Explaining changes in women’s representation in peace processes: The adoption of a gender quota in the Agreement Monitoring Committee in Mali

Abstract

Dynamics of inclusion and exclusion in peace processes have in recent years received increasing attention in research and among policymakers and practitioners. Much of this attention has focused on inclusion in peace negotiations, whereas inclusion in post-agreement commissions or committee-type institutions has received limited attention despite the key role they play in peacebuilding. This article offers an in-depth exploration and process tracing of the introduction of a gender quota in the Agreement Monitoring Committee in Mali. It argues that changes in women’s representation in post-agreement committees in peace processes become possible when critical actors perform their work in the context of international gender equality norms and women’s mobilization. Based on analysis of documents and interviews with key actors involved in the peace process, it finds that critical actors use political accumulation, collaboration with women’s activists, and altering of the institutional environment to effect gender-based policy changes in peace processes.

Introduction

Researchers have studied the adoption of gender quotas and increases in women’s political representation worldwide, including in transitional and post-conflict settings (e.g. Abbas, 2010; Affi, 2021; Burnet, 2011; Childs and Krook, 2008; Dahlerup and Freidenvall, 2005; Hughes and Tripp, 2015; Tripp, 2015). There exists, however, limited research on the adoption of gender quotas in post-agreement commissions or committees in peace processes, despite the key role these play in peacebuilding. Through an in-depth case study and process tracing of the introduction of a gender quota in the Agreement Monitoring Committee (Comité de suivi de l’accord (CSA)) in Mali, this article seeks to answer the following research question: How can we explain changes in women’s representation in post-agreement committees in peace processes?

In November 2020, the level of women’s representation in the CSA increased from 0% to 30%. The CSA was the highest decision-making body in the Algiers peace process that lasted from 2015 to 2023, where representatives of the former conflict parties met regularly to decide on details regarding the implementation of the Agreement for Peace and Reconciliation in Mali (Algiers Agreement) signed in 2015. Given that previous campaigns for women’s inclusion in Mali’s peace process had largely been met with resistance or stalling, and rarely resulted in women’s direct participation (Boutellis and Zahar, 2017; Lorentzen, 2020), the introduction of a gender quota surprised many observers. Further, although there are examples of peace processes (e.g. in Colombia and Northern Ireland) where women’s inclusion has been practised more extensively than in the Malian case, the level (the highest decision-making forum in the peace process) and the scope (from 0% to 30%) of the change in Mali makes the CSA’s introduction of a gender quota a unique event in the context of women’s inclusion in peace processes, warranting in-depth exploration.

In 2012, a coup d’état and an insurgency in Northern Mali threw the country into a deep political and humanitarian crisis. To regain control of major cities in the north, France intervened with the military operation Serval in spring 2013. The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was deployed in July 2013. ¹ In June 2013, ceasefire negotiations were held in Burkina Faso. These were followed by peace negotiations in 2014–2015 in Algiers, resulting in the 2015 Algiers Agreement between the Malian government and two non-state rebel coalitions, the Coordination des Mouvements de l’Azawad (hereafter Coordination) and the Plateforme. From the start, observers noted that the negotiations were characterized by the exclusion of marginalized groups and civil society, and very few women participated in the delegations (Boutellis and Zahar, 2017). Civil society hearings took place during the second round of negotiations but were set up as a parallel forum and perceived by many as lacking influence on the actual negotiations (Lorentzen, 2020).

The Algiers Agreement established several mechanisms to facilitate its implementation, including the Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration Commission; the National Council on Security Sector Reform; the Truth, Justice, and Reconciliation Commission; and the CSA. From the outset, women remained marginalized in these mechanisms (Lorentzen, 2017). The CSA was established through Article 57 of the agreement to coordinate, monitor and control the agreement’s timely and effective implementation. In addition to the main committee, the CSA had four subcommissions covering political and institutional issues, defence and security, development, and justice and reconciliation. Upon its establishment, it was composed of the three parties to the agreement, who were each asked to nominate six full representatives and four alternates, and an international mediation team (known as the Mediation), which included Algeria (leader of the Mediation), the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), the African Union, the United Nations (UN), the European Union, the Organization of Islamic Cooperation, Burkina Faso, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Chad, France and the United States. Algeria was president of the CSA, while the secretariat was headed by MINUSMA (Ambassade d’Algérie à Bamako, 2015).

