Introduction to special issue: Inclusion and commissions in peace processes

Abstract

Academics have found, and policymakers have advocated for, inclusion arrangements in post-conflict societies as a means to reduce conflict recurrence. Although previous research has primarily focused on power-sharing or the inclusion of women in peace negotiations to prevent conflict recurrence, there is a gap in the literature regarding the role of inclusion in commissions in supporting peace. This gap is particularly surprising considering that commissions are often established as part of peace agreements and are entrusted with vital tasks in monitoring and verifying peace agreements. This special issue places inclusion in commissions within peace processes at its centre. By bringing together internationally renowned scholars in this field, we offer new insights into who is included and how this inclusion takes place. We approach these questions using diverse methodological approaches and examine various regions worldwide, aiming to provide a comprehensive understanding of commissions and inclusion globally.

Introduction

Existing studies on specific, but narrow, aspects of inclusion in peace and reconciliation find that it is vital to end conflict, prevent the re-emergence of violence and build peaceful societies (Donais and McCandless, 2017; Krause et al., 2018; Paffenholz, 2015). In particular, power-sharing research has found that the inclusion of conflict parties in key political institutions can end and prevent the recurrence of violence (Farag et al., 2022; Hartzell and Hoddie, 2003, 2005; Jarstad and Nilsson, 2008; Wucherpfennig, 2021). Similarly, research on women, peace and security has found that the inclusion of women in peace negotiations leads to longer-lasting peace (Krause et al., 2018; O’Reilly et al., 2015). Outside academia, policymakers and practitioners recognize the value of inclusion, for peace and reconciliation, as evidenced in key United Nations (UN) actions, such as the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security.

Yet one form of inclusion that has received relatively little focused attention is inclusion in commissions. This is particularly surprising given that commission-type institutions are not only an important modality that provides for wider inclusion in peacebuilding but are also very frequently established. Between 1990 and 2018 alone over 580 independent commissions were established as part of peace agreements. Commissions can be defined as institutions which possess and exercise specialized public authority, but are neither directly elected nor directly managed by elected officials (Thatcher and Stone Sweet, 2002). They are mandated to carry out vital tasks including verifying the implementation of peace agreements, resolving disputes and administering elections. The successful completion of such tasks is vital to the sustainability of peace accords. Fundamentally, commissions are also a microcosm of the wider peace process where the same challenges unfold as in other areas of peace processes. Hence, by exploring the specific aspect of inclusion in commissions, we can increase our general understanding of inclusion in peace processes more widely.

This special issue remedies this existing deficit in both our theoretical and empirical understanding of inclusion in commissions in peace processes. This comprehensive, state of the art collection of articles serves as a forum to provide novel, empirically grounded and useful answers for both academics and practitioners to questions about the impact of inclusion in commissions on peacebuilding. This collection brings together leading scholars who work on different aspects of peacemaking and peacebuilding and employs in-depth case studies, comparative case studies and large N-statistical analyses. By bringing together these different methodological approaches and regional foci, this special issue provides in-depth knowledge of the intricate operations of individual commissions as well as generalizable findings. The variety of cases under study aims to capture the diversity of the work that commissions are carrying out and the range of contexts in which this work is being conducted. The studies focusing on single cases examine the operation of commissions across Europe, Latin America, Africa and Asia where both the conflict causes and contexts vary greatly.

Independent commissions – prevalence, foundation rational and benefits

The use of independent commissions is not restricted to post-conflict contexts; rather, they have been an increasingly popular tool of governance in North America and across Europe for a long time – for instance, around energy regulation. Such bodies possess and exercise some delegated specialized public authority, separate from that of other institutions, but are neither directly elected by the people, nor directly managed by elected officials. They exclude state powers organized within the bureaucracy, when the exercise of such powers are placed under the direct control of ministers and the civil service but include a specialized organ or agency that may be linked to a ministry in certain formal ways, so long as that body is not merely a department or administrative office of a larger bureaucratic entity (Thatcher and Stone Sweet, 2002).

