The peacemaking role of independent commissions: The role of institutional design

Abstract

After a peace agreement is signed, many key peacebuilding tasks remain. Issues of mistrust between former combatants and the difficult compromises which must be made as the agreement is implemented can lead to conflict recurrence. We examine whether commissions can help to overcome these problems. Commissions provide a forum for specific challenges to be addressed in a less adversarial way. We argue that the institutional design of a commission is crucial in allowing it to support conflict non-recurrence. Although previous research highlights the importance of power-sharing in commissions, we propose that broader inclusion is necessary. Using the Independent Commissions in Post-Conflict Societies dataset, we find that rules for international involvement, consensus decision-making and monitoring/verification significantly lower the likelihood of conflict recurrence, whereas, surprisingly, domestic inclusion rules have no effect. As commission design is malleable, our findings provide practioners with levers which they can engage to help support the non-recurrence of conflict.

Keywords

Inclusion commission institutional design peace process power-sharing

Introduction

Peace processes frequently involve the radical reform of existing political institutions and the creation of new institutions. This often includes establishing independent commissions. These institutions are both common and important. Between 1990 and 2016, 580 independent commissions were established as part of peace accords. These bodies are mandated to carry out key peacemaking and peacebuilding tasks, including monitoring ceasefires and administering elections.

Interestingly, the creation of such institutions in the peace process context mirrors increasing delegation to similar institutions in non-conflict environments (Walsh, 2020). Like their non-conflict affected counterparts, commissions ‘(a) possess and exercise some grant of specialised public authority, separate from that of other institutions, but (b) are neither directly elected by the people, nor directly managed by elected officials’ (Thatcher and Stone Sweet, 2002: 2). Recent research has underscored the importance of power-sharing in independent commissions, both demonstrating that power-sharing in such institutions is associated with the non-recurrence of violence (Fontana et al., 2021) and examining under what conditions power-sharing rules are adopted in commissions (Walsh and Neudorfer, 2023). These studies underline the necessity of examining who is included in these post-conflict institutions and how this affects peace duration. However, existing scholarship has not yet conducted a global examination of the impact of inclusion in commissions beyond the conflict parties. In this article, we focus on whether rules for the inclusion of domestic and international actors, decision-making rules and tasks assigned affect its ability to support the non-recurrence of violence.

We propose that the institutional design of independent commissions in post-conflict societies is crucial in determining their ability to support peace. Combining three strands of literature – applying the general research on commissions in non-conflict-affected societies to conflict-affected societies, the small body of case-study-focused research on commissions in post-conflict societies, and the literature on general inclusion in post-conflict society, to the study of commissions – we show theoretically and test empirically how independent commissions play a pivotal role in fostering peace by establishing new or substantially reformed institutional spaces. Broadly, these spaces facilitate collaboration by offering a platform to address particular issues. Specifically, the institutional design allows for the involvement of a range of actors including internationals, cooperative decision-making, and the monitoring and verification of the peace agreement (or aspects of it).

Using the Independent Commissions in Post-Conflict Societies (ICPCS) dataset of 580 commissions tied to peace agreements, we analysed their institutional design. Results show no significant effect of including domestic actors beyond conflict parties. However, rules requiring international involvement and consensus decision-making significantly reduce conflict recurrence. In prolonged, violent conflicts with peacekeeping forces and lower wealth or policy levels, consensus decision-making cuts recurrence by 47%, underscoring its importance. Commissions tasked with monitoring and verification also play a critical role. These findings highlight the pivotal role of commission design (who is included and how decisions are made) in fostering stability in post-conflict societies.

This article is structured in five parts. Firstly, we outline the logics for the creation of commission-type institutions and suggest why they may be well placed to support peace. Secondly, we outline how research on different aspects of peace processes leads us to expect that commissions with certain characteristics will be more likely to contribute to the non-recurrence of violence. We derive four testable hypotheses. Thirdly, we describe our research design, explaining how we carried out the empirical analysis. Fourthly, we present our results, noting which of our initial four hypotheses are supported. Finally, we discuss these results, exploring the potential reasons for surprising results and the significance of our findings for the academy and practitioners of institutional design in both conflict and non-conflict environments.

Commissions and peace: existing literature, new arguments and hypotheses

How do independent commissions maintain peace? Limited research directly addresses this, but three literature strands provide valuable insights. First, studies on commissions in non-conflict settings offer transferable lessons for post-conflict scenarios.¹ Second, the small body of work on commissions in conflict contexts informs their specific role in peacebuilding. Third, scholarship on inclusion in peace processes examines how institutional inclusivity can reduce or exacerbate conflict recurrence. By synthesizing these strands, we identify how commissions’ design and roles contribute to peace, offering actionable insights for policymakers on creating effective post-conflict institutions.

