All public- and private-order institutions have strengths and weaknesses when it comes to the enforcement of contracts. In general, the availability of a low-cost legal system and multilateral reputation institutions is found to be more important for the long-term development of a country than bilateral reputation and private enforcement. The efficiency and cost of institutions differ considerably from place to place. The studies have observed that the cost of using private-order institutions is often lower than public-order institutions in underdeveloped economies. While the existing literature has substantially added to our understanding of contract-enforcement institutions, the issue of complementarity among these institutions has only recently received attention. Investigating this issue may considerably enhance our understanding of enforcement institutions and their economic impact.
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