Functionalist justifications can be used to explain the creation of these bodies in non-conflict environments. The credibility hypothesis argues that political sovereigns are willing to delegate important powers to independent groups to increase the credibility of their policy commitments (Majone, 2001). The incentive for decision-makers to delegate certain tasks to an independent commission is also explained by its ability to lower the political cost of making decisions and the increasing technical complexity of policymaking (Thatcher and Stone Sweet, 2002). However, these logics are also applicable in post-conflict contexts, in some cases even more acutely (see Neudorfer and Walsh, 2025).

There is also an undeniable snowball effect: where commissions are used in one sector, the likelihood that they will be established for others increases (Thatcher, 2002). Similarly, where they are used in one state or region there is often a contagion effect, where other states also adopt their use. These snowball and contagion effects may explain the prevalence of these commissions in certain peace agreements. Where a specific role has been delegated to a commission with relative success, conflict parties appear more likely to choose delegation for further issues. For example, the commissions were first used to navigate the contentious issue of disarmament during the Northern Ireland peace process and were then also established to manage issues such as police reform, monitoring ceasefires and addressing transitional justice issues (Walsh, 2017). Applying mechanisms which have had some success from one accord to another is also common, especially where the same international actors are serving as mediators. This snowball effect explains the prevalence of independent commissions in post-conflict states and underscores the importance of understanding the role they play, including in creating inclusive processes.

These explanations of the logics of delegation highlight the potential benefits of the process in terms of achieving a superior outcome, compared to a situation where the same role was filled by existing politicians or civil servants. Thatcher and Stone Sweet (2002: 18) note that these superior outcomes can include ‘more “efficient” policy making procedures [. . .], enhanced rights protection, lower inflation, and so on’. The claim that independent commission-type institutions produce superior outcomes has been one of the main ways in which their work has been framed as legitimate. This has been employed to counter claims that as they do not include traditional democratic accountability, through electoral means, such institutions are illegitimate. Process legitimacy argues that these institutions are justifiable not because of the result of their actions but because the procedures they use are superior. For example, in non-conflict environments, it has been argued that these institutions have created ‘elaborate consultation procedures’ opening previously closed processes (Thatcher and Stone Sweet, 2002: 19). The perceived legitimacy of a commission is vital if it is to be able to complete its mandate and support the non-recurrence of violence. Yet both outcome and procedural legitimacy claims face additional challenges in post-conflict contexts. Walsh (2015) found that the Parades Commission in Northern Ireland was criticized in terms of both the outcomes it produced and the procedures it used. This highlights the importance of considering ways to bolster a commission’s legitimacy during the institutional design phase. One way of doing so is to ensure that commissions are inclusive. When political institutions are broadly representative of the society which they govern, their activities can be viewed as more legitimate. The inclusion of groups such as women and youth can increase the perceived legitimacy of an institution as it is seen to be more reflective of the needs and experiences of diverse groups in society. The need to include multiple voices for institutions to be seen as legitimate is especially important in a post-conflict context where exclusion of specific groups is often one of the root causes of the conflict.

Using commissions as a modality of inclusion also has potential benefits in overcoming challenges associated with inclusion. Including a range of different actors in decision-making during peace processes has normative and instrumental support. As noted above, existing studies on inclusion in peace processes find that it plays an important role in peacemaking and peacebuilding (Bell and Pospisil, 2017; Donais and McCandless, 2017; Krause et al., 2018). Yet one of the arguments against increasing the number of actors included in peace processes is that this may make securing compromises and reaching agreements more difficult (Cuhadar and Druckman, 2023). Inclusion through commissions may be able to address this potential challenge in several ways. Firstly, commissions can act as a coordination mechanism. Nilsson et al. (2020) noted that a body of scholarly knowledge exists on coordination as it relates to third-party intervention in peace negotiations. Coordination is also necessary where various domestics actors and/or a mix of domestic and external actors are included in efforts to fulfil specific peacebuilding tasks. Commissions can provide an institutional framework that organizes and manages the different actors working on a specific task. This can address issues such as information asymmetries by providing a forum for communication. Secondly, through regular interaction on commissions, actors can deliberate outside the more adversarial partisan political environment, making it easier to reach shared understanding. The responsibility sharing that commissions offer also insulates members from being held individually responsible for unpopular decisions, lowering the cost of compromise (Neudorfer and Walsh, 2025).

