Bolstering Autocracy,Hindering Democracy: Local Stakeholders’ Perspectives on the Effects of EU Migration Policy Externalization in Morocco

Abstract

This article explores how the European Union's (EU) externalization of migration policies affects democratization in Morocco, drawing on the perspectives of local stakeholders, including government officials, civil society actors, and frontline bureaucrats. While the EU frames its partnership with Morocco as grounded in shared and normative values, the findings show that migration (control) priorities often take precedence over democratic reforms. Using a multilevel theoretical framework that combines structural factors (linkage, leverage, and organizational power) with the agency of domestic actors (gatekeeper elites and street-level bureaucrats), the analysis identifies three key dynamics: the prioritization of migration control over democratic progress, the consolidation of Morocco's authoritarian power through the externalization bargain, and the marginalization of civil society and migrants, intensifying their repression and curtailing their capacity to advocate for change. Based on qualitative fieldwork, this study highlights how these policies redistribute resources and power in ways that bolster autocratic structures and hinder democratic reform. By focusing on the lived experiences of local stakeholders, the article sheds light on how the EU's approach to migration can inadvertently undermine democratization in Morocco.

Keywords

democratization Morocco externalization of migration policies local stakeholders‌

Introduction

For over two decades, the European Union (EU) has managed incoming migration by externalizing governance to “countries of origin and transit” (Cobarrubias et al. 2023). This strategy has raised concerns about its effects on regime transformation, particularly in hybrid or autocratic states that often serve as EU migration partners (Akkerman 2018). Research suggests that externalization can bolster elite power, reinforce autocratic structures, and weaken democratic norms in partner states (Demmelhuber 2011; Koch et al. 2018; Andersson and Keen 2019). These outcomes starkly contrast with the EU's stated goals of promoting democracy and human rights abroad (Demmelhuber 2011; Faustini-Torres, 2020).

Despite these insights, significant gaps remain. First, much research overlooks the perspectives of local actors in partner countries, often treating states as monolithic entities and failing to capture internal dynamics (El Qadim 2010, 2015; Lemberg-Pedersen 2017). Scholars increasingly advocate for focusing on local stakeholders, such as gatekeepers, street-level bureaucrats, and civil society actors, who actively shape, contest, and repurpose externalized policies (İçduygu and Üstübici 2014; Gazzotti et al. 2022). Second, little empirical work explores how externalization redistributes power and influences democratization trajectories, particularly in contexts of limited political freedoms (for exceptions, see Stock et al. 2019; Völkel 2020; Faustini-Torres, 2023).

Morocco is examined in this article as a paradigmatic case (El Qadim 2010). Over two decades, Morocco has become a key EU migration partner, managing the second-largest cooperation portfolio among EU neighbors (€384 million, 2015–2022) (European Union 2023). Described as a “laboratory” for EU migration governance (Van Hüllen 2019), this partnership unfolds in a competitive authoritarian context (Szmolka 2010; Hill 2016), where democratization has stalled and autocratization deepens (Freedom House 2024; V-Dem 2022).

This research explores how EU migration policies affect Morocco's democratization, centering the experiences of key stakeholders, including gatekeepers and street-level bureaucrats, to overcome Eurocentric and state-centric biases (Keukeleire and Lecocq 2018; Nicolaidïs and Fisher-Onar 2020). Its increased relevance is embedded in ongoing debates about the need to “reverse the gaze” (Derrider et al. 2020) and “recenter the South in migration studies” (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh 2020). In particular, it relates to the need to acknowledge the complexity of migration governance (Triandafyllidou 2020; Zardo and Wolff 2022) and that “externalization” towards African “countries of origin and transit” does not operate in a vacuum, but rather in complex political and social realities that should be problematized and unpacked (Gazzotti et al. 2022; Natter 2021).

Employing a multilevel framework, the analysis integrates structural factors with domestic agency (Levitsky and Way 2010; Hill 2016; Tolstrup 2013) to explore how externalization intersects with domestic politics, shaping governance, sociopolitical dynamics, and prospects for democratic reform. Grounded in qualitative fieldwork conducted in Morocco, the study adopts a bottom-up approach, drawing on interviews with diverse stakeholders, including social and political actors engaged in EU-Morocco migration governance. Through connecting local insights to theoretical constructs, the analysis provides both empirical and theoretical contributions to understanding the complex interplay between migration governance and democratization.

The article begins by introducing the multilevel analytical framework. After establishing this theoretical foundation, the article outlines the research methodology. The main analytical section presents the case of Morocco, exploring how local stakeholders perceive and experience the effects of externalization on democratization. By highlighting stakeholders’ views and experiences, the article aims to enhance our understanding of the mechanisms shaping policy outcomes in this complex domain.

The Multilevel Dynamics of Democratization

Democratization refers to the transition toward a more democratic political system characterized by representative government, political pluralism, civil liberties, and the rule of law (Dahl 1971; Huntington 1991; Pridham 2000). It involves expanding political rights and freedoms, fostering participation in decision-making, holding free and fair elections, promoting accountable governance, and protecting human rights. Scholars agree that democratization is not a straightforward or linear process; instead, it operates as a continuum between democracy and authoritarianism, varying in degrees rather than fixed stages (Carothers 2002; Lührmann and Lindberg 2019). Outcomes range from successful democratic transitions to setbacks such as autocratization or stagnation, with significant variability across cases, regions, and historical periods (Huntington 1991).

While domestic forces traditionally dominated explanations of democratization, the scholarship has increasingly recognized the importance of international factors (Levitsky and Way 2010; Tolstrup 2013). This theoretical framework synthesizes structural and agency-driven approaches, offering a multilevel perspective that highlights the interaction between systemic pressures and domestic actors in shaping democratization trajectories.

The Structure: Linkage, Leverage, and Organizational Power

Levitsky and Way's (2010) framework identifies three critical variables—linkage, leverage, and organizational power—that explain the varying impacts of Western influence on democratization. Linkage refers to the density of a country's economic, diplomatic, technocratic, social, informational, and civil society-based ties to external actors. High levels of linkage create multiple pathways for influence, shaping the incentives of domestic decision-makers by embedding them in transnational networks. These connections amplify the visibility of regime actions and enhance the effectiveness of external pressure, particularly in contexts where domestic actors are sensitive to global norms or economic dependencies.