Commissions in non-conflict and conflict environments: the basis

What do we know about commissions in non-conflict environments and how does this knowledge help us to understand the role commissions play in post-conflict societies? Seminal work on commission-type institutions in non-conflict environments focuses on three main reasons why the principals – the politicians who have the power to carry out certain roles – delegate these to agents – the commissions that fulfil these roles (see Gilardi, 2007; Thatcher, 2002; Thatcher and Stone Sweet, 2002).² The following paragraphs outline how these logics operate and apply them to the peace process context, giving an overview of how they suggest that commissions may contribute to the non-recurrence of violence. In short, commissions help to stop recurrences of civil war as they help to overcome credible commitment problems, reduce the costs of decision making and provide technical expertise. They establish a forum where effective action can take place despite the challenging context.

Firstly, commission-type institutions enable politicians to overcome credible commitment problems. As Thatcher and Stone Sweet (2002) outlined, they enable politicians to ‘resolve commitment problems (agents are expected to work to enhance the credibility of promises made, either between multiple principals, or vis-à-vis principals and their constituents, given underlying collective action problems)’ (4). Research has found that the creation of such institutions as a way of overcoming credible commitment problems is particularly important in unpredictable or volatile political environments. It enables current actors to commit future majorities and makes it more difficult for any such future majorities to rapidly or radically change current policies as it would require the reform of the statutory frameworks that provide the commission-type institutions with their mandates (Bovens and Schillemans, 2020).

The logic of delegating tasks to commissions to address commitment problems in non-conflict contexts also applies in conflict settings, highlighting their role in preventing violence recurrence. Intra-state conflicts often involve credible commitment challenges – for example, disarmament, demobilization or resource distribution – that create security dilemmas and hinder peace agreements (Walter, 2002). Independent commissions help resolve these challenges by operating beyond political cycles. To be effective, commissions must assure conflict parties that their interests are considered, often incorporating power-sharing provisions to secure participation in decision-making and implementation (Walsh and Neudorfer, 2023).³ This approach underscores the importance of inclusion, decision-making processes and the level of threat in determining the areas where commissions are most effective in supporting peace.

Secondly, the creation of independent commissions can also result from the principals’ desire to lower the cost of decision-making. As Bovens and Schillemans (2020) argue: ‘From the perspective of elected politicians, delegating to non-majoritarian institutions also can be attractive because it offers many opportunities for blame management’ (6). Although accountability is important, in specific situations creating distance between politicians and a particular decision can be to the benefit of the wider community. For example, independent regulatory commissions are seen as important in preventing the development of ‘the unholy alliance of politicians and business’, ensuring that regulatory processes are not subject to undue partisan influence (Wilks and Bartle, 2002: 151).

Independent commissions play a crucial role in preventing violence recurrence after peace agreements. Such agreements, often compromises ending intra-state conflicts without decisive victories, require unpopular concessions to succeed. Attributing these decisions to political or military leaders can provoke backlash, undermining the peace accord’s benefits and raising conflict risks. Independent commissions, through collective decision-making, offer a less politically costly forum for implementing reforms and concessions. This shields key leaders from direct blame, supporting peacebuilding efforts and reducing the likelihood of renewed violence.

Delegation in non-conflict contexts is often driven by the increasing technical complexity of policy fields, which makes it difficult for politicians to engage in policy-making. As a result, ‘[d]elegation to agencies of “unsexy” technical policy making and implementation functions became more attractive’ (Thatcher, 2002: 132). In post-conflict contexts, this complexity, combined with a lack of expertise among political leaders, can hinder peacebuilding efforts. Leaders, whether government or rebel, may have specialized experience, such as military backgrounds, but often lack expertise in other critical areas. Conflicts may also weaken existing institutions’ capacities, prompting the establishment of commissions with the necessary resources and expertise to manage complex policy areas. This highlights the importance of involving international actors who bring additional capacities and employing consensus decision-making to utilize all available knowledge.

How commissions contribute to non-recurrence: creating space for effective action to address key challenges

Taking this research together, we propose that independent commissions contribute to peace because they create a new, or greatly reformed, institutional space for different actors to work together on a specified problem while reducing costs, overcoming commitment problems and providing necessary capacity. Although conflict divisions may persist, commissions often align their actions and recommendations with best practices and include a broader membership beyond conflict parties, incorporating domestic and international actors and consensus-based decision-making. These commissions facilitate regular, structured collaboration outside polarized environments, often with expert input. Their technical expertise in complex and sensitive areas, such as security and verification, helps political leaders make decisions in ways that prevent the recurrence of violence.

Peacebuilding and preventing conflict recurrence is complex, and commissions alone cannot ensure peace. They are part of a broader dynamic that can either support peace or contribute to renewed violence. Commissions assist other actors, including conflict parties, in overcoming challenges in peace processes such as Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration (DDR), security sector reform, and post-agreement elections through direct interventions and enabling positive responses from other actors.

