From Policy to Reality: Examining the Rippling Effects of Return Migration Governance in Nigeria

Abstract

In the global effort to address irregular migration, leaders from Africa and Europe collaborate to implement policies aimed at enabling the safe return and reintegration of migrants. Nigeria played a vital role as a regional partner in this effort, as highlighted in the 2015 Valletta Summit. However, challenges faced by returnees, including violence, job scarcity, and limited resources, demonstrate that these policies are not without difficulties. This article examines the expanding return migration industry in Nigeria, its connections to EU border policies, and its socioeconomic and political impacts. Through empirical analysis, the study explores the roles of different actors in facilitating return and reintegration processes, including governmental bodies, intermediaries such as the International Organization for Migration and the lesser known German Society for International Cooperation, and local civil society organizations. The analysis reveals the rippling effects of return and reintegration policies, including the establishment of new industries and services, changes in governance and organizational frameworks, and notable economic and spatial transformations. Key issues examined include the influence of corruption, the role of international organizations like the International Organization for Migration, and the experiences of returnees and local civil society groups. The article concludes by calling for the decolonization of migration governance, enhanced transparency and accountability, and the centering of returnees’ voices and perspectives to develop more equitable and responsive interventions.

Introduction

In the wake of the 2015 Valletta Summit, Nigeria emerged as a key regional partner in implementing return and reintegration policies for undocumented migrants (Bisong 2021; Zanker 2023). However, the aftermath of these initiatives revealed a complex web of consequences that extend beyond their immediate objectives. This study explores the expanding return migration industry (RMI) in Nigeria and its connection to the European Union's strategy of exporting European border policies to third-country partners to uncover the multidimensional outcomes of Nigeria's socioeconomic and political landscape.

The analysis of the RMI in Nigeria and its relationship with the European Union (Gammeltoft-Hansen 2011; Lavenex and Wagner 2007) highlights the pivotal distinction between voluntary and forced returns within migration policies. Although this binary framework is central to the management of migration, scholars caution against viewing voluntariness in overly simplistic terms. Rather than a rigid dichotomy, voluntariness in return migration operates on a continuum, influenced by varying levels of pressure, coercion, and constraint (Erdal Bivand and Oeppen 2022).

Existing research predominantly focuses on the European context, but the Nigerian case is particularly important due to Nigeria's significant role as a major source, transit, and destination country for migrants (Abumere and Sanni 2022). This makes it a key site for understanding the broader dynamics of return migration governance and the complexities involved in shaping migration policies in such a multifaceted environment. The RMI in Nigeria is framed as a complex, layered network that incorporates actors at the local, transnational, and international levels, collectively shaping the processes of return migration (Cohen 2021; Van Houte 2022). Such complexity underscores the importance of a nuanced, context-specific approach to analyzing how return migration is governed across different geopolitical landscapes.

This study aims to answer two central questions: (1) What are the rippling effects of the return and reintegration policies in Nigeria? and (2) How do various actors, including nation-states, intermediaries, and civil society organizations (CSOs), interact within the RMI landscape? Regarding the second question, the focus is primarily on the interactions among Nigerian government officials, the International Organization for Migration (IOM), the German Society for International Cooperation (GIZ), and local CSOs. Rippling effects of the RMI refer to the interconnected and unintended consequences extending beyond the immediate objectives of return and reintegration policies (Bøås 2021). The rippling effects are shaped by the complex interplay among governance structures, economic incentives, and sociocultural dynamics that collectively influence return migration patterns and processes.

By analyzing this key factor influencing return migration, the article advances the emerging theoretical understanding of the rippling impacts of externalization and provides deeper insights into migration governance and its broader effects on the political economy of the West African region. The central argument posits that Nigerian migration governance significantly influences spatial, political, economic, and social transformations because of Nigeria's crucial role in regional migration management. The collaboration among states, nonstate actors, and international organizations (IOs) elucidates the complexity of governance structures that underpin the industry.

The remainder of this article is organized as follows: it begins by introducing a theoretical framework, the groundwork for exploring the rippling effects of externalization, followed by an overview of the landscape of return and reintegration in Nigeria and the study methodology. The second section explores the multifaceted layers of the RMI, its influence on governance, and the web of relationships among stakeholders. While primarily focusing on the structural and institutional dynamics shaping the impacts of return and reintegration policies in Nigeria, the study also acknowledges the significant influence of corruption on the migration process (Paasche 2022). Corruption could jeopardize the transparency and trustworthiness of organizations that migrants rely on during their return process, potentially undermining the governance and effectiveness of the entities involved in migration management.

Conceptualizing the RMI and its Rippling Impacts

The migration industry (MI) framework serves as a valuable analytical tool for examining the rippling effects of externalized migration policies in Nigeria. This framework emphasizes the involvement of diverse governmental and nongovernmental actors, from large commercial organizations to smaller civil society networks, who collectively shape the dynamics of return migration (Cranston, Schapendonk, and Spaan 2018; Hernández León 2013; Surak 2018). This multitiered governance structure gives rise to “migration management markets,” where control practices are displaced from destination state borders (Gammeltoft-Hansen and Nyberg Sørensen 2013).

Building on this foundation, the proposed conceptual approach further incorporates the infrastructural elements of migration, such as market-driven transactions that involve information and expertise (Cranston, Schapendonk, and Spaan 2018). This expanded framework conceptualizes the RMI as engaging in the generation, dissemination, and perpetuation of knowledge as a valuable economic asset. This theoretical contribution enhances the understanding of return and reintegration governance, the RMI, and the sociohumanitarian dimensions embedded within the economic fabric of MIs and their associated infrastructure (Cohen, Fogelman, and Lebuhn 2022, 5).