Leverage, on the other hand, denotes the capacity of external actors to exert pressure on regimes and the corresponding ability of regimes to resist. Leverage operates through mechanisms such as political conditionality, sanctions, and diplomatic influence. Its effectiveness depends not only on the tools employed by external actors but also on the resilience of domestic regimes. For example, regimes with strong alternative alliances or significant resource independence are often better positioned to withstand external pressure.

When both linkage and leverage are weak, organizational power becomes the decisive factor. Organizational power reflects a regime's internal capacity to maintain control through coercive apparatuses, robust party structures, and economic dominance. This capacity enables regimes to suppress opposition, maintain elite loyalty, and withstand both internal dissent and external pressure. For instance, Morocco's high economic and diplomatic linkage to Western actors is counterbalanced by its strong organizational power. This strength allows the regime to resist democratizing pressures while maintaining internal stability (Hill 2016). Extending Levitsky and Way's framework to North Africa, Hill (2016) demonstrates how variations in linkage, leverage, and organizational power shape distinct political trajectories in Morocco, Algeria, Tunisia, and Mauritania, underscoring the need for context-specific analysis in understanding democratization processes.

The Agents: Gatekeeper Elites and Street-Level Bureaucrats

Structural approaches, while informative, are incomplete without considering the agency of domestic actors. Tolstrup (2013) advances this perspective by integrating the roles of gatekeeper elites and their strategic engagement with external influences. Gatekeeper elites, encompassing ruling elites who control state institutions and opposition elites who lead parties, social movements, and NGOs, mediate the effects of linkage and leverage by shaping relationships with external actors. These elites strategically use external linkages to consolidate political and economic power, influencing the degree to which external leverage is effective.

For instance, ruling elites often exploit international aid or investment to bolster regime stability while selectively restricting the influence of democratic norms. Conversely, opposition elites mobilize transnational networks to challenge authoritarian regimes, as seen in cases where NGOs utilize international human rights frameworks (Tolstrup 2013). This dynamic underscores the inherently political nature of linkage and leverage, revealing how domestic actors actively navigate external influences rather than passively receiving them.

At the grassroots level, street-level bureaucrats play an equally pivotal role by translating macrolevel strategies into local realities. As frontline implementers, these actors (e.g., police officers, border guards, and social workers) operate at the intersection of policy design and citizen interaction, exercising discretion in how policies are enacted (Lipsky 1980). In democratic contexts, their actions are framed by public accountability, institutional checks, and participatory governance, but even within these systems, resource constraints and competing priorities shape their decisions. Maynard-Moody and Musheno (2003) highlight how these actors often prioritize pragmatic solutions over rigid rule enforcement, reflecting the complexities of their operational environments.

In authoritarian regimes, the discretion of street-level bureaucrats is no less significant, though it operates under different constraints. These actors navigate centralized authority, coercion, and limited transparency, adapting policies to local conditions where central directives clash with situational demands (Bersch, Praça & Taylor 2017). For example, Andersson (2014) illustrates how border guards in securitized migration systems adjust enforcement intensity in response to local pressures, while Tsourapas (2019) shows how Egypt deploys street-level bureaucrats in migration control to align with state objectives. These examples underscore how bureaucratic discretion, even within authoritarian systems, enables the flexible implementation of policies that balance state objectives with local exigencies.

EU Migration Policy Externalization and Its Impact on Democratization Dynamics

The multilevel framework of structural variables and domestic agency provides a compelling lens for exploring the intersection between EU migration policy externalization and domestic democratization dynamics. Externalization policies aim to shift migration management responsibilities beyond EU borders (Lemberg-Pedersen 2017), but their domestic effects in partner states remain underexplored. This framework examines how externalization redistributes power and resources among domestic actors, creating asymmetries that influence governance structures and societal relations.

Rather than treating externalization as a unidirectional imposition, this framework emphasizes the agency of domestic actors in shaping, resisting, or repurposing these policies. It highlights the intersection of external and internal forces, capturing democratization trajectories’ fluid and context-dependent nature. Domestic actors—gatekeepers and street-level bureaucrats—play pivotal roles in perceiving, mediating, and reshaping these impacts.

Grounded in this framework, this article takes Morocco as a case study to explore how international pressures and domestic realities converge. By centering local perspectives, it uncovers diverse ways these forces interact to reinforce, challenge, or recalibrate political hierarchies and governance practices. This approach sheds light on how externalization contributes to reshaping Morocco's democratization dynamics, from consolidating state power to marginalizing and repressing civil society and vulnerable groups.

Sources and Methodology

This study employs qualitative methods to explore the multilevel dynamics of EU-Morocco migration governance. Data were collected through extensive fieldwork in Morocco between February and May 2019, supported by complementary desk research. A total of 18 semistructured interviews were conducted with stakeholders actively involved in the EU-Morocco migration governance framework, selected to represent diverse perspectives across different levels of migration policy formulation and implementation (see Supplemental Annexure 1).

The sample included representatives from the Moroccan government, EU officials, and international cooperation agencies, as well as members of international organizations, NGOs, journalists, activists, and migration experts. This diversity ensured a comprehensive view of how the impact of externalization policies is perceived, enacted, and contested. To reflect the framework's focus on both elite-level negotiations and localized implementation, interviews targeted gatekeeper elites, both ruling and opposition actors, and street-level bureaucrats engaged in migration management.

Interviews were primarily conducted in Rabat, the administrative and political center of Morocco, where key decision-makers and organizations are concentrated. To incorporate localized perspectives, additional fieldwork was carried out in Tangier, Oujda, and Nador, key sites along migration routes and borders with Spain. These locations offered insight into how externalization policies are implemented and contested in practice, reflecting the framework's emphasis on multilevel interactions between central directives and local realities.

