Abstract
In this article, we argue that a deeper understanding of citizen satisfaction with democratic elections requires a global perspective. Regional research found that a gap in satisfaction with democracy emerges after an election, between those who supported winning parties and those that did not, and also, crucially, that this gap can be reduced under proportional electoral institutions. In this article we argue instead that these theories of the winner–loser gap actually apply to only a narrow set of countries. We use a comprehensive global dataset to show that the predictions of this theory about the effects of proportional institutions are accurate for Western Europe, but not outside it. Beyond a small cluster of established democracies in Western Europe, the electoral environment is characterized by more fundamental uncertainty. This uncertainty alters the incentives created by proportional institutions. We conclude that the winner–loser gap and ‘losers’ consent’ are concepts that vary systematically around the world. We discuss the implications of this for democratic stability.
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