Generational Perspectives on Homeland-Oriented Diasporic Humanitarianism: Coptic,Assyrian,and Iraqi Christian Charities in the United Kingdom

Abstract

This article explores generational perspectives on homeland-oriented diasporic humanitarianism by minority diasporas. Through a case study of Coptic, Assyrian, and Iraqi Christian charities in the United Kingdom, it compares the motivations for charity-giving of first- and second-generation diaspora members. The first generation has direct life experiences in the homeland, whereas the second generation has indirect knowledge of the ancestral homeland through collective memory. Despite different experiences of the homeland, the article finds that ongoing crises in the homeland serve as trigger events that mobilize both first- and second-generation diaspora members to support members of their community in the Middle East. Generational divergence, however, occurs over the range of charity beneficiaries. The first generation tended to adopt an exclusive approach to humanitarianism by focusing upon homeland-oriented aid solely to Copts, Assyrians, or Iraqi Christians. The second generation, by contrast, was still deeply committed to supporting members of their own community in the Middle East but also maintained an attachment to Egypt or Iraq, as well as to the United Kingdom, that resulted in support for additional causes in the homeland and the United Kingdom. It is the range of recipients of diaspora charity, rather than mobilization to support the community in the homeland, that was impacted by generational differences. The article's findings imply that the second generation of minority diasporas is reshaping diasporic humanitarianism by reacting to their connections with both the homeland and host state when identifying charity beneficiaries.

Keywords

Middle East Christians migration generations faith-based diasporas diaspora humanitarianism

Introduction

By its nature, diasporic humanitarianism primarily focuses upon the needs of the diaspora community, especially those residing in territory recognized by diaspora members as the “homeland” (Werbner 2002; Faist, Fauser, and Reisennauer 2013; Brinkerhoff 2014). A substantial body of literature on diasporic humanitarianism has identified and analyzed the range of activities undertaken by diaspora activists, including disaster relief, development, and advocacy, and focused on political opportunities to organize and lobby in the host state (Brinkerhoff 2008, 2016; Garbin and Godin 2013; Hammond 2013; Akom Ankobrey, Mazzucato and Wagner 2022). More recently, scholars have highlighted that political opportunities in the homeland also impact diasporic activities (Baser 2018; Adamson 2019). The literature on diasporic activism examines groups perceived numerically or in terms of power relations as a minority in the homeland state(s) (Demir 2012; Koinova 2016; Farzana 2017; Baser 2018). This field of research has shown that when governments in the origin country are viewed by connected minority diaspora communities as being inattentive or hostile toward the minority residing in the homeland, diaspora activists feel obliged to step in and assist their community, despite often-limited resources (Farzana 2017; Baser 2018; Schmoller 2020). This aid may be through large, institutionalized organizations but often is provided through what scholars term “grassroots” international non-governmental organizations (Appe and Schnable 2019) or “citizen aid” (Fechter and Schwittay 2019).

Another avenue of diaspora research examines the second generation, particularly its attachment to the homeland (Levitt 2009; Kabir 2014; Huang, Ramshaw and Norman 2016), collective memory (Levitt 2009; O’Neill 2015; Orjuela 2020), return (Waite and Cook 2011; King and Christou 2014; Saey and Skey 2016), and activism (Hess and Korf 2014; O’Neill 2015; Blachnicka-Ciacek 2018). Scholars have also explored generational differences relating to diaspora belonging and attachment to the host state and homeland (Waite and Cook 2011; Baser 2014; Brinkerhoff 2014; Orjuela 2020). This article combines the theme of generational differences in attachment to the homeland and research on minority diasporas through a case study of first- and second-generation perspectives on charities established by Coptic, Assyrian, and Iraqi Christian migrants in the United Kingdom. Its aim is two-fold. First, the article identifies how the organizations created by this diaspora are shaped by members’ experiences of the homeland, whether direct in the case of the first generation or indirect in the case of the second generation. Second, it examines to what extent, if any, perspectives on diasporic humanitarianism differ across generations by identifying each generation's preferred charity beneficiaries.

While acknowledging that diaspora is a contested term, this article uses Shain and Barth's definition of diaspora as “a people with a common origin who reside, more or less on a permanent basis, outside the borders of their ethnic or religious homeland—whether that homeland is real or symbolic, independent or under foreign control” (2003, 452). Similarly, the term “homeland” is understood here to refer to the current Middle Eastern states of Egypt and Iraq. “Homeland” acknowledges the complex relationship between the case study communities and Middle Eastern states, especially the connection between Assyrians and Iraq (Atto 2011; Gow 2004).¹ The term “host state” is applied to the United Kingdom, while accepting that many community members are UK citizens and express their belonging to this state (Baser and Swain 2010).

“Minority” is a contested term in a Middle Eastern context (Pizzo 2015). Christians in the Middle East, for example, stress their indigenous roots and reject the application of “minority,” due to its connotations in the Middle East with a group that has origins external to the region (McCallum 2010). Yet Christians are a numerical minority in the Muslim-majority Middle East (McCallum 2010; Girling 2018), comprising 5–6 percent of the Egyptian population, with over 90 percent belonging to the Coptic Orthodox Church (ElSasser 2014, 7). Iraqi Christians (including Assyrians) numbered around 1.4 million in 1987, but due to insecurity since the Baath regime's downfall in 2003, the Christian population in Iraq has fallen to 300,000–400,000 (Monier 2020, 363). Assyrians are an Iraqi Christian community but identify as a separate ethnic group and perceive themselves as a stateless people with connections to the modern states of Iraq, Syria, and Turkey (al-Rasheed 1994; Donabed 2015). Political instability, economic crises, and insecurity affect all Egyptians and Iraqis (ElSasser 2014; Monier 2020; Hunter 2021), but Copts, Iraqi Christians, and Assyrians in the diaspora not only perceive their communities as suffering but also share a lack of confidence in the Egyptian and Iraqi states’ abilities or inclination to assist minority groups (Marzouki 2016; Hunter and McCallum Guiney 2020). Thus, the example of Middle Eastern Christians can provide insight on homeland-oriented humanitarianism of minority diasporas more broadly.

The article explores motivations for homeland-oriented diaspora humanitarianism through the case studies of three charities founded in the United Kingdom by Christians of Middle Eastern origin: St Kyrel Trust, Iraqi Christians in Need, and the Assyrian Society of Great Britain. Data for this article come from the charities’ website and social media sites; participant observation at fundraising events, and interviews and focus groups conducted between 2013 and 2015 with community members, including those supporting the case study charities.