Given the challenges of conducting research in authoritarian contexts (Tsourapas 2014), the study employed strategies to ensure ethical rigor, including anonymity and confidentiality for all participants (van Liempt and Bilger 2018). To triangulate data and mitigate potential biases, findings from interviews were cross-validated with diverse sources, including reports, official documents, press articles, and academic literature. Participant observation at the 2019 World Border Security Congress in Casablanca complemented the data collection, providing informal interactions with key government representatives, particularly from the Ministry of Interior and security agencies.

The data were analyzed using qualitative content analysis (Schreier 2012), employing a two-step coding process (Saldaña 2013). In the first step, descriptive coding was applied to identify themes related to migration governance dynamics between the EU and Morocco. This was followed by pattern coding (Miles and Huberman 1994), which helped uncover relationships and explanatory patterns emerging from the data. The initial coding scheme was guided by the theoretical framework, focusing on key variables: structural factors (linkage-leverage and organizational power) and domestic actors (gatekeeper elites and street-level bureaucrats). The coding scheme was iteratively refined to remain responsive to the data while ensuring coherence with the theoretical concepts.

While the fieldwork primarily covers a short time period in 2019, the analysis incorporates the broader trajectory of EU-Morocco cooperation since the formal introduction of externalization policies in 1999. Moreover, rather than focusing on individual policies, this research considers externalization as a dynamic process shaped by negotiation and contestation, with particular attention to how domestic actors perceive, interpret, and respond to it.

The Case of Morocco

Context: Migration Governance Externalization Under Competitive Authoritarianism

Morocco plays a central role in the EU's migration governance framework as a country of origin, transit, and increasingly a destination for migrants (de Haas 2016). Its strategic location makes it pivotal to the EU's externalization strategies, where migration is managed at its source. Cooperation between the EU and Morocco reflects multilevel governance, divergent stakeholder priorities, and the constraints of Morocco's competitive authoritarian regime.

Externalization in Morocco is largely security-focused, with close collaboration on border control positioning Morocco as “Europe's gendarme” (Wolff 2014; Wunderlich 2010). While border control dominates, the EU also funds projects addressing migration governance, rights, and root causes, reflecting its normative ambitions (Boswell 2003; Author 2020). However, as Morocco becomes a destination for stranded migrants, its role has grown more complex, shaped by its strategic interests (Gaibazzi et al. 2016; Natter 2014). Far from passive, Morocco actively negotiates within this governance framework.

The prominence of migration in Morocco's political landscape has brought diverse stakeholders into the field. International organizations such as the IOM, UNHCR, and EU delegations, alongside agencies like ENABEL and GIZ, play significant roles in this field. Domestically, agencies like the Directorate General of National Security (DGSN) and the Directorate of Migration and Border Surveillance (DMBS), operating under the Ministry of Interior, are responsible for implementing EU policies. Morocco's civil society sector has also expanded in response to migration challenges, providing services such as healthcare, legal aid, and rights advocacy while monitoring policy implementation (Jacobs 2013; Stock 2020). This growth is partly linked to King Mohammed VI's progressive agenda, fostering civil society involvement in migration-related activities.

EU-Morocco migration cooperation operates within a multilevel governance framework involving stakeholders with often conflicting priorities. However, the authoritarian nature of Morocco's regime makes it unlikely that the goals of civil society or the broader population align with those of the state (Wunderlich 2010). This governance framework persists within Morocco's competitive authoritarian regime. While officially a parliamentary monarchy, most experts describe Morocco as competitive authoritarianism (Szmolka 2010; Hill 2016), a hybrid regime blending democratic elements like elections with entrenched authoritarian practices. Despite an elected parliament and purportedly free elections, power remains concentrated in the ruling elite and the King (Makhzen), who dominate Morocco's political, social, and economic affairs (Feliu and Parejo 2012).

When Mohammed VI ascended to power in 1999, there was widespread hope for political reform, positioning Morocco as a potential model for regional democratic transition (Kausch 2009). The Arab Spring in 2011 prompted constitutional reforms in response to civil society demands, notably the February 20 Movement (M20F). However, experts agree that despite sustained unrest, Morocco remained largely unchanged (Hill 2016). Subsequent protests, such as the Hirak al Rif in 2016 and the 2018 Boycott movement, highlighted persistent issues of unemployment, inequality, corruption, and political stagnation (Bogaert 2018). Scholars often describe Morocco's democratization as a “permanent democratic transition” (Maghraoui 2011) or “stalled democratization” (Cavatorta 2015).

Morocco's limited democratization reflects a combination of domestic and international factors (Hill 2016). While much research focuses on domestic influences, this analysis highlights the impact of external factors, particularly the EU's externalization of migration policies, as perceived by local stakeholders.

Analysis: Perspectives of Local Stakeholders on the Impact of Externalization on Democratization

The following sections examine stakeholders’ perspectives on the externalization of EU migration policies and their impact on Morocco's democratization. The analysis focuses on three interconnected dynamics: the prioritization of migration over democratic reforms, which undermines the EU's leverage for promoting democracy; the externalization bargain, which bolsters Morocco's organizational power and consolidates the regime; and the marginalization and repression of vulnerable groups, including civil society and migrants, weakening their capacity to advocate for democratic change. By centering the voices of local actors, this analysis reveals how externalization is experienced on the ground and its broader connection to Morocco's domestic political realities.

Shifting Priorities and Erosion of Democratic Leverage

This section examines a first theme consistently raised by local stakeholders: the EU's declining leverage over Morocco's democratization as migration priorities overshadow democratic reforms. Stakeholders highlighted three critical dynamics: the dominance of migration as a policy priority, the weakening of democratic conditionality, and contradictions between the EU's stated commitments to democracy and the local effects of its policies.

Migration (Control) as a Dominant Priority

The process of externalization has significantly reshaped the EU-Morocco partnership, with Morocco's role in migration control extending its influence beyond border management (Cassarino 2005; Fernández-Molina and De Larramendi 2020). Stakeholders observe that this interdependence prioritizes migration policies over other aspects of the relationship, particularly democratic reforms.

The EU Delegation views Morocco as a cooperative partner that shares European values and political openness, citing its Advanced Status within the EU Association Agreement and involvement in initiatives like the Mobility Partnership (2013). One official explained, “Migration control is only one part of this cooperation, a new priority, within other important dimensions, which have an important political impact.” However, stakeholders, especially from civil society, argue that migration's dominance has redirected resources and attention, overshadowing commitments to human rights and democratic progress.

