful cluster development can be a key to regional competitive advantage, and the challenge is how to ensure the continued success of existing clusters and nurture the growth of emergent clusters.” (DCMS, 2001: 18)

The 2001 DCMS report identifies more clusters of creative industries activity in each of the UK’s nations and regions and illustrates, albeit briefly, examples of work in towns and cities which has fostered their development.

The work of the DTI and DCMS in the early 2000s can be seen as a key time for policy interest in the geographical manifestation of the creative industries. The rise of clusters in this period was co-constituted by academic work on the topic and led to an explosion of research delving into the workings of local and regional clusters of various kinds (Swords, 2013). It is important to state that the term ‘cluster’ became a catchall for agglomerations of firms and labour due to the power of Michael Porter’s approach and brand to explaining (and promoting) the importance of co-location. Porter was commissioned by the UK Government to undertake cluster mapping, and his influence shaped how policymakers thought about clusters. This ‘gatecrashing’ (Martin and Sunley, 2003) meant other, more robust, academic work on agglomeration was overlooked and as Benneworth and Henry (2004) argue, ‘clusters should not be overendowed as a singular “brand,” but recognised as an emergent set of multiple perspectives in dialogue’ (p1011).

In the early 2000s, regional development agencies (RDAs), devolved administrations, various government quangos and sectoral organisations were tasked, or took it upon themselves, to foster creative industries for their contribution to regional and national economic competitiveness. Their work built on so-called culture-led regeneration schemes in the 1990s. The elasticity of the clusters concept as it was adopted by governance organisations and ‘flying cluster makers’ (Martin and Sunley, 2003: 25), meant the scale at which these interventions were designed varied. We can see this manifest through: local government efforts to foster development in areas within major cities, for example, Birmingham’s jewellery quarter (Pollard, 2004) or ‘silicon roundabout’ in London (Bradshaw, 2008; Martins, 2015); region-wide economic strategies which identify the creative industries as significant for whole regions, for example, in North East England (One North East, 2006).

Although deemed as successful by many commentators (usually while highlighting growth figures), the approach to creative industries spatial interventions in the UK has come under sustained critique for a series of interconnected reasons. First, the DCMS definition and approach have been critiqued for being too economistic and erasing the cultural value of the activities creative companies and practitioners undertake (Kong 2005; Walmsley 2013). We can see this in the way that success is defined in creative industries regional policy where calculi of gross value added, jobs counts, export numbers and economic growth rates are heralded above any other measure.

Second, the economistic discourse is criticised as it is used for boosterist neo-liberal agendas which silences, or at least overlooks some of the negative aspects of the creative industries which are compounded by geographical concentration. For instance, Ekinsmyth (2002) has highlighted how the exploitation faced by freelancers in London’s magazine industry is co-constituted by the project-oriented nature of much creative work and the geographical clustering required to manage this in magazine publishing. Ross’s (2008) work on the quality of jobs in the creative industries demonstrates the importance of geographically concentrated and precarious labour pools to drive the creative economy through the exploitation of workers.

Third, there is an urban-centric bias to a lot of policy for the creative industries (particularly towards very large cities) which draws on ideas of city-led agglomeration economies (Rantisi et al. 2006). This emphasis is often used to justify property-led ‘regeneration’ projects which uncritically, and without acknowledgement of place-specific factors, reproduce generic versions of creative quarters/cities (Peck 2010) which exclude locals (Miles and Paddison 2005) and even artists themselves (Prescott 2018). Finally, the theoretical foundations on which Porter’s cluster concept is based have been criticised as weak (see Markusen, 2003; Martin and Sunley, 2003; Benneworth and Henry, 2004; Malmberg and Power, 2006; Swords, 2013).

2010–2020: Creative industries under coalition and conservative governments

In the 2010s, the new Conservative-Liberal Democratic coalition reined in local and regional-focused policy and removed many organisations tasked with developing and delivering creative industries policy (Flinders et al., 2014; Pike et al., 2018). Under the banner of austerity, the so-called ‘bonfire of the quangos’ saw numerous arms-length bodies with direct or indirect responsibility for arts and creative development culled across the UK. Centrally, DCMS policy continued to be economistic in relation to the creative industries with competitiveness a key buzzword and growth figures, employment numbers and export statistics presented at every possible opportunity when the creative industries were mentioned (see, for example, DCMS, 2016; Hunt, 2010; Miller, 2014). In addition, the response to the hollowing out of local and regional support for arts and culture was to encourage organisations to become more entrepreneurial. This mantra of culture and creativity as economic commodities reinforced the instrumentalist idea of creative industries policy for the economy, but distanced Government from being responsible for it (Gordon et al., 2015). Cuts to local authority budgets, together with reduced funding for arts and culture in general, meant local museums and galleries were told to find new revenue streams and required to have private sector business representatives on their boards (Arts Council, 2016; Newcastle City Council, 2016). During this period explicit reference to creative clusters reduced, particularly in comparison to New Labour’s enthusiasm for this form of spatial intervention.

