Who deserves exceptions in times of crisis? A comparison of policy responses to mitigate negative consequences for unemployed people and immigrants during the COVID-19 pandemic

Abstract

The boundaries for whom the welfare state should protect during times of crisis are not necessarily obvious. Deservingness studies have identified unemployed people and immigrants as groups perceived as 'less deserving' of welfare state support than other groups in need during ‘normal’ times. These two groups have in recent years been subject to more conditional requirements and an incentivizing rationale. In this article, we compare the policy responses for 1) unemployed people and 2) immigrants during the COVID-19 pandemic in Norway form 2020–2022. We ask: Who deserves exceptions in times of crisis? We find that a cross-partisan parliament introduced extensive economic relief packages and temporary regulations to mitigate negative financial consequences for unemployed persons and furloughed workers. Politicians argued that individuals were not to blame for their unfortunate financial circumstances during the pandemic, and that the welfare state had to take the larger share of the burden. However, the government chose not to make temporary exemptions from economic requirements for permanent residence or family reunification. It was explicitly stated that there was no reason to deviate (temporarily) from the general economic requirements during the pandemic, referring to the potential strain on the Norwegian welfare state if immigrants were not self-sufficient. We argue that the political rationale of incentives underlying these requirements falls short during economic crises and that this non-policy response illustrate new forms of welfare state chauvinism.

Introduction

As a response to the spread of the coronavirus in 2020, governments around the world introduced some of the strongest, most intrusive measures during peacetime, including lockdowns and other restrictions on physical contact. Consequently, as well as being a health crisis, the pandemic also led to a severe economic crisis, with businesses closing, record-high unemployment rates and furloughs. Although it was argued that unprecedented restrictions were necessary from a health perspective, concerns were raised about the financial, social and psychological consequences. To ease some of the economic consequences, many governments passed regulatory and financial ‘COVID-relief’ packages to help businesses, employees and other particularly affected groups.

In the Nordic welfare states, as well as in many other countries, the overall narrative during the pandemic was that governments had to step in (Crabtree and Wehde, 2023; Gjerde, 2021, 2022; Greve et al., 2021; Nilsen and Skarpenes, 2020). This attitude is illustrated by the leader of the Norwegian Labour Party, Jonas Gahr Støre's (2020) statement during one of the parliamentary debates that led to the introduction of an economic relief package:

‘All parties are united behind a powerful package to support those affected in the labour market: those who are laid off, lose their jobs or don’t get more assignments or orders: not because they have done a poor job, but because large parts of the economy are grinding to a halt. (…). They should know that we’re there for them: that we’re behind them.’

However, the boundaries for whom the welfare state should protect during crises are not necessarily obvious, particularly with respect to immigrants. During the pandemic, migrants faced additional disadvantages. New, stricter border control practices were a visible consequence of the COVID-19 pandemic and have been the subject of emerging research (Boucher et al., 2021; Macklin, 2022; Martin and Bergmann, 2021; Tanyi and Egan, 2021). These temporary restrictions kept families apart, delayed arrivals of UN quota refugees, and left many stranded away from their homes and workplaces. These consequences were publicly debated, and the border restrictions were gradually removed with the arrival of vaccines and lower infection rates.

Beyond such immediate concerns, however, are additional negative consequences immigrants face that have been given less attention in public debates and the emerging scholarly literature. Although economic crises affect society at large, previous studies show that immigrants are hit disproportionately hard during recessions, which was also the case in most countries during the COVID-19 pandemic (OECD, 2022). Furthermore, many European states have in recent decades introduced conditional economic requirements for permanent residence, citizenship and family reunification; typically requiring evidence of employment or self-sufficiency for a certain period before application (Stadlmair, 2018; Eggebø et al., 2023). Thus, immigrants are more likely to experience additional negative consequences that other citizens are not subject to during recessions. Their unemployment and welfare state dependency during economic crises may not only lead to financial insecurity, but also directly influence their access to a secure legal or family reunification.

In this article, we analyse and compare the Norwegian policy responses during the COVID-19 pandemic for two target groups 1) persons who became (partly) unemployed during the pandemic, and 2) immigrants. In most US and European studies investigating the social legitimacy of welfare state benefits and the literature on different groups’ perceived ‘deservingness’, both unemployed people and immigrants are groups perceived as ‘less deserving’ compared to e.g., elderly persons or persons with disabilities (see literature review in van Oorschot and Roosma, 2017). Both target groups have also been subject to a general trend of more conditional requirements for receiving certain benefits, and – as will be shown – these requirements are strongly based on an incentivizing logic. Empirically, we ask: What policy responses were introduced to mitigate negative consequences for unemployed people and immigrants during the pandemic, and what was the rationale underlying these responses?

