Preventing and countering extremism in the educational sector: Interrogating policy,challenging practices

Abstract

Since the introduction of the Prevent Duty Guidance (PDG) in 2015, public-facing organisations have been legally obligated to report concerns about individuals suspected of engaging in extremism or being at risk of radicalisation. Since inception, critical commentators have argued that implementation of this directive has intensified extant problems created by the Prevent Strategy and accelerated unwarranted processes of securitisation within education, healthcare, and welfare sectors. To extend critical social policy research in this area, in this article we present findings from a qualitative empirical study involving schoolteachers responsible for implementing PDG in the United Kingdom. Our aim is to elucidate two interconnected and recurrent concerns expressed by participants responsible for counter-extremism safeguarding: the ‘suspectification’ of young Muslims and the deleterious effects of ‘false positive’ referrals. Our analysis illuminates ongoing and significant challenges encountered by educators implementing counter-extremism policies and highlights problematic effects on targeted individuals and communities.

Keywords

counter-extremism counter-radicalisation education Prevent Strategy safeguarding

Introduction

Since the introduction of the Prevent Duty Guidance (PDG) in 2015, professionals working across the education sector in the United Kingdom (UK) have been required to actively monitor students for signs of engagement with and/or endorsement of extremism. Together with ‘frontline workers’ from ‘specified authorities’ (Home Office, 2015b: 5) including health, social and welfare sectors - teachers and lecturers are mandated to demonstrate ‘due regard’ to prevent individuals from being drawn into terrorism (Counter Terrorism and Security Act [CTSA], 2015). PDG - first issued in 2015 and revised in 2023 - demands that educators perform a leading role in countering radicalisation and deterring people from ‘becoming terrorists or supporting terrorism’ (Home Office, 2023b: 7). Statutory legal requirements in England, Northern Ireland and Wales, endorsed and regulated by the Department for Education and the Office for Standards in Education (Ofsted, 2019) place responsibility on teachers and lecturers to monitor students for signs of vulnerability and to report behaviours that may indicate engagement with extremist ideologies (Home Office, 2023b).

Scotland follows separate guidance issued by the Home Office (2024c), where devolution has allowed for the omission of certain components. Competence in fulfilling this mandate must be demonstrated by schools and local authorities who otherwise face binding consequences, including being placed under special measures, funding penalties or imposed leadership changes. In addition to statutory policy and guidance, counter-extremism safeguarding duties have been incorporated into professional directives issued by, inter alia, Teachers’ Standards (DfE, 2011) and the Education Inspection Framework (Ofsted, 2019). The Prevent Strategy - one of four prongs of the CONTEST national counter-terrorism strategy first launched in 2003 - has been the subject of much controversy, with debates over its purpose, legitimacy and efficacy being widespread (see Abbas et al., 2021; Khan and Mythen, 2015; Ragazzi, 2017). Notwithstanding the considerable opposition to Prevent vocalised over the last two decades, the Independent Review of Prevent (IROP) commissioned by the then Conservative Government and led by William Shawcross, upheld the ‘noble ambition of Prevent’, asserting that ‘the statutory Prevent Duty works well’ (Shawcross, 2023: 1). The Independent Review of Prevent (IROP) further claimed that implementation of the PDG was ‘especially effective in schools, where awareness of radicalisation risk has been successfully embedded within safeguarding work’ (Shawcross, 2023: 6).

While contrasting views exist on whether teachers and lecturers are best qualified or suited to be involved in safeguarding duties oriented toward counter-terrorism monitoring and surveillance (see Busher et al., 2023; Coolsaet, 2023; Thomas, 2024; Winter et al., 2022), it is vital that the everyday operationalisation of the PDG is subject to scrutiny and that evidence rather than assertion comprises the basis for judgements regarding its effectiveness and appropriateness. To this end, an established strata of academic research has sought to scrutinise the ways in which teachers interpret and enact Prevent duties (see Busher et al., 2017; Busher and Jerome, 2020; Jerome et al., 2019). The empirical evidence from these - and other cognate studies - suggests that teachers typically find the task of identifying students engaging with extremism and/or at risk of radicalisation challenging and conceive it to be a demanding area of professional practice. Amidst longstanding contests over the definition, nature and contents of ‘extremism’ and ‘radicalisation’ (see Heath-Kelly, 2012; Kundnani, 2014; Mythen et al., 2017), the PDG positions educators in a space which is at once power-bearing and precarious. As we will elucidate, the implementation of Prevent safeguarding duties imposes substantial responsibility on teachers and can result in deleterious effects for individuals mistakenly subjected to interventions.

Adopting a critical approach to State securitisation - embodied here by scrutinising the creep of counter-terrorism surveillance in the education sector - this article explores both the discomforting effects for teachers tasked with enacting safeguarding practices in secondary schools and colleges and the iatrogenic effects of ‘false positive’ referrals to Prevent (see Aked, 2020). The conceptual underpinnings of our approach lie in Ball's (2003) groundbreaking work on responses to and enactment of policy guidance by educators. As our empirical data indicates, while directives and procedures such as the PDG are both enshrined in formal documentation and reinforced by bureaucrats and senior leaders, safeguarding policies embedded within the education–security nexus are not simply translatable into, or replicable within, everyday professional practice. Rather, they are actively interpreted and adapted within specific contexts, to a variety of outcomes and ends.