By the end of the decade, however, the creative industries and local and regional development initiatives have re-emerged. Their form drew on a 2000s view of spatial policy for the creative industries but were characteristic of the Conservative Government’s hands-off approach to economic development. Two examples illustrate this well. First, after much lobbying, a sector deal was created for the creative industries as part of the UK Government’s industrial strategy (HM Government, 2018). The sector deals signalled the government’s priority sectors for economic policy and placed the creative industries alongside the aerospace, construction and the life sciences. The Industrial Strategy included a place ‘pillar’ and identified re-balancing the economic base of the UK as important, but as Sunley et al. (2022) suggest ‘“place’ appeared to be an afterthought and not an underpinning or cross-cutting principle that ran throughout all parts of the Strategy, instead relegated to the final section of the document’. In addition, the Industrial Strategy lacked coherence and engagement with more explicitly spatial interventions such as City Deals and the creation of new combined authorities (Sunley, et al., 2022).

In the Creative Industries Sector Deal document place was more prominent with the aim to develop clusters, close the gap between London and South East England and the rest of the UK, and included funding for the Cultural Development Fund ‘so that local partnerships can bid for investments in culture and creative industries, with industry contributing funding, networks and leadership’ (HM Government, 2018: 8). The document also introduced the Creative Industries Clusters Programme (CICP), to be led by the Arts and Humanities Research Council and designed to catalyse university partnerships with local stakeholders and businesses to ‘create jobs and drive the creation of companies, products and experiences that can be marketed around the world, significantly contributing to UK economic growth both regionally and nationally’ (UKRI, n.d). Nine partnerships were awarded funding through the CICP which mobilised both the advantages and disadvantages of previous cluster policy. They were equipped to deliver R&D funding and support to SMEs and acted as a hub to connect creative companies and practitioners. But the geographical elasticity characteristic of Porter’s model was reproduced: ‘Creative Informatics’ operated at the city-scale in Edinburgh, ‘Bristol and Bath Creative Cluster’ focused work across those cities, ‘Clwstwr’ focused on South Wales, ‘XR Stories’ operated across Yorkshire and the Humber, and ‘Future Screens Northern Ireland’ had a remit for all of Northern Ireland.

Second, during this period the role of the Arts Council in place-focused intervention increased exemplifying the Government’s hands-off approach. Peter Bazelgette’s forward to the Art Council's ‘A vision for arts and culture’ declares the Council’s power in regional regeneration. New schemes were launched including the Creative Local Growth Fund (CLGF) which supported ‘partnerships…that deliver initiatives aimed at helping individuals (e.g. artists and sole traders) and small organisations (e.g. micro-businesses, SMEs) in the cultural and creative sectors to increase their contribution to economic activity in their LEP area, in alignment with that LEP’s strategy’ (Nordicity and Saffery Champness, 2020). In addition, ‘Great Place’ sought to ‘enable…the Arts Council and the Heritage Fund to explore and test the placemaking potential of arts and heritage, in contexts marked by inequality and disadvantage’ (BOP Consulting, 2022: 3). Launched in 2015 and 2016, respectively, these schemes represent a shift in the way the Arts Council approached cultural development. We should note, however, together these were not huge interventions. Great Place funded 16 projects and CLGF supported 9, together investment from Arts Council was less than £20m (Nordicity and Saffery Champness, 2020; BOP Consulting, 2022).

By the end of the 2010s, then, we can see spatial policy for the creative industries had returned but it is important to note that compared to support provided under the Labour government in the first decade of the 21st century, the policy infrastructure was weaker, places had to compete for money to a much greater extent and there was a narrower emphasis on what the creative industries were for, namely, economic growth. And despite working through an academic research council, the theoretical basis for the CICP was based on a shallow interrogation of Porter’s work, let alone other theories of agglomeration.

2020–2023: Brexit and pandemic responses

Since the start of the COVID-19 pandemic, UK policy responses to support the cultural-creative industries highlights further shifts. First, the economistic tone remains: growth figures and the contribution to the economy continue to be privileged in policy discourse. Second, it appears the Government no longer saw the creative industries as a special case in the way Labour administrations did and we can see this in policy-makers responses to the pandemic. While film and TV workers were some of the first people allowed to return to work, and certain screen professionals were included on the travel exemption list, pleas for additional support from other areas of the cultural-creative industries were ignored. The Government was slow to respond to calls from the music and events sector to provide support for live events (Partridge, 2021; Brown, 2021) which suffered economic losses and ‘a crisis of spatial materiality’ (Taylor et al., 2020). Theatres were one of the last parts of the creative industries to re-open (Sandhu, 2021) and were also subject to delays in receiving an insurance scheme to support performances (Snow, 2021). Moreover, despite prolonged campaigns to include them, huge numbers of creative freelancers were excluded from furlough and job support schemes (Partington, 2020). It was estimated millions of self-employed workers were unable to access government support available to people in other forms of employment and this disproportionately impacted the creative industries (Redmond, 2020).