The CSA was to conduct its ordinary meetings once a month. Decisions were to be taken by consensus, and, in the event of divergence, the Mediation would propose a solution for adoption by the parties (Ambassade d’Algérie à Bamako, 2015). Any decision to change the composition of the CSA thus needed to be unanimously agreed by the parties. The decision to adopt a gender quota was taken during the CSA’s February 2020 meeting, and in June 2020 the parties submitted their nominations for nine women representatives for the main committee, three from each party. The women representatives attended their first CSA meeting on 16 November 2020 (interviews, Bamako, 2022).

Understanding what produces changes in actors’ preferences and behaviour at the micro level is crucial if we want to identify meaningful strategies for women’s inclusion in post-agreement committees in peace processes. This article provides an in-depth exploration and interpretive process tracing (Norman, 2021) of the key events, actors and factors that preceded the introduction of a gender quota in the CSA. In so doing, it contributes to advancing our theoretical and empirical understanding of changes in women’s representation in post-agreement committees in peace processes and speaks directly to the questions addressed in this special issue (Walsh and Neudorfer, 2025). The analysis is based on 18 interviews with key actors who were involved in or supported the peace process and women’s participation in it, documents detailing important steps and events in the process, and the UN Security Council’s mandates for MINUSMA for the period 2013–2023.

The article begins with a description of the method and data, before situating its contribution within existing research and outlining the theoretical framework. A theory of gendered policy change in post-agreement committees in peace processes is presented, which posits that policy change becomes possible through the work of critical actors when two initial conditions are met: (a) the existence of international gender equality norms, along with international pressure to promote them; and (b) women’s mobilization, including women’s activists’ use of international frameworks to advocate for gender-based reforms. The process tracing and analysis that follows first documents the existence of the two enabling conditions in the Malian case. It then analyses the work of critical actors in the Malian peace process, showing how they used political accumulation, collaboration with women’s activists, and efforts to alter the institutional environment to affect gendered policy change in the CSA.

Method and data

This article uses interpretive process tracing (IPT) (Norman, 2021) to analyse and explain changes related to the adoption of a gender quota and an increase in women’s representation in the CSA. Process tracing can be defined as an ‘in-depth empirical investigation using different types of data-gathering methods and procedures’ (Vennesson, 2008: 229). While process tracing is often used as a within-case method for measuring and testing hypothesized causal links (Bennett and Checkel, 2015: 3), IPT accounts ‘for how changes in intersubjective worlds play into our causal explanations of well-specified outcomes’ (Norman, 2021: 951). The interpretive framework is appropriate when the researcher is working with a lower level of abstraction, and when the goal is to provide an explanation of a particular case, which in turn can contribute to refinement of existing theories (Vennesson, 2008: 227).

The data collection and analysis for this article aimed to identify the key actors, events and factors that contributed to the outcome in the case examined – the introduction of a gender quota in the CSA. This includes 18 interviews with international and Malian actors in Bamako and New York in 2022 and 2023 (13 women, 7 men), including women who sat on the CSA representing the conflict parties and their male colleagues, several documents that map important steps in the process obtained during fieldwork, and the UN Security Council’s mandates for MINUSMA for the period 2013–2023. ² More details of method, data (including lists of interviews and documents), analysis, positionality and research ethics are available in the online supplementary material.

Increases in women’s political representation in transitional and post-conflict settings

Previous literature shows that we often see the adoption of gender-based policy reforms and increases in women’s political representation in transitional and post-conflict settings (Abbas, 2010; Affi, 2021; Anderson, 2016; Berry, 2015; Burnet, 2011; Hughes and Tripp, 2015; Medie, 2022; Tripp, 2015). Violent conflict and ensuing political transitions are thus understood to provide a window of opportunity for women’s increased representation. Additionally, the changes happen relatively fast in comparison with incremental developments in women’s representation in, for example, the Scandinavian countries in the 1970s (Dahlerup and Freidenvall, 2005; Tripp and Kang, 2008).

International gender equality norms, including gender quotas, are often promoted by international actors as part of democracy promotion and liberal peace interventions (Bush, 2011; Raven-Roberts, 2005). Bush (2011) found that the adoption of gender quotas was significantly related to the presence of a UN peace operation and whether a country received international aid, arguing that developing countries are encouraged to adopt gender quotas to signal their commitment to democracy. Similar patterns can also be seen in studies of post-conflict settings in Africa, where changes in women’s representation in the 1990s coincided with a new international discourse supporting active measures to increase women’s representation (Tripp, 2015). Tripp (2015) shows how international pressure and the support of international actors helped the Ugandan and Liberian women’s movements in their campaigns for gender-based reforms. In Rwanda, the women’s movement also used global gender norms in its efforts to insert gender-specific demands in the post-genocide period (Mageza-Barthel, 2015).