To illustrate this, we concentrate on two prominent areas of concern expressed by participants during interviews: the suspectification of Muslim pupils and the harmful effects of erroneous referrals. While the data we present chimes with extant theoretical frameworks, this contribution is primarily geared toward three ambitions: deploying empirical data to elucidate the gaps that appear between policy and practice; building upon and extending existing academic knowledge and literature; and foregrounding the implications of our discussion for both current and future social policy formation.

We begin by outlining the context in which the study was conducted and detailing the key directives ushered in under the PDG in 2015. We then provide a synopsis of key concerns raised in critical social policy literature, foregrounding the dilemmas that professionals across various sectors have encountered when tasked with identifying potential cases of extremism. From here, we employ fieldwork vignettes to illumine the specific challenges and problems arising from the enactment of PDG in the education sector and the implications of this for professional practice and social policy-making more broadly.

Preventing and countering extremism in the educational sector: From guidance to duty

Since its introduction by the Labour Government in 2003, the Prevent Strategy has evolved from providing rudimentary non-statutory guidance for schools to a comprehensive legal duty with associated binding directives. This shift bestows sizeable responsibility on educational institutions and places them at the heart of the UK State's counter-radicalisation efforts. Following the introduction of the Counter Terrorism and Security Act (2015), under Section 26(1) individuals working in specified public organisations are obligated by statute to be proactive in monitoring individuals for signs of radicalisation. The CTSA signalled a turning point in UK security policy, moving beyond interventions at local and regional levels toward national operationalisation. Operationalising this shift, the PDG contains a specific focus on schools, colleges, and higher education institutions, with the Home Office (2015b) providing tailored guidance on identifying extremism, safeguarding students against the risks of radicalisation and encouraging students to develop resilience against extremist beliefs. In instances where students are deemed to be ‘at risk of’ or ‘vulnerable to’ extremism, referral interventions are employed to disrupt ideational processes of radicalisation considered to be precursors to terrorism (see Heath-Kelly and Strausz, 2018; Weston and Mythen, 2022).

Accompanying the PDG, a revised definition of extremism was issued in 2015, designed to function as a reference point for identifying cases of risk. Herein extremism was defined as ‘vocal or active opposition to Fundamental British Values, including democracy, the rule of law, individual liberty and mutual respect and tolerance of different faiths and beliefs’ (Home Office, 2015a: 9). From this point forward, the PDG conferred on the education sector a dual statutory responsibility: first, to proactively safeguard children from radicalisation; and second, to engage them pedagogically with the issue of extremism by fostering resilience through the promotion of ‘Fundamental British Values’ (DfE, 2014). Notwithstanding the nebulous constitution of ‘resilience,’ the defining characteristics of Fundamental British Values were subject to interrogation. More specifically, critics questioned their ethnocentric construction, propensity to reproduce colonial discourses and capacity to exclude and alienate individuals from specific ethnic or religious communities, particularly Muslims (see Elton-Chalcraft et al., 2017; Faure-Walker, 2021; Onursal and Kirkpatrick, 2021; Panjwani, 2016). Following on from this, a revised version of extremism was issued by the Conservative Government in 2024 defining it as:

‘The promotion or advancement of an ideology based on violence, hatred, or intolerance, that aims to:

1. Negate or destroy the fundamental rights and freedoms of others; or

2. Undermine, overturn, or replace the UK's system of liberal parliamentary democracy and democratic rights; or

3. Intentionally create a permissive environment for others to achieve the results in (1) or (2).’

(Department for Levelling Up, Housing & Communities, 2024).

Although the formal directives of Prevent state that ‘threats and risks’ derive from all forms of extremism (see Home Office, 2023b: 22–30), critical research has consistently shown that in design and practice its strategies and policies have focused disproportionately on radical Islamism and underplayed the threat of violence presented by Extreme Right-Wing groups (see Aitlhadj, 2024; Faure-Walker, 2021; Mythen et al., 2009). Furthermore, rather than addressing this longstanding issue, the Independent Review undertaken in 2023 effectively doubles down on it, with the author William Shawcross (2023: 3) encouraging a more concentrated focus on Islamist extremism: ‘the present boundaries around what is termed by Prevent as extremist Islamist ideology are drawn too narrowly while the boundaries around the ideology of the Extreme Right-Wing are too broad’.

While debates about what the ‘new’ definition of extremism encompasses and elides continue, post the Independent Review of Prevent, the pressures on teachers to be a frontline of defence remain. Given the concentration on educational institutions as a key site of intervention to prevent extremism, it is unsurprising that the sector has consistently made the highest proportion of Prevent referrals, far exceeding those made by social work or health sectors (Home Office, 2024b). Indeed, referrals from the education sector between 2022–2023, comprise 40% of the national total (Home Office, 2023a). Correspondingly, young people have consistently constituted the largest proportion of all Prevent referrals. Disaggregation of referrals from 2023, show that individuals aged 11–15 years old are the most populous group, with the median age for all individuals referred to Prevent being 16 years old (Home Office, 2024b). While 85% of Prevent referrals are not deemed suitable for consideration by Channel, the voluntary multi agency counter-radicalisation programme which operates in all Local Authorities in England and Wales, 50% of Channel cases taken up are for those aged 11–15 years old (Home Office, 2024b).

