Ethnic voting and agenda framing under authoritarian reversal: a survey experiment in Myanmar

Abstract

Identity politics suggests that voters favor co-ethnic candidates, but little is known about how ethnic voting operates when democratic institutions collapse. Using a survey vignette experiment in post-coup Myanmar, this study examines how candidate ethnicity and agenda framing (local vs. national) jointly shape voter evaluations under authoritarian reversal. The findings show that local agenda appeals do not increase support for co-ethnic candidates, yet the same appeals are heavily penalized when advanced by non-co-ethnic candidates. The results suggest that under authoritarian disruption, identity cues function less as sources of in-group reward, but more as credibility filters that screen out out-group candidates. Correlational analyses further show that ethnic voting is associated with perceived ethnic identity, experiences of discrimination, and interethnic distrust, rather than categorical group membership alone. These findings demonstrate that ethnic voting is attitudinally mediated and that political uncertainty reshapes identity-based heuristics while limiting the persuasive power of policy appeals.