The impact of the pandemic has been compounded by Brexit with the creative industries largely ignored by the Government. Years of uncertainty in the lead up to the referendum, confusion while the terms of the UK’s withdrawal were agreed, and increased complexity as new trade deals were developed have led to wide ranging impacts with little intervention from policymakers. Touring musicians have called for additional support to help them navigate the loss of freedom of movement (O’Carroll, 2022) but Government response amounts to little more than guidance (Musician’s Union, n.d.). Creative practitioners have had to end partnerships with counterparts in EU countries or find new funders (Faucher, 2023). Visa rules means recruiting workers from overseas has become more difficult and the economy is losing out on the potential growth brought by EU nationals in the creative economy (Montalto, Panella and Sacco, 2020). We can see that it is not that there is little spatial policy for the creative industries, it’s that there is little policy of any kind from central government for the creative industries.

Where creative industries are the subject of policy interventions it is through their mobilisation in spatially blind policy: for example, the commitment of £20bn investment in R&D some of which is available to parts of the creative industries (Krämer, 2022). Alternatively, creative industries are enrolled into local and regional development projects such as the Strength in Places fund or what have become ad hoc levelling up interventions. These are not creative industries programmes, but local authorities and/or local enterprise partnerships may choose to include the creative industries in their bids.

Where we do see specific interventions on the creative industries it is ideologically driven. The Conservative Government has long been keen to support or directly appoint sympathetic cronies to important position at the head of cultural organisations: in 2017 Elisabeth Murdoch (daughter of Rupert Murdoch) was appointed to Arts Council England’s National Council; Boris Johnson appointed Richard Sharp as Chairman of the BBC in 2021; and the Conservative Government nominated Paul Dacre as chair of Ofcom, despite his years as editor of the right-wing Daily Mail newspaper eventually being deemed as a conflict. Support for arts and design courses in higher education were cut by 50% in 2021 (Harris, 2021). Oliver Dowden (Culture Secretary for 18 months, 2020–21) threatened arms-lengths bodies if they removed contested statues and other heritage (Dowden, 2020). But even policies designed to foster regional development lack coherence. The relocation of Channel 4 from London was in the Conservative Party’s 2017 manifesto and designed to encourage ‘the development of new clusters of public services, private businesses and, where appropriate, universities’ (Conservative Party, 2017). The plans were watered down to be just the headquarters by 2018, completed with a move of the HQ to Leeds in 2021 but threatened in 2022 by then Culture Secretary Nadine Dorries (Culture Secretary for 12 months, 2021–22) who ordered it privatised. Her successor, Michelle Donelan (in post for five months and under two Prime Ministers, cancelled the plans in early 2023. The lack of coherence is partly due to the revolving door of Prime Ministers (four in the last seven years), Chancellors of the Exchequer (five in the last four years) and Culture Secretaries (11 in the last 9 years, at the time of writing).

Conclusions

The latest iteration of creative industries spatial policy – a new sector vision (DCMS, 2023) – is not heralding a shift from the ambivalence outlined above. Two of the three main goals are economistic in nature and the third – to ‘[m]aximise the positive impact of the creative industries on individuals and communities, the environment and the UK’s global standing’ – amalgamates four areas under one mission and when read against wider the wider culture war, can only be taken with a pinch of salt. New money is promised to invest in growth and this comes through, for example, in an extension of the AHRC’s clusters programme and R&D investment for virtual production (CoSTAR). However, the former comes too late to sustain the first round of clusters which have, or are about to end. And the latter, while necessary, is focused on a small part of screen and live performance. The total of £200m over 7 years is a fraction of what is required to undo the impact of COVID, Brexit and years of neglect.

One of the outcomes of this mix of ambivalence and targeted under investment is cultural and creative stakeholders increasingly turn to economistic arguments for continued, new or better support. This reproduces the problems we highlighted above and creates an atmosphere where – as a regional policymaker told us recently – ‘We’ll say whatever it takes to get Government funding’. For cultural and creative industries to truly have a meaningful impact at local and regional scales, interventions need to be targeted at the needs of those places, with local priorities driving them, and supported with adequate funding.

Footnotes

Declaration of conflicting interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This paper is the result of research undertaken on XR Stories (AH/S002839/1) and the Screen Industries Growth Network (Research England).

ORCID iD

Jon Swords

Note

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