Inclusion on commissions in peace processes

Inclusion is a complex and multifaceted concept. In order to comprehensively explore the role of inclusion in commissions in peace processes societies, the papers in this special issue focus on two different ways of thinking about inclusion – who is included and how are actors included (i.e. through what modes)? Focusing on these important elements of inclusion allows us to examine which actors (who) are brought into the work on commissions, including conflict parties (Lorentzen, 2025), civil society actors (Cuhadar and Druckman, 2025; Ross and Bramble, 2025), international actors (Neudorfer and Walsh, 2025), and inclusion based on specified demographic characteristics such as gender (Walsh and Murphy, 2025) or age. The how question recognizes that inclusion can be the result of rules or practice, and that it can take different forms including commission membership or consultations (Cuhadar and Druckman, 2025; Neudorfer and Walsh, 2025). It is equally or perhaps even more important to consider when inclusion occurs and to what end – the effects. It is necessary to explore the conditions under which different types of inclusion occur (Lorentzen, 2025; Walsh and Murphy, 2025). Furthermore, the implications of inclusion in commissions must be analysed to fully understand the role commissions play in peace process societies. Here we must consider whether inclusion prevents the recurrence of violence (Johnson, 2025; Neudorfer and Walsh, 2025) or the emergence of violence (Alderman, 2025), or supports broader and deeper peacebuilding and reconciliation (Cuhadar and Druckman, 2025; Murphy, 2024; Ross and Bramble, 2025).

Who?

The inclusion of conflict parties in different state institutions, typically referred to as power-sharing, is a common conflict management tool. Studying power-sharing provisions adds to our understanding of how conflict groups can be included in decision-making and the effect of this on conflict termination. Emerging research has outlined the impact of power-sharing across different types of commissions (Fontana et al., 2021) and when this occurs (Walsh and Neudorfer, 2023).

Yet examining power-sharing alone does not allow us to understand inclusion. Power-sharing is frequently blind to the political marginalization of other groups, including women and minorities (Agarin et al., 2019; Byrne and McCulloch, 2012). Over the last decade, this concern has been the focus of an emerging body of scholarship. The earliest work in this area focused on the potential of power-sharing to further exclude women from the political sphere (Kennedy et al., 2016), whereas more recent work has also looked at sexual minorities (Nagle, 2016) and other ethnic minorities (Juon, 2020). Furthermore, despite arguments that power-sharing leads to the further exclusion of groups not seen as central to the conflict, some research has found a positive relationship between inclusion provisions targeting different groups (Bell, 2015; Bell and McNicholl, 2019). Separate from power-sharing research, practitioners of peacemaking and peacebuilding have increasingly noted the importance of and advocated for the inclusion of different societal groups in peace processes, identifying specific demographic groups such as women, sexual and gender minorities, and youth, whose inclusion in peace processes should be promoted. This is evidenced in key UN actions, such as the adoption of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security and UN Security Council Resolution 2250 on Youth, Peace and Security.

Yet scholarship that is concerned with the inclusion of previously marginalized groups, such as women and youth, tends to explore their inclusion in the negotiation process. Although negotiations are a key step in peace processes, the shape that new and reformed public decision-making institutions take in the post-agreement phase is critically important. In the months years, and decades after an agreement has concluded, the terms it provides for the inclusion of different groups across such institutions will determine who makes decisions of profound importance. Examining inclusion within commissions allows us to examine the provisions and practice of inclusion, opening new understandings of inclusion in post-agreement societies.

This work underlines the importance of examining when historically marginalized actors, such as women, are included as commission members both through the adoption of inclusion provisions – for example, gender quotas (Walsh and Murphy, 2025) – or in practice – for example, as representatives of conflict groups (Lorentzen, 2025).

