Abstract
How do non-governmental organizations (NGOs) affect sanction policies? Using two datasets of sanctions and NGOs, we study whether and how US-based NGOs working in a target state can influence the threat and implementation of sanctions initiated by the USA. At the threat stage, the sender government tends to perceive NGOs as a signaling device such that NGOs increase the probability of sanction threat. At the imposition stage, the presence of NGOs in a target state also increases the likelihood of a sender state imposing sanctions. In addition, the sender state tends to implement costly sanctions when NGOs have more field operations in target states. This study provides a systematic explanation of the relationship between NGOs and sanction threat and implementation.
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