This article contributes to scholarship on diasporic humanitarianism in two ways. First, by comparing the motivations for charity-giving of first- and second-generation diaspora members, it challenges the prevailing view in the literature on diaspora humanitarianism that direct experience of living in the homeland is mandatory for diaspora mobilization to support the needy in the homeland (Hammond 2013; Koinova 2016; Farzana 2017; Olliff 2018). Instead, the analysis presented here shows that collective memory and ongoing trigger events allowed second-generation diaspora members to connect to the homeland situation and aid those in need. Second, the article identifies two approaches to diaspora charity-giving: an exclusive one focused upon members of the donors’ community and a broader one that includes anyone in need in the homeland or host country (c.f., Brinkerhoff 2014). This article contends that although the exclusive approach is more predominant in the diaspora literature (Hammond 2013; Baser and Swain 2010; Orijuela 2020), it is possible for second-generation members to adopt a broader approach to identifying charity beneficiaries—one that includes all who are needy in the homeland and local causes in the host state. It is the range of charity beneficiaries, rather than the mobilization to support the community in the homeland, that is impacted by generational differences, and the second generation's connections with both the homeland and host state can reshape diasporic humanitarianism and contribute to generational divergence in minority diasporas.

The article's structure is as follows. The existing literature on diaspora groups’ motivations to support homeland-oriented humanitarianism is reviewed in the first section. The article, then, provides a brief overview of Middle Eastern Christians in Egypt and Iraq, as well as the communities in the United Kingdom, before discussing the methodology used here. The empirical discussion examines diaspora members’ motivations for contributing to diaspora humanitarianism and analyzes to what extent generational differences impacted the charities’ target beneficiaries. The conclusion addresses how the article contributes to scholarship on homeland-oriented diaspora humanitarianism and where future research on this theme might head.

Diasporic Homeland-Oriented Humanitarianism

Diasporic humanitarianism—whether addressing poverty, aiding those requiring relief due to conflict or natural disasters, strengthening education, or building infrastructure—aims to relieve the situation of those in the homeland (Brinkerhoff 2008; Portes, Escobar and Arana 2009; Faist, Fauser and Reisennauer 2013). Diaspora humanitarianism can be pursued through individuals sending remittances to family members in the homeland, supporting diaspora-based or homeland-based charities, or contributing to government appeals (Werbner 2002; Brinkerhoff 2008). Involvement in diaspora-based homeland-oriented charities is this article's focus.

Diaspora members’ sense of obligation to “give back” is central in the literature on diaspora homeland-oriented activism (Hammond 2013; Olliff 2018; Akom Ankobrey, Mazzucato and Wagner 2022). Faist et al. claim that migrants “settle and integrate into their new country and at the same time remain engaged, concerned and affected by events in their country of emigration” (2013, 89). “Giving back” tends to be strengthened when migrants identify with collective trauma and victimhood, as is often found in diasporas from minority backgrounds (O’Neill 2015; Koinova 2016; Schmoller 2020). Koinova argues that conflict-generated diasporas have an identity based on the “trauma of displacement and myth of return” and are more likely to engage with members of their community in the homeland if the conflict is ongoing, as is the case in Iraq (2017, 114). This sense of trauma strengthens ties between the first generation and those still residing in the homeland (Koinova 2016; Marzouki 2016; Schmoller 2020), even in cases of stateless diasporas, such as the Assyrians. In such circumstances, Gow argues, “the debt is not owed to a homeland qua nation state, but to an imagined familial collective without internationally recognized land of their own” (2004, 14).

The literature on diasporic activism also demonstrates that trigger events, such as conflict or crisis in the homeland, can reinforce suffering and victimhood narratives and strengthen the diaspora's connection to those in the homeland (O’Neill 2015; Koinova 2019). This empathy can lead to first-generation members forming or aiding organizations to assist those in the homeland (Garbin and Godin 2013; Marzouki 2016). There is debate, however, among diaspora scholars regarding the extent to which homeland attachment remains among second and subsequent generations, who may identify as much as or more with the country in which they were born as the ancestral country of their community (Levitt 2009; Portes and Rambaut 2001; Baser 2014). Family and cultural ties, visits, and current trigger events are important factors for second-generation mobilization on behalf of the homeland community (Brinkerhoff 2008; O’Neill 2015).

Children of first-generation migrants from groups sharing a collective trauma are often raised in an environment that reinforces that traumatic past (Levitt 2009; Blachnicka-Ciacek 2018; Orjuela 2020). According to Levitt, “Even if they rarely visit their ancestral homes or are not fluent in its language, they are often raised in settings that reference the homeland ideologically, materially and affectively each day” (2009, 1231). In relation to groups suffering trauma, O’Neill suggests that younger diaspora members can have a “second-hand memory of persecution” (2015, 128). In addition, homeland cultural institutions likely play a prominent role in migrants’ lives (Menjivar 2002; Koinova 2016). In the case-study communities, communal churches play an important role in incorporating second-generation members within the diaspora (McCallum 2010; Atto 2011).

Physical visits of migrants’ children to the homeland can reinforce second-generation attachment by “giving meaning” to parental experiences (Huang, Ramshaw and Norman 2016). Spending time in the homeland can make the second generation more conscious of the privileges they enjoy as members of the diaspora and motivate them to use their resources and influence to benefit the homeland community (Brinkerhoff 2008; Kabir 2014; Akom Ankobrey, Mazzucato and Wagner 2022). For some second-generation visitors, positive experiences during their stay in their origin country, combined with perceived economic benefits and life events, can lead to a permanent return to the homeland (King and Christou 2014; Saey and Skey 2016; Baser 2018). However, not all diasporas have the option of visiting the homeland. For conflict-generated diasporas, physical visits play less significance in building second-generation attachment than do family ties and trigger events (O’Neill 2015; Koinova 2016).

Trigger events taking place during the second generation's formative years can resonate with them, regardless of whether they have physically visited the homeland (Baser 2014; Hess and Korf 2014; Blachnicka-Ciacek 2018). Often, second-generation activism is what Hess and Korf term as “physically grounded” in the host country by using social media and appealing to the host government and society through local and national media (2014, 421). Thus, the second generation can respond to indirect experiences of the hardships faced by community members in the homeland through diasporic humanitarianism.

A direct or indirect shared experience with the homeland community influences diaspora members’ views on who should receive aid from diaspora charities (Werbner 2002; Brinkerhoff 2008; Olliff 2018). Diaspora charity-giving often takes an exclusive form i.e., it is directed solely toward members of the diaspora group, whether in the homeland or elsewhere (Werbner 2002; Hammond 2013; Farzana 2017). The literature on diasporic humanitarianism identifies several reasons why diasporas perceive that they are the best and sometimes only actors to assist their community. First, knowledge of community needs, culture, and values means that founders of diaspora organizations claim that they can tailor their aid to the requirements of recipients in ways that larger aid agencies cannot (Menjivar 2002; Brinkerhoff 2008; Faist, Fauser and Reisennauer 2013). The emotional connection driving grassroots humanitarianism (whether diasporic or otherwise) means that grassroots actors often prioritize building relationships with beneficiaries, rather than seeking to expand initiatives and capacity, as can occur in larger organizations (Appe and Schnable 2019; Fechter and Schwittay 2019). In her study of refugee philanthropy, Olliff found that interviewees stressed that “the ties that bind those who help and those in need” impacted the assistance given, in contrast to larger humanitarian organizations not directly connected to recipients (2018, 672).