Current literature on commissions in non-conflict contexts focuses on independent bodies which provide a regulatory function (for instance, in the energy sector) and how this affects economic competition levels in a country, for example (Lenzi and Neudorfer, 2017). Given that the post-conflict environment is very different, commissions provided for in peace agreements tend to be assign different types of tasks (see also Walsh and Neudorfer, 2023 for more details). The commissions can be divided into three categories based on the role which they are assigned: monitoring and verification, implementation and administration. We draw on Roeder’s (2005) power-dividing theory to increase our understanding of the role commissions play in post-conflict societies. Although Roeder’s work focused on the traditional separation of powers, he also referred to the possible role of ‘independent special purpose administrations’ (e.g. commissions), highlighting that ‘by creating independent organs with specialized decision-making authority, power-dividing balances efficient decisionmaking in specific areas against the dangers of tyranny by a single majority across issue areas’ (2005: 63).

All three types of commissions – monitoring and verification, implementation and administration – can help maintain peace and prevent renewed violence. For instance, verification commissions can clarify ceasefire breaches through providing nuanced assessments of events that may seem to breach a ceasefire, outlining how a specific attack was not sanctioned by a rebel group leadership, and thereby preventing escalation. Implementation commissions can reduce violence by effectively managing DDR programmes and removing weapons. Administrative commissions that oversee free and fair elections can help ensure that rebel groups have access to political power, reducing the likelihood of a return to violence.

Commissions operate independently from the executive and legislature, often outside standard civil service structures, with significant discretion in non-conflict contexts (Thatcher, 2002). In post-conflict settings, peace agreements vary in detailing commission procedures. As well as being tasked with specific goals like verifying disarmament or administering elections, commissions often determine how to achieve these goals (Walsh, 2017). Their legitimacy is bolstered by their origins in peace agreements, signalling consensus among negotiating parties, especially when such agreements are widely celebrated. International involvement further enhances their authority by increasing capacity and perceived neutrality.

Commissions are more effective than politicians or civil servants not only in non-conflict contexts (Thatcher and Stone Sweet, 2002) but also especially in post-conflict contexts where other actors face greater constraints. Post-agreement elections take time, delaying the formation of new elected bodies, and civil services or local non-governmental organizations (NGOs) may lack credibility due to perceived biases. Although international NGOs may have expertise, they often lack local knowledge and legitimacy. Commissions, however, can be established quickly, tailored to address peacebuilding challenges and provide a neutral and effective alternative.

The work of a commission in Northern Ireland demonstrates how such bodies can effectively address key peacebuilding challenges that other institutions might struggle with. Policing reform was particularly contentious during the peace process, and agreement among conflict parties proved elusive. The task of making reform recommendations was delegated to the Independent Commission on Policing in Northern Ireland (ICP). The ICP emphasized that its proposals adhered to policing best practices and were informed by expert consultations. Its members also brought relevant expertise, and the commission’s establishment under a peace agreement endorsed in referenda gave it added authority (Walsh, 2017). The focus on expertise, its mandate from the peace agreement, the inclusion of representatives from both conflict communities and a collaborative approach were crucial in resolving the policing reform impasse.

When the British government resisted implementing some of the ICP’s more sensitive recommendations, such as a 50:50 Protestant/Catholic recruitment quota, these recommendations were strongly supported not only by commission members but also by international leaders like then-US Vice President Al Gore. This external backing ensured the ICP’s success in preventing conflict recurrence, securing implementation of its recommendations and preventing policing from undermining the peace process. Additionally, the reforms gained support from the Catholic community, enabling the police to more effectively counter attacks by groups opposing the 1998 peace agreement.

This example also illustrates how commissions are part of a wider dynamic in peace processes and directly affect the prevention of civil war recurrence in the case of Northern Ireland. More broadly Dyrstad et al. (2021) recently found that implementation of peace agreement commitments, including in Northern Ireland, are associated with higher levels of political trust which may make the emergence of violence less likely. As such, the ICP’s key role in ensuring that provisions were implemented is also highly relevant here. Yet issues such as disarmament and overseeing cultural parades, that were managed by other commissions in Northern Ireland, did result in violence and the suspension of institutions provided for in the peace agreement. This underlines that not all commissions are equally likely to support the non-recurrence of conflict, so we must examine what specific features allow commissions to support peace. Hence, it is important to study different types of commissions and their capacity to prevent civil war recurrence.

Inclusion, decision-making and policy area: the specifics of institutional design

Next, we will outline how the institutional design of commissions encourages or hinders peacebuilding. From these arguments we will derive four testable hypotheses on aspects of institutional design and how likely these are to enable commissions to contribute to the non-recurrence of conflict. Key elements of institutional design support the ability of commissions to function as spaces for collaborative and effective action to address the major challenges to peace.

Institutional design: domestic actors, independent commissions and peace

Research highlights a link between involving domestic actors beyond conflict parties and reducing conflict recurrence. Krause et al. (2018) found that women signatories in peace agreements improved implementation and reduced violence reoccurrence, and Simpson (2018) showed that youth inclusion supported successful peacebuilding. As O’Rourke (2014: 5) observes, ‘the hope is that by changing the players, the nature of the game will change in turn’. This aligns with delegation logic, where transferring decisions to ‘agents’ can address challenges effectively, supported by emerging research on commissions in peace processes (Johnson, 2025). Including civil society enhances accountability and transparency, making commitments more enforceable (Nilsson, 2012; Wanis-St John and Kew, 2008). In Northern Ireland, the absence of local actors in the disarmament commission initially hindered trust, prompting the addition of two local religious observers (Walsh, 2017). Overall, commissions have proven vital for inclusion in peace processes (Cuhadar and Druckman, 2025; McCandless, 2018; Murphy, 2024; O’Reilly et al., 2015; Paffenholz et al., 2016). This research supports the following prediction:

Hypothesis 1: Provisions for the inclusion of domestic actors beyond the conflict parties in a commission make conflict recurrence less likely.