Using Norway during the pandemic as a case study, we analyse the policy processes leading up to (temporary) regulations and financial relief related to a) unemployment-related benefits and b) economic integration requirements for immigrants, from March 2020 to February 2022, when Norway lifted almost all COVID-related restrictions. Norway provides a highly relevant context, as the universalistic principle underlying the Nordic welfare states has, historically, been a central ideology and a measure for ending stigmatization and creating equal opportunities for disadvantaged groups by promoting equality and solidarity between classes, regions and genders (Anttonen et al., 2012). When the pandemic hit Norway, it was in a comparatively good fiscal position to respond to the crisis, with budget surpluses and low baseline unemployment. Greve et al. (2021) also highlight that among the Nordic countries, Norway had the most generous policies during the pandemic, which makes it a ‘most likely’ case for state support in times of crisis.

We start with a brief review of recent developments concerning welfare state retrenchment and chauvinism and show how economic and conditional integration policies for immigrants based on a logic of incentives fall within this overall trend. After describing the data, we give a brief introduction to the Norwegian case. In the empirical analysis, we show how the Norwegian parliament introduced extensive economic relief packages and temporary regulations to mitigate the negative financial consequences for the individuals affected by COVID restrictions and the economic recession. A cross-partisan parliament argued the individuals were not to blame for their unfortunate circumstances, and that the welfare state had to take the larger share of the burden. In the political assessment of economic requirements for immigrants, however, similar arguments were not evident. The Norwegian government actively chose not to provide temporary exceptions to economic requirements for permanent residence or family reunification. It was explicitly stated that there was no reason to deviate (temporarily) from general requirements during the pandemic, referring to the potential cost and strain on the Norwegian welfare state if immigrants were not self-sufficient. Lastly, we argue that the political rationale of incentives underlying the economic integration requirements falls short during economic recessions and discuss how the decision not to make exemptions during the pandemic may illustrate new forms of welfare state chauvinism.

Incentives and conditional requirements for welfare state support

Norway, like the other Nordic countries, developed a comprehensive welfare state in the post-war period, which is characterized by universalistic principles and a high level of public service provision. Since the 1980s, there has been a trend toward retrenchment in line with the overall objective of ‘workfare’ (arbeidslinja). The ‘workfare’ policy holds that it should be more attractive to work rather than to receive benefits, seeing the welfare state partly as a kind of incentive structure aimed at ensuring high employment. Concrete policy changes include means-testing of welfare benefits and activity requirements for unemployed persons (Gubrium et al., 2014), limited access to certain economic benefits and an increased emphasis on the duties of citizens vis-à-vis the state as incentives to work (Breidahl, 2017). The rationale behind these changes has been to create incentives for higher labour-market participation and thereby reduce public expenses, as a response to concerns about the fiscal sustainability of the welfare state (Eggebø et al., 2023).

Similar logics of incentives and conditionality appear in integration policies for immigrants. Immigration has frequently been portrayed as a challenge to the welfare state's fiscal sustainability in public debates, where low unemployment rates among refugees and family migrants are portrayed as a potential threat (Jurado and Brochmann, 2012). During the 2000s, many European states introduced conditional integration requirements to regulate family reunification and access to secure legal status and citizenship, a trend that intensified during the 2015 ‘refugee crisis’ (Hernes, 2018). Common requirements include language and citizenship tests (Baldi and Goodman, 2015). European countries have also introduced conditional economic requirements, whereby an immigrant must have been in employment or self-sufficient for x years before applying for permanent residence or family reunification (Eggebø et al., 2023; Stadlmair, 2018). While scholars have argued that such policies operate on a 'selective logic that distinguishes between ‘desired’ vs. ‘undesired’ migrants' (Keskinen et al., 2016, Staver, 2021), the stated aim is usually that, for example, access to family reunification could be used as an incentive for labour-market participation. This incentive logic runs counter to a previously more common conception of secure legal status and access to family reunification as preconditions for successful integration. In the incentive logic, immigrants earn rights by demonstrating financial independence and deservingness, whereas in the precondition logic, the state provides rights so that immigrants may achieve full participation (Borevi, 2014).

