Abstract
A substantial body of literature explores the relationship between identity, personality and subjective well-being. However, fewer studies have explicitly focused on moral identity and its distinctive significance. In this article, I examine moral identity through the lens of Aristotelian virtue ethics, which offers several advantages. First, the internalisation of virtues, such as magnanimity, strongly indicates a robust moral identity. Second, for Aristotle, cultivating virtues is directly linked to achieving eudaimonia, or a sense of fulfilment. Thus, the good life and the life of virtues (moral life) are inherently intertwined. Despite this connection, no empirical study has directly linked Aristotelian virtues to life satisfaction or moral judgements. To support the Aristotelian idea that a virtuous life—indicative of a strong moral identity—leads to a sense of fulfilment and flourishing, I have proposed a novel method for measuring virtuous dispositions among individuals and their relationship to life satisfaction.
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