Women’s mobilization is also widely understood to be related to women’s rights reforms, including the adoption of gender quotas. For example, Abbas (2010) details how the Sudanese women’s movement’s efforts contributed to the enactment of gender quotas in Sudan’s National Assembly and Legislative Councils in 2008. Further, Affi (2021) shows the important role of Somali women’s struggle for political participation. Despite setbacks and opposition, women have continued to fight for increased representation and the implementation of gender quotas at the national level. Tripp’s (2015: chapter 8) work on Liberia and Uganda also demonstrates similar dynamics of women’s mobilization leading to gender-based reforms and increased representation for women in politics in the aftermath of civil conflict. Similarly, in her study of the adoption of women’s rights policies in Niger, Kang (2015: 3) argues that both civil society mobilization and the domestic political context are key to understanding the adoption of women’s rights policies.

Based on existing research, international gender equality norms, along with international pressure to promote and implement them, and women’s domestic and transnational mobilization, including women’s activists’ use of international frameworks to advocate for gender-based reforms, emerge as important explanatory factors for changes in women’s representation in post-conflict settings. But how does such change come about in peace processes, and how does it translate into specific measures (such as the adoption of a gender quota) in post-agreement committees such as the CSA? The research reviewed above focuses on gender-based reforms and women’s increased legislative representation after conflict. This article builds on that research to study changes in women’s representation in committees in peace processes. The following section outlines a theoretical framework for analysing the micro-level processes that cause powerful actors to change their preferences and behaviour concerning women’s representation in post-agreement committees in peace processes.

Theorizing changes in women’s representation in post-agreement committees in peace processes: The role of critical actors

In analysing changes in women’s representation in post-agreement committees in peace processes, this article uses a broad conceptualization of peace processes as intersecting networks of local, regional and international participants that connect the ‘international’ and the ‘local’, the formal and the informal, and high-level encounters with parallel processes and networks. This understanding of how different actors interact in peace processes is informed by anthropological research that conceptualizes peace processes as intersecting, often informal, networks. This research argues in favour of a contextualized understanding of how participants in peace processes are connected to, and embedded in, local political, social, cultural and economic networks and spheres (Meininghaus, 2021: 329).

Research on women’s inclusion in peace processes distinguishes between descriptive representation (presence) and substantive representation (influence), and between direct and indirect forms of participation (Ellerby, 2016; Paffenholz, 2018). Direct forms of participation include involvement as mediators and negotiators, as civil society representatives and as members of mediation or negotiation teams, whereas indirect forms of participation often take place through some form of consultations, such as consultative forums or civil society hearings (Mendes, 2019; Paffenholz, 2018). This article focuses on women’s descriptive representation and direct participation as representatives of the conflict parties who have been nominated through the adoption of a quota in Track 1 processes, understood as high-level negotiations between official representatives (Lederach, 1997).

The literature on women’s political representation and critical mass has identified the role of critical actors as crucial for understanding women’s representation and the adoption of women-friendly policies (Childs and Krook, 2009; Thomson, 2018). Critical actors are understood as actors who initiate policy proposals or stimulate others to support and/or promote women-friendly policies. They can be both women and men, which underscores the important roles men can play in advancing policies for women, particularly in contexts where women’s representation has not reached a ‘critical mass’. What sets critical actors apart from other actors is their low threshold for initiating women-friendly policy reforms. When critical actors manage to stimulate other actors to join in support for policy reforms, this can create political momentum and establish a window of opportunity for policy change, or provoke backlash or resistance from those opposed to reform (Childs and Krook, 2009: 138).

But when and how do critical actors manage to convince others to join them? And under what circumstances do they manage to sway actors that are initially opposed to reform? Based on the literature reviewed above, this article theorizes that such developments occur in committees in peace processes when critical actors perform their work in the context of international gender equality norms and women’s mobilization. The work of critical actors is enabled when these two conditions are fulfilled. Further, as will be explained below, critical actors may use political accumulation, collaboration with women’s activists, and efforts to alter the institutional environment to affect the behaviour of powerful actors in peace processes.