A central concept in research at the intersection of migration and the welfare state is welfare chauvinism, which emerged in studies of right-wing populist parties’ 'use of the welfare state and welfare benefits to draw the distinction between ‘us’ and ‘them’' (Keskinen et al., 2016, 322). The welfare chauvinism literature has expanded with research on exploring the question of whether governments grant immigrants the same social rights as native citizens. Jørgensen and Thomsen define welfare chauvinism as an ‘unwillingness to grant the same entitlements to all people in a society’, focusing on the specific example of Denmark's separate and lower welfare benefit for newcomers (Jørgensen and Thomsen 2016).

The concept of welfare chauvinism has also been used somewhat more broadly in survey research which examines 'how ordinary people view who is deserving of welfare provisions and under what conditions they perceive migrants to have rights to benefits' (Keskinen et al., 2016, 322). Deservingness studies find that people tend to hold such mental hierarchies, and that perceived control is one of the main criteria for being seen as deserving of welfare state support (van Oorschot, 2000; van Oorschot and Roosma, 2017). For example, studies have found that although unemployed people are often a stigmatized group, people support unemployment benefits more in times of high unemployment, because people then place less blame on unemployed people themselves for their situation (Fridberg and Ploug, 2000; Jeene et al., 2014).

This question of perceived control can be directly tied back to the logic of incentivizing policies. An underlying premise for all such incentivizing policies is that individuals have the possibility to influence their own situation, e.g., to find employment. The (implicit) assumption is that the cause(s) of unemployment are individual, and something they have the possibility to affect by altering their behaviour (Heggebø, 2021). The introduction of conditional economic integration requirements in Norway in 2016, exemplify this line of argument:

It is of utmost importance that immigration regulations encourage people to take up education and apply for work rather than passively receiving welfare benefits (Ministry of Justice and Public Security, 2015: 80–82).

Here, the suggestion is that immigrants’ lower labour market participation and higher uptake of benefits is due to their not trying hard enough, or not having a strong enough incentive.

Thus, both unemployed people and immigrants have increasingly been subject to policies with a similar political rationale, emphasising restrictive and conditional policies as both 1) an incentive and 2) a necessity to ensure the survival of the welfare state (Breidahl, 2017). However, this incentive logic has been criticised in both political and academic debates because it falls short if the individual does not have the possibility to influence their situation. If their unemployment is caused by external factors such as discrimination by employers, or by health issues, the premise for the policy falls short (Heggebø, 2021).

Higher welfare state support and exceptions to existing restrictive policies may be legitimised in times of crisis (Fridberg and Ploug, 2000; Jeene et al., 2014). For those who normally support incentivizing policies, an economic crisis would be a classic example of an external factor that could legitimise introducing exceptions to restrictive and conditional policies. But what happened to the incentivizing policies for unemployed persons and immigrants during the pandemic? Here, it is relevant to not only study whether immigrants and unemployed persons got the same entitlements and programs, but also whether they got the same exceptions due to changes in external factors. Who were perceived as deserving of exceptions in times of crisis?

Methods and data

We analyse the policy processes leading up to (temporary) regulations and economic relief packages related to a) unemployment-related benefits and b) economic integration requirements for immigrants. We include processes from March 2020 to February 2022, when Norway lifted almost all COVID- restrictions. For the policy processes leading to relief packages and regulations related to unemployment, we analyse publicly available documents including governmental policy propositions and announcements, and the transcripts of the related parliamentary debates.

As will be shown, the Norwegian government did not propose exemptions for immigrants from the economic requirements for permanent residence or family reunification. Consequently, there was no formal public policy process with accompanying policy documents or parliamentary debates to analyse. This is, then, a study of a non-decision, or a decision to refrain from doing something. In order to trace how this ‘non-decision’ was made, we located internal documents related to this issue between the Directorate of Immigration (UDI) and the Ministry of Justice and Public Security in their public journal, based on a UDI representative mentioning a specific letter during a debate we attended in spring 2021. Through several Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests directed to both the Ministry and Directorate, we were granted partial access to these documents. They revealed that there had been an internal process within the Ministry and in dialogue with the Directorate concerning potential exemptions from economic integration requirements for immigrants. These documents provided important insights into the policy process. However, as we were only granted partial access, the documents may present a partial picture. To supplement these documents and avoid misinterpreting the process, we conducted three interviews with bureaucrats involved in the internal process in the Ministry of Justice and Public Security, the Ministry of Employment and Inclusion, and the UDI. Additionally, we found that the topic of potential exemptions from the economic integration requirements was brought up in a public consultation concerning other residence requirements for immigrants and once during parliamentary question hour, providing additional information about the rationale for not introducing exceptions.

