Abstract
A key question in representation is how institutional settings bring about particular representational roles among legislators. In this regard, the strategic dilemma that representatives face of whether to represent all people in the district equally or, alternatively, to prioritize some area within the district, has been vastly understudied. Using innovative survey data collected in 12 European democracies, we demonstrate that a striking number of legislators favour representing the interests of their home town over the district as a whole and that the number of representatives elected by the district critically impacts their choice as to whom to represent. As district magnitude increases, an increasing number of legislators will not cater to district opinion but will prioritize the interests of a geographical sub-constituency. These findings have important implications for the study of political representation, challenging the conventional wisdom that – compared to single-seat districts – proportional representation tends not to provide geographical representation.
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