Paffenholz (2018: 182–188) identifies several factors in peace processes that affect women’s participation and influence, including the ability to organize around specific issues; the support/resistance of local elites, parties to the conflict and mediators; and the existence of support structures (including funding) and of international and regional women’s networks. The increased attention, expertise and funding available in many conflict and post-conflict settings are further assumed to have an impact on women’s representation. Over time, these can have an impact on women’s representation in committees in peace processes through a process of political accumulation – understood as the gradual building of political recognition of actors or issues over time (Gómez and Montealegre, 2021). Presumably, awareness raising, learning and expectations building over time may influence decision-makers to change their attitudes and behaviour. Critical actors may thus play a role in supporting and upholding this gradual building of political recognition around specific issues (such as a gender quota) over time.

Studies identify the role of women’s rights norms in supporting and driving women’s mobilization in relation to peace processes (e.g. Anderson, 2016; Lorentzen, 2021). Research has found that it is usually women’s groups, often with the support of international partners, who are behind the promotion of gender equality norms in peace processes (Anderson, 2016; Ellerby, 2016; Paffenholz, 2018; Paffenholz et al., 2016; Saiget, 2016). For example, Saiget (2016) found that cooperation between women and UN agencies during peace talks created a form of parallel diplomacy that, despite taking place outside official structures, influenced the structure, dynamics and outcome of peace negotiations. Critical actors can thus collaborate with women’s activists to convince powerful actors to change their positions.

It is also possible that support for reform becomes more attractive owing to changes in the institutional environment. In peace processes, critical actors can try to alter the institutional environment by creating more enabling conditions – for example, by creating support structures or funding (Paffenholz, 2018). However, facing increasing pressure to adapt, it can also be tempting for the opposing actors to try to manipulate the institutional environment. This can be done through genderwashing, or the promotion of gender equality with ulterior motives. Genderwashing is understood to be ‘used to help a regime appear progressive, liberal and democratic while diverting attention from its existing authoritarian practices’ (Bjarnegård and Zetterberg, 2022: 62). In the context of peace processes, the concept of genderwashing can be used to describe a situation where actors or parties promote gender equality to divert attention from lack of progress or political will, sabotage or spoiler behaviour. However, genderwashing as a diversion only works when there is a certain amount of pressure and expectations towards gender-based reform (i.e. when the two initial conditions are met).

The following analysis first addresses the two initial conditions that enable the work of critical actors in peace processes – international gender equality norms and women’s mobilization – to document that these were in place in the case under study. The second part of the analysis then details the work of critical actors in the Malian peace process and how they used political accumulation, collaboration with women’s activists, and efforts to alter the institutional environment to effect gendered policy change in the CSA.

International gender equality norms

This section focuses on the first condition that enables the work of critical actors in peace processes, demonstrating the existence of international gender equality norms and pressure to promote and implement these. Mali has a long history of international aid dependence and democracy promotion, and was until the 2012 coup d’état considered a model of democracy and a donor darling (Bergamaschi, 2014). After 2012, international presence in Mali increased notably. The UN became an important actor with the deployment of the UN peace operation MINUSMA, whose mandate focused on supporting political processes in the country, including the implementation of the peace agreement, and carrying out a number of security-related tasks.

The UN Security Council adopts the mandates for UN peacekeeping missions, which must be renewed each year. From 2016, MINUSMA’s mandate included specific actions and milestones for increasing women’s participation in the peace process to be taken by the parties and MINUSMA. References to gender and/or women in peacekeeping mandates tend to be more general than specific, and often do not make concrete requests to the conflict parties. Analysing the mentions of ‘gender’ and ‘women’ that address women’s participation in the peace process in the mandate texts, we can see that such references increased over time and gradually became more specific. The number of specific references peaked in 2020 (with seven mentions). In Figure 1, specific references include the identification of milestones, concrete actionable requests, and accountability mechanisms for women’s participation in the peace process. References to including women in the peace process or enhancing their capacity without saying how this should be done are coded as ‘general’.

Figure 1.

References to women’s participation in the peace process in MINUSMA’s mandate.