Through an argumentation analysis (Bergström and Boréus, 2005), we analyse the rationale behind the decisions to introduce, or not to introduce, (temporary) exceptions to previous unemployment and integration policies during the crisis. We identify the problem definitions, premises, and logic of consequence for (not) introducing exceptions to restrictive policies in times of crisis.

The Norwegian context: Economic integration requirements and the financial situation before the COVID-19 pandemic

With respect to conditional integration policies, Norway has often been described in a Nordic context as being ‘between’ Danish restrictive policy and Swedish traditionally liberal policies (Hernes, 2018). Norway has, however, introduced economic requirements for both family reunification and permanent residence. Since the 1980s, sponsors for family immigration have been required to document sufficient means of subsistence. While large groups were exempted from this rule, it was significantly raised and expanded to almost all sponsors in 2008. Only recently arrived refugees and family members of EEA nationals are fully exempt today. The income requirement for family reunification holds that the reference person residing in Norway must 1) document adequate income the past year (based on tax returns), 2) document adequate expected income for the current/future year, and 3) should not have received means-tested welfare benefits. The required income, which is indexed annually, is approximately EUR 25,000 (NOK 300 988) in 2023.

After the large influx of refugees in 2015, Norway also introduced a new income requirement for permanent residence: only immigrants who make more than approximately EUR 24,000 per year (NOK 278,693 in 2023, indexed annually), and who have not received means-tested social assistance during the past 12 months, qualify for permanent residence. This requirement is based on the individual's tax return, meaning it is not sufficient for the applicant to be supported by a family member (e.g., spouse).

When the pandemic hit, Norway was in a comparatively good fiscal position to respond to the crisis, with budget surpluses and low baseline unemployment (Greve et al., 2021). At the start of the pandemic, Norway had a centre-right government, while a centre-left government took office after the 2021 election. As both these governments were minority governments, they had to seek parliamentary support for regulatory and financial changes during the pandemic. However, most of the changes made during this period were subject to large cross-partisan compromises, in line with the Norwegian ‘tradition’ of seeking such compromises during times of crisis (Hernes, 2018).

Policy (non-)responses to mitigate negative consequences during the pandemic

The ‘coronavirus packages’: The welfare state steps in

As a response to the arrival of the coronavirus in Norway, on 12 March 2020, the Norwegian centre-right government introduced what they called the ‘strongest and most intrusive measures we have seen in Norway during peacetime’ (Prime Minister's Office, 2020). These measures included strict social distancing rules and lockdowns of businesses and social services. The financial consequences of these lockdowns – both at a societal and individual level – were addressed the very next day, with the government declaring that they would implement financial and regulatory emergency measures within a few days.

Over the following days, a large majority of the political parties in the Norwegian parliament negotiated and agreed on the first of several ‘corona packages’. The first major package, which included temporary regulatory changes and supporting financial compensation, was announced on 20 March. The united message from a cross-partisan majority was that the welfare state and government would take a large share of the burden and provide for the people in this difficult situation. As the leader of the Centre Party – Trygve Slagsvold Vedum (2020) – said in the parliamentary debate:

What is good about Norway, the good thing about the Norwegian political system, is that when crises strike, we work together, and we work together across party lines. We help each other, and we work together as a society and community.

As many societal functions and businesses were forced to lock down temporarily, the politicians introduced several measures to ease the consequences for both the affected businesses and their employees. New temporary rules concerning furloughs, unemployment benefits and sick pay were introduced. For example, furloughed workers would receive their full salary for the first 20 days, compared to previous rules where they received no salary the first three days and then only a reduced salary. Another adjustment was that the level of benefits for furloughs and unemployed people after this period were raised, particularly for those with lower incomes. In August, the total number of weeks a person could be furloughed was raised from 26 to 52 weeks.