There have also been broader calls for the greater involvement of ‘civil society’ groups. Many studies have confirmed the important role of civil society in peace processes (Belloni, 2001; Orjuela, 2003; Paffenholz, 2014). Yet recent research finds that ‘regardless of the form of participation, it is important to consider if a particular civil society group or political party is linked to and shares the agenda of the warring parties’ (Nilsson et al., 2020: 245). Commissions are one of the key modalities through which civil society can be included. Representatives of specific organizations or sectors of society can be appointed as commissioners or can be consulted in other ways (see below). By examining the inclusion of civil society in the work of commissions we can better understand the advantages and challenges of its involvement in peace processes (Cuhadar and Druckman, 2025; Ross and Bramble, 2025).

Post-agreement international involvement in peace processes is common practice. Walter outlined how third parties can provide security guarantees in post-agreement contexts (Bercovitch and Jackson, 2001; Walter, 1999). However, external or international actors may also be assigned (or take on) roles beyond that of verifier or guarantor in the post-agreement context. The impact of post-agreement international involvement is hotly debated, with long-standing and increasing criticism that such interventions reflect the political priorities of the interveners, are not context-sensitive and can disempower domestic actors (e.g. Richmond, 2006; Selby, 2013). Osier Hampson (1997) argued that broad international intervention in peace agreements can lack legitimacy, and the involved actors may be viewed as acting to progress their own interests in the state or region. International actors may also be viewed as having an insufficient understanding of the local circumstances. Furthermore, excessive reliance on international actors to promote or incentivize domestic actors into arrangements can be indicative of a lack of a domestic spirit of cooperation or accommodation (Roeder and Rothchild, 2005). However, it is critical to note that how international involvement takes place matters. The targeted involvement of international actors within domestic institutions may allow them to lend expertise or financial support, while still building domestic ownership and capacity. For example, focusing on Northern Ireland, Walsh and Doyle (2018) found that international involvement in commissions, when combined with domestic conflict party representation, was helpful in overcoming post-agreement obstacles to peacebuilding. Examining whether the inclusion of international actors in commissions supports peace, and, if so, what roles they should be afforded is a key question that must be addressed (Neudorfer and Walsh, 2025).

How?

Specific actors or groups may be included in commissions as members, staff or through consultations or participation in public meetings. A full understanding of inclusion in commissions requires us to consider these different modes of inclusion. Furthermore, inclusion can also take place with or without specific rules within the commission mandates requiring that specific actors or groups are part of commissions or consulted by them. This underlines the importance of examining both cases of inclusion as the result of specified rules and inclusion that occurs as practice to ascertain whether there are differences in terms of impact.

The impact of gender quotas is found to be closely linked to the type of quota used and sanctions for non-compliance (Dahlerup and Freidenvall, 2005). Following this logic, rules that mandate inclusion of certain groups or demographics may be more effective for independent commissions than measures adopted to increase participation in other state institutions such as the legislature. Rules adopted for independent commissions tend to closely resemble reserved seats for a legislature. This directly ensures the presence of the specified group in a specific proportion and cuts out any potential role for the electorate. The issue of sanctions for non-compliance has an indirect effect in relation to rules for inclusion for independent commissions. There is rarely a direct sanction but, given the direct appointment nature of the positions, selectors have very little cover where they do not follow the rules. Excuses that suitably qualified women, youth or representatives of civil society cannot be found are often less plausible than in other contexts. For example, candidates typically do not need to be members of the legislature as is the case for cabinet appointments in some systems.

Yet we must also consider the limitations of focusing on descriptive representation and how these issues are relevant to commissions. Policies of descriptive representation are challenged by questions of interest aggregation, authorization and accountability. Such issues may be particularly pertinent in relation to independent commissions. Their independent nature, including the fact that members are appointed, not elected, to their positions, means that included actors may be unaccountable to demographic groups, such as women, that they were appointed to represent. Furthermore, claims that groups such as women or youth exist as a group who share common interests is highly contested. For example, it is often alleged that gender quotas in many countries result in white middle-class women being frequently permitted to speak for all women (O’Rourke, 2014). Moreover, even where rules or practice allow actors to gain access to commissions as members, their presence is no guarantee of effective participation in decision-making processes. The formal rules for decision-making matter. Provisions that require consensus rather than majority or supra-majority voting may increase the likelihood of effective dispute resolution or support compromises (Alderman, 2025; Neudorfer and Walsh, 2025). This may support peacemaking in the short and medium term.