A qualitative analysis of the specific references revealed that, in addition to a quantitative increase, their quality – or specificity – also increased over time. Further, once language was inserted into the mandate, it tended to be reproduced in subsequent mandates. The specific references began in 2016 with a request to MINUSMA and the Security Council for enhanced reporting on women’s full and active participation in the implementation of the peace agreement. This request was repeated in the 2017, 2018 and 2019 mandates. In 2020, the language changed, and from 2020 to 2022 the mandate requested that, in their regular reporting on MINUSMA, the Secretary-General should pay specific attention to agreement-related targets laid out in Mali’s National Action Plan (NAP) for the implementation of UN Security Council Resolution 1325 on Women, Peace and Security.

As of 2018, the requests to include more women in the peace process went from being general to becoming more specific (saying how women’s participation should be achieved). First, in 2018, they called for greater representation of women in specific committees or bodies, including the interim authorities. Then, in 2019, the request for a 30% quota in the CSA was introduced. The 2019 mandate also called on the parties to hold a high-level workshop to identify concrete recommendations for increasing women’s representation. In 2020, the parties were asked to implement the recommendations from this high-level workshop. The 2020 mandate further repeated the request to implement a 30% quota in the CSA and urged the parties to set up an observatory led by women to oversee progress towards women’s participation in the peace process. After 2020, the number of substantive references decreased, probably because the 30% quota in the CSA had been achieved. However, the 2021 and 2022 mandates continued to call for women’s meaningful representation in the CSA subcommittees and the women’s observatory.

Women’s mobilization

This section shows how the second condition that enables the work of critical actors in peace processes was present in the Malian case. Women’s mobilization for gendered policy change and increased representation in the peace process and beyond was extensive and can be seen as a continuation of Malian women’s activists’ long history of mobilization for legal reform and increased representation. For example, Malian women played an important role in the events that preceded Mali’s democratic transition in 1991 (Ba Konaré, 1993). The 1990s saw several legal and institutional reforms, such as reform of commercial and tax laws that adversely affected the rights of women and the establishment of the Ministry for the Promotion of Women, Children, and Families (MPFEF) in 1997 (Soares, 2009).

The transition to democracy led to the establishment of a large number of women’s organizations in the country, including the Coordination des Associations et ONG Féminines du Mali (CAFO), an umbrella organization founded to serve as a link between the government and women’s organizations across the country. Over time, women’s presence in politics increased as CAFO used its networks and influence to support women candidates across Mali (Wing, 2008: 106–107). Women’s representation in government and in the National Assembly remained low, however, and a 2006 attempt to address the low representation of women in administrative and political bodies failed when the National Assembly almost unanimously rejected a proposal for the introduction of a quota system into the electoral code (Diallo, 2009: 121).

In 2015, however, the National Assembly passed a law introducing a 30% quota for female appointments to national institutions and legislative bodies. Women’s activists considered this a result of many years of struggle for electoral reform (Lorentzen, 2021). The new law did not have much impact on the peace process or the various committees established in connection with it around that time, but was implemented during the 2016 local elections (Johnson, 2019). It also impacted the number of women deputies in the National Assembly, which increased from 9.5% to 27.9% following the 2020 elections (Interparliamentary Union, 2020).

After the signing of the Algiers Agreement in 2015, women activists in Bamako began talking to the government, embassies and other partners, arguing that it was not normal that there were no women involved (Interview 14). From the outbreak of conflict, throughout the peace negotiations and in the transitional period, Malian women had to fight to be included in the peace process. Their activism was supported by many international and regional actors, such as MINUSMA and UN Women, but was often met with stalling and resistance by the parties and mediators (Boutellis and Zahar, 2017; Lorentzen, 2020).

In parallel to these developments and as the peace process advanced, women from civil society and from the conflict parties received capacity-building from UN Women and other actors. The development of National Action Plans on Women, Peace and Security (WPS) and the adoption of the new quota law in 2015 gave women tools that they could use in their campaigning. Their engagement with the peace process led to a gradual raising of awareness of rights and increasing motivation to claim those rights. For example, one of the women who sat on the CSA from 2020 to 2023 explained that

today, we know what is happening everywhere and we see that women are educated and involved in decision-making. With the conflict, we have seen that a lot of women have become the heads of households. So we have understood that women need to be involved. (Interview 14).