Drawing from Spener’s (2009, 33) metaphorical use of the term “industry,” this article explores stakeholder collaboration in transnational migration and its role in facilitating return management. According to Hagan and Wassink (2020), the successful reintegration of return migrants depends on various factors. Specifically, they suggest that it is not only about migrants’ resource accumulation and readiness to return, as proposed in the classic return migration literature by Cassarino (2004) and Gmelch (1980), but also other factors such as sending state conditions, institutional support, destination family contexts, and postreturn economic opportunities. Thus, the RMI is influenced by governance structures, return motivations, and the socioeconomic impacts on returnees and their home countries.

The rippling effects framework highlights the significance of power imbalances, conflicts of interest, and uneven access to resources among the various stakeholders involved. These dynamics can lead to unintended consequences, often diverging significantly from the original policy objectives and frequently lacking a coherent or fully considered strategy (Ostrand 2024; Weisner et al. 2024). The emerging impacts are widespread, leading to the creation of new industries and services, shifts in governance and organizational frameworks, and significant economic transformations in labor markets and sectoral demands (Ghani and Morgandi 2023). These effects are shaped by the interaction among governance structures, economic incentives, and sociocultural factors, which collectively influence return migration.

This broader perspective underlines the importance of moving beyond state-centric approaches to acknowledge the roles of nonstate actors (Cobarrubias et al. 2023; Faist 2009), including public and commercial entities (Gammeltoft-Hansen 2011). Moreover, it highlights the significance of development aid programs supporting migration control measures (Stock, Üstübici, and Schultz 2019; Welfens and Bonjour 2023) and aims to shed light on the interactions and roles of different stakeholders from “southern” perspectives, including various actors’ roles and governments’ reluctance to engage in cooperation (cf. Gazzotti, Mouthaan, and Natter 2023; Zanker 2023).

This underscores the impact of various state engagement levels, geopolitical factors, and local policies aligned with the European border control goals. In a multilayered migration strategy influenced by numerous actors and institutions with overlapping roles (Fakhoury and Mencütek 2023), external contributors further complicate matters by forming unexpected alliances to allocate resources for border control and migrant return initiatives (Marino, Schapendonk, and Lietaert 2022, 2023). Examining the nature of the return and reintegration processes in Nigeria can elucidate how stakeholder actions shape these distinctions and commonalities within this complex framework.

Within the existing literature on externalization and the MI, this article contributes to the scholarly discourse in two significant ways. First, it critically examines the broader implications of the EU's border policies, focusing on their strategic objectives, funding mechanisms, and national-level cooperation agreements. This analysis acknowledges that externalization efforts are not merely straightforward implementations of policy; they may encounter resistance or be employed by states to strategically recalibrate power relations (El-Qadim 2015; Fakhoury and Mencütek 2023; Paoletti 2010). Furthermore, the broader discourse surrounding the MI underscores the commodification and commercialization of services within the global migration framework (Dadusc and Mudu 2022; Cranston et al. 2020). This article also delves into the roles and interactions of government agencies and IOs, positioning them as intermediary actors in the implementation of EU policies. By analyzing these dynamics, this study reveals the complexities inherent in governance structures and the interplay of various stakeholders. At the microlevel, this research seeks to provide a comprehensive understanding of the experiences and responses of migrants and returnees, particularly through the perspective of returnee associations. This focus on individual narratives enriches the overall analysis, highlighting the human dimension of migration policies and their real-world implications.

Having established the broader context and significance of situating EU externalization policies within the MI, it is now essential to examine the specific landscape of return and reintegration in Nigeria. The following section offers a focused overview, laying the groundwork for the future empirical analysis.

The Return and Reintegration Landscape in Nigeria

Nigeria grapples with diverse challenges, including extreme poverty, illiteracy, terrorism, and governance issues, which contribute to migration flows to Europe and North America (Abumere and Sanni 2022). Despite being among the top five priority nations in the EU's Migration Partnership Framework since 2012, negotiations on readmission have been stalled due to conflicting interests. While the European Union focuses on addressing irregular migration and expediting returns, Nigeria prioritizes establishing legal migration pathways and engaging with its diaspora (Olakpe 2022). This difference in priorities highlights the contrast between the Nigerian authorities’ emphasis on local solutions and EU countries’ preference for immediate returns for irregular migrants (Bisong 2021; Zanker 2023). Despite the absence of commitments to legal migration routes in its 2016 migration partnerships with Nigeria, the strategic use of other policy areas (e.g., development, trade, energy, and security) aims to enhance returns (Arhin-Sam 2019; Olakpe 2022).

Nigeria is a key player in West African migration and is subject to external policy influences. The European Union's externalization of migration policies, particularly through the European Trust Fund for Africa (EUTF), affects Nigeria's migration management and has implications for regional free movement agend as such as those under the Economic Community of West African States (Bisong 2021; Zardo 2020). This external influence can sometimes conflict with regional integration efforts, as seen in the juxtaposition of the European Union’s focus on returns and readmission against Economic Community of West African States' free movement protocol (Diallo 2023).

The EUTF (2015–2021), primarily executed by the IOM in Nigeria, includes the notable €346.9 million EU–IOM Joint Initiative for Migrant Protection and Reintegration, which focused on improving migration governance and ensuring the sustainable reintegration of returning migrants. In collaboration with EU agencies, the IOM, the European Return and Reintegration Network (ERRIN), and European nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), these efforts provide support to both voluntary and forced returnees (Arhin-Sam 2019). However, while collaboration between development actors and assisted return projects is crucial for sustainable return migration and developmental success (OECD 2020), skepticism arises owing to concerns about competing funding priorities, political volatility, and possible mismatches between returnee needs and development agendas (Knoll, Veron, and Maye 2021).