Critics assert that the EU prioritizes migration control over fostering democratic values. It emphazis on containing migration and securing Rabat's cooperation leads to securitized policies, ignoring the “root causes” of migration. As one international cooperation agency member noted: “Does the EU care about the democratisation of Morocco? No, the EU only cares about its interests: that migrants stay in their countries; not about saving lives, nor any other kind of policies”.¹ This reflects EU priorities tied to migration and counterterrorism, pressuring Morocco to act as its “gendarme” and keep borders closed. Despite framing its efforts as advancing shared values, a Moroccan government official remarked that the EU often prioritizes short-term security goals over democratic progress.

The EU's hierarchy of interests is evident in migration projects funded under the EU Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF). Of the seven projects implemented in Morocco, only one—Déploiement des Politiques Migratoires au Niveau Régional²—falls under the objective of “improved governance and conflict prevention,” aimed at fostering good governance and addressing human rights violations.³ The remaining six projects focus on “improved migration management,” with goals such as preventing irregular migration and combating human trafficking.⁴ At the regional level, all five projects are dedicated exclusively to migration management.

Financial allocations reveal a stark contrast in priorities. The €27.6 million allocated for projects aimed at migrant integration and improving conditions is overshadowed by the €184.9 million for migration management and border control. These funds primarily support Morocco's state and border control agencies, including investments in training, personnel, and resources. The primary recipients are the Ministry of Interior and security forces, highlighting the EU's focus on containment over broader governance reforms.

Democratic Conditionality Versus Migration Conditionality

A recurring concern among stakeholders is the perceived decline in the EU's use of democratic conditionality. Historically, EU financial and technical assistance was tied to progress in governance and democratic reforms (Lavenex and Schimmelfennig 2009). However, many stakeholders believe this has been supplanted by “migratory conditionality,” where cooperation on border control now takes precedence (Gabrielli 2016). One expert from an international organization observed, “The EU no longer establishes clear links between the funds it provides and Morocco's democratisation process.” According to stakeholders, this shift reflects the EU's increasing reliance on Morocco as a partner for migration management, often prioritizing this cooperation at the expense of its normative commitments to democracy and governance.

Hill (2016) contends that despite Morocco's economic strength, which theoretically enhances its resilience to external pressure, the EU still possesses considerable leverage over the country that it frequently refrains from using. Instead, the EU often praises Morocco and avoids criticism, adhering to a strategy of stabilization (Kausch 2009; Hill 2016). Local stakeholders largely share this view, expressing skepticism about the EU's capacity to compel democratic reforms. One member of an international foundation observed, “The EU's normative approach towards Morocco is not credible.” Civil society representatives view this as a missed opportunity, arguing that the EU's reluctance to press for democratic reforms allows Morocco's ruling elites to leverage their indispensable role in migration management to resist political change, as will be further explored below.

EU Normative Contradictions and Their Local Effects

Finally, stakeholders highlight the EU's lack of credibility and contradictions in exerting pressure on Morocco, focusing on the development of the Moroccan National Strategy on Migration and Asylum (SNIA). Introduced in 2014, the SNIA aimed to adopt a more humane national approach to migration, granting migrants access to public services and replacing the restrictive Law 02/03. However, despite some regularization programs and advancements in migrant rights, the overall process is stalled (Jacobs 2024).

Workers from the Moroccan government point out a potential contradiction between the EU's persistent focus on securitizing migration and Morocco's recent efforts to develop a progressive, human rights-based migration agenda. They underscore that positive aspects of this endeavor risk being overshadowed by repressive measures against sub-Saharan migrants, as underlined in other reports (Jacobs 2024; AMDH 2017), aligning with the EU's need to secure its borders.

A bureaucrat from a government-led human rights agency offered a different perspective on the evolution of local migration policies. She observed, “Before, it was impossible to work on other things that were not related to transit migration. Now, this has changed a bit.” She emphasized that the diversification of migration patterns, where some migrants now choose to settle in Morocco rather than merely transit, has introduced new complexities to the country's migration landscape. These shifts, she noted, demand more comprehensive and adaptable policies, which are often difficult to achieve within the constraints of the securitization framework.

Echoing this view, an official in the migration sector remarked, “Externalisation is mainly concerned with transit migration. We cannot make a policy just for transit migration. It's not possible to distinguish; you have to make a policy for all [migrants].” This comment underscores how the EU's focus on transit migration constrains Morocco's capacity to develop inclusive policies that address the needs of all migrant groups. Expanding on this point, the same official highlighted contradictions in the EU's approach, noting

The construction of a Moroccan Migration Policy is a work in progress. The EU wants to stop migration towards the continent, whether through the integration of migrants in third countries like Morocco or by deploying security apparatus to block them.

Stakeholders explained that while regularizing migrants aligns with the EU's restrictive migration agenda by reducing pressure on Europe's borders, it could also challenge Morocco's ability to control this population, granting them greater freedom of movement within the country. As explained by a migration expert working with an implementing partner:

To approve an asylum and migration law would go against EU objectives of controlling migration, migrants would be free to circulate and stay in Morocco. The dissuasion policies of Moroccan police, of expelling migrants from North to South (a recurrent practice), would not work in this context.

At the macrolevel, the EU Delegation in Morocco acknowledges its limited influence over the implementation of migration policies. While it provides technical and material support for existing initiatives, it faces significant challenges in fostering effective collaboration with local actors. Morocco, on the other hand, takes considerable pride in these migration policies. Framed as a royal mandate, they align closely with the monarchy's priorities to be a regional power and reflect Morocco's commitment to preserving its international reputation. The country frequently underscores its status as the only African nation implementing such progressive policies and highlights its leadership within the African Union as a key component of its global image. However, despite these claims, Morocco continues to act as “Europe's gendarme,” prioritizing border control and migration containment over substantial progress in implementing truly progressive policies.