Similarly, regulations for self-employed persons and freelancers were altered. For example, freelancers and self-employed persons would now receive sick pay from the fourth day compared to day 17 according to previous rules. Additionally, self-employed people usually had to use their own funds before they were entitled to social benefits, but exceptions were made to this rule, which gave self-employed persons easier access to social benefits. In April 2020, the government implemented further measures that ensured a minimum salary for the self-employed and freelancers if they became unemployed. These exceptions to ordinary rules were justified in the parliamentary debate by highlighting that the ‘victims’ were blameless: ‘For the self-employed, who are completely innocent in this situation, who lose their income base from one day to the next, we have not previously had any such income security scheme.’ [our emphasis] (Vedum, 2020).

From the beginning of the pandemic in 2020 – over the following two years and across governments – several politicians also emphasised that vulnerable groups should get extra assistance, as they are often particularly affected by such financial crises. Measures were introduced targeting additional groups that were not eligible for support through the general regulations, e.g., apprentices in vocational education, students and people with part-time jobs or low income. In the first parliamentary debate in March 2020, Leader of the Socialist Left party, Audun Lysbakken (2020), emphasised that:

A unified effort [dugnad] is not a unified effort if the burden is not fairly distributed, and there would be a lack of unified effort if those with the smallest or most uncertain incomes were to take the toughest blow. Workers should not pay the price for the crisis. We now have an agreement that distributes the burden more fairly.

The Conservative Minister for Research and Education, Henrik Asheim stated in a press release when introducing new measures to ensure students’ financial situation in April 2020:

‘I have previously said that we work to ensure that no one falls between the cracks. Therefore, I am very happy that the government has landed on a scheme to help students who have ended up in a financially difficult situation.’ (Ministry of Research and Education, 2020).

These measures directed at vulnerable groups were prolonged during the pandemic to ‘secure more social justice’, as emphasized by Labour Party Minister of Employment and Inclusion Hadja Tajik (Ministry of Employment and Inclusion, 2022).

During 2020–2022, Norway experienced waves of infection that tested the capacity of the health services. Norway retracted and reintroduced temporary local and national restrictions for social distancing up until March 2022, when almost all restrictions were lifted. Throughout this two-year period, the different governments continuously extended the temporary regulations, easing requirements for businesses and unemployed people. As the Conservative Minister of Finance – Jan Tore Sanner – stated in January 2021:

We will have financial measures as long as the crisis lasts, but it is important that the measures are adapted to the infection situation. We are still in the middle of the crisis and must continue to provide security and predictability to those affected financially. (Ministry of Finance, 2021)

Analysing the politicians’ argumentation in the parliamentary debates revealed the underlying premise that this was an ‘extraordinary situation’ (Jensen 2020), which could legitimise unprecedented measures. It was also stressed that people were affected by this situation through no fault of their own. Liberal MP Terje Breivik (2020) also emphasised this point:

Many people are now unsure of how they will manage everything. How will we get the bills paid this month and in the future? What will happen to my workplace and my kids’ future? These questions may be especially pressing for the self-employed (…). They probably feel more insecure about their investment than ever, and the blame is not theirs [our emphasis].

Another premise was that the regulations and financial measures would be temporary, to get by in this extraordinary situation. Based on these premises, the overall narrative, throughout the two-year period and across governments and partisan lines, was that the welfare state had to step up and ease the burden on businesses and ordinary people, irrespective of the financial cost. This point is illustrated by leader of the Centre Party Trygve Slagsvold Vedum (2020):

The two measures we are taking when it comes to sickness and care benefits are enormously expensive. But we have chosen, across party lines, that we, as a community, should carry the burden, instead of individuals, single families and companies. This is the strength of Norway as a nation state; this is the strength of our community.

No exemptions from economic integration requirements for immigrants

In the integration field, early COVID-19 measures were aimed primarily at newly arrived refugees participating in the introduction programme. Language classes and job placements were cancelled or scaled down, but refugees were required to attend the programme full-time in order to receive the ‘integration benefit’. Rapid amendments were made during March 2020 to ensure that refugees could still receive the introduction benefit even though corona restrictions partly hindered programme participation. By April 2020, however, more substantive policy changes were underway. The new temporary legislation opened up for extension of the introduction programme and Norwegian language training, and career counselling. Nevertheless, in addition to being delimited to a narrow target group (newly arrived refugees and their family members), these measures were short-term in nature. Staff working with refugees during this period expressed concerns about the long-term effects of the pandemic for immigrants, e.g., as a result of interrupted job placements and poorer language acquisition (Hernes et al., 2022).