The Channel process itself operationalises a Vulnerability Assessment Framework (VAF) which lists indicators that may signal engagement with extremism. These include ‘searching for identity, belonging and meaning,’ a ‘desire for status’ and a ‘desire for excitement and adventure’ (HM Government, 2012: 2). Unsurprisingly, the VAF framework has proven to be controversial, with the evidence base for apparent ‘risk factors’ being questioned (see Heath-Kelly, 2012; Mythen and Baillergeau, 2021). Given that ‘indicators’ such as the above appear to be common facets of adolescent behaviour, the possibility of both reading in and misinterpretation looms large (see Mythen and Weston, 2023; Reed, 2016). While debates rumble on regarding the extent to which teachers actively endorse safeguarding duties to prevent students from engaging with extremism (see Busher et al., 2017; ICM, 2019; Thomas, 2024), the implementation of PDG is ultimately mandatory, formally embedded into teaching roles via professional standards, evaluation and inspection protocols, and concomitant contractual regulatory directives. Schools are obliged to comply with the Prevent duty in statutory guidance, which specifies both legally required action (‘must’) and expectations of good practice ('should’) (Home Office, 2024b). Safeguarding duties to counter-extremism cannot be ignored or declined, regardless of ideational commitment.

The PDG invests Ofsted as responsible for monitoring schools’ effectiveness at keeping children safe from extremism and preventing radicalisation, outlining the consequences of inadequate performance (Home Office, 2015b). This oversight is carried out with reference to the Education Inspection Framework (EIF) (Ofsted, 2019), with further guidance provided in the School Inspection Handbook (Ofsted, 2019). Schools are graded from 1 (outstanding) to 4 (inadequate), with a re-visit triggered within a 3-month period if inadequacies in safeguarding provision are identified during inspections. Protocols specified in Keeping Children Safe in Education (DfE, 2018, 2024) and Working Together to Safeguard Children (DfE, 2023c) provide instruction for governing bodies, management, and senior leadership teams. Both documents foreground two key messages: firstly, that safeguarding is the responsibility of ‘everybody,’ and second, that ‘it could happen here’ (DfE, 2024: 6). These mantras are reinforced in mandatory staff training, which teachers are contractually required to complete as a minimum requirement for PDG compliance. They must also undergo annual staff training delivered alongside conventional safeguarding training, in line with updated guidance stating that radicalisation concerns should be integrated into existing safeguarding processes (DfE, 2015, 2023a). Teachers are further required to understand safeguarding procedures, including how to report concerns to the Designated Safeguarding Lead (DfE, 2015, 2023a). Schools may incorporate Prevent into continuous professional development and induction programmes, ensuring that staff with additional safeguarding responsibilities are provided with more comprehensive guidance and training on how to make referrals (Home Office, 2022). Additionally, risk assessment tools, ostensibly designed to identify indicators of ‘vulnerability’ to extremism, are commonly integrated into safeguarding policy documents produced by schools and colleges (Acik et al., 2018).

Research methods and study design

To contribute toward debates in critical social policy and further illuminate how teachers navigate and despatch their statutory Prevent duties, we present data from a small-scale qualitative study focussed on the experiences and reflections of teachers in a large metropolitan area in the UK. Prior to this, we provide a capsule account of the research methods and design. The inductive study aimed to explore how teachers understand and implement Prevent safeguarding practices, including the extent of their ideational commitment to it and compliance with policies and procedures. Fifteen education professionals living and working within the boroughs of the area were recruited via purposive sampling techniques. The rationale for the selection of the study site was in part due to the diverse socio-demographic characteristics of participants in the region. Local knowledge gained via living and working in the area facilitated emic research. The methodological approach was designed to enable participants to reflect on professional experiences and practices in the historical and cultural context of the locale. The heterogeneous sample included participants from different educational provisions, including academies, local authority schools, faith schools, alternative provisions (PRUs) and sixth form colleges. Participants varied in years of professional service and occupied a range of roles, including newly qualified teachers, programme leaders and Designated Safeguarding Leads. A semi-structured interview topic guide was used to support open questions, facilitating exploration of the ways in which PDG is understood and implemented in schools, as well as teachers’ perspectives on their broader safeguarding responsibilities. Full ethical approval was granted for the research by the home University. Due to restrictions on face-to-face research during the Covid-19 pandemic, all interviews were conducted online. Informed consent was obtained, and participants retained the right to withdraw at any stage. Data was securely stored in line with data protection requirements.

While some studies suggest that face-to-face interviews promote participant relaxedness (Keen et al., 2022), in this instance, remote interviews conducted away from the school environment appeared to foster openness and dialogue, resulting in the sharing of candid testimonies and perspectives. Following transcription and pseudonymisation, thematic coding was undertaken, underpinned by the principles of grounded theory (see Clarke and Braun, 2013). An iterative approach was adopted with stages of open and focused coding taking place, alongside constant comparison, and reflection to identify key themes and recurrent issues (Charmaz, 2014). By way of caveat, it should be noted that updated statutory safeguarding policies (DfE, 2024), Ofsted inspection guidance (Ofsted, 2024) and revised Prevent Duty Guidance (Home Office, 2023b) have been introduced post the study. The data in this article was gathered and analysed prior to modified and updated documentation and, as such, pertains to the earlier iterations of policies cited above.

