The heightened concern about political polarization, and the growth of radical parties in many national contexts have had various effects, such as eroding trust in democratic political systems.
This article aims to study political polarization exploring one of its main causes, the polarizing communication of political elites.
By coding the various components of polarizing strategies identified in the literature (partisan identity and issues, attacks against others, incivility), we analyze the polarizing strategies used in the campaign for the 2024 European parliamentary elections by all Italian leaders and parties. We consider parties and leaders’ messages on Facebook and Instagram, also looking at followers’ engagement. This study tackles a simple research question: which parties and leaders choose to polarize? The results show that challenger parties tend to polarize more than dominant parties.
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