The European Union has employed economic incentives (e.g., the EUTF and the external investment plan) that perpetuate existing inequalities between the European Union and West and North African countries (Alpes 2020; Olakpe 2022). Moreover, despite extensive European Union efforts to boost cooperation between West and North Africa and encourage the return of irregular migrants, actual return rates remain exceedingly low (Figure 1). This can be attributed to the substantial differences in interests between African and European states, logistical and administrative inefficiencies, and failures that impact returns (Lücke et al. 2020).

Figure 1.

Return ratios for Nigeria, Senegal, Gambia, Algeria, Morocco, and Tunisia (2015–2022). Return ratios were calculated by comparing returns to third countries (i.e., outside the European Union) with those ordered to return.

European governments prioritize assisting Nigerian returnees in their reintegration through various projects that offer job training, financial management, and mental health support (IOM 2022). Eligibility for this assistance depends on various factors such as the migrant's departure country, level of cooperation in the return process, and the origin country policies. Nigerian returnees in Europe can access reintegration support from EU member state immigration agencies, the IOM, or the ERRIN, ¹ which assist both voluntary and forced returnees (EASO 2021).

The European Union's significant investment in tackling migration challenges in Nigeria highlights the increasing complexity of the MI, which affects the reintegration of returning migrants and broader migration issues in North, West, and Central Africa. To ensure transparency and maintain legitimacy, EUTF policymakers must secure funding, establish robust monitoring and evaluation practices, and align regional goals by integrating development and immigration policies (Boersma et al. 2022; Welfens and Bonjour 2023).

Meeting the objectives of the European Commission and EU member states while gaining public support and fostering progress in North, West, and Central Africa is critical for addressing these challenges. The EUTF has been replaced by the Neighbourhood, Development, and International Cooperation Instrument budget, which introduced migration-related conditions affecting the EU’s collaborative efforts in migration and development, continuing the EUTF's legacy (Tsourdi, Sayed, and Zardo 2023).

Methodology

This study is based on field research conducted in Nigeria from February 2021 to November 2022, including online and in-person data collection. The data comprise policy documents, Nigeria's national migration policies, and secondary data on Assisted Voluntary Return and Reintegration (AVRR) and forced returns, which were obtained from diverse stakeholders including the government, civil society, the IOM, and the GIZ. Eurostat data were also consulted, although their accuracy and comparability were acknowledged as limited owing to variations in counting methods among EU member states (Zanker 2023).

The primary empirical data for this research comprised 35 semistructured interviews conducted using the snowball method (Hsieh and Shannon 2005). The breakdown of the interviews was as follows: five interviews with the IOM; three with the GIZ; 10 with national government officials in Abuja, Lagos, and Edo States; five with returnee associations; and five with Nigerian CSOs; and two with European-based NGOs working on reintegration projects in Nigeria, which also provided perspective from the European view, adding context to the challenges and opportunities. During fieldwork in Abuja, five additional interviews were conducted with individual returnees. Additionally, ethnographic visits were conducted during fieldwork, including attending vocational training for returnees in Abuja, and continuous interaction with returnee associations was maintained after fieldwork in Nigeria through WhatsApp.

These interviews involved key informants representing various stakeholder groups, including professionals from IOs; government officials; CSOs; and returnee associations in Abuja, Lagos, and Benin; regions in which primary return programs, including forced returns, are being actively implemented (IOM 2022). While this sampling approach offers strengths (e.g., accessing hard-to-reach populations such as those involved in returnee associations and engaging government officials in sensitive topics), it also presents weaknesses. Relying on existing social networks can introduce bias by excluding individuals or perspectives beyond the networks. To mitigate these weaknesses, a number of strategies (e.g., carefully monitoring the sample diversity, actively seeking participants beyond the initial networks, and triangulating findings with other data sources) were employed. These efforts aimed to ensure a comprehensive understanding of the issues under investigation while minimizing the bias introduced by the sampling approach.

Government officials provided invaluable internal perspectives through interviews. These insights reveal the motivations behind policy choices, the challenges faced during policy execution, and the tactics employed for enforcement. The interviews spanned various government levels and involved representatives from relevant ministries, departments, and agencies (MDAs) responsible for return and reintegration policies in Nigeria. Accordingly, this research provides insights into decision-making processes, policy frameworks, and resource distribution strategies.

The interviews with the CSOs focused on migration-related services, which include livelihood assistance, psychosocial counseling, and advocacy for the rights of returnees, with a particular focus on trafficking victims and vulnerable groups. In addition, returnee migrant associations were interviewed to incorporate their voices and experiences and to provide insights into real-life encounters, challenges, and prospects during the reintegration process.

Intermediary actors, including the IOM and the GIZ, brought a global perspective to the discussion. The IOM's expertise lies in implementing AVRRs and providing direct support for returnees. The GIZ's contributions shed light on its collaboration with national actors (particularly the Nigerian government), funding strategies, and sustainable reintegration methods. ERRIN, a coalition of member states and NGOs in certain countries, including Nigeria, was included to gain insights into their collaboration with their Nigerian counterparts and involvement in shaping policies regarding returning and reintegrating individuals.

The transcribed interviews were coded and analyzed using a directed content analysis approach (Hsieh and Shannon 2005). The coding process involved drawing on existing research and original data to ensure a comprehensive examination of the collected information. This method enabled the derivation of evidence-based findings and conclusions.