The work of critical actors in the peace process

During the ceasefire and peace negotiations in 2013–2015 and the subsequent transitional period (2015–2018), there was little focus on women’s inclusion, and important actors including the parties and the Mediation (particularly chief mediator Algeria) showed little interest in women’s representation (Interviews 1, 2). These actors had a lot of influence on the process, and without their endorsement it would have been difficult to achieve changes in women’s representation. However, through the work of critical actors and their efforts to engage in and support the gradual building of political recognition of actors and issues in the peace process over time (political accumulation), collaboration with women activists as well as efforts to alter the institutional environment, the adoption of a gender quota in the CSA became possible.

Political accumulation

The introduction of new language in MINUSMA’s mandates contributed to increasing political pressure and occurred in parallel with strengthened efforts to promote women’s representation among MINUSMA and other actors. As we will see, MINUSMA’s gender unit was one of the critical actors pushing for policy change. Around the time that language in MINUSMA’s mandate started changing, the gender unit hired a senior adviser, and its influence on MINUSMA’s priorities increased (Interview 18). The appointment of Joanne Adamson as Deputy Special Representative of the Secretary-General in 2018 was also important, and she can be understood to have played the role of a critical actor. When Adamson arrived in Mali, she requested that the issue of women’s representation be put on the CSA’s agenda (Interview 8) and remained committed to this issue throughout her time in MINUSMA. This was before the Security Council mandates referred to the CSA, which they only did from 2019 onwards. This indicates that causal pathways are complex: rather than simply the Security Council requesting actions that then happen, events on the ground also influenced the content of mandates.

According to several interviewees, the high-level workshop that was requested in MINUSMA’s 2019 mandate was crucial. There were multiple attempts to organize it in 2019, before it finally took place in January 2020. According to a UN representative, the workshop was discussed from 2017 onwards, but it was only when the issue made it into the mandate that it happened (Interview 18). The request further put pressure on the parties, the Mediation and MINUSMA, whose role it was to support the government (Interview 8).

The workshop was organized by the government of Mali and brought together 200 women representing women’s organizations from different regions of Mali as well as representatives from the conflict parties and the international community. Representatives of MINUSMA and UN Women were involved in facilitating the organization of the workshop. In addition, the Folke Bernadotte Academy (FBA) supported the workshop’s organization, and later played an important role providing capacity-building and support to women in the peace process, including the women appointed to the CSA (Document F, G). The workshop was well attended by Mali’s political leadership and international partners. According to one participant, ‘there were so many ambassadors there. Algeria was there, and were very present [sic], and all three of MINUSMA’s top leadership were there’ (Interview 1).

Several other meetings were also held prior to the high-level workshop (Interviews 8, 1), of which a 2018 meeting organized by MINUSMA and UN Women was seen as particularly important. According to interviewees, this was where the idea of a women’s observatory was first formulated, which later appeared in the 2020 mandate. The international partners and critical actors who had supported the organization of these meetings all said that their organization had been challenging, requiring considerable mobilization and lobbying. However, they highlighted the organization of the 2020 high-level workshop as an example of good cooperation between MINUSMA (gender unit and mediation unit), UN Women and FBA (Interviews 1, 8, 18).

After the 2020 high-level workshop, MINUSMA supported the establishment of a follow-up committee, which also included the women in the CSA. The committee held monthly meetings focused on implementation of the recommendations from the high-level workshop and preparatory meetings ahead of each CSA meeting (Interview 18). Representatives from Canada, Norway and Sweden also participated, and these countries appear to have played roles as critical actors in funding and driving activities directed at promoting women’s participation in the peace process. For example, in addition to funding capacity-building and support on the ground (including several activities supported and implemented by FBA and secondment of personnel to UN Women Mali), Sweden collaborated with other member states on introducing new language on WPS in resolutions and mandates during their membership of the UN Security Council in 2017–2018 (Olsson et al., 2021).

Norway has a long-standing engagement with communities in Northern Mali, and from 2017 the Norwegian Embassy began holding regular meetings with the non-state parties. According to Norwegian diplomats, they always brought up the issue of women’s participation in these meetings (Interviews 9, 17). In 2019, the embassy invited the parties on a trip to Norway and insisted that they brought women as part of their delegations. The participants travelled around Norway, visited important democratic institutions and discussed topics related to governance. In addition, the parties received considerable support and capacity-building over time. Interviewees observed that the non-state parties were ‘trained in WPS language’ (Interviews 13, 18).