Second, diaspora groups are in a strong position to assist homeland community members because they can gain access that may be difficult for other humanitarian organizations to obtain, whether due to security issues or suspicion toward outside agencies (Hammond 2013; Brinkerhoff 2014). Additionally, diaspora groups can cooperate with communal institutions in both the origin country and the host state to identify recipients and distribute funds (Menjivar 2002; Brinkerhoff 2008; Moon and Choi 2013).

Third, minority diasporas argue that their communities are served by neither hostile or indifferent homeland governments nor Western states or aid agencies that rarely understand their complex situation (Marzouki 2016; Farzana 2017; Schmoller 2020). Koinova (2019) found that this narrative was particularly strong in stateless diasporas, such as the Kurds and Assyrians. The sense of obligation to “my people,” as discussed earlier, encourages diaspora groups to focus exclusively on their community (Brinkerhoff 2008, 2014; Olliff 2018; Baser 2018). In her study on Coptic Christian humanitarianism in the United States, Brinkerhoff found that “Older respondents were more likely to target their philanthropy to fellow Copts, perhaps owing to a longer history and understanding of the plight of Copts in Egypt” (2014, 981). Thus, it would be expected that Coptic, Iraqi, and Assyrian Christians in the United Kingdom would employ an exclusive approach toward identifying charity beneficiaries by only supporting members of their communities in the Middle East.

By its nature, diaspora humanitarianism primarily focuses upon the diaspora community's needs. However, a few studies on diaspora humanitarianism show that a broader approach toward charity-giving is possible (Menjivar 2002; Moon and Choi 2013; Brinkerhoff 2014). A broader approach is defined here as supporting those beyond the immediate group to which the donors belong (c.f., Brinkerhoff 2014). When national identity is strong among a minority diaspora group, donors can be open to providing aid based upon need, rather than prioritizing members of their own community (Menjivar 2002; Demir 2012). Brinkerhoff's survey on Coptic diaspora philanthropy discovered that respondents identifying as Egyptian were more likely to support assistance to anyone in need in Egypt, rather than to focus exclusively on Copts (2014, 981). She concludes that it is “inappropriate to assume that minority diasporas, even those who have encountered discrimination and persecution in the COO (country of origin), will necessarily shy away from participating in philanthropy in the COO or, if they do so, to target only their minority compatriots” (Brinkerhoff 2014, 988).

A broader approach can also be adopted by diaspora members who are aware of needs in their new environment and who direct their attention toward combating poverty and crises more locally (Portes, Escobar and Arana 2009; Moon and Choi 2013; Brinkerhoff 2016). In their study of Korean immigrants in the United States, Moon and Choi found that when immigrants interacted with the local community and enjoyed socio-economic success, they were “more likely to donate to causes relevant to the broader community and society at large” (2013, 808). Studies on second-generation diaspora members residing in Western countries show that they may also identify with local causes and concerns (Waite and Cook 2011; Garbin and Godin 2013; Kabir 2014). This widening of youth (second-generation) interests is explored in this article to ascertain if there are differences between first- and second-generation views on who should benefit from diaspora charity-giving beneficiaries.

Context

As discussed in the Introduction, Christians in Egypt and Iraq perceive themselves as indigenous to the region but are a numerical minority (al-Rasheed 1994; Rowe 2020). In Egypt, Copts are found in all socio-economic classes and have been affected, like all Egyptians, by economic crises, political instability, and insecurity (ElSasser 2014). The official Egyptian “national unity” narrative emphasizes that Egyptian national identity incorporates both Muslims and Christians but has not overcome the “Coptic Question” relating to identity, equality, and rights (ElSasser 2014; Pizzo 2015). The “Coptic Question” includes Coptic under-representation in political life, church building, and recurring communal violence (McCallum 2010; ElSasser 2014). The 2011 Revolution led to initial optimism among Copts that issues relating to equality and citizenship would be addressed (Pizzo 2015; Lukasik 2016). However, that optimism was dashed by a deteriorating security situation after the Mubarak regime's fall in 2011, as well as the presence of Islamist parties in government in 2012 (Rowe 2020). In particular, the 2011 “Maspero massacre”² was a significant trigger event for the Coptic community in Egypt and the diaspora (Rowe 2020, 353). The security situation worsened in 2013, when Copts were targeted by supporters of ousted President Morsi, due to the view that the community, particularly the Coptic Orthodox Church, was actively involved in the military's return to power (Pizzo 2015). Subsequent attacks on churches, Coptic-owned property, and individuals acted as additional trigger events for the community (Pizzo 2015, 2606).

In Iraq, Christians of all denominations (including Assyrians) have a contested relationship with the state (Monier 2020). Under the Baath regime, Christians were not directly targeted for their religious identity and enjoyed community rights subject to the political restrictions imposed by the authoritarian regime (Rassam 2010, 149). The Baath regime used Arab nationalism as a means of legitimacy, perceived non-Arab ethnic groups as a threat to regime survival, and suppressed ethnic minorities’ communal institutions, languages, and cultures (Donabed 2015). Assyrians self-identifying as a stateless ethnic group were impacted by the Baathist repressive policies toward ethnic minorities (al-Rasheed 1994). In addition, Assyrians have a collective history of trauma centered around the mass killings and displacement of Assyrians in 1915, known as the Year of the Sayfo (sword), and the Simele massacre in 1933 (Atto 2011; Donabed 2015).

Conflict in Iraq since 2003 has been a significant trigger event for all of Iraq's Christian communities and for the diaspora (Hunter 2021). Like all Iraqis, Christians have been affected by a dysfunctional state, years of conflict, militias, and foreign intervention (Rassam 2010, 195–238). Due to their shared faith with the “Christian” West, Iraqi Christians and their institutions, especially churches and clergy, have been attacked by Islamist militants (Girling 2018, 112–32). An additional trigger event occurred in 2014, when the militant group Islamic State gained control of territory in Northern Iraq, where there was a strong Christian presence (Hunter 2021, 493). Christian properties were attacked and looted, resulting in Christian internal displacement and emigration (Girling 2018, 230). Because of the multiple challenges in Egypt and Iraq, many Christians have chosen to emigrate from the region (Schmoller 2018).

Middle Eastern Christians located outside the Middle East are estimated to number 7.7 million and are found in North America, Latin America, Australasia, and Europe (Schmoller 2018, 354).³ The Middle Eastern Christian population in the United Kingdom numbers around 30–40,000, encompassing 20,000 Copts and 8–10,000 Iraqi Christians including Assyrians (Hunter and McCallum Guiney 2020).⁴ Middle Eastern Christian migration flows to the United Kingdom have occurred since the 1950s, primarily through skilled labor and student routes (McCallum 2019, 250). In the case of Iraq, conflict since the 1980s has also led to a small number of refugees entering the United Kingdom (al-Rasheed 1994). Coptic, Assyrian, and Iraqi Christian communities in the United Kingdom are broadly middle class and strongly represented in medical professions, engineering, architecture, teaching, and business (Hunter and McCallum Guiney 2020). The Coptic community and its institutions are spread throughout the country, but Assyrian and Iraqi Christian communal institutions tend to be concentrated in London, where most of their members reside (McCallum 2019, 250). This article engages with grassroots organizations established by Copts, Iraqi Christians, and Assyrians in the UKUnited Kingdom (Appe and Schnable 2019).