The political impasse surrounding the implementation of the SNIA highlights the intricate relationships among stakeholders and the significant challenges in enacting meaningful migration and asylum reforms, let alone democratic ones. Most notably, it underscores the proactive role of Moroccan domestic actors, especially ruling elites, in navigating and leveraging these dynamics to their advantage, a theme explored further below.

The Externalization Bargain: Power Dynamics and Organizational Power

This section examines a second key theme identified in the analysis: how migration policies reinforce the Moroccan regime's organizational power while intensifying the interdependence between the EU and Morocco. By strategically leveraging its position as a pivotal partner in migration control, Morocco secures substantial concessions from the EU and consolidates its ruling elites’ domestic power. These dynamics underscore the agency of Moroccan ruling elites, challenging oversimplified narratives of EU dominance and reframing externalization as a complex bargaining process that aligns with the strategic interests of both parties.

Moroccan Leverage in EU Relations

As it has been acknowledged in the literature, Morocco's government is broadly aware of its essential role within the EU's migration governance framework (El Qadim 2010; Zaragoza-Cristiani 2016; Werenfels 2018), employing it as a negotiating tool to secure more favourable deals. Stakeholders argue that ruling elites in the country tend to use migration cooperation as a “bargaining chip” to obtain different kinds of concessions from the EU, such as to improve the country's economy or to help manage other crucial internal and external affairs. As articulated by a Moroccan migration expert, Morocco adeptly employs the “migration dossier” to exert pressure on the EU.

Key demands from Morocco include financial aid, security equipment, and support for its territorial claims and fisheries agreements. An NGO member noted, “If Morocco is satisfied with these issues, then the EU can ensure cooperation on migration control.” Given the EU's desire to maintain its partnership with Morocco in this domain, it frequently acquiesces to the regime's demands.

It is well known that Morocco receives substantial financial aid from the EU. As several interviewees noted: “it's all about money.” For example, the 2023 EU cooperation agreement, worth €624 million, targets green transition, migration (€152 million to address irregular migration), and various reforms (European Commission 2023). Meanwhile, Rabat explicitly requests equipment, capacity building, and technology transfers to strengthen its security forces, citing the significant efforts and budgetary support required to safeguard its borders (Telquel 2018). Informal conversations with Moroccan officials at the Border Security Congress highlighted the regime's heavy investment in security technology, which they described as both costly and essential for managing complex border challenges.

Morocco's leverage extends beyond financial negotiations. Stakeholders pointed to its ability to shape EU positions on geopolitical issues, particularly to pressure the EU on fisheries agreements and garner support for its stance on Western Sahara. They referred to the pivotal 2015 European Union Court of Justice ruling that challenged Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara, which was interpreted as a “stab in the back”, and led to strained relations (see Fernández-Molina and De Larramendi, 2020). In response, Rabat temporarily scaled back migration cooperation and even hinted at opening its borders to pressure the EU on fisheries negotiations. A subsequent favorable resolution in 2018 coincided with reduced migration flows from Morocco to Europe (Frontex Data⁵).

While Morocco exerts pressure through such strategies, it also adopts a cooperative stance when it serves its interests. For instance, by showcasing its effectiveness in curbing irregular migration and dismantling human trafficking networks, Morocco strengthens its standing as a reliable EU partner. As an NGO worker explained, the regime continues to “prove it can secure its borders” even when resources are insufficient, reinforcing its indispensability to EU migration goals.

Government actors echo this sentiment, positioning Morocco as both generous and cooperative actor while expressing dissatisfaction with the perceived imbalance in EU contributions. Khalid Zerouali, Director of the Directorate of Migration and Border Surveillance, articulated this frustration: “Regardless of migration, for us, border security is the responsibility of all countries. Border security is indivisible; all countries must contribute so that the fight against cross-border crime is effective” (El Diario 2019).

Ruling Elites and Organizational Power

Stakeholder accounts emphasize how EU migration policies bolster the regimes’ organizational power and Morocco's ruling elites. King Mohamed VI and the Makhzen occupy a central gatekeeper position within the Moroccan political sphere, dictating the rules of the game and leading most of the country's democratic reforms (Kausch 2009; Feliu and Parejo 2012; Hill 2016). The palace's control over key government ministries like Foreign Affairs, Interior, and Defense, along with the security forces, positions the Makhzen as a crucial player in negotiating and implementing EU external migration policies. Apart from the King himself, the Ministry of Interior is considered the central actor in EU migration policies within Morocco. As stakeholders observed, the same elites who resist democratization domestically also benefit directly from the externalization process. EU-funded security forces, including the Moroccan Auxiliary Forces (MAF), the Directorate General of National Security (DGNS), and the Directorate of Migration and Border Security (DMBS), are the same forces that support the regime's coercive apparatus.

Field perspectives suggest that the externalization process reinforces Morocco's authoritarian tendencies by consolidating its organizational power through two key channels: financial assistance and migration control technology. These concessions, provided through EU cooperation, enhance the regime's coercive state capacity, which underpins its ability to maintain control over the economy, territory, and population. As Hill (2016) highlights, Morocco's security forces, which are large, well-funded, and experienced, operate across the country, including in Western Sahara, conducting both low-intensity operations, such as harassment, intimidation, and persecution of critics, and high-intensity repression during protests and disturbances.

Stakeholders emphasized that these two forms of concessions—financial flows and migration control resources—are particularly problematic as they channel material and political support to Morocco's ruling elites. This not only strengthens their ability to suppress dissent but also entrenches their domestic authority. Below these themes are examined in detail, focusing on how EU support for financial assistance and technology reinforces Morocco's coercive state capacity and organizational power.

Abundant Funds and Limited Accountability

The first theme centers on the substantial financial assistance provided to the Moroccan government and the lack of transparency and accountability surrounding its use. Stakeholders expressed deep concerns about the opacity of EU migration funds, which they fear may reinforce authoritarian tendencies rather than address broader governance or development goals. One NGO advocate critically remarked: “How is the money being spent? The only EU financing without any control is the migration funds, and the EU seems content with that, even if it leads to more deaths in the Mediterranean.” Although strongly worded, this sentiment reflects widespread frustration among civil society actors about the EU's lack of oversight in its financial contributions.