Implementing Prevent Duty safeguarding: Quandaries, obstacles and dilemmas

Systematic thematic coding of interview data uncovered several salient challenges that teachers face, revealing some of the dilemmas and obstacles that arise in incorporating security policies into educational contexts. While participants expressed diverse attitudes toward the Prevent Strategy and their safeguarding duties therein - ranging from endorsement to dissatisfaction - several common problems emerging out of the implementation of Prevent in schools were voiced. In the discussion below, we concentrate on two concerns frequently articulated by participants, both of which were seen to have occurred as problematic ‘side effects’ of policies formally designed to reduce risk and improve safety. These are processes of suspectification affecting Muslim students and the deleterious effects of erroneous referrals. As we will illustrate, these processes are not only interconnected but also mutually reinforcing, creating compounding effects, generating uncertainty and anxiety amongst teachers, and feelings of stigmatisation for erroneously referred students.

Suspectification of Muslim students

The deleterious impacts of a longstanding focus within the Prevent Strategy on Muslim minority groups has been well documented (see Kundnani, 2012; Mythen et al., 2009; Mythen et al., 2017). However, it should be noted that details of an individual's religion have never been formally included in Prevent statistics. Although not consistently captured by the Home Office, local Prevent and Channel agencies may choose to record an individual's religion on case notes - a practice which could well increase in the light of the IROP recommendations (see Shawcross, 2023). The persistent lack of data on the religious affiliation of individuals referred to Prevent is mirrored by the failure of police service in England and Wales to record the race or ethnicity of 33,116 people - nearly two-thirds of the 51,204 referrals made between April 2015 and April 2023 - this despite ongoing concerns about potential discrimination against minority ethnic groups (Syal, 2024). Given the routine and embedded nature of data collection on religious affiliation in equality, diversity and inclusion screening and monitoring, such a void in information is striking. NGOs critical of Prevent, including Prevent Watch (2025), the Muslim Council of Britain (2015) and Rights and Security International (2025) have provided substantial qualitative evidence detailing the impacts of the implementation of the policy on Muslim individuals, especially children, who are overrepresented in school referrals relative to population size.

The disproportionate scrutiny of Muslims, conceived as a risky population - coupled with persistent and prevalent Islamophobic discourses in the media, politics, and public life - has contributed to heightened feelings of marginalisation and stigmatisation among Muslim minority groups. Simultaneously, confusion has abounded in policy and practice as regards distinguishing between the positive anchoring of Islamic identities and signs of affiliation with extremist ideas and/or organisations (see Kundnani, 2014; Mythen, 2012). Failure to appreciate the complexity of intercultural and inter-ethnic identities amongst Muslim youth has resulted in erroneous assumptions that Islamic religious symbolism and pride in Islamic heritage is somehow related to an increased risk of radicalisation (Abbas, 2019; Mythen et al., 2013). This assumption has served to both further problematise Muslim identities and perpetuated the ‘otherness’ of Muslims (see Bibi, 2022; Lynch, 2013). The potential for stigmatising effects arising out of Prevent safeguarding practices has been flagged in large-scale national surveys (Busher et al., 2017) and small-scale empirical studies (see Elwick and Jerome, 2019; Panjwani et al., 2018; Vincent, 2019). Aligning with and expanding on these findings, teachers’ testimonies in this study illumine the problematic consequences of the PDG for Muslim teachers and students.

Anisha is a recently qualified British-born Muslim teacher who works in a large secondary school in a socially deprived urban area. She feels that the Prevent training provided for teaching staff essentialises and racializes suspect(ed) groups, perpetuating negative stereotypes of the ‘typical’ extremist:

I absolutely think there is this implicit meaning. That we are really looking for a man … and he would look a certain way … he would be Brown - perhaps occasionally Black - would be quite lonely, isolated, would be a Muslim.

Anisha conveyed discomfort about the content of Prevent training and was uncomfortable with the way in which it positioned her as both ‘implementer and target’ (see Fernandez, 2024). This is evident in the rhetorical question she posed to colleagues: “I said to them, so we’re not really looking for a White person are we in this training course? You know, I mean we’re just not. They just agreed.”

Jade is a non-Muslim experienced English teacher, working in a single-sex Islamic school. She is also critical of Prevent and believes that it has been divisive in education:

Yeah, it feels biased, and it feels heavy handed. It feels like, you know, when you put kids in sets in primary school and they’re on different tables. You’ve got apple table, pear table and orange table and the kids on the orange table know that they’re the bottom set.

Like Anisha, Jade observes that Prevent training and student workshops predominantly focus on Islamist extremism, leading Muslim students to feel under scrutiny and surveillance:

It feels like they’ve called it Prevent, and they try to dress it up around, you know, preventing any kind of extremism. Well, it doesn’t feel like that because of how conscious different kids are made to feel. Like, well, if you were a kind of neo-Nazi living in [study site], would you feel as conscious of it as you do if you’re a Muslim girl? You know when you were sat there during the Prevent drama workshop in your school? Would you feel like it was targeted at you in the same way?

Gill, a mid-career teacher and vocational lead in a city sixth form college, shares similar concerns to Jade and Anisha regarding the negative effects of the implementation of Prevent safeguarding. She observes that the (over)representation of young Muslim males as Islamist extremists in training has ripple effects on professional practices, potentially diverting attention from other forms of extremism:

I think the focus is on the Muslim kids. I think that actually for that reason, other kids could easily be missed. I think there could be things going on with White kids or, you know, kids from other backgrounds. I think it could easily be missed because of the, you know, the assumption and the stereotype that it's all … I think Muslim boys are probably the ones that we kind of keep the closest eye on. That's not appropriate and not right. I do think there are probably other things that could easily go under the radar.