Practicalities limit the number of actors and groups that can be represented within commissions as members or staff. As such, exploring other modes of including input from a wider array of stakeholder is key. Consultations and public meetings are important ways that commissions can elicit the opinions of a wider section of society (Cuhadar and Druckman, 2025). In addition, mass-based approaches may come with benefits for the peace process. They can increase the legitimacy of the elite-based approaches, such as including members of civil society as commission members, by demonstrating that civil society indeed represents a significant position in the general public (Nilsson et al., 2020) Yet when adopting different ways of including civil society, formalizing or institutionalizing its role may be advantageous – anchoring peace among broader communities (Imoghibe, 2003: 307).

When?

Institutional change is most often an incremental process, but crises or shocks, such as a natural disaster, a terrorist attack or an economic recession, can induce an acceptance of different or new opportunities norms (Chappell, 2006). The creation of new political institutions or the substantial reform of existing ones offers such opportunities. During the ‘permissive’ stage of institutional creation, provisions that promote inclusion can be ‘locked in’, to counteract exclusionary dynamics which are typical of established bodies, such as gender imbalances (Mackay, 2014). The creation of new institutions during peace processes may present such opportunities. Braniff and Whiting underlined that a peace settlement is not just about ending armed conflict; it could provide the dispensation for a broader and more representative political process. It presents a unique opportunity for the conditions of new and inclusive democratic structures to be established (Braniff and Whiting, 2016). However, the ‘newness’ of these institutions should not be overstated. No institutions are truly new, even where they are the product of a completely new political system – for example, after a comprehensive peace accord that provides for new political bodies. Rather, they embody a ‘nested newness’ and are influenced by ‘legacies of the past’, which include existing patterns of power distribution and normative legacies – ‘frames of mind’ (Mackay, 2014). This is certainly true for independent commissions; although many are wholly new institutions established in peace accords, their creation (and operation) takes place within a wider societal context, and existing inclusion norms will impact their design.

Examining under what conditions inclusion occurs in commissions is a key question. For example, given that recent research found that including conflict parties on commissions supports the non-recurrence of conflict (Fontana et al., 2021) it was vital to understand when such provisions for power-sharing were built into the rules establishing commissions (Walsh and Neudorfer, 2023). Furthermore, given that existing research also supports the idea that wider inclusion supports peace, and the normative arguments against continuing patterns of historical exclusion, we must also explore when inclusion of other actors occurs. Building on work that ascertains when gender quotas are adopted in non-conflict contexts and when women are included in peace processes, we can examine when women are included in commissions (Lorentzen, 2025; Walsh and Murphy, 2025). In-depth case studies can also uncover the dynamics through which wider inclusion can be built into the work of commissions (Cuhadar and Druckman, 2025). Furthermore, we must consider the temporal aspect of commissions’ work. Commissions that are inclusive in helpful ways at specific points in the conflict cycle may in fact contribute to increasing tensions at other points (Alderman, 2025). In addition, different types of inclusion, with different aims and goals, may be appropriate at different stages of a peace process – or for the completion of specific tasks (Murphy, 2024). Given the broad range of policy areas that commissions work in, and the wider array of powers assigned to them, it is necessary to examine if and how these aspects of institutional design matter. Are commissions more influential when they work on certain issues or have specific powers (Johnson, 2025; Neudorfer and Walsh, 2025)?

Effects?

The creation of new political institutions, including independent commissions, in post-conflict peace accords offers an opportunity to restructure decision-making to be more inclusive. Inclusivity in these important state institutions can help facilitate the incorporation of a wider range of voices and concerns in peacemaking and peacebuilding. Research, in other contexts, has shown that even small numbers of women can impact the workings of, and decisions taken by, a political body through critical acts (Ayata and Tütüncü, 2008; Childs and Krook, 2009). Given the non-partisan nature of many independent commissions and the fact that their procedures are often more collaborative and less confrontational than elected politics (Fontana et al., 2021), there may also be more space for such critical acts on commissions when compared with legislatures.