An interviewee from a cooperation agency elaborated on the issue, highlighting the lack of balance and transparency in fund allocation: “The Ministry of Interior receives and controls most of the money allocated for migration.” When asked about accountability, he responded with a laugh: “Transparency? In Morocco?” He went on to explain: “The Ministry of Migration, which could play a crucial role in addressing internal migration issues, receives almost nothing. Whatever is left over, that's what they get.” According to their accounts, the absence of effective oversight raises fears that EU financial flows disproportionately strengthen the regime's coercive apparatus rather than fostering policies aimed at governance reforms or addressing migration's root causes.

This concern is further amplified by Morocco's ongoing issues with corruption. Transparency International's 2023 Corruption Perceptions Index ranks Morocco 97th out of 180 countries, with a score of 38 out of 100.⁶ Civil society workers argue that corruption not only undermines democracy but also risks diverting EU funds toward the entrenchment of authoritarian structures and elite control over the economy. As one civil society representative noted, the lack of accountability exacerbates corruption and empowers the regime's repressive mechanisms, shifting attention and resources from meaningful development initiatives.

However, Moroccan officials offer a different perspective, challenging these critiques and pointing to the scale of demands placed on the country in its role as a key partner in EU migration governance. A government bureaucrat from a migration agency highlighted the complexity of coordinating budgets across multiple ministries, stating: “In Morocco, they don’t have data about the finances; it is very difficult to coordinate the budget, as there are too many ministries involved.” He further emphasized that Morocco remains dissatisfied with the level of EU financial support:

Morocco is ‘pas contente de tout’ with the EU support to stop migration. If the process of externalization continues, Morocco cannot be happy with the situation, but it needs EU money, so it accepts to continue playing the game.

Technology and Equipment: Dual-Use Concerns

The second key theme raised by stakeholders centers on the dual-use potential of EU-provided equipment and technology. While officially intended to support migration control, these resources are perceived as strengthening the Moroccan regime's coercive capacity, often being repurposed to repress both migrants and the broader population. An NGO worker expressed this concern: “They use the money to buy materials and repress the people. Have you seen the material they have and use against protesters?” Another stakeholder specifically pointed to the MAF, a unit under the Ministry of Interior known for its heavy-handed suppression of protests, emphasizing their direct benefit from EU financial and equipment support. This raises alarms that resources allocated for migration management may, in practice, serve as tools to suppress social movements and stifle political dissent.

Civil society actors further highlighted the misuse of surveillance technologies and biometric tools, noting their deployment to monitor activists, track communications, and enhance the regime's ability to control opposition. These concerns are substantiated by an Oxfam report (Uzelac 2020, 7), which indicates that despite official narratives framing these tools as critical to tackling irregular migration, the scale and sophistication of the equipment suggest far broader, multipurpose applications. This dual-use dynamic fuel fears that EU support, while ostensibly targeting migration management, inadvertently empowers authoritarian mechanisms within Morocco, exacerbating domestic repression and contradicting the EU's stated commitments to human rights and democratic governance.

Moreover, stakeholders underscore that advanced surveillance technologies, including digital monitoring tools and biometric systems, are increasingly embedded in Morocco's internal security apparatus. These tools, initially justified for migration control, are seen as strengthening the regime's intricate system of soft and social control (Hill 2016). For instance, Human Rights Watch (2022) reported the widespread use of digital and camera surveillance to monitor, harass, and persecute dissidents, highlighting the regime's expanding technological capacity to suppress opposition.

Concrete examples of EU-funded projects underscore these concerns. For instance, the Border Management Programme for the Maghreb (BMP-Maghreb),⁷ with a budget of €30 million, prioritizes IT infrastructure for digital biometric collection, identification systems, and the acquisition of field surveillance and communication equipment. Similarly, the Support for Integrated Border and Migration Management in Morocco project,⁸ valued at €44 million, includes the planned purchase of 384 vehicles worth €26 million for the DMBS and MAF (Secretaría de Estado de Comunicación, 2019). While framed as critical investments in migration management, stakeholders argue that these resources have the unintended consequence of reinforcing state surveillance and authoritarian control.

Impact on Vulnerable Groups: Marginalization and Repression of Civil Society and Migrants

This section explores a third and final key theme identified in the analysis: the disproportionate impact of externalization policies on vulnerable groups, including Moroccan civil society and migrants. Stakeholders underscore how the prioritization of migration control strengthens the Moroccan regime while marginalizing critical civil society actors and exacerbating human rights abuses against migrants. Two interconnected issues emerged: the disempowerment of civil society and the human rights violations faced by migrants. Both issues reflect not only the symptoms of Morocco's fragile democratization but also significant obstacles to its progress, as externalization policies bolster authoritarian practices and hinder the very actors pushing for reform.

Civil Society Disempowerment: Marginalization and Repression

The literature indicates that civil society actors in Morocco are broadly constrained due to their close affiliation with the regime, including political parties (Hill 2016). Historically, Moroccan civil society organizations (CSOs) have faced significant challenges in promoting democratization due to factors such as depoliticization, co-optation of the associative movement, and a focus on the pragmatic and technical aspects of governance rather than political demands (El Hachimi 2014). Insights from interviews, particularly with frontline civil society workers working, suggest that the externalization of EU migration governance further disempowers an already vulnerable opposition.

Field perspectives indicate that Moroccan CSOs have been systematically excluded from meaningful participation in migration policymaking. Stakeholders argue that externalization processes favor state-aligned actors and international organizations while marginalizing critical voices that advocate for political reforms. As one interviewee succinctly put it, “Civil society in Morocco is generally quite frustrated; it lacks financial backing and support.” He also emphasized the inconsistency of this scenario given the substantial financial resources available and the large number of associations that address the issue.

Stakeholders identify EU funding dynamics as a significant barrier for Moroccan civil society, particularly for smaller, critical NGOs advocating for accountability and reforms. EU migration funds are often channeled to large international organizations such as the IOM or government-approved entities, leaving grassroots organizations excluded. An NGO worker explained that accessing EU funds is particularly challenging for small associations:

It is very tricky to access EU funds; it requires a lot of knowledge and the fulfilment of their requirements, which most small NGOs that work on migration cannot. Most of the funding comes now from the EUTF, and usually big organisations, or those chosen directly by the EU, are the ones that receive the funds.