Power Asymmetries and the Rippling Impacts on Nigeria's Migration Governance

Based on extensive fieldwork and interviews, partnerships significantly influenced migration governance in Nigeria during the 2000s. Notably, the inception of the Standard Operating Procedure on Return, Readmission, and Reintegration (SOP RRR) in 2015 was a direct consequence of the financial backing provided by the IOM, serving as a principal guiding framework for return processes (Utoh-Ezeajugh and Esene 2021). The institutional framework governing migration in Nigeria encompasses both vertical and horizontal networking between the relevant stakeholders, the European Union and its member states, Federal states, local authorities, the IOM, the GIZ, and NGOs/CSOs.

The National Commission for Refugees, Migrants, and Internally Displaced Persons (NCFRMI) oversees and coordinates Nigeria's migration policy, collaborating with all relevant MDAs involved in migration and development (Bisong 2022). Additionally, the NCFRMI and the National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons serve as primary coordinating entities that address issues related to irregular migration, trafficking, return, and reintegration.

Furthermore, thematic groups, such as the Working Group on Return, Readmission, and Reintegration, are instrumental in coordinating activities at the subnational level. However, challenges arise, particularly financial constraints stemming from competition between national and state-level antitrafficking agencies (e.g., the National Agency for the Prohibition of Trafficking in Persons) and state antitrafficking agencies (e.g., those in Edo State). This competition is exacerbated by the fact that funding channels from entities, such as the European Union, primarily favor national level agencies, leading to strained resources at the grassroots level (Olakpe 2022).

The SOP RRR provides guidance for the effective management of the return and reintegration of Nigerian nationals by focusing on three main components: readmission, return, and reintegration. The readmission application process centers on verifying nationality, travel documents, and health and security aspects, whereas the return component seeks to safely and orderly repatriate and transport migrants back to Nigeria (Bisong 2022). As evidenced in an interview where it was stated, “So there is no agreement now. Our focus now is we want to de-emphasise irregular migration” (Interview #1_NCFRMI), despite Nigeria having signed a Common Agenda for Migration and Mobility with the European Union in 2015 (Bisong 2021), negotiations aimed at finalizing a readmission agreement between Nigeria and the European Union have thus far proven “unsuccessful.” In contrast to the European Union's goals, the Nigerian government prioritizes remittances and diaspora investments for national development and legal pathways toward Europe (Zanker 2023).

The Nigerian government holds significant authority in determining the criteria for return eligibility and the support provided to returnees, as well as in negotiating assistance from IOs and donors for return and reintegration. However, according to an interview conducted with the Nigerian CSO Network:

Without a doubt, distributing that money is also connected to their [EU] interests. Today, the focus of the EU on migration is to remove unwanted migrants. These projects were designed only from European perspectives with no involvement of local NGOs. (Interview #8_CSO Network)

National-level actors are marginalized as they are excluded from decision-making processes regarding the allocation of funds for migration management initiatives, highlighting the asymmetry of power wherein external agendas take precedence over local interests and evoke parallels with neocolonial dynamics. This phenomenon reflects the resurgence of colonial geopolitics, portraying it as the emergence of a contemporary European frontier (Andersen, Martin Klatt, and Sandberg 2012). In contrast to the historical imposition of borders by European powers, this frontier spans multiple geographies and is delineated by a range of regulatory frameworks. The MI often perpetuates these structures by creating distinctions between “deserving” and “undeserving” migrants, which can be seen as a continuation of colonial attitudes toward “otherness” and control (Sirriyeh 2020).

The reintegration component includes various services necessary to ensure the successful reintegration of returnees into the existing community in Nigeria. Such services include health care, access to legal assistance, education, employment opportunities, and financial support for housing and subsistence (Arhin-Sam 2019; Bisong 2022). The NCFRMI led to the implementation of the SOP RRR with assistance from a wider network of MDAs and development partners, including the IOM, the ERRIN, and the GIZ. At the local level, CSOs providing return and reintegration services have proliferated and are now competing vigorously for contracts. Additionally, corruption and rivalry among various governmental bodies and tiers obstruct the execution of migration policies aimed at migrant settlement and integration initiatives, thereby fuelling the expansion of the RMI (Bisong 2021; Gammeltoft-Hansen and Nyberg Sørensen 2013).

Recently, Nigeria has faced significant challenges in terms of international aid and development. A key issue is the lack of engagement and benefits for Nigeria from the numerous programs implemented by the European Union and its member states. As stated in an interview:

There are challenges too. .. that so many projects are implemented by the EU and some other support groups. No significant contributions have been made to Nigeria. Most of these programmes were designed by European legal funding bodies. (Interview #3_Miny)

This highlights the difficulties Nigeria has encountered in its return and reintegration efforts. Such discrepancies raise questions about the effectiveness and inclusivity of foreign aid initiatives in Nigeria and underscore concerns about Nigeria's domestic ownership and participation in shaping these policies to address its specific needs and circumstances.

At the national level, the government often inadvertently shapes the conditions that foster the growth of RMI through either action or inaction. For example, a fragile economy or political instability in different regions can increase the demand for reintegration. In Nigeria, even though most people do not internalize this value or approve of it, corruption has become institutionalized in society and has become a part of the culture. In addition to being widely regarded as the norm or standard for acceptable behavior, corrupt practices have been publicly acknowledged by the government for their detrimental effects on the nation's economic and social development (Kempe 2018). Corruption can significantly impact RMI, affecting returnees’ decision making, reintegration, and the overall effectiveness of AVRR. Corruption in the country of origin can create barriers for returnees, influence their social and economic reintegration, and undermine the legitimacy of the RMI. Conversely, the moral implications of corruption can mask the fact that some returnees might benefit from it. For example, a small bribe could facilitate opening a business or obtaining a cheaper price to purchase supplies or services (Paasche 2022).