Yet research on the effects of inclusivity in commissions are mixed. Neudorfer and Walsh (2025) do not find that including domestic actors beyond conflict parties supports the non-recurrence of conflict, but Cuhadar and Druckman (2023) find that it supports the broader concept of ‘durable peace’. Furthermore, we must consider the effect of inclusion beyond the understandable but narrow focus on measures of peace. Beyond instrumentalist justifications of inclusion in peace processes there are powerful normative arguments that compel us to explore ways of bringing marginalized groups voices into state decision-making. For example, Murphy (2024) highlights the potential value of allowing for dissent within a peace process.

However, greater inclusivity in commissions is not without its challenges. Issues including accountability, essentialization and intersectionality temper the positive impact of such developments. Furthermore, inclusion can be used to nefarious ends in certain contexts. For example, Alderman (2025) shows how inclusion can lead to the consolidation of the power of traditional elites, increasing societal tensions. In addition, even where commissions are inclusive of civil society actors, for example, and these actors can introduce substantive institutional changes, obstacles to impact remain. Reform proposals and legislation produced by commissions can be disregarded.

Conclusion and outline

This special issue highlights the crucial role of inclusion – both who is included and how inclusion is implemented, when this inclusion occurs and what its effects are. The articles in this issue not only employ critical, qualitative and quantitative research designs to explore various inclusion mechanisms and inclusions aspects but also focus on different regions of the world. Although this special issue focuses on the role of inclusion in commissions in building and securing peace, it also offers broader, transferable lessons to inspire future research in the area of other institutions’ design in peace processes. These include, first, lessons on the legitimacy and effectiveness of institutions: the success of institutions in peace processes seems to depend on their composition, mandate and operational dynamics, influencing their legitimacy and effectiveness. Second, lessons on power and representation in peacebuilding: the balance of power between conflict parties, civil society and international actors shapes decision-making within institutions, ultimately affecting peacebuilding efforts. Third, lessons on institutional design and functionality for peace processes: rules, procedures and practices determine whether institutions meaningfully contribute to peace processes or remain symbolic. Fourth, lessons on timing and context of institutions in peace processes: the effectiveness of institutions is closely tied to when they are established (e.g. during negotiations or post-conflict) and the conditions under which they operate.

In the following paragraphs, we provide a summary of each article, showcasing their unique contributions to the understanding of inclusion in peacebuilding.

Neudorfer and Walsh examine how inclusion rules, decision-making processes and mandates of independent commissions affect peace in their article ‘The peace-making role of independent commissions: The role of institutional design’. Recent research highlights the importance of power-sharing within these commissions to prevent the recurrence of violence. However, there has been little global examination of broader inclusion in these bodies. Using a quantitative research design approach including data from 1990 to 2016 and 580, they find that rules requiring inclusion of domestic actors beyond the conflict parties have no effect on the likelihood of conflict recurrence. However, rules for international involvement, consensus decision-making, working in security or fulfilling monitoring and verification roles have been found to statistically significantly reduce the likelihood of conflict recurrence.

Previous research identifies commitment problem as a key issue to securing peace when conflicting parties struggle to trust each other to uphold agreements. These commitment problems are influenced by factors such as conflict duration, state capacity and external enforcement. Johnson’s study, ‘Stabilizing transitions from conflict: The importance of transitional decision-making procedures’, introduces a new argument by analysing the impact of decision-making procedures within transitional institutions and how this might affect commitment problems. Using a quantitative methodological approach, she finds that delegating dispute resolution in transition institutions can reduce conflict recurrence, whereas consensus requirements in transition institutions may lead to deadlock and scepticism.