Institutional design: international involvement, independent commissions and peace

Research investigating the influence of international engagement in peace processes has predominantly centred on security guarantees, technical expertise and the institutionalized dynamics of international–local hybridity. However, the empirical findings from research examining the relationship between international involvement and peace outcomes is mixed. The provision of security guarantees is positively associated with the non-recurrence of conflict (Fortna and Howard, 2008; Walter, 1997, 1999). Additional external assistance might be required as conflict severely impacts the capacity of the state and its institutions (Hampson, 1997), and international actors may have extensive experience in peacebuilding (Barnett, 2006). However, there are many valid criticisms of international involvement, including that the external actors follow their own agendas, have insufficient regard for the local conditions, lack legitimacy, short-circuit the development of domestic good governance (Hampson, 1997; Lotz, 2010) and often rely wholly on liberal peacebuilding which delivers a low-quality and fraught peace (Richmond, 2006). The use of commissions as a way of harnessing the benefits of international involvement while limiting the disadvantages has been underlined in case studies (Schneckener, 2002; Walsh and Doyle, 2018). Commissions can facilitate the involvement of international actors in a way that allows the integration of their capacity – technical and financial – with domestic knowledge and ownership. This may create positive conditions for addressing issues that are technically complex or require significant capabilities – in line with the logic of delegation that underlines its ability to address technical complexity.

However, in the post-conflict context, political sensitivity rather than complexity may motivate the delegation of tasks to commissions and the inclusion of internationals, rightly or wrongly seen as more neutral than political leaders – directly in line with arguments related to credible commitments and delegation. The relative success of both the aforementioned ICP and the Independent Monitoring Commission (IMC) – which reported on security normalization in the region by the British government and on activity by groups such as the Irish Republican Army (IRA) – in Northern Ireland support this understanding. Combining strong international expertise with local knowledge from Northern Ireland and/or Britain and Ireland meant that commissions had the credibility needed to complete difficult tasks which were vital to supporting the fragile political institutions in the year after the 1998 peace agreement. Given the ability of commissions to maximize the advantages of and limit the drawbacks of international involvement it would lead us to expect the following:

Hypothesis 2: Provisions for international involvement in an independent commission make conflict recurrence less likely.

Institutional design: decision-making, independent commissions and peace

Simple majority decision-making rules can undermine the value of establishing a commission generally, and specifically of making commissions inclusive. As Fontana et al. (2021) note in relation to power-sharing, it is important to consider not only who is represented (the identity of members of a state decision-making body) but also how they can participate in decision-making. In Lijphart’s (1969) original writing on power-sharing, he noted that it was cooperative behaviour rather than a specific institutional design that supported the stabilization of political situations in heterogeneous societies. However, specific institutional design elicits specific behaviours and so there is an indirect link between formal institutional design and political stability or peace (Bormann et al., 2019). A rule that obliges that decisions made by the commission must be made by ‘consensus’, or using equivalent language, will support collaboration and guard against majoritarianism. A formal requirement for consensus decision-making may incentivize prolonged discussion within a commission. Given the divided nature of post-conflict societies, discussions can be fraught and conflictual. Yet the specific conditions in commissions help avoid this impasse. Commission members are not working in the adversarial party political context that can discourage compromise and they often have access to considerable expertise. This helps them to rely on norms of ‘best practice’ in relation to a specific policy area. So commission members, although not abandoning their identities and associated conflict narratives, may be able to agree after a period of discussion that ‘outcomes are right or fair’ (Mansbridge et al., 2010: 70). Furthermore, the collective nature of decisions can insulate individual members of commissions from personal attacks. Consensus decision-making can also protect commission members from retribution, which may be particularly important in the post-conflict context. The fact that members, often from different backgrounds, can support the decision increases the likelihood that it will be accepted or supported, especially where the status of the commission is invoked by commission members or powerful allies. This was the case for both the ICP and IMC in Northern Ireland (introduced above) (Walsh, 2017). The consensus decision-making may not have been widely known by the public initially but it was stressed when carrying out their work and this increased their credibility, contributing to their relative success. Taken together this suggests the following:

Hypothesis 3: Consensus decision-making provisions in a commission lower the likelihood of conflict recurrence.