The next section examines the pivotal role of the IOM, a longstanding industry actor that has significantly influenced policy frameworks related to return and reintegration projects. This symbiotic relationship has been further entrenched through initiatives such as the development of the SOP RRR framework in Nigeria, which was a direct consequence of IOM's financial and technical backing.

The Self-Preserving MI and Its Influence on Return

When evaluating Nigeria's return and reintegration policies, it is vital to consider the unintended consequences and power relations that influence these programs. These endeavors receive primary funding from the European Union (e.g., the EUTF) and member states and are carried out by the IOM. The IOM has strategically positioned itself as the central driver of return and reintegration initiatives in Nigeria as emphasized by its self-perception as “the main actor driving return and reintegration support through developing frameworks and measuring sustainability. This is an important step, and there is a need to focus on development policies” (Interview #3_IOM). For nearly two decades, the IOM has provided crucial assistance to the Nigerian government in managing migration through an agreement that includes capacity building, advisory services, and technical assistance on various migration matters such as migration health, information dissemination, AVRR, and counter-trafficking (IOM 2022).

The IOM had substantial influence on Nigeria’s migration policy, projects, and services, working closely with government counterparts to enhance the nation's capacity for returnee reintegration and access to services (IOM 2022). It has also developed national strategies to assist returnees in reintegrating into their home country. By contrast, ERRIN assists the Nigerian government in managing migration flows, specifically by facilitating the voluntary return of irregular migrants. Unlike the IOM, ERRIN is a member state-driven initiative focused on a collective and European approach to return and reintegration that seeks to bridge the gap between policies and development priorities by streamlining the entire return process, from predeparture arrangements to postarrival support (ICMPD 2021).

A 2022 interview with an NGO representative based in the European Union revealed critical insights into the dynamics of AVRR and strategies for return and reintegration. This interview identified a critical but often overlooked aspect of these initiatives: the existence of an industry whose primary goal is self-preservation.

Behind [these programmes and strategies for return and reintegration] is an industry that aims to preserve itself. Therefore, no monitoring or evaluations were performed. If we were to conduct a study on cash-based and in-kind assistance and the result showed that cash-based assistance is better, the IOM and the GIZ would [protest] and say they would have no jobs anymore [in the sense that providing cash as assistance would not require additional support from IOM or other subcontractors]. (Interview #3_NGO)

Although a collaborative approach can be effective in achieving migration control objectives, it also raises concerns regarding potential conflicts of interest and power dynamics. For example, as the abovementioned interviewee pointed out, the industry's inclination toward self-preservation can hinder impartial evaluations of assistance methods such as cash-based aid. In Africa, IOs often adopt managerial approaches that project political neutrality and technocratic competence, highlighting goals such as development, migrant protection, and good governance (Geiger and Pécoud 2014; Pécoud 2015).

The formal expansion of an industry shapes migration patterns and policy influence, which are closely intertwined with social legitimacy and postcolonial funding dependency (Dellmuth and Tallberg 2015; Gaibazzi 2023; Roos, Trauner, and Adam 2023). The deterioration of local institutions leads to lower levels of public trust, weaker economic security, fewer job opportunities, and lower overall quality of life.

In Nigeria, nonstate entities predominantly orchestrate referral mechanisms and cultivate trust-based connections with individuals who return to the country. However, notable issues arise from the dissemination of initial misinformation and fundamental misunderstandings of certain procedures. As highlighted by a Female Network:

Mistrust emerges due to the initial misinformation and a lack of comprehension concerning the reintegration process. The absence of adequate guidance fosters misconceptions, skewing perceptions regarding the support packages available for returnees. (Interview #9_CSO)

This situation fosters mistrust toward organizations involved in return programs, with migrants often seeing them as complicit in deportations. As noted by Weisner et al. (2024), the IOM's focus on return services tied to global containment strategies undermines its credibility and raises ethical concerns regarding its reintegration efforts. Migrants’ perceptions of the IOM may also have been influenced by the organization's budget fluctuations, high degree of project-based funding, and the temporary nature of available resources (Lebon-McGregor and Micinski 2021).

Relieance on informal networks poses a risk to sustainability. Corruption in an RMI can lead to inefficiencies and erode trust, thereby complicating the return process. Bureaucratic hurdles and complex legal processes often hinder smooth return migration for individuals or companies seeking to expedite papers, bypass regulations, or secure preferential treatment of essential services for return migrants, possibly tarnishing the reputation of AVRR programs (Paasche 2022).

In addition, the industry reproduces and embeds forms of development and migration policy reliant on externally funded institutionalized efforts such as the use of humane migration enforcement practices and individualized programs (Andersson 2014). However, these migration policies often mirror a “top-down” and “one-size-fits-all” approach which frequently fails to match local conditions and realities. Consequently, these initiatives have struggled to provide effective and long-lasting solutions to migration and development challenges.

The IOM relies primarily on external funding in Nigeria, directing resources to local partners such as national institutions, NGOs, and civil society actors. These local entities play an important role in anchoring migration activities within Nigeria and have privileged access to the intended beneficiaries of IOM programs. Despite the uneven power relations and their reliance on the IOM, these local actors assert their positions in the RMI by leveraging their own expertise and capabilities (Bava and Maâ 2022; Maâ 2021). However, reliance on external funding from multiple donors is a clear example of the rippling effects of external migration governance. Competing agendas, timelines, and approaches lead to uncoordinated interventions, creating challenges for long-term reintegration and weakening the overall sustainability of projects. This external influence also shapes local policies, complicating cohesive responses and leaving gaps in support systems for returnees.