The implications for the education sector of the ‘suspectification’ of young students from non-majority ethnic groups is disturbing. A large-scale survey of staff and students from schools and colleges in most regions of England, found that 43% of all respondents believed that the Prevent Duty had stigmatised Muslim students, with 75% Black and Minority Ethnic (BME) respondents believed that Prevent Duty caused Muslim students to be ‘considerably more’ likely to feel stigmatised (Busher et al., 2017; Busher et al., 2019). The penumbra of risk hovering over young Muslim students was highlighted by the case of the ‘Bethnal Green girls’ who travelled to Syria in 2014 (Brown, 2015). In Busher et al.'s (2019) research, this case caused general disquiet, with teachers using it as an example to reflect on the difficulties of their safeguarding roles. While it would appear that the suspectification of Muslim students is perceived to be encouraged by Prevent training undertaken, as the vignettes above illustrate, teachers were both reflective about its content and reflexive with regards to how they incorporated it into professional practice.

May is an experienced social science teacher in a large sixth form college, who shared unease about the emphasis of Prevent safeguarding on Islamist extremism. She explains that she decided to issue a ‘disclaimer’ to the students in her citizenship class, due to worries about the potentially harmful effects on Muslim students in the group, whom she believes may feel targeted by its content:

You'd feel, definitely Muslim kids must have felt like they were being targeted. Because I felt like what I was doing was targeting them. So, I decided to make a point by saying: “I’ve got to just remind you that not all extremism and terrorism is to do with Islam”’.

In the following extract, Jasmin - who is the Designated Safeguarding Lead and thus has overall responsibility for the management and delivery of Prevent – describes adopting a process of vetting Prevent materials before approving them for use: “It's a bit cringey, what with working at a Muslim school. So, to be honest, before I kind of expose the students to it, I check them out myself.” Jasmin's admission chimes with previous research which indicates that - rather than unquestioningly accepting directives - educators reflect on and negotiate their approach to delivering safeguarding duties (see Bryan, 2017; Busher et al., 2017, 2019). In what might be described as a ‘safety paradox,’ in the instances raised by Jasmin and May, autonomous decisions are being made by teachers to ‘safeguard’ pupils from the Prevent educative materials designed to assist them in the safeguarding process itself. As Jerome et al.'s (2019) work illuminates, although accumulated evidence about the impacts of Prevent in schools and colleges has brought to light negative consequences and harmful side effects on pupils, it is important to recognise that the agency and discretion used by teachers can also act as a tempering force in protecting students against unwarranted stigmatisation and suspicion.

The risks of safeguarding: Clouded judgements, iatrogenic effects

One of the consequences of the historical suspectification of Muslim students, is the overrepresentation of this group in annually published Prevent referral statistics (see Amnesty International, 2023; Home Office, 2024b). While some attribute such disproportionalities to systemic institutional prejudice against Muslims (Aitlhadj, 2024; Miah, 2017), others question the extent to which bias or teachers’ misinterpretation of aspects of Muslim culture contributes to the high rates of ‘no further action’ or ‘attrition’ cases which constitute the vast majority of Prevent referrals (see Home Office, 2023; Thomas, 2020). The substantial number of ‘false positive’ cases in the education sector - which neither progress through the Channel process nor lead to interventions - has also been connected to zealous reporting by teachers concerned about overlooking signs of extremism (see Acik et al., 2018; Busher et al., 2019). Indeed, the National Education Union (NEU) (2025) has cautioned its members about the impact of unnecessary ‘just in case’ referrals, emphasising that in undertaking safeguarding, schools must abide by the Equality Act (2010), specifically, ‘Public Sector Equality Duty’ which sets out the legal requirements to avoid discrimination, advance equal opportunities and foster equality between students (Equality Act, 2010: s149). Given the wider climate of indeterminacy and disagreement about language and actions that should be considered as extremist (Abbas, 2019; Faure-Walker, 2021), it is unsurprising that teachers are both uncertain and apprehensive about identifying students that are ‘at risk’ or exhibiting risky behaviour.

In addition to awareness of the dangers of non-compliance, fears about the consequences of failing to identify genuine cases of concern, coupled with Prevent training steered toward monitoring students with particular ethnic profiles, is likely to have contributed to the problem of over-referral. For participants in the study, the headline message to be ‘better safe than sorry’ was uppermost in mind and often a default position influencing decisions to refer (see also, Busher et al., 2019; Lakhani, 2020). In the following extract, Alan - an experienced PE teacher in a large secondary school - describes reporting his concern about a Muslim pupil shortly after a serious terrorist attack had occurred in the UK. His actions were prompted by overhearing a comment made by the student and behaviour which he describes as ‘suspicious’:

I’ve referred a few things. Yeah. Um, terrorism stuff, really. For the kids I reported one time was um, it was just something, just a comment he said. You know what, I can’t even remember. I think it might have been not long after [serious terrorist attack]. I reported him on the government website. I can’t even remember what it's called. What's it called now? It was a national thing anyway. I remember going straight through just because of a comment he’d said, coupled with sort of suspicious behaviour. Across school he was very quiet, which doesn't mean anything, you know, kids can be quiet, but quite thoughtfully, quiet, you know. And you weren't quite sure what he was thinking.