The UDI identifies a problem

In April 2020, the UDI contacted the Ministry of Justice and Public Security to notify them of a possible need for amendments to the Immigration Act and Regulations to respond to the pandemic. They highlighted three separate issues, potentially affecting all non-EEA immigrants in Norway. First, the Directorate noted that travel restrictions could leave people stranded abroad for so long that they would either lose their permanent residence permit or fail the presence test. They suggested that the rules concerning both granting and loss of such permits should be amended, to ensure that inability to return did not have a detrimental impact. Second, the UDI pointed to the income threshold for permanent residence. While unemployment benefits or furlough pay counted toward the minimum income, such benefits were paid at lower rates than the recipients’ prior salaries. This could lead to people failing to qualify for permanent residence due to pandemic furloughs and unemployment, because potential applicants would not meet the required income threshold anymore. They did not propose amendments, as it was unclear how long pandemic restrictions would be in place. Finally, they made similar observations concerning the income requirement for family reunification. Sponsors must demonstrate a certain level of income both the year preceding the application and the current year, and unemployment benefits do not count towards the current income threshold (although they count as past income). They argued that exemptions should be made for people who fulfilled the income requirement when they filed the application. The letter ended with a reflection on the possible long-term consequences of high unemployment for people's ability to obtain family reunification, saying that ‘how significant the consequences must be assessed in the longer term, but we wish to make the Ministry aware of the situation’. The letter suggests that the Directorate's understanding of the problem was that the pandemic would lead to immigrants, through no fault of their own, losing their status or not qualifying for certain immigration permits.

The ministry responds

In October 2020, six months after the letter from the UDI, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security sent a proposal to make temporary amendments to the Immigration Regulations for public consultation, addressing only the first of the three concerns raised by the UDI. They appeared to agree that permanent residents should not lose their status if they were physically unable to return from abroad, nor should people fail the presence requirement for permanent residence for the same reason. The concerns raised pertaining to income rules, were not included in the consultations. Like most consultations during the pandemic, it had a short deadline and received few responses. Three of the main NGOs did, however, respond, and the Norwegian Organisation for Asylum Seekers (NOAS), included an additional section in their letter where they noted that they could not understand why an exemption from the income rules had not been proposed. As NOAS noted, the Ministry's reasoning concerning conditions not being fulfilled through no fault of the person could also apply to the economic integration requirements. As they argue, ‘if the person, due to COVID measures, loses their job, income or is forced to seek social assistance, this could entail that the self-sufficiency requirement is not fulfilled’. NOAS’ suggestion was not taken up, and indeed the entire proposal was shelved.

Interestingly, only a week prior to issuing this public consultation, our FOIA requests show that the Ministry had considered making the very exemption NOAS requested. On 6 October 2020, the Ministry sent a letter to the UDI referring to a proposed instruction to make exemptions from the self-sufficiency requirement which they had, according to the letter, submitted to the UDI for comment in July 2020:

Following renewed consideration, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security has concluded that it is not desirable to make exemptions from the income requirement in accordance with the Immigration Regulations Section 10-11 for persons with income loss relating to the outbreak of COVID-19. [emphasis in original]

This decision to not make exemptions was made when Norway was a few weeks into its second wave of infections in autumn 2020, and local pandemic measures had already been reintroduced in Oslo. The letter does not go into why they consider it ‘not desirable’. Some clues may, however, be found in later communication. In late 2021, following a high-profile case involving an American entrepreneur who lost his residence permit due to reduced income during the pandemic, a representative of the Liberal Party asked the new Minister of Justice and Social Security, Emilie Mehl, (representing the Centre Party, elected in September 2021) ‘what measures the Minister will take in order to give the UDI […] more flexibility in the interpretation of the income requirement during the COVID pandemic’. The Minister responded that:

The purpose of the income requirement is, as is well known, that foreigners who come to Norway should as a main rule be self-sufficient and not become a strain on the Norwegian welfare society. This is a basic principle which there is broad political agreement on […] Any exemptions from the income requirement must be considered in light of the cost to society of a foreigner not achieving sufficient income after the pandemic and needing support from the state. […] The government has not found reason to deviate from the main rule of the income requirement for self-employed persons so far during the pandemic. Neither did the Solberg government. [our emphasis] (Mehl, 2021)

While this response concerned labour migrants specifically, it is notable that the Minister used the term ‘foreigners who come to Norway’, implying broader application. She also emphasised cross-party agreement and continuity of policy orientation with her predecessors, when stating that they had not found any reason to make temporary exemptions from the income requirement during the pandemic. This suggests at least a form of welfare chauvinism at work: however exceptional the circumstances, the welfare state would not step up for immigrants who had not yet fully become ‘insiders’ by complying with the conditions laid out.