As Bradley and Erdilmen (2023) recently discovered, returns are consistently mentioned in many IOM speeches, with references appearing in 33% of its speeches from 2006 to 2021. One such example is the widespread dissemination of humanitarian return assistance between Libya and Nigeria. The IOM portrays these returns from the appalling conditions in Libyan detention centers as a victory for humanitarianism and human rights. However, instead of restricting movement into Europe, the IOM placed key migrant hubs en route well before migrants reached Europe (IOM 2022). The IOM's rhetoric and portrayal of returns, especially in humanitarian settings such as from Libya to Nigeria, may present ethically complicated migration management interventions as commendable and rights-based support. This can blur the line between regulating and protecting people, normalizing interventions with long-term consequences and making it difficult to determine whether there are insufficient monitoring and evaluation processes (Pécoud 2021, 22). Although these initiatives may have short-term success in terms of return numbers, it is often difficult to ascertain their long-term effects on migrant reintegration, partly because of the lack of monitoring and evaluation processes to adequately assess their impact on the lives of returning migrants. The dominance of IOs (e.g., the IOM) supported by external funding primarily from the European Union in shaping return and reintegration initiatives in Nigeria underscores the complex power dynamics and potential conflicts of interest within the MI.

The GIZ is another significant factor in the implementation of EU migration projects in Nigeria. Specifically, the involvement of organizations such as the GIZ in curbing irregular migration through development aid and job creation initiatives raises questions about the implications of such strategies on return migration and reintegration processes. Although efforts to tackle the underlying reasons for irregular migration are well intentioned, they can result in unforeseen effects and affect the experiences of returnees in Nigeria. The next section details the GIZ's strategies and approaches to job creation and explores the implications of its efforts on return migration and reintegration processes in Nigeria.

Emerging Intermediaries in the RMI

The GIZ plays a vital role in Nigeria's return and reintegration process by focusing on bolstering government capacity, mitigating migration-related risks, protecting migrant rights, and facilitating successful returnee reintegration. As an actor within the RMI, GIZ promotes “sustainable reintegration” by stressing the dual significance of individual factors (e.g., voluntariness) and structural factors (e.g., labor market access) in shaping sustainable return conditions (Haase and Honerath 2016).

The Programme Migration for Development, which has operated since 2017, exemplifies the GIZ's active involvement in return counseling and reintegration efforts in Nigeria. Within the Perspektive Heimat project, reintegration scouts play a crucial role in providing labor market information to potential outgoing migrants, those in the process of migration, and prospective migrants. These scouts draw on the expertise of the GIZ's migrant resource centers (MRCs), which function as comprehensive hubs for migration-related information and offer further training and employment opportunities in 10 specific countries of origin. The MRCs are strategically located in Abuja, Lagos, and Benin, where they cater to a diverse range of individuals, including returnees from Germany and other third countries, internally displaced persons, and local populations. Their services encompass comprehensive guidance on social and employment prospects, vocational skills, and essential psychosocial support, all of which aim to enhance returnees’ job prospects (Gerloff 2021).

Importantly, return counseling provided by the GIZ is not only a service for migrants but also a competitive market (Rietig and Günnewig 2020). In this situation, various stakeholders including the GIZ compete to meet the diverse needs of migrants and displaced individuals in Nigeria.

The GIZ offers essential guidance and support for both returning migrants and local communities on matters of migration and reintegration aimed at boosting employability through vocational training and entrepreneurial support. However, unlike the IOM, the GIZ assists all individuals, including returnees and deportees, through “in-kind support” rather than direct financial aid, creating a disparity between the two groups (Interview #2_IOM). While voluntary returnees benefit from informed support, including goods, services, and vocational training, deportees often expect financial assistance, which leads to disappointment. The lack of such provision results in unmet expectations and challenges in their reintegration process.

One interviewee pointed out that the training offered lacks an assessment of labor market demands, hindering the measurement of returnees’ success in specific job sectors. These returnees, often referred to as “jumpers,” frequently switch between training programs, including those offered by IOM, due to the availability of alternative entrepreneurship training options (Interview #2_NGO). Returnees engage in multiple training curricula offered by various local organizations and IOs, acquiring equipment that they either sell to fund daily expenses or use for reintegration projects, due to a lack of coordination among these programs (Bisong 2022).

Thus, the sustainability of migration and reintegration remains an ongoing challenge. As Interview #2 from GIZ notes:

So, one thing that remains a challenge is sustainability. We are doing our best to view the capacities of the state and non-state actors, and you will see that is why, as I mentioned earlier, when working with MRCs, we are trying to learn and integrate. We are adopting an integrated approach, working with the MRC, so that they can take over the services that we will provide later in the future.

According to the statement, ensuring sustainable migration and reintegration remains a persistent challenge. The GIZ recognizes the significance of assessing the capabilities of both state and nonstate actors in addressing this issue; through active cooperation with MRCs, it promotes a cooperative and integrated approach to service delivery.