Institutional design: role in monitoring and verification, commissions and peace

Monitoring and verification are vital elements of peacemaking and peacebuilding. It is crucial that processes such as the monitoring of ceasefires and the demobilization of combatants are verified. In the absence of credible supervision and verification of such processes, conflict parties will find it incredibly difficult to move away from conflict postures, due to the associated vulnerabilities (Walter, 2002). This can be carried out exclusively by international actors, usually but not solely through the deployment of international peacekeepers (Fortna and Howard, 2008; Walter, 1997, 1999). However, many commissions play a key role in monitoring and verification. This can relate to supervising the completion of security-related processes such as demobilization but it can also address the implementation of other aspects of peace agreements, or agreements as a whole. The use of commissions to overcome credible commitment problems related to the implementation of peace agreements directly connects to the use of commissions to overcome credible commitment problems in non-conflict environments. The work of the above-mentioned IMC in Northern Ireland was key in this regard. By verifying the reduction in IRA activity, the commission was able to create an environment where the British and Irish governments could push the local Northern Ireland parties to re-establish the political institutions provided for in the peace agreements after a suspension of over four years which was an ongoing threat to peace (Walsh, 2024). Overcoming the security dilemma is a necessary condition to build peace and prevent the reoccurrence of conflict. This leads us to propose the following:

Hypothesis 4: The establishment of commissions mandated to monitor or verify aspects of the peace process lowers the likelihood of conflict recurrence.

Research design

Our unit of analysis is post-conflict years, and we consider each year as a distinct unit measuring whether there is a conflict present (=1) or not (=0). Commencing our analysis from the conclusion of the final conflict year, we extend our examination until 2018. Given the propensity of many countries to experience multiple civil wars (as highlighted by Caplan, 2019), our data encompass numerous failed peace attempts, contributing to a comprehensive understanding of the challenges faced in post-conflict scenarios.

Our assessment of conflict recurrences relies on data from the Uppsala Conflict Data Program (UCDP)/Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO) dataset of conflicts,⁴ offering a comprehensive foundation for our investigation.

For our main explanatory variables, we use the ICPCS dataset. Covering the years 1990 to 2016, this dataset comprises information on 580 commissions, offering a robust basis for our in-depth exploration into the dynamics of post-conflict scenarios. This dataset focuses on commissions established as part of peace agreements. We expect that commissions established in these circumstances will have a specific impact on the non-recurrence of violence as they help to overcome the challenges associated with ending a conflict through negotiation and compromise. However, an area for further research may be what role commissions play in preventing conflict from emerging and if they can effectively be used where a conflict ends in victory for one party.

To elucidate, we employ the following variables to gauge our five crucial independent variables:

Domestic actor inclusion within a commission: are domestic actors included in the commission? (a) Number of domestic actors. Count variable on the number of included actors; (b) Dummy Yes = 1 No = 0. This count and dummy variable are based on DOMMEMCOM: commitment to include other communities, religious, linguistic or ethnic groups; DOMMEMEXP: commitment to member or members having expertise; DOMMEMINDIV: commitment to included named other individual; DOMMEMORG: commitment to include member from other named organizations or institution; DOMMEMSECT: commitment to included named sectors of society; DOMMEMDIVER: general commitment to inclusivity or diversity reflecting society.

International involvement in the commission: Are international actors involved in the commission? (a) Extent of international involvement. Count variable on the number of international involvements in a commission; (b) Dummy for international involvement. Yes= = 1 No = 0. INTERCHAIR: stipulation for international chair; INTERMEM: stipulation for international member; INTEROBS: stipulation for international observer; INTERASSIT: stipulation for international assistance; INTERFIN: stipulation for international financial assistance; INTERTECH: stipulation for international technical assistance.

Consensus decision making in the commission: CONSEN: rule requiring consensus decision-making. Yes = 1 No = 0.

Monitoring and verification: MONIT/VERF: does the commission supervise or verify conformity with the peace agreement? (As a whole or specific elements.) Dummy variable where Yes = 1 and No = 0.

Additional to our main variables of interest, we incorporate common controls for life expectancy at birth (total years), revised combined polity score for political institutions, cumulative conflict intensity, peacekeeping operation in place, conflict length in days,⁵ time since last civil war (and three natural cubic splines (Beck et al., 1998)) based on the dependent variable in our analysis.⁶

As we want to investigate the likelihood of another conflict occurring (as opposed to modelling the peace duration), we employ a binary time-series cross-sectional probit regression with natural cubic splines (instead of a survival analysis) a method commonly used in conflict studies (e.g. Neudorfer and Theuerkauf, 2014). This method models the relationship between time and conflict recurrence while accounting for post-conflict contextual factors. We used clustered standard errors, with conflict identity (ID) as the cluster variable, to address correlations within countries such as Sudan, South Sudan and Colombia, where commissions are common. This approach adjusts for intragroup correlation, increasing standard error size but ensuring cautious statistical conclusions.