Data and Methods

The data presented in this article come from research conducted between 2013 and 2015 as part of a wider project entitled “Defining and Identifying Middle Eastern Christian Communities in Europe (DIMECCE)”.⁵ DIMECCE showcased the diversity of Middle Eastern Christianity in Europe through three case studies—Copts (faith-based identity spiritually connected to Egypt; McCallum 2010), Assyrians (stateless ethnic group with ties to Iraq, Syria, Turkey, and Iran; Donabed 2015), and Iraqi Christians (belonging to a range of denominations linked through their national identity; Rassam 2010).⁶ The three case studies differ historically, theologically, and nationally in the Middle East, but in the migration context, their shared experiences as Middle Eastern Christians in the United Kingdom were of interest to this research (Hunter and McCallum Guiney 2020). The fieldsites were Kirkcaldy (the location of Scotland's only Middle Eastern Christian church) and London (location of several churches relating to the three communities). This article explores the activities of three migrant organizations involved in humanitarianism—one per community. The charities were selected because they were the most popular responses of interviewees from each community when asked if they supported any UK-based diaspora organizations.⁷

The first organization—St Kyrel Trust—is an education-focused body founded in 1995 that sponsors Coptic university students in Egypt.⁸ The charity has an affiliated youth choir that brings together youth from various Coptic Orthodox congregations in the United Kingdom and beyond. The St Kyrel website describes the choir's origins: “One of these [funding ideas] was to establish a concert series that would bring Coptic sacred music enthusiasts together as a fund-raising source as well as informing of the Trust's mission.”⁹

The second organization—Iraqi Christians in Need—was set up in 2007 to support Christians facing hardships in Iraq.¹⁰ The charity focuses on educational, health, and building projects, both in Iraq and with displaced Iraqi Christians in Jordan.¹¹ It holds regular fundraising events aimed at the Iraqi Christian community in the United Kingdom, including music nights, gala dinners, and outings. Iraqi Christians in Need has recently started holding events such as pub quizzes and music and games nights for youth, marketing these as “ICIN G2” (Iraqi Christians in Need Second Generation) events.¹²

The final organization is the Assyrian Society of Great Britain. It runs a social club (known as Assyrian House) that provides a space for members to meet regularly, hosts community events such as weddings, funeral receptions, and festival celebrations, and runs activities like bingo and music and children's events.¹³ The Assyrian Society of Great Britain also raises funds for Assyrians in the Middle East through donations and fundraising events. Assyrian House has a sub-committee composed of youth members who run occasional events celebrating Assyrian culture aimed at the community's children.

The first type of data collection was to conduct content analysis of the organizations’ websites and social media accounts in 2013 to garner information about their origins and activities.¹⁴ Additional information on charity activities was obtained in 2013–2015 through news articles and the Charity Commission for England and Wales.¹⁵ All three organizations resemble the characteristics identified by Brinkerhoff in her study of Coptic diasporic philanthropy: small scale, volunteer-based, and personal networks (Brinkerhoff 2008, 415). The founders and most board members of the case-study charities are first-generation migrants, and all are volunteers. The three organizations are relatively small in terms of funds raised.¹⁶ They fundraise within their community through concerts, cultural events, meals, fetes, and trips¹⁷ and work closely with communal churches to fundraise, publicize their activities, and distribute funds in the Middle East.¹⁸ Relevant to this article, the charities have sought to cater to and involve youth from their community, including in assistance with Information Technology and to design and update websites and publicize events.¹⁹

The second type of data collection was participant observation in charity events and church services between 2013 and 2015. The author attended fundraising and community events hosted by the organizations, including musical concerts, festive meals, and cultural nights. Charity activities and fundraising were frequently publicized during church services held by the case-study denominations. Attending community events provided data regarding participants and the type of activities taking place.

The third type of data collection involved recruiting and conducting interviews. Eight interviews were conducted with leaders or board members of the three organizations in London in 2014. Charity representatives were contacted directly through the organization website. These interviews concentrated on the organization's activities, successes, and challenges. A further 45 interviews were conducted with “active” members of the case-study communities (34 male and 11 female).²⁰ Given that the Coptic Orthodox community was significantly larger than the Iraqi or Assyrian communities and that it had more organizations and activities, it is unsurprising that interviews were not evenly split between the three communities—24 Coptic Orthodox, 11 Assyrians, and 10 Iraqi Christians. Interviews were conducted in London and Kirkcaldy (the latter solely with Coptic Orthodox) between 2014 and 2015. Interview data for this article come from questions on charity-giving, involvement in the local neighborhood, connections to the Middle Eastern homeland, and challenges facing the community in Egypt or Iraq.

Focus groups were conducted in 2014 and 2015 with community members by recruiting individuals when the author attended community events. Focus groups strove to ascertain if the views offered by “active” members were representative of the wider community. Additionally, while interviews aimed to have diversity in terms of gender, age, and migrant generations, the project definition of “active” members led to an over-representation of middle-aged, first-generation males. To compensate for this lack of diversity, some focus groups were targeted at groups under-represented in interviews, such as youth and women. 30 people (15 male, 15 female, and 11 youth) participated across six focus groups (five in London and one in Kirkcaldy). The focus group data for this article come from discussion on the type and extent of support diaspora members should offer to individuals in the homeland, the impact of trigger events in the homeland on the diaspora, and the relationship between Middle Eastern Christian communities and their local neighborhood in the United Kingdom.

All interviews were held in English and took place in a range of settings: interviewees’ homes, workplaces, churches, and cafes. Interviews were conducted by the author or other researchers on the project, all of whom were “outsiders” in terms of being white British and not from the community but were also considered by some interviewees as being “insiders,” due to presumed shared religious faith as Christians. All interviews were recorded, transcribed, and analyzed, using NVivo, a qualitative software program that allows researchers to code interview material. Due to the small number of individuals involved in the case-study organizations, interviewees from diaspora organizations are referred to as “charity representative” to ensure anonymity, and additional information, such as gender or community, is not given in the discussion. Non-organization interviewees are also anonymized, listing only their self-identified community, age range, and migrant generation.

Migrant generation refers to birthplace, with the first generation meaning those born in the Middle East, the second generation meaning those born in the West (usually the United Kingdom), and 1.5 generation meaning those born in the Middle East but spending their formative years in the West (usually the United Kingdom). In the United Kingdom, the oldest second-generation members tended to be in their 30s (with a third generation now being born); thus, the terms “youth” and “second generation” are mostly interchangeable. Organization committee members tended to be first-generation migrants, whereas interviews and focus groups with the wider community allowed for second-generation voices to be heard.