This exclusion exacerbates the disempowerment of civil society groups that advocate for accountability and reforms. A governmental representative acknowledged the challenge, noting that smaller organizations often struggle to balance their priorities while navigating financial dependence.

Political alignment also determines access to funding, as stakeholders distinguish between government-aligned NGOs and critical, independent organizations. The latter are often excluded from EU partnerships, raising questions about the EU's commitment to supporting genuine civil society engagement. A member of an international foundation criticized this dynamic: “In the EU's discourse, civil society has always been the protagonist, but which actors from civil society are getting involved and receiving funds? Civil society that advocates for changes?” This sentiment was echoed by a worker from a cooperation agency, who described the situation as deeply frustrating for Moroccan associations. According to them, international organizations dominate the funding landscape and leave little for local actors:

Moroccan civil society's participation is very low. Most of the funds go to international organisations, and they don’t leave much behind in Morocco. The associative network here is very frustrating. Migration attracts a lot of money, and everyone is trying to take advantage of it—even NGOs that never worked on migration are now shifting their focus just because that's where the funding is.

Such funding dynamics, stakeholders argue, undermine the autonomy of local NGOs and exclude critical voices that could serve as agents for reform. A governmental representative acknowledged this imbalance, noting that financial dependence often forces organizations to compromise their priorities, while political alignment determines access to partnerships.

In addition to funding exclusion, stakeholders underline the increasing repression and surveillance of civil society organizations, activists, and journalists as a direct consequence of externalization. Since 2011, civil society actors report being under immense pressure, facing harassment, operational restrictions, and state-led interference. These measures, they argue, are intended to stifle dissent, silence critical voices, and conceal the realities of migration control.

A representative from an NGO that previously collaborated with the EU described the deteriorating conditions: “It's not easy for us to work as an organisation—we face ongoing problems due to the situation in the country. Our website was hacked, for example. Democratically speaking, the situation in Morocco has deteriorated.” Another interviewee shared a similar experience, illustrating how restrictive measures extend to financial isolation:

Our NGO cannot function properly. We don’t have access to international funds or cooperation anymore because the government has pressured other countries not to collaborate with us. We’re constantly persecuted by the police. We’ve never been invited to the table by the EU, never consulted—probably because of the strong criticisms we voice.

These testimonies underscore a broader pattern of exclusion, where critical NGOs are systematically sidelined. Organizations that monitor and report human rights abuses—particularly those exposing violence at the borders and managing migration statistics—face the harshest restrictions. Stakeholders argue that Morocco carefully controls these narratives to reinforce its bargaining position with the EU. A worker from an established NGO succinctly explained this strategy: “The government wants to be the only interlocutor with the EU, especially when it comes to statistics. Serious human rights violations are happening at the borders, but they want to conceal them to justify the flow of funds and sophisticated equipment.”

This aligns with observations of Rabat's strategic use of “politics of numbers” (Greenhill 2010), where migration data are carefully managed to bolster its credibility with the EU. By selectively controlling statistics, Morocco justifies the continued influx of EU funds and secures advanced security measures, while simultaneously reinforcing its leverage in negotiations and threats (AMDH 2019).

In response to increasing marginalization, some NGOs have turned to alternative strategies, such as seeking international cooperation or focusing on monitoring and advocacy work to expose abuses. However, stakeholders argue that the cumulative effect of repression is a systematic weakening of one of Morocco's few remaining democratic forces. This dynamic not only exacerbates Morocco's democratic backsliding but also conceals the broader human cost of externalization policies.

Human Rights Abuses and Migrant Vulnerabilities

A central concern raised by stakeholders involves the worsening human rights situation in Morocco, particularly for migrants, as a downstream effect of externalization policies. These policies, while strengthening the regime's coercive capacity, disproportionately target vulnerable groups, exacerbating violence, forced displacements, and systemic neglect. Stakeholders highlight that Morocco's role as Europe's migration gatekeeper has allowed it to leverage increased financial and technical support to enhance its security apparatus while simultaneously repressing both migrants and dissenting voices within society.

Interviewees described escalating incidents of violence in northern Morocco, where migrants are forcibly removed from border regions and relocated to the south in coordinated operations. These interventions intensified during critical EU-Morocco negotiations, such as the 2018 fisheries agreement, leading to mass arrests and expulsions, including minors and pregnant women (GADEM 2018; AMDH 2019).

Civil society actors view these operations as deliberate displays of cooperation designed to reassure the EU of Morocco's commitment to migration control and secure continued funding. A governmental representative justified these actions under Law 02-03, which restricts access to certain regions for individuals lacking residence permits, asserting that they align with national law (El Diario 2019). However, other stakeholders working in the field remain skeptical, arguing that this legal justification conceals the prioritization of EU border interests over Morocco's human rights obligations.

The role of street-level bureaucrats, mainly security forces and local authorities tasked with implementing migration policies, was repeatedly raised by stakeholders. Their discretionary actions are viewed as central to the execution of these measures. Civil society workers argued that the arbitrary enforcement of migration control disproportionately affects migrants and fosters abuse. This includes the practice of “hot refoulements” (summary deportations), which Moroccan authorities frame as “voluntary returns” coordinated with the IOM. Stakeholders contest this narrative, asserting that migrants face coercion and lack genuine choice. Moreover, despite official denials that Morocco operates detention centers, interviewees report the unlawful detention of migrants in police stations, which function as covert holding facilities (AMDH 2019).

Beyond migrants, Morocco's enhanced coercive capacity has had significant repercussions for local populations and opposition elites, particularly in regions like the Rif. Activists and civil society actors described the severe government crackdown during the 2016–2017 Hirak al-Rif protests, where security forces employed violence, mass arrests, and intimidation to suppress dissent. One activist reflected that the political response to these demonstrations underscored the regime's reliance on repressive tactics to stifle opposition: “The quest for more rights was met with more repression.” The protests left many feeling trapped and disillusioned, with one interviewee describing the country as “a prison, not a nation.” This sentiment reflects the broader frustration with systemic governance failures and the lack of political freedoms.