The GIZ's goal is to empower MRCs to gradually assume responsibility for the services it currently provides, thereby ensuring long-term sustainability and local ownership, which is in line with its approach to addressing the complex challenges of return and reintegration. Additionally, a GIZ representative emphasized the importance of German funding in facilitating Nigerian returns. This approach aligns with the German government's interest in promoting sustainable solutions for migration and fostering social and economic development in Nigeria, as reflected in the following statement:

We are receiving German funds to implement this, supporting returnees and their integration. Germany is committed to returning Nigerians to Nigeria and bolstering their integration, which is of social and economic importance. Furthermore, when the German government makes decisions, it should consider what should be anticipated. While ample funds are available to support the returnees and the project itself, the establishment of sustainable structures is vital. A substantial amount of money has already been invested in this endeavour. (Interview #1_GIZ)

The development actors add another layer of involvement to return policies. Various actors in the voluntary return of migrants can support and validate each other's engagement, contributing to the establishment of norms and standards for state-induced returns while assisting governments in maintaining control over immigrant populations. The return migration process is shaped by the interests of key actors, such as the Nigerian and German governments, who provide resources and influence narratives around return. However, tensions between these actors (Cuttitta 2022) can hinder the effective implementation of reintegration schemes. These conflicts create rippling effects, leading to policy inconsistencies, delays in resource allocation, and fragmented reintegration efforts. Such disruptions can extend beyond the immediate scope, affecting local economies and social cohesion, ultimately undermining both the success of reintegration programs and broader migration strategies.

In addition, the link between migration policies and sectoral strategies, such as job creation, is often unclear, focusing on short-term support such as training and education. External evaluations are not comprehensive, the amount of publicly accessible information is limited, actors must rely on key figures from the Federal Ministry of Economic Cooperation and Development and GIZ homepages, and the explanations provided in response to parliamentary questions are insufficiently detailed (Feneberg 2021). Given the limited opportunities for regular migration to Germany from third countries, counseling is oriented primarily toward exploring “options to stay” in the country of origin (Gerloff 2018).

The Ministry of Labour has partnered with the GIZ to improve employment prospects for locals through job centers, which also assist returnees and the local community. However, recent studies have shown that, contrary to popular belief, these centers are not available for Nigerians seeking employment in Germany. Furthermore, the GIZ's focus on promoting job opportunities within Nigeria, rather than abroad, has raised questions about the organization's ability to effectively support locals in their job search (Olakpe 2022). Indeed, despite the GIZ's experience in driving local employment initiatives, the high unemployment rate in Nigeria is expected to rise to 40.6% owing to demographic changes in 2023, presenting a significant challenge for returnees in search of viable job options (Ngozika, Obi-Ani, and Chukwudi 2020).

The emergence of intermediaries, such as the GIZ, in Nigeria's return and reintegration programs underscores the challenge of ensuring the long-term sustainability of migration and reintegration efforts amid obstacles such as high unemployment rates, limited access to credit for entrepreneurial ventures, and bureaucratic hurdles. This scenario mirrors those of other West African nations where soaring unemployment rates, heightened insecurity, and challenging political and economic landscapes hinder the effective reintegration of returnees (Zanker 2023).

The following section concentrates on local organizations, striving to gain a more profound comprehension of returnees’ perspectives within the local dimension of the RMI and acknowledging that most of these associations are led by individuals who have themselves returned.

CSOs and Returnee Associations at the Grassroots Level

Returnees encounter obstacles due to limited access to credit and high initial expenses when attempting to use their entrepreneurial skills for reintegration (Bisong 2021). As one CSO mentioned, “You need documents, and that can be confusing at times. I know that the IOM can be bureaucratic. IOM has policies, so people have to understand these policies” (Interview #7_CSO). Some returnees struggle to comprehend the bureaucratic requirements or why their documents were rejected, and such a lack of clarity could lead to the suspicion of internal corruption (Strand et al. 2016). Ironically, instead of achieving goals, this situation may foster the emergence of local fixers who know the bureaucracy, forgery of requested documents, and enabling returnees to capitalize on their in-kind support from the IOM or GIZ.

CSOs and returnee associations assume crucial functions by providing guidance, support, and advocacy to returnees. One association explained,

It’s hard for them to return to the community because of how the country is. In addition, funding has decreased, making this difficult for them. Usually, we just give them a basic kit and then they are on their own. But that’s not enough. (Interview #6_Returnee Association)

In this situation, CSOs fill the gaps left by the state's limited response, often framing migration as a noble cause, although their involvement often carries hidden political and economic agendas (Shaidrova 2022). Local actors provide a niche in the returns sector by leveraging their expertise and forging trust-based relationships with communities, even when faced with financial constraints.

The implementation of return and reintegration policies in Nigeria has led to the emergence of associations that actively address the challenges associated with irregular migration. This phenomenon is particularly pronounced in urban centers, such as Lagos and Benin City, where return migration is concentrated, with the IOM reporting a significant increase of approximately 20 new associations registered across Nigeria in the last 10 years.

The role of IOM in facilitating AVRRs is important in contemporary migration management. Despite criticism regarding their voluntariness, these programs are advocated by the IOM as compassionate alternatives to coerced deportation. Through the deployment of visual imagery and narratives aimed at reshaping the “political imaginary of deportation” (Fine and Walters 2021), the organization endeavors to foster a positive perception of return, potentially catalyzing the formation of returnee associations.

One prominent campaign led by the IOM is “Migrants as Messengers,” which seeks to empower young people in West Africa to make informed decisions about migration (IOM 2022). Such initiatives leverage personal experiences to educate communities about the harsh realities of irregular migration, smuggling, and trafficking, with a particular focus on the hardships faced in Libya. This effort is reflected in the active participation of approximately 80 members throughout the country (Interview #1_ReturneeA), indicating a tangible interest among returnees in contributing to advocacy and outreach.