One limitation of this article is the extent to which interviewees can be deemed representative of the wider case-study communities. The cited quotations are representative of views shared by numerous respondents and should not be considered as outliers. However, the wider project's aims meant that the recruitment of interviewees was tilted in favor of those who were most active in their community—what Shain and Barth term the “core group” or “organizing elites, intensively active in diasporic affairs and in a position to appeal for mobilization of the larger diaspora” (2003, 452). While interviewees were active in raising the community's profile, it does not follow that they speak for the wider community (Koinova 2017). The combined approach of website/social media analysis, participant observation, and interviews avoids the pitfalls of relying on only one methodology and allows organization leaders’ perspectives to be analyzed in the context of wider community responses to the charities’ work.

The Impact of Direct and Indirect Homeland Experience on Diaspora Humanitarianism Motivations

The findings on diaspora members’ motivations for humanitarianism show that first-generation diaspora members identified their direct experience of living in Egypt or Iraq as a key factor for their decision to contribute to diaspora-based charities that supported their communities in the Middle East. Support was closely connected to a sense of obligation to use the opportunities and resources available to them in the United Kingdom to benefit those still in the homeland. Several founders and committee members indicated that their knowledge of the poverty, insecurity, and/or discrimination experienced by Copts, Assyrians, and Iraqi Christians in Egypt and Iraq motivated them to set up or get involved with charities. For example, one respondent had been involved in charity work while in Egypt and wished to continue this support:

I used to travel regularly to Egypt to sort of keep an eye on the service I used to do before I came to England…, and I realized that since I had left Egypt…, things started to deteriorate significantly in terms of economy and finance and things, and even the youth I used to invite to help with the weekly service in the church, they can’t afford simple life because of the economic situation there. (Charity representative)

Another interviewee argued:

So, the devotion to my belief, what I believe in, and it should be actually the duty—in my opinion—of every Copt who left Egypt and came here. Part of his life here, he should be doing whatever he can to help who needs help in Egypt. (Charity representative)

An Iraqi Christians in Need board member explained that awareness of the difficulties facing Iraqi Christians post-2003 meant that “a group of expatriate Iraqis—British Iraqis—got together and thought they have to do something and formed this charity” (Charity representative).

Violent incidents affecting the homeland community accentuated the first generations’ memories of discrimination and insecurity and reinforced this sense of obligation. Interviews for this project were undertaken not long after a deterioration in the security situation in Egypt (2013) and while the Islamic State takeover of Mosul was ongoing (2014). Both developments were at the forefront of interviewees’ concerns about community members in Egypt and Iraq. In Egypt, the fallout after the Morsi regime's downfall in 2013 led to churches, Coptic-owned property, and individual Copts being attacked (Pizzo 2015, 2606). Speaking about this situation in 2014, one interviewee explained:

As you know, a year ago, when the Muslim Brotherhood burnt around 80 churches—it leaves a very deep wound in everyone, every Christian, here in London. So, they started—the people, by themselves, they started to collect money and send it to Egypt to help the families there, to help building the church, to help in any way. (Coptic male, 40s, first generation)

Many Iraqi respondents indicated that they were in contact with family and friends who had fled their homes due to the Islamic State's advance in Iraq in 2014 (Hunter 2021). One interviewee recounted how Assyrian aid organizations immediately responded to the crisis:

The majority of the people who fled, our people you know, managed to reach the safe places in Kurdistan, and they were residing in churches and, you know, like, places of worship basically. And that's where they [charities] started setting up. (Assyrian male, 50s, first generation)

Consequently, such events acted as triggers for interviewees to continue and increase their contribution to diaspora charities.

First-generation interviewees mainly took for granted that direct experience as Christians in the Middle East would lead to first-generation migrants mobilizing on behalf of communities in Egypt or Iraq. However, there was a mixed reaction on whether these views would be shared by the second generation. For some, the collective memory experienced by youth in the United Kingdom was no substitute for experiencing the challenges first-hand. For example, one first-generation respondent discussed generational reactions to the expulsion of Christians from Mosul in 2014:

They [younger generation] look at us, and they see us; they just share their sorrow with us, but they don’t feel. They don’t have the same feeling like we do. My son will not have the same feeling I do because I’ve been to Mosul… For my son, he will be sad, but he will not experience what I’ve experienced. (Charity representative)

Similarly, a first-generation Copt attributed difficulties in mobilizing youth to their lack of understanding of the situation in Egypt:

They haven’t lived in Egypt; they haven’t seen what the Coptic Christians in Egypt face in their daily lives. You tell them what's happening—but there is a great difference between telling them and they are seeing and living it like we did before. (Coptic male, 50s, first generation)

By contrast, other respondents highlighted that trigger events led to direct responses from the second generation. For example, an Assyrian House committee member recounted how youth collected goods and ran a food festival to raise funds for Iraqi Christians affected by Islamic State attacks in 2014: “There were 18 youngsters that was involved in, like everything, the Iraq business.” Similarly, a first-generation activist emphasized that those born in the United Kingdom were motivated by their group identity to raise funds for co-religionists, just like those born in the Middle East:

Awareness, the passion, it's not just because you were born there. You know the passion; it still runs through the veins of people who were actually born here [United Kingdom] as well. (Charity representative)

Importantly, youth interviewees generally stated that they felt a strong connection to their community, particularly due to family and religious ties. For Coptic youth, being Coptic meant attachment to Egypt as the country of their parents and the spiritual homeland of their church. One second-generation respondent explained:

I really value our, the heritage of our church and its identity for a variety of reasons because I see it living its, its Christianity quite clearly in the Middle East… And so I see that as quite core to my identity. (Coptic female, youth, second generation)

For second-generation Iraqi Christians and Assyrians, connection to the community was produced through the ongoing crisis of displacement and attacks on Iraqi Christians (Atto 2011; Hunter 2021). One Iraqi Christian youth emphasized that his awareness of the difficulties facing Christians in Iraq was heightened post-2003, with the realization that if his parents had not migrated, he would have been directly affected by the conflict.

Because I think to myself, I could have been, you know, my parents could have stayed there and, you know, I could have been one of those people who, who's had to endure the suffering that people have had to endure. (Iraqi Christian male, youth, second generation)

Youth's growing interest in the fate of their co-religionists in the Middle East could also serve to refresh the enthusiasm of first-generation diaspora members. St Kyrel Trust had a youth choir that performed fundraising concerts. A St Kyrel Trust member explained how youth participation raised awareness within their own families:

It has softened people's hearts significantly, and even if the parents, for example, of these youngsters or youth were not very aware or interested about the charity, because the young one take part in the choir here or the orchestra here, they persuade their parents to come along and either to pay or help.

Motivation to contribute to diaspora homeland-oriented humanitarianism came from both direct and indirect experiences of the challenges facing those still in the Middle East. For the second generation, collective memories of trauma through family and cultural institutions, combined with trigger events, served the same purpose as the first generation's lived experiences (c.f., Hess and Korf 2014; O’Neill 2015). From this shared starting point for motivations, this article now turns to the generational differences relating to the target beneficiaries of diaspora charity fundraising.