While one might argue that labour migrants would be the least likely beneficiaries of such support, it is notable that very similar arguments were made concerning the income requirement for family reunification. During the interview with the Ministry representative, s/he read (out loud) a written reply from the Ministry to an individual concerning these rules. In the letter, the Ministry refers to considerations behind the rules:

It is uncertain how long the current situation with layoffs and lost income resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic will last and what long-term consequences it will have for applications and family immigration. Access to family immigration is of great welfare importance. It can be seen as an intrusive measure that the application is refused due to the income requirement no longer being met when the cause is COVID-19. On the other hand, any exceptions must be assessed against the societal cost if many of the reference persons do not return to work after the pandemic and the family have to be supported by the public. We have no assurance that all the reference persons who have been laid off or lost their income will return to work. It will have negative consequences both financially and in terms of integration if the person who was left permanently out of working life is allowed to bring family members to Norway. Against this background, the government has chosen not to make exceptions to the income requirement for people who have been made redundant or have lost their income due to the pandemic.

In the Ministry's letter, it is acknowledged that it may be ‘seen as an intrusive measure’ if the individual does not meet the income requirement when the cause is COVID-19. Nonetheless, the cost for the welfare state of potential long-term unemployment caused by the pandemic is highlighted as a reason not to make exceptions. The interviewee continues by clearly implying that this decision came from the political leadership.

When comparing the rationales for introducing temporary exceptions and relief packages for unemployed people and for not introducing temporary exceptions to economic integration requirements, there is a striking difference. Both explicitly highlight the premise that individuals are unemployed – or in an extraordinary financial situation – through no fault of their own, but as a consequence of the lockdowns during the pandemic. Thereby, the politicians acknowledge that both groups lack ‘control’ over their situation, which suggests they could be seen as ‘deserving’ public support (van Oorschot, 2000; van Oorschot and Roosma, 2017). However, while this premise was used to legitimise exceptions and financial measures aimed the general population who became unemployed, a similar rationale was not evident for immigrants concerning economic integration requirements. Instead of emphasising how the welfare state should step up for the individuals, the political rationale for not making temporary exemptions from the economic integration requirements was reversed: the rationale for not introducing exemptions was that individuals potentially could have negative economic consequences for the welfare state.

Our analysis indicates cross-partisan agreement on not making exceptions for the economic integration requirements, as this view was expressed by two Ministers from different sides of the aisle. However, a general challenge when there is not a public policy process to study, it is not clear exactly how deep the agreement runs across the political spectrum. The fact that there has not been a public policy process may have suppressed potential critique and opposition.

What are the potential implications?

This article studies a decision not to make exceptions from the existing requirements, which poses a methodological challenge in terms of measuring the potential impact and effects this non-decision have had – and may still have – on immigrants in Norway. For example, it is challenging to analyse how many people refrained from applying for family reunification or permanent residence because of unemployment or because their income dipped below the threshold, or how many people left Norway because they were unable to comply with economic requirements to renew their residence permits. Not enough time has passed to study such potential medium and long-term effects. However, in our analysis, we have documented concerns for negative consequences raised by a variety of actors and in different arenas: 1) cases that reached the media, 2) question hour in parliament, 3) would-be sponsors for family reunification who contacted the Ministry to complain, 4) the UDI's correspondence with the Ministry, and 5) NGO responses in public consultation processes.

The stakes may be high, especially for certain groups. For separated families, family reunification could be severely prolonged. Persons in unhappy or even violent relationships may have been unable to leave their partner, since family migrants’ residence permits are conditional upon the maintenance of the relationship until they achieve permanent residence (which, of course, requires adequate income). Refugees have increasingly been made to understand that their stay in Norway is highly conditional. Since 2016, the Ministry of Justice and Public Security has imposed a policy of compulsory cessation of refugee status in case of improvements in the situation in the country of origin, and attempts have been made to withdraw refugee status from Somali refugees (Brekke et al., 2021). Refugee status may be withdrawn until permanent residence is obtained (Eggebø and Staver, 2020). Any delay in access to permanent residence due to inadequate income would lead refugees to worry not only about employment, but also about the possibility of forced return or loss of residence.