Aside from the forgotten comment - and being alerted by the student appearing ‘thoughtfully quiet’ - it is not possible to definitively discern whether Alan would have made the same decision referral at a time less temporally proximate to the attack. Inasmuch as availability bias in decision-making is both commonplace and difficult to mitigate against, particularly under conditions of uncertainty (see Tversky and Kahneman, 1974), other participants recounted similar cases in which Muslim students had been reported to Prevent on grounds that, in retrospect, were less than concrete. In this regard, while Thomas (2020) is doubtless correct in observing that sensationalised media coverage of referrals made on specious grounds draws public attention to cracks in the Prevent system, the immediate and long-term impacts of ‘false positives’ - for individual students, their families, the wider school community and teachers - remain deeply troubling (see Holmwood and O’Toole, 2017). Even in small-scale empirical studies such as that discussed here, the examples recalled by teachers were disquieting, supporting Fernandez's (2024: 1) view that ‘the surveillance of Muslimness’ extends beyond the content of Prevent training sessions and feeds into a lingering spectre of suspicion.

Jasmin recalls discussions amongst members of the staff group following on from a Prevent safeguarding session:

After the training, even teachers in our school, who are Muslim, were like “Oh well, that girl started to wear hijab. What do you think she's watching?” If Prevent training got a Muslim teacher questioning why a girl is wearing a full-on abaya, then God forbid, I don’t know what's going on. It's drummed into us the idea that teachers need to be watching out for these things … constantly looking in the classroom and seeing what they’re saying.

Jasmin's remembering illuminates the sensitising effects of Prevent Duty training on the perceptions of some of her colleagues. She went on to explain that, although Muslim teachers fully understand Islamic cultural practises, they too are influenced by the profile ‘indicators’ embedded in Prevent training. As Chivers (2018) observes, having to conform to risk assessment protocols that clash with cultural, personal, and political values can produce dissonance and tension. Both this example and the case discussed by Alan indicate uncertainty and confusion regarding what constitutes a reliable sign of engagement with extremism. An example that Gill recalls, further demonstrates not only the decision-making binds that teachers must grapple with, but also the iatrogenic effects of false positive referrals:

They told us in the [Prevent] training to look out for colours. So, you know, ISIS colours. If a student starts wearing black and yellow, those are kind of ‘flag colours’ so just be aware of that. A very slight indicator, but just something to keep your eye on. A student had changed his computer monitor. He changed the background screen to black and was writing in yellow. So, this training was really fresh in everybody's head and this particular teacher freaked out and thought: “Oh my God” and you know unfortunately he was a Muslim boy. He really freaked out. It turns out that he's dyslexic.

Gill, in a lamenting tone, reflected on how the boy in question had not displayed any other behaviours that might have raised teachers’ concerns, recalling the damaging consequences of the experience for the student:

And he just said he was upset that, you know, that we all think that of him. And actually, you know, on reflection, there was nothing else at all. He was a really nice kid. He was hardworking and, you know, there was nothing else to suggest that that was the case. The teacher felt terrible about it. But it's hard because she felt terrible, but she said she also thought well, if I’d have just ignored it and then it was something, then what?

In Gill's reflections the nub of the problem that teachers face resounds. Strongly encouraged by senior management and Prevent training messaging to adopt a ‘better safe than sorry’ approach, teachers wrestle with profound concerns about the professional and personal repercussions of overlooking or missing instances that may fulminate in endorsement or enactment of violence fuelled by extremism. Yet they must also carry the burden of guilt and responsibility in instances such as that related above. In circumstances such as these, teachers are charged with making safeguarding decisions in situations of indeterminacy and imperfect knowledge. Given the impacts on pupil wellbeing and the risk of subsequent labelling by their peers and staff, such decisions have consequential repercussions. While the capacity of the Prevent programme to identify and intervene positively to prevent or disrupt pathways into extremism must not be lost (see Educate Against Hate, 2025), neither should the deleterious impacts on those erroneously referred. Gill's reflections regarding the impacts of a false referral on the pupil above chime with other studies and case reports, which highlight some of the psychological impacts of false referrals, including depression, feelings of isolation and distrust, and ontological insecurity (see Abbas et al., 2021; Aked, 2020; Heath-Kelly and Strausz, 2018).

While PDG operates in a pre-criminal space, counter-terrorism police manage the Prevent Case Management database which stores referral data - including cases deemed to require ‘no further action’ - for six years (Home Office, 2024a). There is scant information in the public domain about this database. What little is known, has been gleaned from FOI requests (see Rights and Security International, 2025). In the study, participants raised concerns about inadequate communications post-referral. May, a vocational teacher in a sixth form college, aired disquiet about what happened to information about young people after it went into what she alluded to as ‘the black hole’ of the referral system:

Other people might find it more reassuring and might actually report them more. I think not knowing what happens to people who get reported is a problem as well though, you know what I mean. And that makes me a bit, that's why I'm saying I'm a bit wary, because I don't know what's gonna happen to them.

In addition to the immediate harms caused by erroneous referrals which potentially jeopardise the psychological and emotional well-being of students (see Welply, 2018; Winter et al., 2022), longer term future harms may occur if information from the database - which is accessible to a range of security agencies, including NPCC, individual police forces, local authorities and public/private bodies) - is disclosed to other agencies, such as potential employers (Dobson, 2020; Rights and Security International, 2025). Concerns over the civil rights implications of the retention and sharing of data in the Prevent Case Management database has been raised by several campaign groups and NGOs, including Liberty, the Runnymede Trust and Medact.