Exclusive and Broader Approaches to Charity Beneficiaries

The sense of obligation to assist community members in the homeland discussed above is clearly present in many minority diasporas. Regarding Middle East Christians, Schmoller argues that “The perception persists—in the homelands as well as in the diaspora—that discrimination and persecution of a minority group is not taken serious if it concerns Christians” (2020, 208). A recurring theme from first-generation interviewees was that other communities in the homeland received support from the government or international organizations but that few groups were assisting Christians in the Middle East. The view that Western policymakers and broader society lacked awareness of these communities and their difficulties was widely shared among interviewees. As diaspora members, they believed it was their responsibility to disseminate information about the situation of Christians in the Middle East to Western states and organizations (Hunter and McCallum Guiney 2020). Speaking about setting up a campaign in 2003 to publicize the plight of Assyrians, one respondent claimed:

After the downfall of the previous regime, everybody was trying to talk about the rights of the Kurds, of the Sunnis, Shiites; nothing was being mentioned about the Christians of Iraq. (Charity representative)

This view was shared by another respondent:

And increasingly, after the 2003 war and the Gulf War and the increasing hardship suffered by Iraq, it was felt that Christians were not being helped specifically by anyone really, whereas the Muslim community was being aided if you were Shiite by Iranians or Saudi Arabia or Qatar for the Sunnis. No-one gave a toss about the Christians. (Charity representative)

This perception that no institutions outside the community were supporting Christians in the Middle East was not confined to Iraqi interviewees. Coptic respondents had a similar narrative, as the two quotes below illustrate.

I knew exactly how they suffer; in terms of the support they get from government is zero. Other non-Copts in Egypt, they have lots of foundations and organizations that support them from outside Egypt, Gulf areas. (Charity representative)

You can be a voice for the voiceless. You’re trying to get the message from these people, whom nobody listens to them in Egypt, the Copts. (Coptic male, 60s, first generation)

First-generation respondents overwhelmingly referred to their sense of obligation to prioritize support to needy community members in the homeland. Their humanitarianism conformed to the exclusive approach of assisting group members only. By contrast, second-generation interviewees indicated that their charity support was not community centric. Instead, they also contributed to charities working in the Middle East as a whole, as well as local causes in the United Kingdom.

Regarding initiatives aimed at wider society in the Middle East, a few second-generation voices challenged the first generation's Coptic-only approach. For example, one respondent declared, “I felt that the church was a bit isolated in its funding, was very oriented to the very specific Coptic charities” (Coptic female, youth, second generation). She explained how she supported charities raising money for projects in Egypt that benefitted both Copts and Muslims. Another second-generation member explained that different factors influenced her decision-making relating to charity giving in the region. “Usually, the charities if I do donate it, it won’t be Egypt—I’m not so fixated on Egypt, I think there's this obsession” (Coptic female, youth, second generation).

The United Kingdom was also a focus of second-generation youth charitable activities. Second-generation interviewees discussed their desire to fundraise for local causes in the areas where the community churches were located. One respondent recollected fundraising events held in Assyrian House which divided the proceeds between causes assisting displaced Assyrians in Iraq and charities working in the local area.

We [Assyrian youth] encourage doing that [giving proceeds of fundraising events to local charities] more so we help out the local community more because we are here, we want to be more active, we want to be more involved. (Assyrian female, 30s, 1.5 generation)

The desire to cater to the local community's needs was also found among Coptic youth in London. Respondents recounted various activities undertaken in the area surrounding St Mark's Coptic Orthodox Church in Kensington, including visiting local hospitals and care homes and dropping off cards in neighboring streets at festive times. One participant explained, “We’d just knock on people's door and say, you know, Merry Christmas at the time and just give them a little Christmas gift” (Coptic male, youth, second generation). One notable activity was Coptic City Mission, which provided food and support to the homeless in London.²¹ The majority of Coptic City Mission volunteers were Coptic youth motivated by meeting needs in their local society. This sense of identification with the United Kingdom as “home” appears to have led to more interest in directly contributing to local causes (c.f., Waite and Cook 2011; Kabir 2014; Huang, Ramshaw and Norman 2016). In contrast to the first generation's exclusive homeland-oriented focus, the second generation fashioned a compromise which allowed them to assist both those in the homeland and those in their new locale.

UK-oriented activities had mixed responses from older generations in the community. There certainly was some support for outreach activities, especially from clergy. For example, Coptic City Mission was founded by Bishop Angaelos in 2000 as part of his pastoral work with youth.²² Several clergy interviewed for this project expressed their pleasure and encouragement of youth activities aimed toward the local community. One priest stated that local outreach “is something I consider very important, and one of the missions of the church.” Brinkerhoff reports a similar approach by Coptic clergy in the United States, who encouraged youth to provide “service to the poor in the US and beyond the church” (2016, 482). Similarly, Assyrian House committee members indicated that they were supportive of fundraising events that brought in people from the neighborhood and supported both Assyrian and local causes. One respondent recollected a food festival fundraiser that was publicized to people in the neighborhood, and we “gave the money, collected for charity, to a charity in England” (Charity representative).

However, in some cases, there was tension about holding events on community premises if the proceeds did not go to community-based organizations working on projects that solely benefited the community in the Middle East. One interviewee observed differences between organizing fundraising events for Coptic or non-Coptic charities. For the latter, the event “wasn’t advertised much even though we asked,” and church council members argued that “they should have some money returned back to them” (Coptic female, youth, second generation). The words of another second-generation Copt sum up the perceived generational differences regarding fundraising priorities:

I think we’re responsible for our neighbor—eh Egyptian or not Egyptian… They’re (older generation) not bothered; they don’t see it as a priority. They’re just focused on their culture, and they’re very inwards—very parochial. (Coptic female, youth, second generation)

Thus, identification with and experiences in the United Kingdom led to different prioritizations among second-generation youth regarding charity beneficiaries. They still mobilized in support of their vulnerable communities in the Middle East but also held a sense of responsibility toward those in need in their local environment in the United Kingdom. In doing so, second-generation members of minority diasporas reshaped diasporic humanitarianism and contributed to divergence between migrant generations.

Conclusion

This article has explored individual motivations for involvement in homeland-oriented minority diaspora charities. When there are ongoing difficulties in the homeland, members of minority diasporas respond to a sense of obligation to aid community members. By focusing upon the second generation, this article challenges two assumptions in the diaspora humanitarianism literature—namely, that direct experience of homeland difficulties is required to mobilize individuals in the diaspora to assist their community in the homeland and that diaspora members follow an exclusive approach to charity-giving by focusing solely on their own community (Werbner 2002; Hammond 2013; Koinova 2016; Farzana 2017).