Empirical results

We propose that the institutional design of independent commissions, established in post-conflict societies, is crucial and serves as a significant factor in preventing the recurrence of conflicts. Before examining the detailed components of the institutional design of commissions and the effect this has on conflict incidence, we first run a baseline model to assess the impact of the presence of a commission on the likelihood of conflict incidences. These results are presented in Model 1 of Table 1. Our findings indicate that conflict-affected countries with a peace agreement that establishes an independent commission have a statistically significant lower probability of experiencing a conflict incidence. The marginal effect reported in Model 1 of Table 1 suggests that independent commissions reduce the likelihood of a conflict incidence by 6.8%, with a confidence interval ranging from −12.5% to 1.1%. These results clearly demonstrate that commissions play a crucial role in post-conflict societies (as has already been shown by, for instance, Fontana et al. (2021)). But what institutional designs are most effective in maximizing their impact? Our four hypotheses propose different dimensions of institutional design that may influence the likelihood of conflict recurrence. The following sections will outline these results in detail, exploring which features make commissions most effective in reducing conflict incidences in post-conflict settings.

Table 1.

Analysing the incidences of conflict using commissions in general, domestic actors and international involvement using probit analysis.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4	Model 5
Commission (present = 1 or not = 0)	−0.53* (0.23)
Domestic actor inclusion		0.21(0.41)
Domestic actor inclusion (dummy) = 1			0.01(0.55)
International involvement				−0.20* (0.10)
International involvement(Dummy) = 1					−0.48+(0.27)
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)	0.02(0.01)	0.02+(0.01)	0.02+(0.01)	0.02(0.01)	0.02+(0.01)
Revised combined polity score	−0.01(0.02)	−0.02(0.02)	−0.02(0.02)	−0.02(0.02)	−0.02(0.02)
Cumulative conflict intensity = 1	−1.25** (0.34)	−1.29** (0.35)	−1.29** (0.35)	−1.22** (0.35)	−1.24** (0.35)
Peacekeeping operation in place = 1	−0.53(0.35)	−0.80** (0.29)	−0.80** (0.29)	−0.53(0.37)	−0.57+(0.34)
Conflict length in days	0.00(0.00)	0.00(0.00)	0.00(0.00)	0.00(0.00)	0.00(0.00)
Time since last civil war	−0.40** (0.05)	−0.40** (0.05)	−0.39** (0.05)	−0.38** (0.05)	−0.39** (0.05)
(peaceyrs-k1) cubed	−0.00(0.00)	−0.00(0.00)	−0.00(0.00)	−0.00(0.00)	−0.00(0.00)
(peaceyrs-k2) cubed	−0.00** (0.00)	−0.00** (0.00)	−0.00** (0.00)	−0.00** (0.00)	−0.00** (0.00)
(peaceyrs-k3) cubed	0.00** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)
Observations	1106	1106	1106	1106	1106
Countries	160	160	160	160	160
Margins for commission (institutions) LC	−.125	−0.080	−0.137	−0.050	−0.158
Margins for commission (institutions)	−.068	0.027	0.002	−0.026	−0.071
Margins for commission (institutions) HC	−.011	0.135	0.141	−0.001	0.015
Pseudo R²	0.379	0.364	0.364	0.379	0.377
LR²	149	148	149	156	145
Count R²	0.91	0.90	0.90	0.90	0.90
Adjusted McFadden R²	0.35	0.34	0.34	0.35	0.35
AIC	544	556	556	544	546

Note: +significant at 10; *significant at 5; **significant at 1. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Estimations performed using Stata 18. Constant suppressed from output.

LC: lower confidence bound; HC: higher confidence bound for marginal effect; AIC: Akaike information criterion.

Hypothesis 1 posits that rules requiring the incorporation of domestic actors beyond the primary conflict parties within an independent commission would diminish the likelihood of conflict recurrence. However, as Table 1 demonstrates, the provision for the inclusion of domestic actors, whether assessed as a count variable (Model 2) – counting the number of domestic actors involved in the commission – or a binary indicator (Model 3) – whether there are any domestic actors or not, fails to demonstrate a statistically significant reduction in the likelihood of future conflicts. The marginal effects in Table 1 and Figure 1 reinforce the same conclusion: mandating the incorporation of domestic actors in an independent commission is not associated with the recurrence of civil wars where the marginal effects for the count variable range between −0.080 and 0.135 (Figure 1) and for the dummy variable ranging from −0.137 to 0.141.

Figure 1.

Marginal effects plots for Models 1 and 3 of Table 1 and Models 1–3 of Table 2.

Table 2.

Analysing the incidences of conflict when consensus and simple majority decision making is present or the commission works on monitoring or verification using probit analysis.