In previous work, Cuhadar and Druckman (2023) found that inclusive peace commissions, employed in 40% of peace processes in their dataset, were the most effective modality for achieving durable peace. Despite their proven impact, scholarly literature on inclusive peace commissions is sparse compared to other modalities like national dialogues and problem-solving workshops. In their article in this special issue ‘Inclusive commissions and durable peace: Lessons learned from the Liberia peace processes (1990–1996) and (2003)’, they analyse Liberia’s peace processes (1990–1996 and 2003) and demonstrate that inclusive commissions played a crucial role in achieving lasting peace. This paper highlights the contributions of four key inclusive commissions (Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC), Independent National Human Rights Commission, Governance Reform Commission and Contract and Monopolies Commission), emphasizing their role in ensuring continuity between phases of the peace process, fostering trust and strong connections between high-level decision-makers and grassroots actors, and balancing broad and deep inclusion.

From the individual and smaller case comparison, we move on to qualitative work of a larger nature. In their article ‘Sins of omission or acts of commission? Explaining the impacts of commissions on lasting peace’, Ross and Bramble propose a framework for classifying peace commissions. They argue that significant variation in commission design and their interaction with other institutions in peace or political processes may explain the lack of consensus across thematic literatures. Additionally, the prevailing focus of commission studies on specific functions or mandates, along with their narrow conception of ‘inclusion’, may overlook key aspects of commissions’ contributions.

Following on, Walsh and Murphy, in their article ‘Gender quotas and commissions in post-conflict societies’, explore gender quotas in independent commissions. Employing a qualitative explorative approach, the study examines four factors influencing the inclusion of gender quotas: the commission’s policy area, women’s pre-existing political empowerment, UN Security Council Resolution 1325 adoption, and external mediators’ roles. Using the Independent Commission in Post-Conflict Societies dataset and a case study of Colombia’s Truth, Coexistence, and Non-Recurrence Commission, the article seeks to identify initial factors promoting gender quotas, laying the groundwork for further research.

In her article ‘Explaining changes in women’s representation in peace processes: The adoption of a gender quota in the Agreement Monitoring Committee in Mali’, Lorentzen proposes a theory of gendered policy change in post-agreement committees in peace processes, which posits that policy change becomes possible through the work of critical actors when two initial conditions are met: (a) the existence of international gender equality norms, along with international pressure to promote them; and (b) women’s mobilization, including women’s activists’ use of international frameworks to advocate for gender-based reforms. The analysis shows how changes in women’s representation are facilitated by critical actors who initiate or stimulate others to support and/or promote women-friendly reforms, and how these actors used political accumulation, collaboration with women’s activists, and efforts to alter the institutional environment to affect gendered policy change. Through a micro-level analysis of the actors, factors and events that preceded the adoption of a gender quota, the article sheds light on the dynamics surrounding how important actors may be persuaded to change their minds and move from opposing women’s participation to supporting women-friendly policies.

Election commissions are crucial institutions for organizing elections, but their role often extends beyond technical management, especially in conflict-prone and post-conflict societies where their conduct can significantly influence peace and stability. Although the independent election commission model, designed to prevent manipulation by ruling parties, has become widespread, its effectiveness in fostering positive electoral outcomes remains mixed. Alderman’s study, ‘Subverting elections in Thailand: Inclusion and independence in election commission design and practice’, utilizes a qualitative research design to explore how inclusion and independence within election commissions can either promote or undermine peace and reconciliation, particularly in deeply polarized contexts.

In her article ‘Independent commission design and transitional justice in Northern Ireland: agonistic versus traditional approaches’, Murphy examines the design and impact of independent commissions on inclusion in post-conflict Northern Ireland. Using a critical research approach, she compares the agonistic approach of the Commission on Flags, Identity, Culture, and Tradition (FICT Commission) with the traditional liberal peace principles of the Northern Ireland Human Rights Commission. Through archival research and interviews, the study explores how these differing approaches affect reconciliation and inclusivity in the Northern Irish peace process.

Overall, this special issue underscores the significance of inclusion and commissions as essential considerations peace builders should consider when establishing (new) institutions, as they can play a vital role in fostering or securing peace. The success of these institutions depends on who is included and how inclusion is implemented.