Concluding discussion

We have documented the Norwegian policy responses in the field of unemployment and integration during the pandemic from 2020 to 2022. The empirical analysis shows that the general incentive logic – which has permeated both integration and general unemployment policies in recent years – was only partially abandoned during the pandemic. The politicians explicitly justified (temporary) policies and relief packages aimed at mitigating negative consequences for the general population concerning unemployment. The cross-partisan mantra was that the welfare state would make exceptions and support people during these extraordinary circumstances, justified by the narrative that ‘it's not your fault; it's the pandemic’.

We do not find similar exceptions in the immigration rules. It is important to acknowledge that some policies were introduced to ease the short-term negative consequences for a select group of immigrants (e.g., ‘integration packages’ for refugees). Immigrants who were entitled to unemployment benefits received the same financial assistance as other unemployed persons. Nevertheless, the Norwegian government made an active choice not to make exemptions from the existing economic integration requirements, although it was explicitly acknowledged that the economic situation during the pandemic could have repercussions for their residence permits and access to family reunification. The main argument was that (potential long-term) unemployment for immigrants caused by the economic recession could be a strain on the welfare state. It was deemed irrelevant that it was not their fault.

The stated rationale, that these economic integration requirements are intended to function as incentives, can be questioned (Eggebø et al., 2023). If they are, instead, intended as selection mechanism, it is beside the point whether the structural conditions of the pandemic made it impossible for immigrants to change their behaviour accordingly. Indeed, an extensive literature has noted that integration requirements more often demonstrate a selective effect on immigration, as opposed to positive effects on labour-market integration (Goodman, 2011; Jensen et al., 2019). Broader trends towards selective immigration policies suggest that this is more of a feature than a bug (de Haas et al., 2018; Staver, 2021).

Our analysis suggests that there is a limit to who is seen as ‘deserving’ of help during extraordinary times (Chauvin et al., 2013; Jørgensen and Thomsen, 2016). Although originally legitimized by the same underlying logic of incentivizing the individual, exceptions in times of crisis were only applied to policies addressing the general population, and not the economic integration requirements for immigrants. This finding may exemplify a new kind of welfare state chauvinism during times of crisis, where immigrants are not considered deserving of or entitled to exceptions that may ease their specific negative consequences. Earlier studies of welfare state chauvinist policies have examined active decisions or policies that distinguish between immigrants and the general population (e.g., Jørgensen and Thomsen 2016). As our study shows, welfare chauvinism may, however, also result from non-decisions or failures to make exemptions from existing rules in times of crisis. While active political decisions and new policies are often subject to evaluation and open debate, non-decisions and non-policies could avoid such scrutiny. Although the consequences of a non-decision may be just as severe for the individual affected as an active decision, their effects may be more easily overlooked. Thus, although potentially methodologically challenging, such non-decisions should be the subject of both public and academic scrutiny when debating welfare state chauvinism.

With millions of Ukrainians who seek refuge in European countries as a consequence of the full-scale Russian invasion in February 2022, both the question of who is deserving of exceptions (in times of crisis) and the trend of increased selectivity in immigration and integration policies have risen to the top of the political agenda. Although it is still too early to conclude on European governments’ policy responses in this current situation, analyses of the initial responses show that many European governments have made temporary exceptions in their existing immigration and integration policies, e.g., related to housing, access to integration measures and financial support (Korsrud, 2023). Whether these policies treat Ukrainians more or less favourably than other groups differ. For example, in Norway, some policy changes provide Ukrainian protection seekers with more flexibility and choice compared to other groups of protection seekers (Hernes et al. 2022), while in Sweden, Ukrainians beneficiaries of temporary protection receive lower financial assistance than other beneficiaries of international protection (Berlina 2022). Still, initial analyses indicate a common trend towards more selective policies for different groups of protection seekers, where potential welfare chauvinist policies and questions of perceived deservingness may affect ongoing and future policy developments. The supposedly egalitarian ethos of the Nordic welfare states make these a fruitful context for further study policy development and consequences for different target groups.