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3
Consensus decision-making = 1	−1.27* (0.59)
Simple majority = 1		−0.37(0.39)
Commission working on monitoring andverification topics = 1			−0.51* (0.25)
Life expectancy at birth, total (years)	0.02+(0.01)	0.02+(0.01)	0.02+(0.01)
Revised combined polity score	−0.02(0.02)	−0.02(0.02)	−0.02(0.02)
Cumulative conflict intensity = 1	−1.29** (0.35)	−1.27** (0.35)	−1.27** (0.34)
Peacekeeping operation in place = 1	−0.80** (0.29)	−0.78** (0.29)	−0.59+(0.34)
Conflict length in days	0.00(0.00)	0.00(0.00)	0.00(0.00)
Time since last civil war	−0.40** (0.05)	−0.39** (0.05)	−0.39** (0.05)
(peaceyrs-k1) cubed	−0.00(0.00)	−0.00(0.00)	−0.00(0.00)
(peaceyrs-k2) cubed	−0.00** (0.00)	−0.00** (0.00)	−0.00** (0.00)
(peaceyrs-k3) cubed	0.00** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)	0.00** (0.00)
Observations	1106	1106	1106
Countries	160	160	160
Margins (Consens/Simple/Monitoring/Verification) LC	−0.597	−0.189	−0.161
Margins (Consens/Simple/Monitoring/Verification)	−0.266	−0.057	−0.077
Margins (Consens/Simple/Monitoring/Verification) HC	0.065	0.075	0.007
Pseudo R²	0.368	0.365	0.378
LR²	146	163	137
Count R²	0.90	0.90	0.90
Adjusted McFadden R²	0.34	0.34	0.35
AIC	553	555	545

Note:+significant at 10; *significant at 5; **significant at 1. Clustered standard errors are in parentheses. Estimations performed using Stata 18. Constant suppressed from output.

LC: lower confidence bound; HC: higher confidence bound for marginal effect; AIC: Akaike information criterion.

Even upon careful disaggregation of this variable into the original subcategories (other communities, expertise, named individual, name organization or named sector of society), no discernible impact emerges (Table A.1 – see online Appendix). Further analysis into the marginal effects of domestic actors on conflict recurrence within specific settings reveals that, despite our thorough investigation, these remain statistically insignificant. Our findings underscore the complexity of the relationship between domestic actor inclusion in independent commissions and the mitigation of conflict recurrence. It could be the case that inclusion makes reaching decisions more difficult mitigating some of the benefits of commissions. However, it may also be the case that inclusion occurs without rules mandating this (see Lorenz, 2025) or that inclusion modes outside commissions membership, such as consultations, are more effective (Cuhadar and Druckman, 2025; Elfversson and Nilsson, 2022).

Our second hypothesis analyses the role of international involvement in independent commissions and its potential impact on conflict recurrence, predicting that countries with commissions featuring international involvement are less likely to experience conflict recurrence. Our findings (Tables 1 and A.2 in the online Appendix) reveal a compelling relationship: international involvement significantly diminishes the likelihood of civil war recurrence (Models 4 and 5 in Table 1, Figure 1). This effect is particularly robust when international involvement is operationalized as a variable representing the count of international involvements, ranging from zero (no international involvement) to six (the theoretical maximum, but, in reality, the maximum value achieved in the observed data is three components of international involvement in any post-conflict event). Of the six components of international involvement, it is the international chair in an independent commission that is driving the results. When disaggregating international involvement into its components, the international chair is the only component of international involvement that remains statistically significant at the conventional level of significance of 95% (Model 2, Table A.2).

Our third hypothesis predicts that consensus decision-making provisions within a commission reduce the likelihood of conflict recurrence. Our results suggest that consensus decision-making statistically significantly reduces the recurrence of war in a peace process (Model 1, Table 2). The marginal effect provides a point estimate of −26.6%, with a range from −59.7% to 6.5% (see Figure 1), suggesting that consensus decision-making reduces conflict recurrence by 26.6%. This effect is comparable in strength to the impact of cumulative conflict intensity and peacekeeping operations (see coefficient plot (Jann, 2013), Figure 2).

Figure 2.

Coefficient plots for Models 2 and 4 of Table 1 and Model 1 to 3 of Table 2.

In Hypothesis 4, we examine the impact of commissions tasked with monitoring or verifying aspects of the peace process on conflict recurrence. The analysis reveals a statistically significant effect: such commissions play a crucial role in reducing the likelihood of civil war recurrence. These findings highlight the importance of monitoring and verification commissions in effective peacebuilding strategies. Notably, the coefficient size is relatively strong compared to cumulative conflict intensity, peacekeeping operations, wealth and political institutions (Figure 2).

Robustness checks

In our robustness section, we complement our probit estimation using bootstrapping (Tables A.2–A.7) and pooled ordinary least squares regression (Tables A.8–A.12), ensuring a comprehensive examination of our research question. The results remain robust according to the robustness definition of Sala-i-Martin (1997), meaning they retain the same coefficient signed. Results can be found in the online Appendix.

The degree of societal division may impact the establishment and effectiveness of commissions in preventing civil war recurrence. To address this, we included ethnic fractionalization as a control variable and an instrument in instrumental variables (IV) regression, assuming diverse societies adopt different institutions. Ethnic fractionalization, a common control in conflict studies (e.g. De Soysa and Fjelde, 2010; Fearon and Laitin, 2003), bolstered our findings, which remained robust (Table A.13), suggesting conservative original estimates. However, the ethnic fractionalization variable itself is not statistically significant, so we retained our main model. Additionally, none of the IV regressions (Models 1–5, Table A.14) reached statistical significance (p > .05), confirming the reliability of our models without corrective measures like instrumental variables.