Between 2017 and 2022, a shift in the attention to the topic of women’s inclusion can be observed, from only a few international actors showing interest in the topic, to an increase in the number of meetings and activities, funded and attended by a larger number of actors (fieldwork observations and interviews, Bamako, 2017–2022). As the political pressure mounted, even the chief mediator, Algeria, which had never viewed the issue as a priority, started to see the exclusion of women as a problem that needed to be solved (Interview 1). As more actors decided to support the promotion of women’s inclusion, the parties’ exposure to the topic also increased.

Collaboration with women’s activists

Many of the activities described above that were supported by critical actors also involved women’s activists or women representing the parties to the peace process, and were important meeting spaces for women’s activists and international partners. At the 2018 meeting, women from the non-state parties and civil society came up with a plan for how to work towards the inclusion of women in the peace process (Interviews 1, 14), and the 2020 workshop resulted in a list of recommendations (Document D). During these meetings, women’s activists wanted to focus on direct participation. However, international partners admitted in interviews that they did not think this would become a possibility: ‘The women wanted to focus on formal inclusion, but at the time we [international partners] all told them that it is never going to work’ (Interview 1).

Women from civil society and those representing the non-state parties should both be considered critical actors. In Mali, women representing armed groups sometimes find themselves in a difficult position when they are expected to represent both the interests of their respective group and those of ‘women’ (Interview 6). However, women from civil society and women representing the non-state parties attended many of the same meetings and trainings and collaborated on joint recommendations. On these occasions, they also collaborated with other critical actors, who noted: ‘We helped them look at it as “women” ’ (Interview 18).

Over time, women leaders thus built networks and alliances with different international partners and lobbied within their own groups (interviews, Bamako, 2022). This sustained activism over time was highlighted by the international partners interviewed, who emphasized the role of women’s activism as a contributing factor and said that the women became better at expressing their needs and understanding their contributions to and roles in peacemaking (Interview 16).

Altering the institutional environment

The removal by critical actors supportive of women’s inclusion of obstacles and counter-arguments also contributed to the creation of an enabling environment. In an effort to demonstrate that there existed qualified female candidates and to address potential counter-arguments to the contrary, Norway hired a consultant to vet and rank women candidates for the CSA (Interviews 2, 9, 17; Document B). The extensive capacity-building that several critical actors were involved in also sought to address counter-arguments concerning women’s qualifications. Another obstacle was money, as members of the CSA received financial compensation for their work on the committee. The parties claimed they did not have the money to pay additional women representatives. Faced with this, Norway offered to pay for the ‘salaries’ of the women, effectively removing this counter-argument (Interviews 2, 14, 17). With the financial issue resolved, a gender quota meant a de facto expansion of the CSA, as each party would appoint three new (female) representatives. Expanding the membership rather than replacing men with women thus made the introduction of the gender quota a less politically challenging issue.

At this point, the benefits of supporting the gender quota may have begun to outweigh the costs of opposing it. Since it implied opportunities to increase their representation, expansion also created new incentives for the parties, especially for the non-state parties, among whom internal competition and fragmentation were recurring issues and who, according to one interviewee, ‘instrumentalize gender for patronage and see it as a way they can “put more people here” ’ (Interview 13). Having more people in this case also meant a possibility to obtain more money. According to one interviewee, the salaries were quite generous, and ‘when the parties realized that, they said “three women are not enough” ’ (Interview 18).

A male representative of one of the non-state parties who was also a member of the CSA explained that, in the beginning, they were not aware of the need to include women, since the quota was not planned for in the agreement (Interview 11). The non-state parties further referred to the government as the party that was resisting or blocking the inclusion of women (Interviews 10, 15). Others described resistance to women’s participation from the parties, as well as from key actors such as MINUSMA and chief mediator Algeria. One western diplomat explained how, in meetings, the parties said that if they were going to include women, they would also have to include young people, people with disabilities and other minorities, ‘so it was not easy to achieve’ (Interview 9). According to diplomats in Bamako, the non-state parties also used internal fragmentation to stall the process, by asking for more women candidates (Interviews 6, 9).

By 2022, however, it was striking how most of the actors involved, including representatives of MINUSMA’s mediation unit and the Malian non-state parties, claimed that including women in the CSA had been their idea and something they had worked to promote. According to one male representative of the Coordination, ‘the women will tell you that they are the ones who fought for this. This is true. But the parties also requested it’ (Interview 15). Plateforme concurred, saying ‘it was “les mouvements” [the non-state parties] that asked for women’s inclusion since 2017’ (Interview 10). Finally, another Coordination representative explained that ‘the three parties decided together. MINUSMA helped put pressure on the government to accept women’s inclusion’ (Interview 11).