International organizations, including Human Rights Watch and local NGOs, have documented a rising trend of harassment, imprisonment, and surveillance of activists, journalists, and social media influencers critical of the regime (El Hamamouchi 2022). Stakeholders pointed out that Morocco's selective use of advanced surveillance tools, partly funded by the EU, has expanded the regime's ability to monitor dissent and silence opposition voices.

The repression of the Hirak al-Rif movement (2016–2017) was singled out as a specific trigger for migration flows from the Rif region. The significant increase in Moroccan migrants crossing the Western Mediterranean route in 2017 coincided with the political crackdown, persistent unemployment, and the reintroduction of mandatory military service. Some interviewees suggested that Morocco border guards implement a “double border policy”: tacitly allowing dissident Moroccans to emigrate as a safety valve to ease political tensions, while strictly restricting African migrants. This strategy reveals the regime's selective use of migration control to simultaneously placate domestic unrest and align with EU expectations.

Civil society workers expressed frustration at the EU's strategic silence on these human rights violations,⁹ with one interviewee remarking: “Officially the EU doesn’t say anything or react in any way towards this type of violation, or in fact towards any kind of violation against human rights at all perpetrated in Morocco. These matters are way too sensitive for the EU to make a statement or react. They relate to the King, and the EU does not want to jeopardise its relations.”

This silence highlights a critical contradiction in EU-Morocco cooperation: the EU prioritizes short-term stability and migration control, yet undermines its normative commitments to democracy and human rights. As one international foundation member explained, addressing migration drivers requires a broader focus on governance: “Focusing on good governance, reducing corruption, and tackling political crises would better address migration push factors.” According to local actors, externalization policies fail to address the root causes of migration. Instead, these policies exacerbate the very conditions - repression, lack of opportunity, and poor governance - that drive Moroccans to leave their country. This dynamic underscores the ethical and strategic contradictions of EU-Morocco cooperation, where the focus on short-term migration control comes at the cost of long-term human rights and democratic development.

Conclusion

This article explored how local stakeholders perceive and experience the impact of the EU's externalization of migration policies on Morocco's democratization process. By grounding the analysis in a multilevel theoretical framework and drawing on diverse local stakeholder voices—government officials, civil society workers, and activists—it revealed the complex and often contradictory ways that externalization reshapes Morocco's political and governance landscape. Moving beyond one-dimensional interpretations, the study highlighted how migration policies, designed to serve EU priorities, produce ripple effects that bolster authoritarian tendencies, and hinder democratic forces within target states like Morocco.

The findings indicate that externalization influences both structural and agency-based dynamics. At the structural level, it alters power linkages, diminishes EU leverage, and bolsters the organizational capacity of the Moroccan regime, particularly its coercive apparatus. At the agency level, it empowers ruling elites to consolidate control while marginalizing opposition actors, civil society organizations, and vulnerable groups. This redistribution of resources and power reinforces existing hierarchies, entrenching authoritarian resilience and undermining opportunities for democratic reform.

Despite their diverse positions and roles, stakeholders largely converge on one central critique: the EU's externalization agenda prioritizes short-term border control over long-term democratic development. Once a potential source of normative influence, the EU now finds its leverage diminished as Morocco leverages its role as a migration gatekeeper to secure concessions, from financial aid to political recognition. This shift enables the regime to tighten its grip, using EU-provided resources to suppress dissent and silence critical voices, all while perpetuating human rights abuses. Civil society organizations—historically vital forces for reform—find themselves increasingly excluded, underfunded, and repressed. Migrants, meanwhile, endure systemic neglect, violence, and displacement as migration control takes precedence over human rights obligations.

The voices of local stakeholders provide a crucial perspective often overlooked in policy debates. Their insights emphasize the need for more inclusive, context-sensitive approaches that address the realities on the ground. By engaging meaningfully with local actors, policymakers can design migration governance frameworks that balance security objectives with commitments to human rights and democratic progress. Without such recalibration, externalization risks perpetuating the very conditions—political repression, instability and inequality—that drive migration in the first place. A shift toward policies that promote genuine cooperation, accountability, and reform could offer a more sustainable and equitable foundation for EU-Morocco relations, aligning strategic priorities with shared democratic values. Su Policies are more attuned to on-the-ground realities, enhancing their effectiveness and legitimacy.

Supplemental Material

sj-docx-1-mrx-10.1177_01979183251314854 - Supplemental material for Bolstering Autocracy, Hindering Democracy: Local Stakeholders’ Perspectives on the Effects of EU Migration Policy Externalization in Morocco

Supplemental material, sj-docx-1-mrx-10.1177_01979183251314854 for Bolstering Autocracy, Hindering Democracy: Local Stakeholders’ Perspectives on the Effects of EU Migration Policy Externalization in Morocco by Luisa Faustini Torres in International Migration Review

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

I am deeply grateful to the individuals and institutions that supported this research. I thank the peer reviewers for their invaluable feedback, which significantly improved this manuscript. My heartfelt appreciation goes to my Ph.D. director, Ricard Zapata Barrero, and the GRITIM-UPF team for their unwavering support from the beginning of this work. Special thanks are due to the University Mohamed V in Morocco, particularly Professor Mohamed Khachani, for hosting me during fieldwork and to the TransDeM research group for their insightful reviews and contributions during the final stages. I am also immensely grateful to Cathrine Talleraas and Ida Marie Vammen for inviting me to the Special Section and for their meticulous review process and for their invaluable feedback and encouragement. Lastly, my deepest thanks are due to the interviewees, whose testimonies are the heart and soul of this project.

ORCID iD

Luisa Faustini Torres

Special Issue

This manuscript is being submitted as part of the Special Section “Unpacking the rippling effects of European migration governance in Africa,” by Cathrine Talleraas and Ida Marie Savio Vammen.

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

Activity funded by the European Union-NextGenerationEU, Ministry of Universities, and the Recovery, Transformation, and Resilience Plan, through a call from Pompeu Fabra University (Barcelona).

Supplemental material

for this article is available online at https://journals.sagepub.com/home/mrx

Notes

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