This article found that ongoing crises in the homeland acted as trigger events to mobilize second-generation diaspora members to provide charity assistance to community members. As the literature on diaspora attachment has shown, the second generation do not share the lived experience of difficulties in the Middle East that motivates first-generation members to provide humanitarian aid to members in Egypt or Iraq (Levitt 2009; Koinova 2016; Olliff 2018). Yet as this article demonstrated, second-generation attachment to Copts, Assyrians, or Iraqis in the Middle East was maintained through collective memory and reinforced through recurring trigger events. While homeland crises remained, the diaspora's sense of obligation to assist needy members resonated with both first- and second-generation members. Rather than direct experience of homeland conditions, collective memory and trigger events motivated diaspora humanitarianism and allowed second-generation members to mobilize in aid of their homeland community.

The article identified two approaches to diaspora charity-giving: an exclusive one focused on members of the donors’ community and a broader one that expanded to include anyone in need in the homeland or host country (c.f., Brinkerhoff 2014). The exclusive approach of focusing solely on the homeland community has been explored in-depth in the literature on diaspora humanitarianism (Brinkerhoff 2008; Baser and Swain 2010; Hammond 2013; Orjuela 2020). While the concept of “multiple belonging” is acknowledged in the literature on diaspora identity, it is rarely applied to diaspora humanitarianism (Portes and Rambaut 2001; Waite and Cook 2011; Kabir 2014). This article argued that the second generation employed a broader, or multiple, approach when identifying beneficiaries of diaspora charity-giving. Members of the homeland community were an important recipient group for second-generation diaspora humanitarianism, but national identities (both homeland and host state) also influenced second-generation decision-making concerning charity beneficiaries. Second-generation minority diaspora members’ attachment to the homeland went beyond assisting Copts, Assyrians, or Iraqi Christians and included aid that benefited needy Egyptians or Iraqis, regardless of religious or ethnic identity. Similarly, second-generation connections to the United Kingdom resulted in a desire for diaspora charitable activities to support local causes. The article showed that migrant youth were committed to supporting people in need, in the homeland and in local communities in the host state. The second generation's broader approach to charity-giving combatted the first generation's assumptions that one set of beneficiaries (community members in the homeland) had to be prioritized over others (other groups in the homeland or local causes in the host state). The second generation's connections with both the homeland and host state challenged the traditional community-centric exclusive approach to diaspora humanitarianism and has the potential to reshape diasporic charity.

As this article has shown, generational differences impact diaspora charity beneficiaries but do not necessarily affect commitment to assisting community members suffering hardships in the homeland, especially when the group can be categorized as a minority diaspora. Based on this argument, two avenues of future research become clear. First, the significance of the minority diaspora context could be further explored by adding case studies of the indirect experiences of national (majority) diasporas among second-generation members also affected by collective trauma, such as the Lebanese, Sudanese, or Syrian diasporas. Second, a different variable from the analysis of charity beneficiaries could be selected to identify if there are further areas of generational differences, such as the professionalization of diaspora organizations or approaches to fundraising. This article aims to advance a research agenda that analyses how generational differences impact homeland-oriented diasporic humanitarianism.

Footnotes

Declaration of Conflicting Interests

The author(s) declared no potential conflicts of interest with respect to the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article.

Funding

The author(s) disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship, and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by the Humanities in the European Research Area, (grant number 291827).

ORCID iD

Fiona McCallum Guiney

Notes

References

Adamson

2019. “Sending States and the Making of Intra-Diasporic Politics: Turkey and Its Diaspora(s).” International Migration Review 53(1): 210–36. https://doi.org/10.1177/0197918318767665.

Akom Ankobrey

Mazzucato

Wagner

. 2022. “Giving Back Through Mobility Trajectories: Motivations for Engaging in Development Encounters in Ghana among Transnational Youth.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 48(9): 2018–36. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2021.1959304.

Al-Rasheed

1994. “The Myth of Return: Iraqi Arab and Assyrian Refugees in London.” Journal of Refugee Studies 7(2–3): 199–219. https://doi.org/10.1093/jrs/7.2-3.199.

Appe

Schnable

. 2019. “Don’t Reinvent the Wheel: Possibilities for and Limits to Building Capacity of Grassroots International NGOs.” Third World Quarterly 40(10): 1832–49. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2019.1636226.

Atto

2011. Hostages in the Homeland, Orphans in the Diaspora: Identity Discourses Among the Assyrian/Syriac Elites in the European Diaspora. Leiden: Leiden University Press.

Baser

2014. “The Awakening of a Latent Diaspora: The Political Mobilization of First and Second Generation Turkish Migrants in Sweden.” Ethnopolitics 13(4): 355–76. https://doi.org/10.1080/17449057.2014.894175.

Baser

. 2018. “Homeland Calling: Kurdish Diaspora and State-Building in the Kurdistan Region of Iraq in the Post-Saddam Era.” Middle East Critique 27(1): 77–94. https://doi.org/10.1080/19436149.2017.1415512.

Baser

Swain

. 2010. “Stateless Diaspora Groups and their Repertoires of Nationalist Activism in Host Countries.” Journal of International Relations 8(1): 37–60. http://hdl.handle.net/1814/14820.

Blachnicka-Ciacek

2018. “Palestine as ‘a State of Mind’: Second-Generation Polish and British Palestinians’ Search for Home and Belonging.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 44(11): 1915–31. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2017.1369868.

10.

Brinkerhoff

2008. “Diaspora Philanthropy in an At-Risk Society: The Case of Coptic Orphans in Egypt.” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 37(3): 411–33. https://doi.org/10.1177/0899764007310423.

11.

Brinkerhoff

. 2014. “Diaspora Philanthropy: Lessons From a Demographic Analysis of the Coptic Diaspora.” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 43(6): 969–92. https://doi.org/10.1177/0899764013488835.

12.

Brinkerhoff

. 2016. “Assimilation and Heritage Identity: Lessons from the Coptic Diaspora.” Journal of International Migration and Integration 17: 467–85. http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s12134-015-0418-0.

13.

Demir

2012. “Battling with Memleket in London: The Kurdish Diaspora’s Engagement with Turkey.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 38(5): 815–31. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2012.667996.

14.

Donabed

2015. Reforging a Forgotten History: Iraq and the Assyrians in the 20th Century. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

15.

ElSasser

2014. The Coptic Question in the Mubarak Era. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

16.

Faist

Fauser

Reisennauer

. 2013. Transnational Migration. Cambridge: Polity Press.

17.

Farzana

2017. Memories of Burmese Rohingya Refugees: Contested Identity and Belonging. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

18.

Fechter

Schwittay

. 2019. “Citizen Aid: Grassroots Interventions in Development and Humanitarianism.” Third World Quarterly 40(10): 1769–80. https://doi.org/10.1080/01436597.2019.1656062.

19.

Garbin

Godin

. 2013. “‘Saving the Congo’: Transnational Social Fields and Politics of Home in the Congolese Diaspora.” African and Black Diaspora: An International Journal 6(2): 113–30. https://doi.org/10.1080/17528631.2013.793133.

20.

Girling

2018. The Chaldean Catholic Church: Modern History, Ecclesiology and Church-State Relations. Abingdon: Routledge.

21.