It is also likely that making advances on women’s participation became a way for the parties to look good in the eyes of the international community, as a form of genderwashing that would divert attention from lack of progress and political will. In the end, the arguments that some of the international actors used with the signatories were that this would appear as an effort to support and show good will towards the peace process (Interview 9). Increasing women’s representation may have been considered an easy win by the parties, who struggled to agree and make advances on many other issues and thus were under mounting pressure from an increasingly impatient international community.

Conclusion

During fieldwork in Bamako in 2022, it was striking how most of the key actors in the peace process claimed that including women in the CSA had been their idea and something they had worked to promote. How did some of the most powerful actors in this process shift their position from resistance to endorsement of women’s inclusion? This article has sought to explain the adoption of a gender quota in the CSA through an in-depth analysis and process tracing of the actors, factors and events that preceded this outcome.

The article argues that changes in women’s representation in post-agreement committees in peace processes become possible when critical actors perform their work in the context of international gender equality norms and women’s mobilization. Further, critical actors use political accumulation, collaboration with women’s activists, and efforts to alter the institutional environment to effect gender-based policy changes in peace processes.

By analysing interviews, documents and MINUSMA mandates, the article shows how in the period leading up to the adoption of the gender quota in the CSA, there was a significant and steady increase in international pressure. We can see this in the introduction of new and more specific language in MINUSMA’s mandates and in how critical actors such as MINUSMA’s leadership, its gender and mediation units, and other international partners became more vocal and active. This further contributed to the gradual building of political recognition for the issue of women’s inclusion over time. This happened through a combination of gradual increases in the number of actors and initiatives supporting and promoting women’s inclusion and the repeated exposure and learning among the parties and other key actors.

Critical actors also collaborated with and supported Malian women’s organizations and women leaders engaged in sustained activism for women’s increased representation in the peace process. Additionally, critical actors actively worked to remove counter-arguments and obstacles – for example, through funding and capacity-building. This contributed to a more enabling environment in which the benefits of supporting the gender quota began to outweigh the costs of opposing it. In sum, the combined efforts of critical actors, which occurred in a context of international gender equality norms and women’s mobilization, contributed to changes in the behaviour of key actors and made possible the adoption of a gender quota in the CSA.

By offering a theoretical and empirical exploration of how critical actors can affect the behaviour of key actors at the micro level in post-agreement committees in peace processes, this article refines and advances existing theories about changes in women’s representation in such processes. Its findings should thus be useful for policymakers and practitioners involved in supporting women’s inclusion in peace processes. A recurring criticism of international peacebuilding concerns the high number of uncoordinated and sometimes overlapping initiatives. The analysis and findings presented here, however, suggest that when critical actors manage to collaborate on reaching common goals, while also leaving enough room for initiative and entrepreneurship, this can contribute to promoting women-friendly policies.

One theme that came up in conversations and interviews was whether women had any influence on the peace process and its outcomes. This question lies outside the scope of the present article, but it will be an important topic for future research. Although the relationship between the presence and influence of women has been extensively researched in institutionalist literature on women’s representation in politics, only a few attempts to transfer and build on the insights from that literature in the context of peace processes have been made (e.g. Ellerby, 2016). Future research should investigate the relationship between women’s presence and their influence in peace processes, and whether there are certain forms of participation that are more efficient when it comes to ensuring women’s influence.

Although the adoption of a gender quota in the CSA was considered a major win at the time, since then the Algiers process has disintegrated, fighting has resumed between the parties, and MINUSMA and several other international partners have left the country. It is too early to assess the impact of women’s representation in the Algiers process on Malian women’s lives or on future processes in Mali. Nevertheless, the take-aways from Mali may carry lessons for women’s inclusion in post-agreement committees and commissions in other contexts.

Supplemental Material

sj-docx-1-ips-10.1177_01925121251323483 – Supplemental material for Explaining changes in women’s representation in peace processes: The adoption of a gender quota in the Agreement Monitoring Committee in Mali

Supplemental material, sj-docx-1-ips-10.1177_01925121251323483 for Explaining changes in women’s representation in peace processes: The adoption of a gender quota in the Agreement Monitoring Committee in Mali by Jenny Lorentzen in International Political Science Review