Despite the positive intentions behind these initiatives, the scholarly discourse has raised concerns about the potential perpetuation of neoliberal frameworks that exploit migrant experiences (Cappi and Musarò 2023; Cranston, Schapendonk, and Spaan 2018; Maâ, Van Dessel, and Savio Vammen 2022). This critical assessment underlines the importance of maintaining a balanced approach that addresses structural inequalities while promoting the empowerment of migrants within migration governance frameworks.

Nigerian returnee associations play a crucial role in addressing diverse economic reintegration needs (Shaidrova 2022). They offer essential services, acting as networking hubs for job opportunities, providing access to resources, and facilitating integration into local markets. By encouraging returnees to share their stories, these associations foster a strong sense of community and social capital. One member of such an association stressed the significance of this support system in coping with life's challenges and economic hardships as follows: “Managing the stress in my life and dealing with economic challenges wasn’t easy. But now, having something that allows me to share my story and connect with people is helpful” (Interview #2, Returnee Association 2022).

Returnee associations play a key role in reintegrating individuals by providing resources, financial aid, and emotional support. Operating at the grassroots level, they collaborate with NGOs to empower returnees through skill development, entrepreneurship, and social networking, creating a positive rippling effect that strengthens community building and social capital. However, hierarchies often emerge between associations based on their ties to entities like the IOM or government, influencing access to funding. This alignment with international mandates can limit service diversity and the autonomy of smaller groups, hindering their ability to meet returnees’ specific needs (Olakpe 2022).

Studies on the incorporation of returnees into MIs have focused primarily on their complaints about the hierarchical organization of migration management work (Maâ 2021; Maâ, Van Dessel, and Savio Vammen 2022). As a positive outcome, Shaidrova (2022, 511) found that in Nigeria, joining a return association was a beneficial “way to validate one's identity,” allowing the leaders of these associations to expand their followings, increase their visibility, and become more involved in the political scene in Benin City. Therefore, returnee associations are becoming increasingly important avenues for people to express their ideas, recognize their need for a community, share resources, and build relationships in postmigration circumstances. By forming these associations, returnees can shape their political discourse and achieve their socioeconomic, cultural, and political goals.

While discussing the challenges of funding for NGOs working at the grassroots level, one interviewee underlined the need to reconsider the concept of decolonizing financial support and granting local NGOs the authority to autonomously shape strategies:

One of the challenges that I have had, and I have been pushing a lot back on, is this idea of decolonising funding… and allowing, trusting the NGOs that are on the ground that are doing the work, that we know what we are doing and allows us to allocate and distribute the funds. (Interview #5_CSO)

Decolonizing funding by empowering local NGOs leads to tailored solutions to enhance community ownership and sustainability. In the literature, migration is seen as a form of decolonization granting individuals from historically marginalized regions the right to self-determine and challenge traditional notions of sovereignty. The concept of “decolonizing consciousness” shapes (unauthorized) migrants’ understanding of their journey, highlighting the importance of empowering marginalized communities in policy-making processes (Achiume 2019).

Returnee associations and CSOs are vital in facilitating the reintegration of returnees into Nigerian society. However, these organizations face a dual challenge. On the one hand, they must uphold their ethical duty to aid migrants while safeguarding their independence. On the other hand, they must overcome a range of obstacles, including financial limitations and dependence on external funding and partnerships, which jeopardize their autonomy. This raises questions about the cocreation of policies and services as these organizations often function as service providers within a collaborative model involving both state and nonstate entities (Vaillancourt 2009).

Conclusions and Future Research

The examination of the RMI in Nigeria underscores the complex, far-reaching consequences that extend well beyond the immediate objectives of return and reintegration policies. By tracing the rippling effects of externalized migration control, the analysis reveals how these initiatives not only influence migration flows but also reinforce existing racial hierarchies, postcolonial dependencies, and uneven power relations (Opi 2021; Gammeltoft-Hansen and Nyberg Sørensen 2013).

A key contribution of this work is its nuanced understanding of the multidimensional impacts of the RMI: from the establishment of new industries and services to the transformation of governance frameworks and labor market shifts. This holistic perspective moves decisively beyond the narrow confines of state-centric migration management, highlighting the pivotal roles of diverse stakeholders, including public, private, and civil society actors, in shaping the realities of return migration.

Crucially, the study's focus on Nigeria, a crucial player in West African migration management, provides critical insights that challenge the predominantly Eurocentric lens of existing scholarship. By examining the complex interplay of actors, interests, and incentives within the Nigerian context, the analysis illuminates the ways in which externalized policies are contested, leveraged, and reshaped at the local level.

Looking ahead, this research points to several key avenues for future scholarly inquiry. First and foremost, there is an urgent need to decolonize migration policymaking, empowering local CSOs and returnee associations to autonomously define the priorities and solutions that best serve communities.

Second, transparency and accountability within the RMI must be dramatically improved, rooting out the entrenched corruption that undermines the legitimacy of return and reintegration efforts. The presence of corruption in the MI driven by service demand and power imbalances underscores the need for further research to grasp these complexities as it obstructs decision making, diminishes trust in migration governance, and undermines political legitimacy.

Finally, comparative studies examining the RMI in other key African transit and destination countries could further elucidate the global-local dynamics that shape the consequences of externalized migration management. This cross-contextual approach would enhance scholarly understanding of the variegated ways in which return migration policies are experienced, contested, and reshaped across diverse socioeconomic and political landscapes.

By addressing these critical imperatives, researchers and policymakers can work toward a fundamental rethinking of return migration governance, one that prioritizes the well-being and agency of migrants, rather than the self-interest of the industry.