Discussion: Policy implications and the dilemmas of enactment

Given the responsibilities bestowed upon teachers under the PDG and their significant role in the national counter-extremism programme, it is reasonable to question whether the training received is sufficient to adequately prepare for what is indubitably, a security-critical role. It is evident that teachers must make high-stakes referral decisions in an environment of uncertainty, placing them in an unenviable double-bind. Should they elect to make a referral that transpires not to require further attention, they risk accusations of poor judgement. If they decide not to refer a case that later leads to harm, they can be deemed negligent. Notwithstanding the ambiguity surrounding definitions of extremism and radicalisation noted earlier, whether - or how - to factor in one's own cultural and political values and beliefs into safeguarding practices to counter extremism is a taxing dilemma that teachers in the study were iteratively negotiating.

Looking beyond the study, it is possible that the problems and issues raised represent the thin end of a chunkier wedge. All participants had completed the compulsory Prevent training and the majority had engaged with additional and/or specialised safeguarding training. While the dilemmas and quandaries with which they grapple - both logistically and emotionally - are significant, we are minded to wonder how the PDG is being implemented in schools less engaged with counter-extremism safeguarding duties and, indeed, what the ripple effects of this are. A UK Government-funded national survey of Prevent published four years after PDG was introduced, reported that only four in ten teachers understood their Prevent duties well, with almost a quarter (24%) reporting that they had ‘never heard’ of Prevent Duty (ICM, 2019: 18). Given the power entrusted to teachers and the damaging effects of erroneous referrals, these statistics are alarming.

Although generalisations cannot be made based on small-scale localised research, almost a decade on from its introduction in the education sector, our findings supplement understandings of the ways in which PDG is enacted on the ground and the quandaries that teachers face in delivering safeguarding to counter-extremism. Mirroring the findings of cognate studies, the negative effects of its implementation appear to disproportionally effect students from minoritized ethnic groups, and, more specifically Muslims. The ‘institutionalisation of suspicion’ (Borrelli et al., 2024: 670) looms large over Muslim students within secondary education settings, producing lasting deleterious effects. Whilst principally harming the young person falsely implicated, erroneous referrals fuel an environment of distrust and can erode teacher-student relations. Teachers do not make risk assessment judgements in a vacuum and cannot condition out influencing factors of diverse types. Heightened sensitivity to risk because of training, in conjunction with risk assessment tools informed by ambiguous ‘indicators of radicalisation’ are likely to be contributing to a high rate of referrals where no further action is taken. As Busher et al.'s (2017) large-scale survey work reveals, BME respondents are more sceptical towards the Prevent Duty and more likely to be attuned to its capacity to damage positive trust relationships in schools. While the need to comply with the PDG may encourage instrumentally directed and ‘performative’ responses (see Ball, 2003), educators also act autonomously and utilise ‘agency gaps’ to modify, mediate and ameliorate what they perceive to be training, policy, or procedural shortfalls. Teachers in the study expressing strong pastoral relationships with Muslim students were acutely aware of the dangers of Islamophobic discourses and the need to interrogate wider societal prejudices and biases. For some, cogitation on potential harms to Muslim pupils emanating out of implementation of the PDG had generated challenges to dominant training messages and engendered protective strategies to safeguard students from its perceived flaws. Although the scale of the ‘chilling effect’ is contested in research, teachers in the study cited examples whereby they had encouraged students to self-censor to protect themselves. This process of ‘hushing’ aligns with practices of self-surveillance and censorship deployed by some young Muslims to deflect suspicion and stigmatisation (see Barker, 2024; Mythen et al., 2013).

As we have illustrated, in addition to operationalising a ‘safety paradox’ to shield students from potential risks of safeguarding procedures, some teachers in the study had elected to ‘safeguard’ themselves - not from extremism itself, but from the iatrogenic effects of the policy. To this end, the ratcheting up of ideational compliance and attempts to quell reasonable criticism which are embedded in the recommendations of the Independent Review of Prevent (see Shawcross, 2023) are causes for alarm. Similarly, in our view, the prolonged and increasingly vain search for ‘behavioural traits’ and ‘radicalisation risk indicators’ - such as ‘criticising government policy’ and ‘expressing concerns about being victimised’ (see DfE, 2023b) - is misguided and obscures rather than illumines the structural factors and material grievances frequently present and significant in journeys into extremism.