We added a control variable for additional institutional conditions linked to independent commissions. The baseline model included a dummy for commission presence, and the robustness test accounted for factors like domestic actors, decision-making mechanisms and monitoring roles. Direct inclusion of the baseline variable risked double-counting (e.g. international involvement in both Models 1 and 4). Results remain robust (Table A.15).

Conclusion

Preventing conflict recurrence after peace agreements is a key challenge. Institutional design research often focuses on executives and legislatures, whereas inclusion studies emphasize negotiation processes, overlooking commissions. This article develops a theory on commissions, analysing their global role. Findings show that commissions address peacebuilding challenges by fostering collaboration, resolving commitment issues, reducing decision-making costs and enhancing task capacity. Their flexible design offers policymakers actionable guidance on effective structures.

It is highly surprising that rules for domestic inclusion beyond the conflict parties are not associated with higher levels of the non-recurrence of violence. This runs counter to research which has found that wider domestic inclusion helps build peace. However, the relatively low status of some such domestic actors may limit the effectiveness of the relevant commissions in providing credible commitments, in line with Walsh’s (2017) findings on the Consultative Group on the Past in Northern Ireland noted above. Similarly, Bramble and Ross (2025) underline the difficulty inclusive commissions face in having an impact. This underlines two interconnected considerations for policymakers. Firstly, when choosing whom to include it is important to ensure that, overall, a commission has the status necessary to credibly complete its task and withstand likely criticism. This can be done either by appointing domestic members who enjoy high status or by combining their involvement with high-status internationals (see below). Secondly, the ability of commissions to be successful depends not only on their work but also on how others respond and engage. It is likely commissions will face criticism as they complete challenging tasks. Having high status can help protect commissions from such attacks. Status can be bolstered through expertise, as well as local and international reputation. Two potential avenues for exploration are, firstly, whether this form of inclusion can effect other outcomes of interest aside from non-recurrence of violence (see Murphy, 2024) and, secondly, whether other forms of inclusion, such as consultation, but short of membership of a commission, are more effective ways of including such groups in commissions (see Cuhadar and Druckman, 2025).

The inclusion of internationals, particularly as commission chairs, is strongly linked to preventing violence recurrence, as they provide credible commitments in peace processes. Similarly, commissions focused on monitoring and verification support non-recurrence, emphasizing the importance of credibility. Consensus decision-making rules also enhance legitimacy and ease compromises, suggesting that decision-making methods may be more critical to commission effectiveness than broad domestic inclusion, despite the normative appeal of inclusivity. Overall, the findings highlight that commission design significantly influences violence prevention, especially in prolonged high-conflict settings, underscoring the importance of careful structural planning in such contexts.

In taking these findings forward, scholars may focus on a number of connected areas. Firstly, the impact of forms of inclusion other than commission membership should be analysed, including formal advisory roles, consultations and public meetings. Secondly, how inclusion affects outcomes aside from conflict recurrence should be explored. Although conflict recurrence is a key outcome of interest for scholars of peace and conflict, other outcomes such as levels of development, democracy and reconciliation are also important parts of the wider peace and conflict dynamics. Finally, examining when different forms of inclusion occur, especially in the absence of rules requiring it, will shed invaluable light on the circumstances in which commissions can be part of an inclusive peace process.

Supplemental Material

sj-docx-1-ips-10.1177_01925121241310858 – Supplemental material for The peacemaking role of independent commissions: The role of institutional design

Supplemental material, sj-docx-1-ips-10.1177_01925121241310858 for The peacemaking role of independent commissions: The role of institutional design by Natascha S Neudorfer and Dawn Walsh in International Political Science Review

Footnotes

Acknowledgements

The authors are grateful to the participants of the International Studies Association conference 2023 as well as of a workshop on independent commissions in post-conflict societies, held in Dublin in March 2024, for their valuable feedback and insightful comments on earlier drafts of this article.

Funding

The authors disclosed receipt of the following financial support for the research, authorship and/or publication of this article: This work was supported by the Irish Research Council Grant reference: IRCLA/2017/185

ORCID iDs

Natascha S. Neudorfer

Dawn Walsh

Supplemental material

Supplemental material for this article is available online.

Notes

Author biographies

Natascha S Neudorfer is a professor of political economy at the University of Düsseldorf and affiliate at the University of Birmingham, UK. She specializes in how economic conditions interact with formal and informal political institutions, and how this affects corruption levels and the likelihood of civil war or civil war recurrence. She has a keen interest in measurement problems and quantitative research designs (inferential statistics and machine learning) as well as mixed-method research designs. She is commissioning editor for International Affairs and associate editor for Journal of Global Security Studies.

Dawn Walsh is an assistant professor in the School of Politics and International Relations, and director of the Centre for Peace and Conflict Research at University College Dublin. She is the author of two monographs: Independent Commissions and Contentious Issues in Post-Good Friday Agreement (2017) and Territorial Self-Government as a Conflict Management Tool (2018). Her works has also been published in a number of journals including the Journal of Peace Research, Third World Quarterly and Federal and Regional Studies. Her research interests include the creation of inclusive institutions to manage conflict, the implementation of peace agreements, and Northern Ireland politics.

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