Gow

. 2004. “Watching Saddam Fall: Assyrian Refugees in Sydney and the Imagining of a New Iraq.” Social Analysis 48(3): 8–23.

22.

Hammond

2013. “Somali Transnational Activism and Integration in the UK: Mutually Supporting Strategies.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 39(6): 1001–17. https://doi.org/10.1080/1369183X.2013.765666.

23.

Hess

Korf

. 2014. “Tamil Diaspora and the Political Spaces of Second-Generation Activism in Switzerland.” Global Networks 14(4): 419–37. https://doi.org/10.1111/glob.12052.

24.

Huang

Ramshaw

Norman

. 2016. “Homecoming or Tourism? Diaspora Tourism Experience of Second-Generation Immigrants.” Tourism Geographies 18(1): 59–79. https://doi.org/10.1080/14616688.2015.1116597.

25.

Hunter

2021. “Iraq.” In Handbook of Christianity in the Middle East, edited by Raheb

Lamport

, 486–97. London: Rowman & Littlefield.

26.

Hunter

McCallum Guiney

. 2020. “The Quest for Equal Citizenship: Middle Eastern Christian Narratives of Migration and Inclusion in the UK.” Mashriq & Mahjar Journal of Middle East and North African Migration Studies 8(1): 15–43. https://doi.org/10.24847/v8i12020.288.

27.

Kabir

2014. “Young Somalis in Australia, the UK and the USA: An Understanding of Their Identity and Their Sense of Belonging.” Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 34(3): 259–81. https://doi.org/10.1080/13602004.2014.939556.

28.

King

Christou

. 2014. “Second-Generation ‘Return’ to Greece: New Dynamics of Transnationalism and Integration.” International Migration 52(6): 85–99. https://doi.org/10.1111/imig.12149.

29.

Koinova

2016. “Sustained vs Episodic Mobilization among Conflict-Generated Diasporas.” International Political Science Review 37(4): 500–16. https://doi.org/10.1177/0192512115591641.

30.

Koinova

. 2017. “Conflict and Cooperation in Armenian Diaspora Mobilisation for Genocide Recognition.” In Diasporas as Cultures of Co-Operation: Global and Local Perspectives, edited by Carment

Sadjed

, 111–30. London: Palgrave MacMillan.

31.

Koinova

. 2019. “Diaspora Coalition-Building for Genocide Recognition: Armenians, Assyrians and Kurds.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 42(11): 1890–910. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2019.1572908.

32.

Levitt

2009. “Roots and Routes: Understanding the Lives of the Second Generation Transnationally.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 35(7): 1225–42. https://doi.org/10.1080/13691830903006309.

33.

Lukasik

2016. “Conquest of Paradise: Secular Binds and Coptic Political Mobilisation.” Middle East Critique 25(2): 107–25. https://doi.org/10.1080/19436149.2016.1144910.

34.

Marzouki

2016. “The US Coptic Diaspora and the Limit of Polarization.” Journal of Immigrant and Refugee Studies 14(3): 261–76. https://doi.org/10.1080/15562948.2016.1210712.

35.

McCallum

2010. Christian Religious Leadership in the Middle East: The Political Role of the Patriarch. Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press.

36.

McCallum

. 2019. “Shared Religion but Still a Marginalized Other: Middle Eastern Christians’ Encounters with Political Secularism in the United Kingdom.” Journal of Church and State 61(2): 242–61. https://doi.org/10.1093/jcs/csy006.

37.

Menjivar

2002. “Living in Two Worlds? Guatemalan-Origin Children in the United States and Emerging Transnationalism.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 28(3): 531–52. https://doi.org/10.1080/13691830220146590.

38.

Monier

2020. “The Chaldean Patriarch and the Discourse of ‘Inclusive Citizenship’: Restructuring the Political Representation of Christians in Iraq Since 2003.” Religion, State & Society 48(5): 361–77. https://doi.org/10.1080/09637494.2020.1835293.

39.

Moon

Choi

. 2013. “Ethnic Giving Versus Mainstream Giving by Foreign-Born Korean Immigrants in California.” Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Quarterly 42(4): 803–27. https://doi.org/10.1177/0899764012448235.

40.

Olliff

2018. “From Resettled Refugees to Humanitarian Actors: Refugee Diaspora Organizations and Everyday Humanitarianism.” New Political Science 40(4): 658–74. https://doi.org/10.1080/07393148.2018.1528059.

41.

O’Neill

2015. “In the Path of Heroes: Second-Generation Tamil-Canadians After the LTTE.” Identities 22(1): 124–39. https://doi.org/10.1080/1070289X.2014.931233.

42.

Orjuela

2020. “Passing on the Torch of Memory: Transitional Justice and the Transfer of Diaspora Identity Across Generations.” International Journal of Transitional Justice 14: 360–80. https://doi.org/10.1093/ijtj/ijaa005.

43.

Pizzo

2015. “The ‘Coptic Question’ in Post-Revolutionary Egypt: Citizenship, Democracy, Religion.” Ethnic and Racial Studies 38(14): 2598–613. https://doi.org/10.1080/01419870.2015.1061136.

44.

Portes

Escobar

Arana

. 2009. “Divided or Convergent Loyalties? The Political Incorporation Process of Latin American Immigrants in the United States.” International Journal of Comparative Sociology 50(2): 103–36. https://doi.org/10.1177/0020715208101595.

45.

Portes

Rambaut

. 2001. Legacies: The Story of the Immigrant Second Generation. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

46.

Rassam

2010. Christianity in Iraq. Leominster: Gracewing.

47.

Rowe

2020. “The Church and the Street: Copts and Interest Representation from Mubarak to Sisi.” Religion, State & Society 48(5): 343–60. https://doi.org/10.1080/09637494.2020.1849894.

48.

Saey

Skey

. 2016. “The Politics of Trans-National Belonging: A Study of the Experiences of Second-Generation Egyptians During a Period of Socio-Political Change in Egypt.” Migration Studies 4(1): 59–75. https://doi.org/10.1093/migration/mnv019.

49.

Schmoller

2018. “Middle Eastern Minorities in Diaspora.” In Routledge Handbook of Minorities in the Middle East, edited by Rowe

, 351–69. London: Routledge.

50.

Schmoller

. 2020. “Anti-Islamic Narratives of Middle Eastern Diaspora Christians: An Interdisciplinary Analytical Framework.” In Eastern and Oriental Christianity in the Diaspora, edited by Teule

Verheyden

, 189–211. Leuven: Peeters.

51.

Shain

Barth

. 2003. “Diasporas and International Relations Theory.” International Organizations 57: 449–79. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0020818303573015.

52.

Waite

Cook

. 2011. “Belonging among Diasporic African Communities in the UK: Plurilocal Homes and Simultaneity of Place Attachments.” Emotion, Space and Society 4: 238–48. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.emospa.2010.08.001.

53.

Werbner

2002. “The Place Which is Diaspora: Citizenship, Religion and Gender in the Making of Chaordic Transnationalism.” Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies 28(1): 119–33. https://doi.org/10.1080/13691830120103967.