Conclusion

The data we have presented challenges established practices of knowledge production and current methods of enacting security measures to combat extremism in educational contexts. Whilst the focus of the present study was oriented toward eliciting the experiences and perspectives of teachers responsible for safeguarding practices designed to counter radicalisation, it is important to stress the vitality of - and ongoing necessity for - research that engages directly with individuals and communities that have disproportionality borne the brunt of the deleterious impacts of the Prevent Strategy. Extending beyond this contribution, there is also a need to key into and develop theoretical frameworks that not only give voice to the experiences of marginalised and oppressed groups but also enable deeper understandings of embedded processes of exclusion and discrimination. While it has been beyond our orbit to advance progressive and purposive theories - such as Critical Race Theory (see Crenshaw, 2011; Crenshaw et al., 1995) – we recognise the potential for theoretical alignment that illumines the systemic and structural ways in which social policies can both mirror and produce institutionalised forms of bias and prejudice. In foregrounding the experiences of teachers responsible for implementing counter-radicalisation policies at the chalkface, here we have raised both the contradictions in policymaking and the dilemmas that dominant constructions of ‘risk’ (re)produce for those that are, at once, mediators and subjects of State securitisation. We have highlighted the specific processes of labelling and risk attachment that reinforce wider racialised relations of subordination and domination. What is notable here is the awareness and reflexivity exhibited by participants who reluctantly comply, be it because of professional adherence to safety first dictats, fear of reprisals or worst-case concern about missing signs of extremism that may later produce harm. Such processes of negotiation are resonant with Ball's (2003) observations regarding instrumental and performative forms of compliance with policy. Even in instances where the purpose and trajectory of State policy is questioned by those responsible for its implementation, its enactment persists, and the performance of security – including its harmful effects and collateral casualties - continues unabated.

In conclusion, the thorny issues raised in this article signal the need for further interrogation of the effects of the enactment of PDG in educational contexts. The cumulative policy implications for the education-security nexus are manifold. Firstly, as our vignettes indicate, instances of misinterpretation of behaviours are particularly pronounced in instances involving Muslim students (see also Qurashi, 2018; Sian, 2013), suggesting that especial diligence needs to be applied when exercising judgement. Second, given that false referrals can damage both mental and physical health, greater awareness of and support for individuals negatively affected by erroneous referrals is required (see Aked, 2020). Third, our data suggests that some teachers view the risk indicators they are provided with to inform Prevent referral judgements as problematic, inviting further review of the appropriateness and workability of current guidance. Fourth, some teachers are exercising agency to make more intuitive professional judgements that either sit alongside - or may travel against the grain - of directives issued (see also Jerome et al., 2019; Wicker, 2021). This itself points toward the value of further research probing issues of compliance, trust, and enactment of safeguarding duties to counter radicalisation. Fifth, current data management and storage practices potentially expose individuals erroneously referred to future adverse consequences if data is shared with other agencies.

Factoring in the broader context, post the controversial recommendations of the Shawcross Review, a subsequent change in political party governance in the UK and the publication of Critical Learning Reviews of the attacks conducted by Axel Rudakabana and Ali Harbi Ali - both of whom were referred to Prevent - the bigger question of what to ‘do’ with Prevent looms large. In the interregnum, whilst the Labour government's review of the strategy and adjacent consideration of resetting the legal definition of extremism progresses, it is essential to persist in interrogating both the effects and effectiveness of the Strategy. Only through evidence-based evaluations of the impacts of current policies can progressive approaches to tackling the problem of hateful forms of extremism - in multiple manifesting forms - be developed and refined.

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

Thank you to the anonymous referees on the editorial collective for their constructive and helpful feedback, and to Arianna Silvestri for clear editorial guidance.

Ethical approval statement

The School of Law and Social Justice Research Ethics Review Committee at the University of [redacted] approved qualitative fieldwork for the research project reported on above on 29 January 2020 (Case Number 4871). All participants gave informed verbal consent and provided written signatures to this end before commencing interviews.

Funding

The lead author discloses receipt of the following financial support ESRC Post-Doctoral Fellowship ES/EZ504518/1/APP48535.Understanding and overcoming the challenges of implementing the Prevent Duty Guidance in the education sector (October 2024–October 2025).

ORCID iD

Jane Louise Horton

Author biographies

Jane Horton is an ESRC funded Post Doctoral Fellow in the department of Sociology, Social Policy and Criminology . The Fellowship ‘"Understanding and overcoming the challenges of implementing the Prevent Duty Guidance in the education sector: advancing knowledge, enhancing academic, practitioner and policy interchanges.” (October 2024 – October 2025) advances on from her doctoral research to focus on understanding practitioners’ subjective experiences of implementing the Prevent Duty in the education sector. Jane applies a critical lens to her inter-disciplinary work. She is especially interested in processes of responsibilisation for pre-emptive in counter terrorism, dynamics of trust, vulnerability, safeguarding, pastoral education and practitioner agency in policy enactment. She uses qualitative methods to conduct research, the findings of which contribute to wider debates around PCVE and inform policy.

Gabe Mythen is Professor of Criminology in the Department of Sociology, Social Policy and Criminology at the University of Liverpool. His research expertise lies in exploring the institutional production of risks across a range of spheres and responses to environmental and social harms. During the course of his career, he has been motivated to explore the ways in which threats and harms are socially produced. He is interested in how risks are represented and communicated as well as how societal risks and perceived by individuals and communities. His research also uses a critical lens to focus on the processes and practices through which government and macro institutions manage, mediate and regulate risk. In seeking to create and develop impactful research with ‘real-world’ relevance, he utilises a variety of methodological modes to sustain a multi-dimensional approach. He has made significant contributions and interventions in the fields of social and security policy, criminological studies and sociological theory.

Jacob Astley is a PhD Candidate funded by the ESRC in the Department of Sociology, Social Policy and Criminology at the University of Liverpool. His research expertise lies in contemporary forms of extremism, with a focus on youth socialisation, digital environments, identity and belonging, and meaning-making at the intersections of fluid, ambiguous, and ideologically unstable forms of radicalisation.

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